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Abstract 
The protection of minority shareholders is one of the important topics in 
company law. The two major oppression of minority shareholders are from the 
management and the majority shareholders. In this thesis, I seek to study the 
two oppression and the minority protection under the company law in Hong 
Kong and China. This thesis discusses: (i) Whether the Hong Kong common 
law system provides better protection to minority shareholders than is found in 
the Chinese civil law system? (ii) Whether the high degree of concentrated 
corporate ownership leads to the poor protection of minority shareholders in 
Hong Kong and China? (iii) What are the transplantation effects of foreign 
company laws on the protection of minority shareholders in Hong Kong and 
China? (iv) Whether the existing legal remedies to minority shareholders in 
Hong Kong and China are adequate? and (v) What are the problems of 
minority shareholders protection in Hong Kong and China? A comparative 
study of corporate governance and the protection of minority shareholders in 
Hong Kong and China is to identify the similarities and differences in the two 
systems for the purposes of legal reform. 
 
This thesis argues that mere adoption of Hong Kong common law system 
according to the legal origin theory could not improve corporate governance 
and minority shareholders protection in China; Chinese corporate governance 
and minority shareholders protection reform must include both legislative and 
structural aspects and these aspects are shaped by the initial paths according 
to the path dependence theory. This thesis argues that the high concentration 
of corporate ownership does not necessarily lead to poor legal protection of 
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shareholders in Hong Kong, and the weak protection of minority shareholders 
in China is not due to its civil law origin but its structures relating to the rule of 
law principle. This thesis examines the theoretical debates between the legal 
origin theory and the path dependence theory and applies them to Hong Kong 
and China. This thesis contends that the basic company law has already 
achieved a high degree of uniformity in Hong Kong and China and the base of 
divergence between Hong Kong and China is in the structural and institutional 
differences. 
 
This thesis argues that the success of legal transplantation and minority 
protection in Hong Kong is dependent upon its initial structures which have 
been locked-in to the current structures. This thesis concludes that the issues 
of minority shareholders protection in China are in its socialist market economy, 
state intervening policy, public ownership, relation-based tradition, rule by law 
culture, corruption practices, dominant role of the CCP and non-independent 
judiciary; and the Chinese minority protection reform, in a broader sense, 
involves not only the legislative issue but also the structural issues which relate 
to the rule of law principle. This thesis proposes that the transplantation of 
foreign company law will not necessarily improve the protection of minority 
shareholders and hence the corporate governance in China. This thesis also 
confirms that direct transplantation of foreign law is not always suitable for 
countries with less developed structures. These findings are also relevant to 
other emerging economies and developing countries in understanding the 
limitations on the use of foreign law to improve corporate governance and the 
protection of minority shareholders.  
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background 
Corporate governance and the protection of minority shareholders are popular 
and important subjects of legal research in company law.1 The purpose of this 
thesis is to present a comparative perspective of corporate governance and 
the protection of minority shareholders in Hong Kong and China. One of the 
requirements of the program is that I have to write a reflective commentary in 
my thesis analysing the significance of the legal issues explored, critically 
assessing the implications and wider context of the professional work 
undertaken, and relating the case studies to the existing body of knowledge 
within the field. There are two case studies, one from Hong Kong and one from 
China. The cases set out the background of the shareholders’ disputes, the 
differences in corporate governance, and the deficiencies of remedies to 
minority shareholders under the existing company law, and these form the 
basis of this research. The introduction to the two cases will be included in 
Chapter Five and the reflective commentary will be made in other chapters. 
 
Hong Kong and China share the same high concentration of corporate 
ownership structures; 2  however, Hong Kong is a common law system 
whereas China is a civil law system. The concentrated corporate ownership 
structures in Hong Kong and China seem to support that it is negatively related 
                                                     
1
 Low CK and Selwyn Mar, ‘Enhancing the Governance of Public Listed Companies in East 
Asia’ in Low CK (ed), Corporate Governance, An Asia-Pacific Critique (Sweet & Maxwell Asia 
2002) 606. 
2
 Goo SH and Carver Ann, Corporate Governance, The Hong Kong Debate (Sweet and 
Maxwell Asia 2003) 87; Tam On kit, ‘Ethical Issues in the Evolution of Corporate Governance 
in China’ (2002) 37(3) Journal of Business Ethics 303. 
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to shareholders’ protection in accordance with the legal origin theory.3 In this 
research, an attempt will be made to explore whether a high concentration of 
ownership necessarily leads to poor legal protection of minority shareholders 
in Hong Kong and China; whether the Hong Kong common law and corporate 
governance systems provide better protection to minority shareholders than 
that in the Chinese civil law and corporate governance systems; what are the 
deficiencies of remedies to minority shareholders under the company law in 
Hong Kong and China; what are the legal effects of transplantation of foreign 
company law on Hong Kong and China where the cultures and backgrounds 
are different; and what are the problems of corporate governance reforms in 
Hong Kong and China.  
 
The chapter is structured as follows: It starts with the background. It then 
identifies the research issues and questions. It also discusses the research 
objectives and the methodology of this research. Next, it describes the ethical 
concerns, confidentiality and outline of this research. Finally, some concluding 
remarks are offered.  
 
1.2 Research Issues  
In this thesis, I will test the two conventional legal origin theories4 that a high 
concentration of corporate ownership leads to poor legal protection of minority 
shareholders5 and the common law system provides better protection to 
                                                     
3
 La Porta Rafael and others, ‘Law and Finance’ (1998) 106(6) J Pol Econ 1152, La Porta 
Rafael and others, ‘Tunnelling’ (2001) 90(2) AER 22 and Andrei Shleifer and Robert Vishny, ‘A 
Survey of Corporate Governance’ (1997) 52 (2) J Fin 737. 
4
 La Porta Rafael and others, ‘Law and Finance’ (1998) 106(6) J Pol Econ 1113, La Porta 
Rafael and others and ‘Legal Determinants of External Finance’ (1997) 52(3) Journal of 
Finance 1131. 
5
 La Porta Rafael and others, ‘Tunnelling’ (2001) 90(2) AER 22 and Andrei Shleifer and Robert 
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minority shareholders than that in the civil law system6 in Hong Kong and 
China respectively.  Path dependence theory contends that there are two 
sources for development of corporate law and governance, namely, the 
rule-driven and structure-driven paths.7 I argue that the issues of corporate 
governance and minority shareholders protection could not be solved by mere 
legal transplantation; it must be solved in a local context; and shall include both 
legislation and structures changes and these are shaped by the initial paths 
according to the path dependence theory. To this end, I will examine the 
legislative and the structural paths in regard to corporate governance in Hong 
Kong and China. I will also examine company law and corporate governance 
theories to explain the different legal effects on transplantation of foreign 
company law into Hong Kong and China and the justification of legal 
intervention on the protection of minority shareholders. The purpose of this 
thesis is to study the corporate governance and minority shareholders 
protection by examining how the interests of minority shareholders are 
protected in Hong Kong and China. The comparative research aims to make a 
reflective commentary to the existing literature from a theoretical perspective 
to a practical perspective. 
 
Hong Kong, formerly a Britain colony, now a special administrative region of 
China, has adopted the principles of rule of law, capitalism and common law.8  
The common law legal system, the English company law and the 
                                                                                                                                                        
Vishny, ‘A Survey of Corporate Governance’ (1997) 52 (2) J Fin 737. 
6
 La Porta Rafael and others, ‘Law and Finance’ (1998) 106(6) J Pol Econ 1113, La Porta 
Rafael and others and ‘Legal Determinants of External Finance’ (1997) 52(3) Journal of 
Finance 1131. 
7
 Bebchuk Lucian and Roe Mark, ‘A Theory of Path Dependence in Corporate Ownership and 
Governance’ (1999) 52 Stanford Law Review 129. 
8
 Dobinson Ian and Roebuck Derek, Introduction to Law in Hong Kong SAR (2nd ed, Sweet 
and Maxwell 2001) 9. 
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Anglo-American corporate governance model were transplanted into Hong 
Kong. In contrast, China is a communist country and has adopted the state 
intervening policy, the public ownership, the socialist market economy and the 
rule by law system.9 The Hong Kong and Chinese corporate governance 
models have been shaped by these structures and institutions. Under the 
doctrine of one country two systems,10 Hong Kong and China have operated 
under two different systems. The issues of two case studies include the 
oppression of minority shareholders in the parent and subsidiary companies. 
The two cases will identify the differences in corporate governance and 
deficiencies of the minority protection in Hong Kong and China. 
 
Although Hong Kong and China share a very close geo-political proximity, the 
legal systems and corporate governance structures are very different.11 It is 
contended that existing corporate law and governance are shaped by the path 
that was set in place in earlier times and the path includes the economic, 
cultural and political structures. 12  This thesis will examine the historical 
development of these structures. Inevitably, Confucianism (ru jia) and 
Legalism (fa jia) have a major influence on the traditional Chinese culture and 
philosophy in Hong Kong and China.13  
                                                     
9
 Potter Pitman, The Chinese Legal System: Globalization and Local Legal Culture (Routledge 
2001) 88. 
10
The common law and equity previously in force in Hong Kong shall remain in force after its 
handover from Britain to China under Articles 8 and 18 of the Basic Law, a constitutional 
document for the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region. 
11
 Mobius Mark, ‘Corporate Governance in Hong Kong’ in CK Low (ed), Corporate 
Governance, An Asia-Pacific Critique (Sweet & Maxwell Asia 2002) 201 and Ho Simon and Xu 
Haigen, ‘Corporate Governance in the People’s Republic of China’ in CK Low (ed), Corporate 
Governance, An Asia-Pacific Critique (Sweet & Maxwell Asia 2002) 269. 
12
 Bebchuk Lucian and Roe Mark, ‘A Theory of Path Dependence in Corporate Ownership 
and Governance’ (1999) 52 Stanford Law Review 129. 
13
 Bodde Derk and Morris Clarence, Law in Imperial China: Exemplified by 190 Ch'ing 
Dynasty Cases (University of Pennsylvania Press 1967) 17. 
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I will explore how these historical aspects affect the development of corporate 
law and governance in Hong Kong and China. Hong Kong and China share the 
same high concentrated ownership structures;14 the oppression of minority 
shareholders by majority shareholders and management is the major issue for 
corporate governance. 15  I will examine the issues of expropriation by 
management and majority shareholders under the doctrines of separation of 
management and ownership and the majority rule. 16  The two cases on 
shareholders’ disputes will identify the deficiencies of the minority protection 
under the company law; I will explore the possibility to transplant foreign 
company law and examine the corporate law and governance theories to 
analyse the justification of legal intervention on the protection of minority 
shareholders in Hong Kong and China. 
 
Different theories advocating for different factors may have more influence to 
the development of corporate governance in the existing literature. Million17 
points out that the orthodox assumption of Berle and Means corporation18 is to 
develop a corporate governance structure that will maximise shareholder 
wealth. Roe argues that shareholder wealth maximisation may be the best rule 
                                                     
14
 Goo SH and Carver Anne, Corporate Governance, The Hong Kong Debate (Sweet and 
Maxwell Asia 2003) 89; Tam Onkit, ‘Ethical Issues in the Evolution of Corporate Governance in 
China’ (2002) 37(3) Journal of Business Ethics 303. 
15
 Armour John, Hansmann Henry and Reinier Kraakman, ‘Agency Problems and Legal 
Strategies’ in Kraakman Reinier and others (eds), The Anatomy of Corporate Law: A 
Comparative and Functional Approach (OUP 2009) 35. 
16
 ibid. 
17
 Million David, ‘New Direction in Corporate Law: Communitarians, Contractarians, and the 
Crisis in Corporate Law’ (1993) 50(4) Washington and Lee LR 1374. 
18
 Berle Adolf and Means Gardiner, The Modern Corporation and Private Property (68 
Revised edn, Harcourt 1932) 245. The modern Berle and Means corporation, in which shares 
are widely held, management acts depart from those required to maximise shareholder 
returns. 
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of corporate governance because a stakeholder measure of managerial 
accountability could leave managers so much discretion that managers could 
easily pursue their own agenda, one that might maximise neither shareholder, 
employee, consumer, nor national wealth, but only their own.19 Behchuk and 
Roe argue that path dependence results in persistence of existing corporate 
governance structure and divergence across systems and suggest a number 
of barriers to convergence towards the Berle-Means corporation that is diffuse 
in share ownership.20 Shleifer and Vishny find that the political pressures are 
as important in the evolution of corporate governance system.21 Bebchuk and 
Roe identify three factors that might influence a country's choice of corporate 
law and governance, namely, the public-regarding choice of efficient corporate 
law, the interest group politics and the culture and ideology.22 La Porta et al. 
suggests that cross-country differences in legal origin explain the differences in 
corporate governance and the protection of minority shareholder.23 
 
Chinese scholar Xi contends that the factors affecting corporate governance in 
China are the economic policy to reform the state owned enterprises (SOEs), 
the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) politics and the cultural ideology.24 Lau, 
Young and Li suggest that the impediments of corporate governance in China 
                                                     
19
 Roe Mark, 'The Shareholder Wealth Maximization Norm and Industrial Organization,' 149 
(2001) U Pa L Rev 2065. 
20
 Bebchuk Lucian and Roe Mark, ‘A Theory of Path Dependence in Corporate Ownership 
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are the differences in economic policy, political ideology and cultural attitude.25 
Fu suggests that the problems of corporate governance in China cannot be 
solved by legal reform; and a socio-economic and political approach should be 
employed to examine the corporate governance reform in China. 26  Ma 
criticises that a more fundamental issue as to the different social, economic 
and political backgrounds of the countries has been largely neglected in the 
existing literature on the comparative study of shareholders’ remedies.27   
 
In this thesis, I seek to fill this gap and argue that China has adopted the 
foreign company law from the European and the Anglo-American 
jurisdictions28  but the protection of minority shareholders is still weak, I 
attempt to find out the reasons for (i) poor protection of minority shareholders 
and (ii) concentrated share ownership could persist over time in China. My 
main goal is to find out whether the legal origin influences the corporate 
governance and to explore the roots of the persistence of ownership 
concentration and poor minority protection in China.  
 
1.3 Research Questions  
This research is based on the cases drawn from my previous work under the 
requirements of the course. For comparative purposes, I will explain the facts of 
two cases, discuss the legal issues, and develop the research issues in Chapter 
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Five. I will relate the issues to the existing body of knowledge and theory of 
company law in Chapter Two. The contractarian, communitarian, agency, legal 
origin and path dependence theories will be examined to explain the conflicts 
between management and shareholders, and between majority and minority 
shareholders; whether the common law system is better than the civil law 
system in terms of minority protection. 
 
The two case studies are related to shareholders disputes. These cases will 
identify the deficiencies of protection of minority shareholders. Discussion will 
be made later to provide the answers to the research questions. It is hoped 
that this thesis will promote the appreciation of good corporate governance 
and the protection of minority shareholders in Hong Kong and China.  
 
This research will address the following main research questions on the finding 
of literature review and two case studies: 
 
1. Is the protection of minority shareholders better in the Hong Kong common 
law system than that in the Chinese civil law system? and 
2. Does the high concentration of ownership lead to poor legal protection of 
minority shareholders in Hong Kong and China? 
 
There are many possible reasons for poor legal protection of minority 
shareholders in Hong Kong and China and these are explored in this research.  
The subsidiary questions are developed and examined including the following. 
Are the problems of corporate governance and the protection of minority 
shareholders in Hong Kong and China due to: 
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1. the different legal effect of transplantation of foreign company law into Hong 
Kong and China?  
2. the deficiencies of statutory provisions for the protection of minority 
shareholders including the issues of the structure of parent and subsidiary 
companies in the existing Hong Kong Companies Ordinance and Chinese 
Company Law? and 
3. the different economic, cultural and political institutions and structures? 
 
1.4 Research Objectives 
There are only a few pieces of literature exclusively providing a comparative 
study of corporate governance and the protection of minority shareholders in 
Hong Kong and China.29 Existing literature30 is either on corporate governance 
and the protection of minority shareholders in Hong Kong or in China; and 
focuses on the legislative aspect for corporate governance reform. This thesis 
attempts to fill these gaps and focuses on a comparative analysis between 
Hong Kong and China as well as both legislative and structural aspects for 
corporate governance reform. This research takes the position that only a few 
pieces of existing literature deal with corporate governance and the protection of 
minority shareholders both in Hong Kong and China and fully explain the 
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relationship of the changes in company law and the political, economic and 
social aspects and their mutual interactions. In addition, the existing literature on 
corporate governance in Hong Kong is based on the Hong Kong Companies 
Ordinance Chapter 32 which has been repealed by the Companies Ordinance 
Chapter 622 (Companies Ordinance 2014) enacted on 12 July 2012 and come 
in force on 3 March 2014.31 This thesis is one of the first to deal with corporate 
governance and the protection of minority shareholders under the new law at 
the time of writing. It is hoped that this thesis will contribute to the existing 
literature in corporate governance and the protection of minority shareholders in 
Hong Kong. 
 
There is limited published research on corporate governance and minority 
shareholders protection in Asian countries, during and after the global financial 
crisis of 2008, especially on the difference in corporate governance practices 
within Asian countries. The research of La Porta et al. was mainly based on 
European civil law countries such as France, Germany and Scandinavian 
countries and common law countries such as the United Kingdom (UK) and the 
United States (US) and there are no socialist or transition economies in their 
studies.32  
 
In this thesis, I will only use Hong Kong and China as a basis for comparative 
analysis. Hong Kong is a capitalist, developed economy and common law 
                                                     
31
 The New Hong Kong Companies Ordinance (Chapter 622 of the Laws of Hong Kong) was 
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system and China is a socialist, transition economy and civil law system, they 
will be used to test the legal origin theory in Asia. Hong Kong and China have 
different legal systems but share same high concentration of ownership.  
 
Both Hong Kong and Chinese jurisdictions33 are based on a foreign company 
law but they have different legal transplantation effects.34 In Chapter Two, I will 
review the corporate law and governance theories to articulate a legal basis to 
compare the company law in Hong Kong and China, in particular, the agency, 
contractarian, communitarian, legal origin and path dependence theories. I will 
also examine these theories to analyse and argue the justification of legal 
intervention on the protection of minority shareholders in the subsequent 
chapters. It is also hoped that this research will address the issues of different 
legal effect of transplantation of foreign company law into Hong Kong and 
China.  
 
The scope of research is based on a comparative study of corporate 
governance and the protection of minority shareholders in Hong Kong and 
China. I will adopt a social, economic and political approach and examine the 
unique features of local culture, the freedom of economic policy and the 
political ideology of the government between Hong Kong and China in Chapter 
Three. The objective of comparative law is to find out the differences between 
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two places.35 This raises the question as to whether one country’s company 
law can be successfully transplanted to another country.  
 
A legal transplantation of the Western notion of law to other countries has 
obvious limitations such as local political power, culture and value. Potter 
argues that direct adoption of the Western laws without the consideration of the 
local cultures and values may result in failure in the legal reforms.36 Watson 
suggests that the importance of legal culture in transplantation of foreign law.37 
Milhaupt and Pistor provide the useful insights into why legal transplants are 
often unsuccessful as the transplanted law may be misused by different interest 
group and there are also differences in systems stemming from their different 
economic and social contexts. 38  Roe advocates that the legal differences 
simply flow from the political differences.39 La Porta et al. argue that the law 
matters in corporate governance.40 Bebchuk and Roe contend that the history 
matters in shaping the current corporate and ownership structure.41 Hansmann 
and Kraakman argue that the structural and institutional differences are the 
bases for persistence of divergence in corporate governance.42  
 
This thesis will present an argument that the legislation, institutions and 
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structures are important for corporate governance reform and that the 
institutions and structures determine the existing corporate governance and this 
argument will be supported by the cases of Hong Kong and China.43  
 
1.5 Research Methodology 
In this thesis, several research methodologies are used which include the 
traditional library-based qualitative approach, the case study approach, the 
comparative study approach and the historical analysis approach. These 
approaches are adopted in this research. 
 
A qualitative and library-based approach is adopted in this research. Both 
primary and secondary materials are investigated in this research. This 
includes a comprehensive review of key corporate governance reports and 
studies, academic literature, legal and regulatory requirements. The materials 
include the legislation, cases, articles, journals, reports and books relating to 
company law, corporate governance and minority protection. The materials are 
beyond legal and cover the perspectives from historical, economic, 
social-cultural and political sciences. 
 
It is the requirements of the program that this research shall comprise two 
parts. Part one is an introduction to two case studies based on my previous 
legal practice, which will be illustrated in Chapter Five. Part two is a reflective 
commentary analysing the significance of the legal issues explored and critical 
assessment of their implications which will be illustrated in the other chapters. 
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The two case studies of this research are the shareholders’ disputes in private 
companies. Over 90% of companies in Hong Kong are the private 
companies.44  The research on the protection of minority shareholders in 
private companies in Hong Kong and China is both of academic and practical 
value and significance. The two case studies will identify the problems of the 
protection of minority shareholders in Hong Kong and China.  
 
A case study approach is employed to identify the issues and the research 
questions for my research, and then such issues and such research questions 
are related to the existing theoretical debates. It is important to determine 
which cases are selected for this thesis and whether to study cases which are 
considered typical in minority protection based on the geographic regions in 
Hong Kong and China. My criterion is looking for the cases that satisfy the 
comparative purpose of this thesis and answer the research questions posed 
and is based on representativeness from my previous legal practice. The 
cases form the basis of this thesis in identifying the issues of this research. I 
will make use of this qualitative research method to examine contemporary 
real-life situations and provide the basis for the application of company law and 
corporate governance theories. This thesis takes a form of qualitative research 
that is used to look at the protection of minority shareholders in Hong Kong 
and China. A comparative approach will be used to compare the two cases 
that may share some characteristics. 
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This thesis adopts two methodologies used in comparative law: the functional 
method and the structural method. The functional method has been the most 
commonly used methodology in comparative law.45 The structural method 
looks beyond the function of law and emphasizes the structural elements of a 
legal system which include institutions, norms, cultures and rights elements 
and their interrelationship in a system.46 
 
The fundamental approach of this research is comparative and it follows the 
traditional method of comparative law. The research should go beyond the 
scope of domestic law and cover laws from other jurisdictions and the 
jurisdictions being compared are also specified.47 The core methodology of 
comparison is to compare the laws which are comparable and to find out the 
differences for the purposes of legal transplantation.48 In addition to Hong 
Kong and Chinese jurisdictions, reference will be made to other jurisdictions 
such as the UK, the US and Australia and to see whether it is appropriate to 
transplant their company laws into Hong Kong and China. In this comparative 
research, emphasis will be placed on divergences rather than convergences 
between Hong Kong and China. Comparisons between different protections of 
minority shareholders are commonly dealt with a functional approach.49 It is 
difficult to conclude one jurisdiction is better than another jurisdiction by the 
criteria of the home historical, cultural, political and economic backgrounds in a 
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comparative research.50 Thus, this thesis places special emphasis on the 
institutional approach in regard to local institutions, norms, cultures and rights 
elements.51 I argue that the problems in China are beyond legal rules; a wider 
approach should be adopted in order to find out the solution in its local context; 
and the comparative economic, cultural and political analysises will be used in 
this thesis. 
 
The comparative methodology of legal remedies to minority shareholders 
includes the normative/descriptive and the functional approaches. These 
approaches will be used to compare the shareholders remedies in Hong Kong 
and China. The normative/descriptive approach is based on the remedies 
adopting the same name in Hong Kong and China and the functional 
approach52 is based on the remedies of different names but also functions to 
solve the same issues of shareholders disputes in Hong Kong and China. The 
purpose of comparative research of legal remedies to minority shareholders is 
to provide the important suggestions for legislative amendment.53 
 
The procedure of comparative study takes the Hong Kong common law model 
as the basic model to compare with the Chinese civil law model. To this end, I 
will divide each chapter into two parts. Part one will discuss and examine the 
law in Hong Kong, while part two will discuss and examine the same issues in 
the law of China. Comparisons will be made between the company laws in the 
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two jurisdictions including the historical paths, the remedies to minority 
shareholders and the structural and institutional differences. In conducting this 
comparison, I will identify the various gaps of the two jurisdictions and to see 
whether it is appropriate to transplant the common law legal norms in the 
protection of minority shareholders into China. A comparative socio-economic 
and political analysis approach will be adopted in this thesis. 
 
Comparative law is legal history concerned with relationship between places.54 
A historical analysis will also be used to analyse the history of evolution of 
company laws and legal systems in Hong Kong and China and to see what 
has brought them to their current forms. The examination of historical 
development of company law provides useful insights into how and why it 
changed, and its inter-relationship with the economic, social and political 
environments.55  The historical analysis is based on the concept of path 
dependence which places importance on historical development and links the 
past to the present in relation to development of company law so that 
institutions are described as the ‘carriers of history’.56 This thesis adopts the 
path dependence methodology and emphasies on ‘what we have today is a 
result of what has happened in the past.’ 57  For the purposes of legal 
transplantation, it is important to study the law as it has been in the past in 
order to understand the law as it is today.58  
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So criticizes that the history of company law in Hong Kong and China has 
attracted remarkably little attention in the academic literature.59 This thesis 
seeks to point out the importance of the evolution of company law in the 
context of the social, economic and political paths.60 In order to fill this gap, 
the historical paths of company law and corporate governance in Hong Kong 
and China will be discussed in Chapter Three. According to the path 
dependence, history certainly ‘matters’ but what are the specific ways in which 
history shapes the current structures? How do the interest holders react to the 
constraints and opportunities of history? I will examine under what condition 
does the lock-in of path dependence lead to inefficiencies or efficiencies in 
Hong Kong and China. Path dependence theory asserts that a country’s 
corporate governance is contingent on its economic, cultural and political 
paths set in place at an earlier time.61 The economic, cultural and political 
paths of Hong Kong and China will be discussed in Chapter Three. Path 
dependence further argues that company rules are rarely enacted for 
efficiency reasons and are strongly influenced by the initial rules; and this is 
the rule-driven path dependence.62 The legislative paths of minority protection 
in Hong Kong and China will be discussed in Chapter Four.  
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1.6 Ethical Concern and Confidentiality 
Ethical concern is one of the major issues in this research. This thesis is based 
on the two cases, in Chapter Five, from my previous legal practice. These 
cases may contain many particulars of my previous clients. In order to ensure 
the professional ethics is observed, the particulars of the cases will be 
modified so as to prevent the clients and cases are able to be identified; the 
names of the parties involved will be anonymous or fabricated; and the 
modified particulars of the disputes will only be used for the purpose of 
conducting this research. 
 
As a practising solicitor, it is my legal and professional obligation to keep all the 
particulars of two cases confidential. Given that the type of data or information 
discussed in the case studies are under professional privilege and confidential, 
every possible step and effort has been taken to ensure the names, identities, 
status, position and particulars of the persons and companies involved will not 
be revealed. Privacy and confidentiality are important issues in this research. I 
have made sure that any personal particulars and details obtained from the 
case studies will not be disclosed in the research. 
 
1.7 Outline of the Thesis 
Chapter One gives the background of and the methodology to this research. 
This chapter discusses the objectives of the research, the research issues, 
and questions, the ethical concern and confidentiality and the outline of each 
chapter. It concludes with some remarks for this thesis.  
 
Chapter Two will review the existing literature in corporate governance and the 
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protection of minority shareholders in general and develop the theoretical 
framework for this research. The theoretical framework articulates the 
prerequisite for comparative study of company law. The corporate law and 
governance theories such as contractarian, communitarian, agency, legal 
origin and path dependence theories will be used to explain the existence of 
corporate law and governance in Hong Kong and China. The definition and 
role of corporate governance; the effect of legal transplantation; the protection 
of minority shareholders and the justification of legal intervention to protect 
minority shareholders in Hong Kong and China will be examined.  
 
Chapter Three will explain the paths of corporate governance and economic, 
social and legal institutions in Hong Kong and China. Path dependence theory 
will be used to explain the path of developing corporate governance structures 
and economic, social and legal institutions in Hong Kong and China. This 
chapter will compare the development of corporate law and governance in Hong 
Kong; how the English common law and the Anglo-American model of corporate 
governance were transplanted into Hong Kong; and how the Western model of 
company law and continental model of corporate governance were introduced to 
China. The integration between the two systems under the doctrine of one 
country two systems will be examined and discussed. The economic structures 
and developments in Hong Kong and China, the former being a market economy 
and the latter being a centrally planned economy; the two Chinese schools of 
philosophy, Confucianism and Legalism; and the legal and political environments 
in Hong Kong and China, Hong Kong as a former British colony and China as a 
communist country, and the Hong Kong rule of law and the common law legal 
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system and the Chinese rule by law and the civil law legal system will be 
examined. The issues of corporate governance and economic, social and legal 
institutions in Hong Kong and China will be identified. 
 
Chapter Four will analyse the minority shareholders protection under the 
company legislation in Hong Kong and China. This chapter will discuss various 
remedies such as oppression remedy, derivative action and winding up 
available to minority shareholders in Hong Kong and China. A comparative 
study of company law will be made with reference to other jurisdictions; the 
normative/descriptive (remedies carrying same description and function) and 
functional (remedies carrying different description but same function) 
comparisons will be made. The inadequacies and deficiencies of the remedies 
to minority shareholders including the issues of parent and subsidiary 
companies’ structure under the existing company law in Hong Kong and China 
will be identified. 
 
Chapter Five will explain the backgrounds of two case studies from Hong Kong 
and China, for comparing the corporate governance and protection of the 
minority shareholders in the two places. This chapter will include the 
backgrounds of the parties, the facts of the disputes, the corporate governance 
and ownership structures, the legal issues, the outcome of the disputes. This 
chapter will identify the issues of minority shareholders protection from the 
cases.  
 
Chapter Six will discuss the proposals for future reform for the company 
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legislation and economic, social and legal institutions and offers 
recommendations to enhance the protection of minority shareholders in Hong 
Kong and China from a corporate governance perspective. 
 
Chapter Seven will be a concluding chapter and summarise this research. This 
chapter will include the research findings for each chapter; provide the 
answers to the research questions; and conclude this research with 
recommendations for improvement of corporate governance and reform of the 
protection of minority shareholders and suggest the future research. 
 
1.8 Concluding Remarks  
In concluding this chapter, this thesis attempts to bridge the gap between the 
theoretical debate and the practical perspective by testing the applicability of 
legal origin and path dependence theories; and uses these theories to provide 
the practical suggestion to minority protection in Hong Kong and China. This 
thesis argues that the historical structures determine the existing corporate 
governance; the issues of corporate governance and minority shareholders 
protection could not be solved by mere transplantation of common law 
according to the legal origin theory; the issues must be solved in the local 
context; and the corporate governance reform shall include both legislative 
and structural changes which have been shaped by the initial paths according 
to the path dependence theory. 
 
It is sought, in this thesis, to conduct a comparative research and make a 
reflective commentary on corporate governance and the protection of minority 
shareholders in Hong Kong and China and to offer some practical suggestions 
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for their reforms. It is hoped that much significance will be attached to the 
possibility of transplanting the legal mechanisms from other jurisdictions into the 
Hong Kong common law system and the Chinese civil law system. 
 
Chapter Two will present a broad review of the literature on corporate 
governance and minority shareholders protection and the theoretical 
framework of corporate law and governance. The theoretical framework 
articulates the prerequisite for comparative study of company law and the legal 
basis for the protection of minority shareholders and corporate governance in 
Hong Kong and China. By studying the main theoretical frameworks that have 
influenced the development of company law, I am able to develop a critical 
analysis of corporate governance and the protection of minority shareholders 
in Hong Kong and China in the following chapters.  
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CHAPTER TWO 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND LITERATURE REVIEW  
2.0  Introduction 
Goo and Craver regard the protection of the rights of shareholders as a key 
pillar in the corporate governance regime.63 Low considers that the protection 
of the rights of shareholders is vital in enhancing corporate governance.64 La 
Porta et al. opine that the legal system and the rule of law are the important 
elements for corporate governance and the protection of shareholders; 
countries whose legal rules originated from the common law system and with 
the rule of law have better protection to shareholders whereas countries under 
the civil law system and no rule of law have less protection to shareholders.65 
La Porta et al. also opine that the least protection for shareholders is provided 
in countries in which companies have the highest ownership concentration.66 
In this thesis a comparative study of corporate governance and the protection 
of minority shareholders from the Hong Kong common law and the Chinese 
civil law perspectives are examined in order to test the legal origin theory in 
Asia. I use the agency theory to identify the conflicts between management 
and shareholders and between majority shareholders and minority 
shareholders. I argue that the path dependence theory is better than the legal 
origin theory in explaining the protection of minority shareholders in Hong 
Kong and China.  
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This chapter starts with the theoretical framework and the review of the 
literature on corporate law and governance theories. The corporate law and 
governance theories such as the contractarian, communitarian, agency, legal 
origin and path dependence theories are discussed. It then discusses the 
definition and role of corporate governance and presents the review of the 
literature on the institutional and legal transplantation theories and the Chinese 
differing cultural ideologies in the minority shareholders protection in Hong 
Kong and China. Next, it examines the justification to protect minority 
shareholders; the protection of minority shareholders and the deficiencies of 
minority shareholders protection in Hong Kong and China. Finally, some 
concluding remarks are offered. 
 
2.1  Theoretical Framework 
The two case studies are based on the two different jurisdictions, one from a 
common law jurisdiction and one from a civil law jurisdiction. From a 
comparative point of view, the company law theory is the conceptual basis for 
many of the fundamental aspects of company law.67 The existence of a 
company and the role of the shareholders can be explained by different 
company law theories which may also be applicable to the explanation of the 
company law in Hong Kong and China. Some theories suggest that a company 
is merely a contractual entity created by the shareholders as the owners of this 
private entity68 and some consider that it is an institution created by the state 
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and the shareholders are the providers of capital and are separate and distinct 
from the company.69 The theoretical framework forms the legal basis for my 
comparative study of corporate governance and the protection of minority 
shareholders in Hong Kong and China. 
 
2.1.1 Company Law Theories  
There are various company law theories to explain the existence of a company. 
However, there is no universally accepted company law theory which provides 
the complete explanation as a base from which company law can be 
deduced.70 I examine these company law theories to analyse the legal effects 
of transplantation of foreign company law and the justification of legal 
intervention on the protection of minority shareholders in this chapter. The 
review of company law and corporate governance theories offers this thesis an 
analysis of the fundamental aspects of the company law and corporate 
governance in Hong Kong and China. 
 
2.1.1.1 Concession Theory  
The evolution of company law theory, in common law jurisdictions, began with 
the concession theory which was a dominant approach to explain the 
existence of a company in the first half of the 19th century.71 The House of 
Lords decision in Solomon v Solomon & Co Ltd72 is a typical example of 
concession theory. The existence of company as legal entity is dependent on 
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law, a company is an artificial creature of the Legislature.73 The principles are 
that a shareholder enjoys the limited liability protection and a company with 
separate legal entity can be created only by the state.74 There has been a 
great deal of political debate over this theory that it may be used by state as a 
means of curbing freedom to associate for political purposes.75  
 
Million argues the incorporation of a company as a legal fiction (also known as 
the fiction theory) and is a concession granted by the state.76 The concession 
theory is bound with the fiction theory. In return, the company accepts the legal 
regulations imposed by the state to maintain such privilege.77 
 
The weaknesses of the concession and fiction theories are that they fail to 
describe the shareholders behind the company and the privilege is diminished 
when company legislation is introduced to simplify the incorporation and the 
diminished role of state imposing regulations on the company formation.78  
The concession and fiction theories fail to explain the situations in Hong Kong 
and China where incorporation is as of right and no approval is required.79 The 
advent of reality theory emerges and replaces the concession theory.80 
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2.1.1.2 Reality Theory 
The reality theory argues that a company is not a fiction but a natural-entity 
and asserts that a company is real and is not imaginary.81 The existence of a 
company is separate from the shareholders and therefore justifies departure 
from a shareholder-oriented focus, since the company is a real person with its 
own entity and interest which is defined by its management and the 
shareholders shall have no primacy in its operation.82 Dodd83 opines that a 
company is a real person representing its own interest and not representing a 
group of investors behind the company; he further asserts that a company 
must act as a corporate citizen and balance the interests of various 
stakeholders in society including shareholders, employees, consumers, 
creditors and the general public.  
 
Realist contends that a company has its own mind and is only acting through 
its agents,84 it can enjoy legal rights and execute legal acts through its 
organs85 and is a person just like a human being with a physical body, a man 
uses his bodily organs and a company use men to execute the legal acts.86 
The corporate realism theory is also associated with the organic theory. The 
theory uses the human body as an analogy for the company.87  
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Armour et al. argue that the corporate realism and organic theories fail to deal 
with the managerial accountability issues of the agents to the principal, a 
company that they are two separate entities.88 These theories fall short in its 
failure to recognise the existence of a one-member company controlled by one 
shareholder and a wholly owned subsidiary as a separate and independent 
real entity. In both Hong Kong and Chinese jurisdictions, it is possible to have a 
one-member company and a wholly owned subsidiary. A company is not a real 
and natural person and can only be owned and controlled by another person or 
company.89 The other criticism relates to the question of ultra vires. The 
restrictions by the company’s object in the articles of association and the ultra 
vires doctrine reflect the limitations of the company. Unlike a natural person, a 
company has no power to act beyond the borders.90 The corporate realism 
and organic theories are criticised as unrealistic.91 The main challenge to the 
theories is the work of Berle and Means which focuses on the separation of 
ownership from management of a company and an owner and a company are 
two separate entities. 92  The separation of ownership from management 
creates the agency conflicts in the modern corporation.93 
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2.1.1.3 Legal Contractarian and Nexus of Contracts Theory  
Legal contractarian contends that corporate governance consists of legally 
enforceable contracts between various stakeholders.94 Legal contractarian 
believes the law should not interfere with the freedom of contract and the role 
of the government is very limited.95 Instead the government should provide a 
standard form contract to save the expense of people in negotiating their own 
contract such as the Model Articles under the relevant company legislation.96 
The Model Articles97 are provided by the Hong Kong company legislation as a 
default rule. Hong Kong also adopts the laissez-faire policy with minimum 
governmental intervention.98 However, legal contractarian falls short in its 
failure to recognise the imperfect market conditions in some countries such as 
China.  
 
Contractarian also provides a useful analysis for economists who are 
interested in companies engaging in economic activities and promoting 
freedom of contract and voluntary interaction.99 In other words, a company is 
nothing more than a collection of contracts amongst various parties.100 This 
theory is developed to view a company as a ‘nexus of contracts’,101 but it fails 
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to explain why the creation of a separate legal personality cannot be done by 
contract alone without the state intervention by giving the legal status to a 
company.102 
 
The nexus of contracts theory seeks to provide an answer to the managerial 
accountability issues that the agents and managers are accountable to the 
shareholders by emphasising the primacy of shareholders.103 The interests of 
the shareholders are paramount in the company and the management must 
act in the interests of the shareholders.104 The nexus of contracts theory is an 
extension of fiction theory that a company is an artificial person created by law 
which is actually derived from a group of investors.105 Easterbrook and Fischel 
argue that the fiction of corporate personality is better approached by viewing 
the corporation as a set of contracts and voluntary arrangements amongst 
investors which is made through a private contracting arrangement between 
individual shareholders.106  The only role played by the state is to promote the 
freedom of contract environment which allows the individual to make their own 
contractual arrangement.107 The theory emphasises on freedom of market 
and arm-length transactions108 and a company is a form created by the 
agreements between investors and management.109  
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Gilson and Reinier criticise that contractarian theory is based largely on perfect 
market assumptions where the government should play a limited role and it 
fails to explain the separate legal personality and the reality of imperfect 
market conditions.110 For example, China is a socialist planned economy 
where the market is subject to state intervening policy and under an imperfect 
market condition.111 In terms of corporate governance structures, they are 
commonly adopted without contractual commitments to maintain them.112 This 
is contrary to the theory that the corporate governance mechanisms are 
included in legally enforceable contractual documents; and non-compliance of 
the mechanisms can be enforced by non-legal means such as administrative 
sanctions.113 The use of legal means may be justified in some cases. 
 
2.1.1.4 Communitarian Theory  
The emergence of communitarian theory seeks to reject the contractarian.114 
Communitarian theory disagrees the view of the contractarian that company 
law should focus on shareholder supremacy and leave the protection of 
non-shareholder interests for other legal regimes. 115  This communitarian 
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theory views a company from a political perspective and recognises the 
multilateral community of interests affected by corporate behaviour and the 
various people having a stake in the companies. 116  The communitarian 
contends that company law shall take into account the whole community of 
interests who contribute to or are affected by the corporate entity. 117  It 
advocates that public scrutiny and control of a corporate entity is justified 
because companies are sufficiently crucial for the economy as a whole to be 
categorised as quasi-public institutions and companies should not exist for the 
benefit of shareholders only.118 The imposition of law to govern the corporate 
activities is to secure fair play for various stakeholder groups such as creditors 
and employees.119 It favours the state intervention and the imposition of law to 
regulate corporate activities. 120  Communitarian is adopted in China and 
companies have special duties to promote the socialist economy in China.121 
 
Communitarian theory emphasises the need for mandatory rules and legal 
sanction on the management of a company.122  This theory stresses the 
importance of corporate management and managerial accountability. Failure 
to comply with the duties will lead to legal sanction and enforcement. It relies 
on a strict legal compliance by the managers.123  
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The communitarian does not believe the free operation of market.124 State 
intervention and imposition of law are justified to control the failure of market 
forces that impede self-protection through contract.125 These include cases 
where the interests of community are undermined, and for the preservation of 
morality in the market system, for example, the downsizing of the company as 
a result of merger and acquisition and insider dealings committed by the 
management. 126  Communitarian tends to understand social cost more 
capaciously and suggests that state intervention is necessary to protect the 
interests of community as a whole including those employees being made 
redundant and individual investors who may be affected by the lack of insider 
information.127 
 
The justifications for state intervention in company affairs are not solely for the 
promotion of efficiency of the company but for the public interest as 
appropriate. 128  The communitarian supports that lawmakers should take 
action whenever the interests of community are undermined or threatened.129 
It is to protect the community ideals and not to increase competitiveness and 
profit making of the companies.130  
 
This theory cannot explain the situation in Hong Kong as Hong Kong adopts 
the free market economy and the laissez-faire policy with minimum 
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government intervention. 131  The communitarian is criticised as the 
effectiveness of state intervention depends very much on the effectiveness of 
enforcement of the law and clarity in the law-making process and may also 
lead to loss of public confidence in the freedom of market forces and autonomy 
if too much intervention is made by the state.132 
 
2.1.2 The Role of Company Law and Corporate Governance Theories  
The above discussion shows that company law theories matter because they 
offer the necessary understanding of the role of company law.133 The role of 
company law is to provide a (default or mandatory) rule to resolve the conflicts 
between various stakeholders.134  There are two major agency conflicts in 
company law and the major role of company law is to provide a mechanism in 
reducing these conflicts.135 The major doctrines of company law include the 
doctrine of separate legal entity136 and the doctrine of majority rule.137 The 
problems of separation of control and ownership as well as the oppression of 
minority shareholders are at the heart of the corporate governance debate.138 
There are two kinds of potential oppression of minority shareholders in the 
modern corporation.139 First, the oppression by the directors under the doctrine 
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of separation of ownership and management;140 and secondly, the oppression 
by the majority shareholders under the doctrine of majority rule.141 In addition to 
the company law theorists, other economic and finance theorists have 
developed some theories to address the corporate governance issues.142 
 
2.1.2.1 Agency Theory  
The work of Berle and Means was an important milestone in the corporate 
governance literature which provided a justification for the separation of 
ownership from control; a corporation is made up of the management and 
ownership and the owners do not manage a corporation.143 Jensen and 
Meckling contend that the relationship between the owners and management 
is that of agent and principal (also called agency theory).144 The principal may 
incur ‘agency costs’ to monitor the agent’s acts to ensure whether they are 
acting in their best interests.145  The agency costs in a corporation can be 
reduced by the market force and the share value will decline as a result of 
inefficient management. 146  The agency theory places emphasis on 
shareholder supremacy, which is largely a reformulation of contractarian 
analysis and the management may be replaced and sanctioned by the 
shareholder which is a resonance with the nexus of contracts theory.147 
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Shleifer and Vishny contend that the separation of ownership and 
management creates agency conflicts and problems.148 Agency theory is a 
branch of economics that in the modern corporation, in which shares are 
widely held, management acts may depart from those required to maximise 
shareholder returns. 149  Unless appropriate governance structures are 
implemented to safeguard the interest of shareholders, management may not 
act to maximise the returns to shareholders.150 Claessen et al. identify that 
controlling shareholders may also create a new principal-agent problem which 
occurs between majority shareholder and minority shareholder.151 Shleifer and 
Vishny argue that concentrated ownership is not necessarily bad as agency 
costs could be reduced by the controlling shareholders in monitoring the 
management and maximising the return and the best corporate governance 
could be achieved by a combination of controlling shareholders and strong 
legal protection for shareholders.152 The agency relationship makes it easier 
to cause damage to shareholders.153  The role of company law is to resolve 
the agency conflicts and problems.154 Hence, corporation law states that 
minority shareholders enjoy the right of attending general meeting and the right 
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of derivative lawsuits. 155  Good corporate governance can facilitate 
accountability and transparency of management and ensure proper and 
reasonable returns to shareholders and thereby reduce the agency costs.156  
 
In order to reduce the potential oppression of minority shareholders, the 
doctrine of business judgment rule 157  and fiduciary duties on majority 
shareholders158 can be considered. It is contended that in both civil and 
common law jurisdictions such as Germany and the US have started to impose 
fiduciary duties on controlling shareholders. 159  It is suggested that the 
business judgment rule should be considered for transplantation into Hong 
Kong and China160 and the fiduciary duties should be introduced on the 
majority shareholders in China in regard to issues of oppression of minority 
shareholders by majority shareholders 161  and these will be examined in 
Chapter Six. 
 
2.1.2.2 Legal Origin Theory  
The theory of legal origin states that the economic development of a country is 
the result of its legal system and legal system is the key element for economic 
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growth. 162  It suggests that countries whose legal system originate in the 
common law system tend to protect minority shareholders considerably more 
than civil law system countries and that the elements of law, quality of law 
enforcement and ownership concentration are curial for minority protection.163 
The theory also claims that the origin of law is important in minority 
shareholders protection.164 It follows that countries under the common law 
system such as the US and the UK have better developed stock markets and 
minority shareholders protection.165 
 
The legal origin theorists propose the hypothesis that companies in countries 
with poor minority shareholders protection have more concentrated 
ownership. 166  Low and Mar consider that the expropriation of minority 
shareholders is more serious in civil law jurisdictions with weak legal protection 
of minority shareholders than that of common law jurisdictions with strong 
protection to minority shareholders and that highly concentrated ownership 
structure provides less protection to minority shareholders while less 
concentrated ownership structure provides better protection to minority 
shareholders.167 The result is similar to the research conducted by La Porta et 
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al. that the common law system in the US provides more protection for investors 
than civil law countries such as France and Germany. The research on 
protection was based on European countries and found that France, a civil law 
country, was the weakest and Germany and the Scandinavian civil law countries 
were in the middle category whereas the US was comparatively good although 
ownership concentration was quite high.168  
 
Deakin and Pistor contend that the merits of the legal origin theory in the context 
of three fields of inquiry: the study of comparative law; the analysis of the 
relation between law and markets; and the understanding of the role of legal 
systems in social ordering.169 However, the studies of La Porta et al. are 
controversial and are much debated.170 A group of legal scholars at Cambridge 
University conducted an empirical test and found that legal origin was not much 
of an obstacle to formal convergence in shareholder protection law.171 Michaels 
criticises that the methodology using number in comparative law is inappropriate; 
the homeward bias evaluation of comparative legal systems is not objective; 
and the classification of legal families between civil law system and common law 
system is too simplistic.172  
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The legal origin theory is also challenged by Yu and Li in their study of the Hong 
Kong market.173 Fu contends that the concentrated ownership structures in 
China lends support to the research findings of legal origin literature, however, 
due to its particular economic, cultural and political contexts, the Chinese 
ownership structures has its own characteristics and further study is required.174 
I will explore the issues of high ownership concentration leading to poor 
protection to minority shareholders and the common law system providing better 
protection to minority shareholders than that in the civil law system in the case 
of Hong Kong and China in the following chapters. 
 
2.1.2.3 Path Dependence Theory  
Path dependence theory was originally developed by economists to explain 
industrial evolution and technology adoption processes. 175   It is used to 
describe a set of decisions for any given circumstance and is limited by the 
decisions made in the past notwithstanding they may be no longer relevant 
today.176 It was later used to explain the nature of legal change.177 Margolis 
and Liebowitz contend that ‘what we have today is a result of what has 
happened in the past.’178 Path dependence theory in law is relevant to the 
common law system under the doctrine of stare decisis. The doctrine of stare 
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decisis et non quieta movere me means to stand by decision and do not 
disturb settled points.179 The previous decisions of higher courts are binding in 
subsequent cases involving similar circumstances; judges must give great 
weight to such decisions in making their judicial decisions. Hathaway suggests 
that it is impossible to understand the law as it is today without understanding 
the law as it has been in the past; reliance upon binding precedents leads 
courts to begin every new case with an examination of the past; and the 
resolutions that arise in turn form a foundation for future cases, hence the path 
dependence in law.180 
 
Puffert181 argues that path dependence is the dependence of outcomes on the 
path of previous outcomes, rather than simply on current conditions. In a path 
dependent process, ‘history matters’, it has had an enduring influence. 
Choices made on the basis of transitory conditions can persist long after those 
conditions change, thus, explanations of the outcomes of path-dependent 
processes require looking at history, rather than simply at current conditions. 
 
Bebchuk and Roe182  link this theory to describe how corporate ownership 
and governance are developed and apply them to explain the reasons why the 
legal rules at any point in time might be influenced by the ownership patterns 
that the country had at an earlier time. Bebchuk and Roe also distinguish 
between two different forms of path dependence: one being structure-driven 
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path dependence; the other being rule-driven path dependence. The sources 
of structure-driven path dependence have two folds: one grounded in efficiency, 
the other in the persistent power of existing interest holders. Similarly, the 
sources of rule-driven path dependence are efficiency and interest group 
politics. It is suggested that the existing corporate governance structure in 
economy is directly influenced by the initial structures, likewise, the existing 
corporate rules are directly influenced by the initial rules.183  
 
Bebchuk and Roe 184   identify that the sources of structure-driven and 
rule-driven are efficiency, persistence power of existing interest holders and 
interest group politics. Thus, the path for corporate law and governance 
includes the company, government, stakeholders, shareholders and 
management; and the inter-relationship between them as well as the relevant 
laws and regulations, including not only the corporate and securities laws but 
also the rules for corporate governance and financial institutions and legal 
systems. All of the above factors in themselves are the path-dependents. The 
company legislation and corporate governance rules are the rule-driven path 
and the existing common law legal system and corporate governance structure 
of Hong Kong are the path-dependents that was shaped in the British colonial 
period. Similarly, China is a communist country, its two key elements, the 
Marxist communist ideology of centrally planned economy and the public 
ownership are its structure-driven path. I will use the path dependence theory to 
explain corporate governance in Hong Kong and China in the following 
chapters. 
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Rasheed and Yoshikawa 185  argue that the evolution of the corporate 
governance system of a country is determined by a thousand of individual 
historical events and policies; the current state of corporate governance 
system is a result of its initial conditions as well as the path it took. Current 
corporate and ownership structures have a direct impact on the subsequent 
structures and this is the structure-driven path dependence. Similarly, 
corporate rules are rarely enacted for efficiency reasons and are strongly 
influenced by the initial rules and this is the rule-driven path dependence. 
These structures and rules are themselves path dependent. The initial costs 
incurred in adapting these structures and rules, in turn, become the sunk costs 
to resist any change from its current state.186 
 
Schmidt and Spindler187 advocate that path dependence is strengthened by 
the development of complementarities; the complementary elements include 
the legal, economic, political, financial and organisation structures. They 
consider that structures are complementary to each other if there is the 
potential that they fit well together. Milhaput and Pistor argue that legal change 
may occur as a result of historical political reasons that are driven by particular 
powerful interest groups who may have their own immediate objectives, as 
opposed to the most beneficial and efficient objectives.188 It can be strongly 
influenced by the political factors. It follows that the development of company 
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law is affected by non-legal factors and hence is not entirely independent of its 
environment and the economic, social and economic, legal and political 
spheres are connected and interlinked.189  
 
Kay considers several criticisms of path dependence: it is a fashionable label 
for the intuition that ‘history matters’ without a clear and convincing account of 
decision-making over time; it explains only stability and not change and its 
normative implications are confused and mostly left unexplored.190 It is also 
criticised that path dependence in law can lead to growing inefficiency and 
identifiable costs over time, as rules are unable to change with the underlying 
social conditions that they govern. 191  The emergence of political 
economy-based theory attempts to explain that economic and political factors 
play a significant role in shaping corporate governance. 
 
2.1.2.4  Political Economy Based Theory 
Legal and political factors play important roles in shaping economic reform in 
China.192 The economic reform policy adopted by the CCP in 1980s was a 
catalyst for subsequent corporate rules and regulations enacted by the 
Chinese government including the General Principle of Civil Law 1986 (GPCL) 
and Company Law 1993. 193  The Chinese authorities are committed to 
establishing a socialist market economy, a market economy with socialist 
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characteristics and emphasis on public ownership and planned economy.194 
The political economy-based theory emphasises how countries are managed 
taking into account political and economic factors.195 This theory can be used 
to explain how the CCP’s politics shape the corporate governance and 
ownership structure in China and the British colonial politics shape the 
corporate governance in Hong Kong, a former British colony. Roe advocates 
that corporate rules are often the product of political processes, which combine 
public regarding features with the interest group politics, the politics, and the 
governmental policies are the critical determinants of minority protection and 
ownership concentration.196  
 
Gourevitch197 criticises that the political economy-based theory is incomplete 
as it does not consider two significant alternative political analyses; the first is 
an alternative political preferences and interest group model; and the second 
alternative political model looks at political institutions, divergence in outcomes 
reflects differences not in preferences but in the mechanisms of preference 
aggregation, such as electoral laws, federalism, legislative-executive relations, 
and party systems. Easterbrook198 argues that more importance should be 
placed on markets and economies than laws and politics; law and politics are 
the output of the process and not the input. It is also criticised that various 
political groups have different interests in how a policy is to be developed, they 
compete for limited resources in order to determine which courses of action 
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will give the most beneficial results to the groups and as a result high agency 
costs are incurred.199 
 
2.1.3 The Definition and Role of Corporate Governance  
Corbett and Bottomley contend that corporate law is being transformed into a 
broader category of subject, which can be called corporate governance; they 
assert that ‘[c]orporate law may in the past have been described as a 
one-dimensional body of law concerned with the regulating the interests of 
investors, managers and directors. The impact of regulation has been to 
transform this body of law into an emerging law of corporate governance, 
which seeks to integrate the policies and concerns of broad areas of regulation 
into corporate law.’200 Corporate governance literature is now a popular topic 
in the law, finance and economic disciplines. Although some scholars attempt 
to define corporate governance, there is no universally accepted definition.201 
Some definitions may assist us in understanding what corporate governance is 
about. Amongst those, Monks and Minow define corporate governance as 
essentially: ‘[t]he relationship amongst various participants in determining the 
directions and performance of corporations. The primary participants are the 
shareholders, the management (led by the chief executive officer), and the 
board of directors.’202 
 
The role of corporate governance is to deal with the ways in which 
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shareholders supply the finance to corporations and to assure themselves of 
getting the return on their investments.203 The protection of shareholders is a 
vital element of corporate governance.204  Corporate governance involves 
various stakeholders in the company including but not limited to directors and 
shareholders and the mechanisms of how companies are directed. The key 
issue is the agency conflicts arising from the doctrine of separation of 
ownership and management and the doctrine of majority rule. In this thesis, I 
adopt the corporate governance definition from La Porta et al. that the main 
issue of corporate governance is the expropriation by the insiders (the 
controlling shareholders or managers) against the outside investors (the 
minority shareholders).205 I focus on these two agency problems, namely, 
principal (shareholders) and agent (directors) conflict, and majority 
shareholders and minority shareholders conflict in this thesis. To this end, legal 
transplantation of a rule and a system of law from one country to another 
country to resolve these conflicts may be relevant.206 I argue that the origin of 
law is not the key element for corporate governance in Hong Kong, the 
corporate governance problems must be solved in its own context and the 
Chinese corporate governance problems are not its civil law origin but 
institutions and structures in the following chapters.  
 
 
                                                     
203
 Andrei Shleifer and Robert Vishny, ‘A Survey of Corporate Governance’ (1997) 52(2) 
Journal of Finance 737. 
204
 Low CK and Selwyn Mar, ‘Enhancing the Governance of Public Listed Companies in East 
Asia’ in Low CK (ed), Corporate Governance, An Asia-Pacific Critique (Sweet & Maxwell Asia 
2002) 612. 
205
 La Porta Rafael and others, ‘Investor Protection and Corporate Valuation’ (2002) 57 
Journal of Finance 1147. 
206
 Watson Alan, Legal Transplants: An Approach to Comparative Law (2
nd
 ed. University of 
Georgia Press 1993) 21. 
  
 
63 
 
2.2 Legal and Institutional Transplantation Theories  
In this part, I seek to answer two questions regarding legal transplantation: 
Firstly, whether it is possible to extend the Hong Kong common law system to 
the Chinese civil law jurisdiction? Secondly, whether the differences in economic, 
cultural and political structures and institutions between Hong Kong and China 
are the barrier for legal transplantation?207 The debate of legal transplantation 
from one country to another country is not new.208 The issues about whether 
such principles or rules from one legal system can be successfully transplanted 
into another legal system; the reason why attempts are made to transplant law; 
and whether legal transplants can be successful, have been discussed for at 
least 300 years in the Western countries.209 I adopt the legal transplantation 
and institutional theories to explain the different legal transplantation effect of 
foreign company law on Hong Kong and China. The purpose of comparative 
company law is to find out the differences between two jurisdictions for potential 
legal reform,210 the question whether one jurisdiction’s company law can be 
successfully transplanted into another has become a vital part of discussion.211 
Roe contends that different systems should learn from each other and the 
question is how; he identifies that US companies and corporate governance 
were the result of path dependence rather than economic selection as each 
system solves the problem in the peculiar context of its own path-dependent 
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institutions.212 That is to say that each system has its own problems to solve in 
its own context. Scott argues that China should focus on institutional reforms 
based on its own path.213 The issue is which institutional model is suitable for 
Chinese reforms. In this thesis, I will present my argument that Hong Kong’s 
model is a good reference.  
 
It has been a long-standing conceptual debate in comparative law literature 
whether, and if so in what circumstances, it is possible to transplant laws from 
one legal system to another.214 Different opinions on these issues are given by 
various scholars.215 Based on the legal transplantation literature,216 this part 
examines, whether legal transplantation is feasible. Legal transplantation 
refers to moving a rule or a system of law from one country into another or 
from one people to another.217 It is a process whereby a country establishes 
its own law by relying on the model from another country. This is the case for 
many common law countries. The common law system was introduced to 
many Asian countries after Britain had invaded and took over the sovereignty 
of these countries.218 The legal system of Hong Kong was modelled from that 
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of England as a result of the Opium Wars. 219 The experiences of other 
countries serve as a good foundation to develop the law of a country.  
 
Legal transplantation from one country to another is controversial and there 
are conflicting views on the effectiveness of transplantation. 220  Existing 
literature reveals that there is no consensus on whether legal transplantation is 
feasible.221 Some scholars argue that it is feasible222 and some question its 
feasibility.223 Watson argues that legal transplantation is an easy task and 
successful legal transplantation could be achieved even when nothing was 
known of the political, social or economic context of the foreign law. 224 
However, the transplantation of highly developed rules used by one country 
into another without the proper foundation or compatible corporate structures 
can result in failure in the legal reform.225 Montesquieu claimed that legal 
transplantation was influenced by various causes: by the laws, the maxims of 
government, precedents, morals and customs.226 Kahn-Freund argues that 
law has a close connection with its original culture and legal transplantation 
from one country into another entails the risk of rejection and transplanting a 
law from a foreign jurisdiction that has no similar social-cultural element to 
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another jurisdiction is unlikely to be successful.227 Berkowitz et al. argue that a 
foreign law could be transplanted into other country after some local 
modifications. 228  Kahn-Freund identifies that the success of legal 
transplantation is subject to a range of factors such as geographical, economic, 
social and, in particular, political factors, it has a great significant on 
transplantation.229 Watson argues that the adoption of foreign law is driven by 
desire of the local political party who has the lawmaking power.230  
 
It is suggested that some local features must be taken into account such as 
strong regulatory power to implement and enforce the reforms; and a 
competent and independent judiciary. 231  The local features include the 
economic, political and legal factors. Watson argues that the choice of foreign 
law to transplant is from the wishes of political parties (members of the 
Parliament) who believe the foreign law is beneficial to the country. 232 
Kahn-Freund contends that interest groups, including law makers and political 
parties are significant in legal transplantation as they tend to choose the 
foreign law which might advantage them.233 
 
Yeung and Huang contend that the legal transplantation to another country is 
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not difficult, there must be an existence of demand for importation of law from 
a developed country in the first place.234 Berkowitz et al. argue that a strong 
public demand for law is important to the success of legal transplantation as it 
pushes the legal agents and institutions to enforce the transplanted law.235 
The direct adoption of the Western legal norms may be the most convenient 
method to cope with the changing environments.236 It is argued that the 
demand of foreign law is more important than the supply of foreign law for the 
purposes of legal transplantation.237 Should they be adopted uncritically or 
selectively? There are two schools of thought in this area. One school focuses 
on what kind of Western law shall be transplanted and introduced into China 
with local elements (a hybrid form of transplantation) for the company law 
reform.238 The other school focuses on local charactertics and needs and 
emphasises on the inconsistency between Western and local context.239  
 
Legal transplant theory warns that regulatory concepts from one 
political-legal-social culture cannot simply be transposed to a different context 
and expected to operate in the same way; and law is a product of the society 
and political institution and not the other way round.240 Legal transplant is not 
only about transplanting the legal rules but also the institutions.241 Any attempt 
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to use the pattern of law outside the environment of its origin continues to entail 
the risk of rejection.242 Institutional theory considers the processes by which 
structures, including schemes, rules, norms, and routines, become established 
as authoritative guidelines for social behavior and seeks to understand the 
processes of conflict, reform and change in social institutions.243 It is necessary 
to understand and articulate the immensely complicated institutions such as 
Parliament, the political parties, the law courts, the legal profession and other 
social and economic institutions.244 Legal transplantation, in a wider sense, 
refers to the transfer of institutions which include formal (political and legal) and 
informal (social and cultural) institutions from one place to another (also called 
institutional transplantation) with a view to transform the place to a rule of law 
country.245 
 
Comparisons of mechanisms of the protection of minority shareholders will be 
made between Hong Kong and China in this thesis for the purposes of 
transplantation. Reference of the protection of minority shareholders will be 
made to other legal systems. The US is very innovative and introduces majority 
shareholders’ fiduciary duty to minority shareholders and brings in cumulative 
voting mechanisms.246  Australia is by far doing quite well in the development of 
statutory remedies to minority shareholders. The UK, though very conservative, 
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remains a major influence in this area.247  
 
Legal transplantation from the Western countries obviously has its limitations.248 
Direct adoption of the Western laws without consideration of local cultures and 
values may result in failure in legal reforms.249 It is contended that culture is 
inherently and largely local and cannot be easily transplanted and remains 
rarely touched in discussions of corporate governance.250 Hong Kong is no 
longer a British colony, the practice of direct or selective adoption approaches 
ceased after the handover of sovereignty to China in 1997. I will examine the 
future reform and the transplantation of foreign company law into Hong Kong. I 
will also examine whether the transplantation of Hong Kong’s common law and 
equitable remedies into the Chinese legal system is viable or not.  
 
The above review of the literature shows that there is no unified approach as to 
successful legal transplantation; the arguments are beyond legal issues and 
extend to cover the historical, economic, cultural and political institutions. Both 
institutional transplantation theory and path dependence theory will be used in 
this thesis, this thesis argue that the historical structures shape the emerging 
and resulting structures. It is necessary to look into these factors which might 
hinder the feasibility of legal transplantation into Hong Kong and China. In this 
thesis, I will focus on the effects of the legal transplantation on Hong Kong and 
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China and examine the success and the failure of the transplants which have 
occurred in Hong Kong and China respectively. Drawing from the success of 
Hong Kong’s experience, I will examine which Hong Kong aspects could be 
used for the Chinese corporate governance reforms. 
 
2.2.1 Differing Chinese Cultural Ideologies  
In regard to Chinese cultural ideology, there are two schools of thought, namely, 
Confucianism (ru jia) and Legalism (fa jia). 251  Confucianism emphasises 
harmony, compromise, education and use of connection/relationship (guanxi)252 
with a resistance to using legal means.253 On the contrary, Legalism believes in 
centralised authority, competition, confrontation, strict adherence to law and 
severe punishment.254 In short, Confucianism is described as rule by man as 
the ruler sets himself as an example for his people to follow and the ruler 
possesses humaneness (ren), righteousness (yi), etiquette (li), knowledge (zhi) 
and integrity (xin). Legalism is described as rule by law as the ruler use law (fa), 
tactic (shu) and authority (shi) to rule the people. The influence of these schools 
has been varied over different period of time.255   
 
Hong Kong is a former British colony, the rule of law and the common law were 
directly transplanted from England.256 On the contrary, China is a communist 
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country and adopts Marxist ideology.257 The Chinese civil law system was 
shaped by the path set by the communism from the former Soviet Union.258 
There are undeniable socio-economic, political and legal differences between 
Hong Kong and China that might hinder the successful transplantation from 
Hong Kong into China.259 Therefore, I argue that direct transplantation of 
foreign law into China is not viable. I adopt the path dependence theory260 to 
explain the government’s policies and politics play a very important role in 
shaping the existing company law and corporate governance structure as the 
public ownership and the planned economy are adopted in China since its 
inception and these are its major barrier for direct transplantation.261  
 
2.2.1.1 Hong Kong  
Hong Kong has adopted the English model of company law and the 
Anglo-American model of corporate governance by legal transplantation since 
1843.262 The existing model has been adopted by the special administrative 
region government and has remained unchanged after the return of 
sovereignty to China under the Basic Law.263 Path dependent theory contends 
that the existing model is shaped by the initial path set in place during the 
British colonial period.264  
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Since Hong Kong adopts the rule of law, the independent judiciary,265 and the 
Anglo-American model of corporate governance, 266  these are the path 
dependents set by the initial colonial government.267 Under the ruling of British 
colonial government for over 150 years, the historical and cultural influences 
from China have less impact on the Hong Kong Chinese. They have accepted 
these foreign values since the colonial period and the traditional Chinese 
culture has lesser impact on them.268 I contend that the path dependence 
theory explains the effect of legal transplantation and the evolution of 
corporate governance in Hong Kong.  
 
2.2.1.2 China 
China was taken over by the CCP in 1949. The People’s Republic of China 
(PRC) was established by CCP in the same year, the CCP adopted the Marxist 
ideology to rule the country and to build a classless communist society.269 The 
process gradually turned the PRC into a centrally planned economy.270 The 
state maintains certain control over some public utilities companies and 
remains as a major shareholder of SOEs.271 Such control is path dependent 
on the initial ownership structure and the state’s control over the entire 
economy.272 Path dependence theorists postulate that a country’s patterns of 
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corporate governance are likely to depend on the patterns shaped by the 
system it had in place and set down at an earlier time. 273  The path 
dependence theory is able to explain why the state remains as a major 
shareholder and retains the management of most of the listed companies in 
China while no other theories are able to explain such control. 
 
The Chinese legal system is described as a bird cage.274 It is criticised that the 
Chinese legal cultures do not meet the Western standard of rule of law.275 
China is a nation that used to be governed by imperialism under the ruling of 
the King or the emperor and the system of absolute rule by man has a long 
history for more than 2,500 years.276 Over the years, Confucianism and 
Legalism have become the established legal norms and cultures in China.277 
Lubman contends that China is a rule by law rather than a rule of law country 
which affects the development of the Chinese legal system.278 Potter suggests 
that direct transplantation of foreign law does not suit the prevailing Chinese 
legal cultures. 279  Lau, Young and Li argue that given the fundamental 
difference in political ideologies and cultural attitudes, legal reform in China is 
not just a matter of changing a few laws or a few institutions to transform the 
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legal system.280 Ma contends that legal reform in China shall take into account  
its own political, socio-economic and cultural backgrounds.281 
 
In short, legal transplant is not only about transplanting the legislation.282 
Carothers283 suggests that the path of developing countries towards the rule 
of law culture has several stages of progression: legal transplantation and 
legislative reform is only the first stage and the most critical stage which 
involves institutional and structural reforms aiming at underpinning and 
strengthening the law-related institutions for more efficient, accountable and 
independent. The adoption of foreign legal forms may fit Hong Kong but does 
not fit in the prevailing Chinese rule by law culture as the rule of law is never 
rooted in the Chinese legal culture.284 I will elaborate my argument that 
different legal cultures and ideologies cause different legal transplantation 
effect on Hong Kong and China in Chapters Three and Six. 
 
2.3  Why Impose Legal Intervention to Protect Minority Shareholders  
Why is special protection offered to minority shareholders? Particularly in 
relation to the managerial power or voting right conferred by and under the 
doctrine of separation of ownership and management (by directors) or under 
the majority rule (by majority shareholders). Two issues need to be addressed: 
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is it appropriate to impose legal intervention to protect the minority 
shareholders? and if so, how much of legal intervention is justified? In this 
thesis, I seek to find a mechanism to strike a balance between majority rule 
and minority protection.  
 
2.3.1 Justifications for Legal Intervention 
Existing literature285 can be broadly divided into two schools of thought in this 
area, one argues that there is no justification for having strong protection of 
minority shareholders as there are other measures to encourage the 
managers to act in the best interests of the shareholders and other mechanism 
to allow the minority shareholders to exit.286 Conversely the other school 
advocates for strong protection as it promotes corporate governance and 
investors’ confidence. 287  I examine these schools to see whether it is 
justifiable to impose legal intervention in protecting the minority shareholders 
in Hong Kong and China.  
 
2.3.1.1 School Against Protection 
Traditionally, it is difficult for shareholders to take corporate litigation for the 
company under the proper plaintiff rule.288 Lowry and Dignam289 observe that 
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the judiciary’s reluctance to interference with management decisions under the 
business judgment rule and thus the shareholders are in a particularly weak 
position within the company’s matrix. Payne observes that shareholders’ 
litigation is designed to be complex and obscure, and this is deliberated as the 
purposes behind it is to prevent vexatious litigation.290 This view is also 
supported by Pettet who opines that if strong protection is offered to minority 
shareholders, they can abuse the process and increase the volume of 
litigation.291 
 
The fear of multiplicity of shareholders’ litigation is a policy argument that the 
government and judiciary do not support extensive use of litigation in 
companies’ activities. 292  This argument is supported by various doctrinal 
approaches under the business judgment rule,293 the internal management 
rule,294 the proper plaintiff and majority rules.295 Under the business judgment 
rule, it is not for the judges to make business judgment in companies in order 
to protect shareholders.296 The internal management rule holds that internal 
disputes amongst shareholders shall be resolved through internal rules and 
procedures and use of shareholders’ litigation is generally not supportable.297 
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Another doctrine, the proper plaintiff and majority rules only allow a company 
has standing to sue and shareholders have no such standing.298 It follows that 
the court will not interfere with the decision confirmed or ratified by majority 
shareholders. 299 Kim et al. argue that since majority shareholders invest more 
money, they deserve to have more power in the company.300 Dally argues that 
majority shareholders have substantial amount of investment in the companies, 
they should have superior position and opposes any fiduciary duty to be 
imposed on the majority shareholders as they are entitled to have a powerful 
position in the company.301 Means argues that too much minority protection 
will have a great impact on the vast majority of companies and cause 
disturbance and uncertainty in their businesses.302 
 
The other main opponents are contractarians. Contractarians303 consider that 
a company is merely premised on freedom of contract for its existence under a 
private contracting system. Company law should minimise their role in order to 
achieve efficiency and allow full market operation.304 Legal intervention incurs 
unnecessary costs and the investors may exercise their contractual rights or 
simply sell their shares as the way of exit is always open.305 
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2.4.1.2 School For Protection 
As a result of globalisation, investors are more easily to invest aboard. Good 
corporate governance and the protection of minority shareholders are one of 
the crucial elements for investors’ consideration.306 Dam argues that there is a 
strong link between law and economic growth, he suggests that a strong legal 
protection will enhance economic growth. 307  It follows that a good legal 
protection to investors will attract more investment from overseas and locally. 
The investors look for security for their investments regardless of being the 
local or overseas investors.308 From an economic point of view, minority 
protection is justifiable which can contribute to the economic growth. La Porta 
et al. suggest that a good protection for investors encourages developing a 
better financial market and attracts more foreign investors.309 Miles and He 
opine that a good system for protecting the minority shareholders is important 
particularly in a place where protection of the minority shareholders is weak.310 
Judge further suggests that an effective minority shareholder protection 
promotes transparency, accountability and investor confidence.311 
 
The other source of supporting minority protection is under the doctrine of 
equity and justice. Ramsay and Saunders argue that ‘when justice so requires’, 
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law shall be operated to protect the minority shareholders who are in a 
relatively weak position in the company.312 The equity and justice argument is 
based on equality at law, all shareholders be treated fairly and disregard the 
shareholder is majority or minority.313 In general, the legal position of minority 
shareholders in a company is inferior to that of the majority shareholders. If 
minority shareholder is in the vulnerable status subject to expropriation by the 
majority shareholders or the management, the law shall apply to them out of 
justice and provide them with protection. Abugu supports this argument for 
minority protection and law shall be operated in favour of minority shareholder 
on the basis of justice and fairness.314 Lowry and Dignam suggest that the 
purpose of law is to check and balance between majority rule and minority 
protection at an equilibrium level.315  
 
The other proponents are the agency, legal origin and communitarian theories. 
Jensen and Meckling argue that a proper mechanism must be in place to 
safeguard the interest of shareholders which can reduce the agency conflict 
between the minority shareholders and the controlling shareholders or 
managers.316 Legal origin theory suggests that a proper legal mechanism is 
required to regulate the majority shareholders and directors to promote 
corporate governance.317 Communitarian supports the lawmakers to impose 
                                                     
312
 Ramsay Ian and Saunders, Benjamin ‘Litigation by Shareholders and Directors: An 
Empirical Study of the Australian Statutory Derivative Action (2006) 6(2) JCLS 397. 
313
 ibid. 
314
 Abugu Joseph, ‘A Comparative Analysis of the extent of Judicial Discretion in Minority 
Shareholder Protection Litigation: the United Kingdom and United States’ (2007) 18 (5) ICCLR 
181. 
315
 Lowry John and Dignam Alan, Company Law (Lexis Nexis Butterworths 2003) 171. 
316
 Jensen Michael and Meckling William, ‘Theory of the Firm : Managerial Behaviour, Agency 
Costs and Ownership Structure,’ (1976) 3 Journal of Financial Economic, 305. 
317
 La Porta Rafael and others, ‘Investor Protection and Corporate Valuation’ (2002) 57 
Journal of Finance 1147. 
  
 
80 
 
statutory duties on directors and majority shareholders and argues that legal 
intervention can assist the parties to achieve optimum efficiency.318 Boyle and 
Birds opine that the mechanism for protecting minority shareholders is not aim 
at limiting the power of majority shareholders but to prevent their misuse and 
abuse and the minority shareholders always have measures to redress the 
wrongdoing.319  
 
In response to the arguments from these schools, I agree that more power and 
authority should be given to majority shareholders who invest more in the 
company. However, this is not say that the power and authority are without limit 
and minority shareholder has nothing but only the law to protect them. I reject 
the argument from contractarians that law can be replaced by contract as it is 
always incomplete and cannot provide full protection to minority shareholders 
and only law can offer a comprehensive protection. 
 
2.3.2 How Much of Legal Intervention  
In regard to second issue as to how much of legal intervention is justified, it is a 
very difficult question to answer. Contractarian argues that too much 
intervention will reduce the freedom of private contracting and market 
efficiency.320 On the other hand, communitarian contends that intervention can 
ensure freedom of investors, facilitate market efficiency and reduce costs of 
private contracting.321 
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The state must reconcile the two different schools in determining how much of 
intervention should be imposed. Path dependence theory provides a good 
foundation for the lawmakers.322 It is contended the existing pattern is shaped 
by the path that was set in place in earlier times and the path includes 
economic, political and legal factors and the government politics are important 
to shape the corporate governance and the protection of minority 
shareholders. 323  To this end, Chapter Three will discuss the paths of 
developing corporate law and governance in Hong Kong and China. It is useful 
to give an overview, I only discuss in the following part in brief. 
 
2.3.2.1 Hong Kong 
The British colonial government in Hong Kong followed a free market economy 
mechanism with minimum government intervention.324 The laissez-faire policy 
based on the capitalism, the common law system and the English model of 
company law have been adopted for more than 150 years. The colonial policy 
has been adopted by the special administrative region government after the 
handover in 1997 and is consistent with the path dependence theory. 
 
Hong Kong adopts the laissez-faire policy which is contrary to the principles of 
communitarian. Contractarian is applicable to Hong Kong where there is a full 
functioning market economy and a rule of law system though ownership is 
concentrated within family members.325 I suggest that places such as Hong 
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Kong where the perception of rule of law is widely-held and the market 
mechanism is fully functioned as part of the established cultures and norms, 
the contractarian approach should be adopted with less legal intervention. The 
need for mandatory minority protection is lesser as investors can easily sell 
their shares in the competitive market.  
 
2.3.2.2 China  
Before the Open Door Policy implemented in 1978, all the business 
enterprises were dominated by the state. The CCP upholds the principles of 
communist public ownership. The state acts as a majority shareholder326 in 
many listed corporations. 327  The state policy plays an important role in 
shaping the protection of minority shareholders. The PRC Company Law is a 
product of the economic policy of the CCP.328 This is consistent with the 
principles of ‘rule the country by law’ under the PRC Constitution.329 The legal 
mechanisms for the protection of shareholders are an important indicator of 
the success of the capital markets in attracting foreign capital. Jiang opines 
that this is a tough and challenge task to provide adequate mechanism to 
protect shareholders in China.330 Art and Gu opine that minority shareholders 
in China normally rely on administrative sanctions rather than on derivative or 
personal actions against the wrongdoers that causes loss to them and the 
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company as their counterparts do in Hong Kong.331 Osgathorpe points out that 
by being a majority shareholder of the companies, the state maintains control 
over the companies from a non-regulatory position, the state frees itself of 
micro-management but retains a visible hand in the companies and this visible 
hand is used to ensure that the companies do not derivate from the state 
objectives.332  
 
Many academics opine that ‘the interests of minority shareholders are not well 
protected in China,’ and ‘there is no legal framework in place to protect the 
minority shareholder’s rights’.333 Brain contends that the protection of private 
and individual shareholders is becoming an important corporate governance 
topic in China. 334  China with high concentrated ownership and less 
competitive market economy, contractarian is inapplicable to China. There is a 
conflicting role for the state as both regulator and shareholder. Communitarian 
approach should be adopted to improve the weak protection to minority 
shareholders in China. The need to have mandatory minority protection in 
China is greater than that in Hong Kong. 
 
2.4 The Protection of Minority Shareholders in Hong Kong and China 
There are various legal remedies available under the company law for the 
protection of minority shareholders if the shareholders choose to enforce their 
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rights at court. In this thesis, I argue that the Hong Kong minority shareholders 
protection regime has been shaped by the English model and the PRC 
Company Law has been shaped by the CCP’s policy. The shareholders 
remedies include the derivative action, direct action, unfair prejudice claim, 
and just and equitable winding up action which have been existed in the 
colonial period in Hong Kong.335 Likewise, the shareholders remedies in China 
include the direct, derivative and winding up actions and remedies to set aside 
resolutions.  
 
2.4.1 Hong Kong  
Hong Kong follows the English traditions and has extensive remedies to 
minority shareholders under the company legislation, common law and equity. 
The Hong Kong Companies Ordinance 2014 has been recently amended.336 
The recent amendments have been made after a series of researches, reviews 
and consultations since 2006, it shows how Hong Kong lawmakers diagnosed 
the problems of minority protection and offered recommendations for 
reform.337 It might be argued that the new Hong Kong Companies Ordinance 
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is one of the most advanced legislation in Asia which offers a very efficient and 
effective mechanism to protect minority shareholders and can be used as a 
reference for the Chinese reform.  
 
2.4.2 China  
The Chinese company laws are modelled on the foreign company laws.338 
The PRC Company Law 2005 provides the shareholder with the right to 
challenge the validity of shareholders’ and board’s resolutions,339 the right to 
sue wrongdoers by derivative action340 or by direct action,341 and the right to 
wind up a company342 which are very similar to the shareholders’ remedies in 
Hong Kong. I will present my argument that the Hong Kong and Chinese 
company laws in terms of minority protection have some degree of 
convergence in Chapter Four.  
 
2.5 The Deficiencies of Protection of Minority Shareholders in Hong 
Kong and China 
Armour et al. suggest that one of the main functions of company law is to solve 
the generic agency problems which arise out of the company law doctrine.343 
It follows that one of the principal functions of company law is to protect 
minority shareholders and to provide a mechanism to reduce agency 
conflicts344 The following part discusses the deficiencies of minority protection 
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in Hong Kong and China. 
 
2.5.1 Hong Kong 
Hong Kong was seized by Britain during the Opium Wars and became a 
colony in 1843. Arjunan and Low opine that the company law in England was 
directly applicable to Hong Kong as all the English laws existed on 4 April 1843 
were applicable to Hong Kong as if they were appropriate to the circumstances 
of Hong Kong and its inhabitants.345 The English model of company law and 
the Anglo-American corporate governance were transplanted into Hong Kong 
accordingly.346 
 
Tyler contends that the first company legislation of Hong Kong in 1865 was 
directly transplanted from the Companies Act 1862 in England.347 It was not 
until 1984 when the practice of direct adoption approach was changed and a 
local version of Companies Ordinance was enacted. Bates describes the 
change from the direct adoption to localization of company legislation as a 
great leap forward to Hong Kong company law.348 The practice of direct and 
selective adoption approaches were used until the handover of sovereignty of 
Hong Kong to China in 1997. The Hong Kong special administrative region 
government introduced the new Companies Bill into the Legislative Council in 
2012 and the new Companies Ordinance is effective in 2014. It is a complete 
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local version of legislation and includes new features to enhance protection of 
minority shareholders.349 
 
In Chapter Four, I will argue that the company law in Hong Kong is better than 
that in China, however, it is not without problem.350 It is criticised that the 
scope of the statutory derivative action is too narrow,351 the remedies for 
derivative and unfair prejudicial actions are too limited,352 and the problems of 
co-extensive common law and statutory derivative actions and the bar on the 
statutory derivative action by shareholders’ ratification 353  are barriers for 
minority protection.354 To this end, I suggest that the Australian model can be a 
good reference for Hong Kong reform.355  
 
In terms of corporate governance, Hong Kong has a highly concentrated 
ownership structure. 356  The Standing Committee on the Company Law 
Reform (SCCLR) in Hong Kong identifies two local features of listed 
companies: they are predominantly family-owned and their shares are often 
rather illiquid in the stock market.357 Von Nessen et al. opine that these two 
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local features explain why stronger shareholder protection in terms of the right 
to take legal action is necessary in Hong Kong.358 La Porta et al. reveal that a 
high concentration of ownership may lead to poor legal protection of 
investors.359 
 
The legal origin theory is unable to explain the situation of Hong Kong where 
Hong Kong companies are closely-held, there is a system with good protection 
of investors and accounting standards.360 Hong Kong adopts the common law 
system and the rule of law and therefore provides better protection to investors, 
whereas China adopts the civil law system and the rule by law and therefore 
have less protection to investors.361 Over 99% of the companies registered in 
Hong Kong are non-listed companies which are usually owned and managed by 
one major shareholder and family-owned shareholders. 362  These unique 
features are worth studying in terms of good corporate governance and 
protection of minority shareholders.363  
 
It is contended that the US-style approach of corporate governance under the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act should be introduced to and made mandatory for all 
companies in Asia including Hong Kong. 364  The Anglo-American style of 
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corporate governance does not suit to all Asian companies as the codes of 
corporate governance compliance in Asia are only voluntary and any deviation 
from the codes can be excused with explanation and the sanctions are largely 
on an administrative basis. Lau et al. suggest that if the Western codes of 
corporate governance are adopted, mandatory compliance is recommended.365 
 
In each of the two case studies, a subsidiary company was used. The use of 
parent and subsidiary companies has become more common in modern 
business dealings, and disputes between shareholders may result in 
litigation.366 Recently, Hong Kong has followed the common law patterns and 
amended the Companies Ordinance to allow multiple derivative action.367 I will 
examine the foreign company law for the purposes of legislative reform of 
Hong Kong company law in Chapter Six. 
 
2.5.2 China 
The Chinese Company Laws were transplanted from the European and the 
Anglo-American countries.368 It has been criticised that such legal borrowing 
from the West does not always work well in China.369 Potter considers that 
                                                                                                                                                        
scandals of Enron and Worldcom. It is a US federal law for all US public and private 
companies, provision includes the willful destruction of evidence to impede a Federal 
investigation. Top management of the company must individually certify the accuracy of 
financial information and penalties for fraudulent financial activity are very severe. See Lau 
Alex, Nowland John and Young Angus, ‘In Search of Good Governance for Asian Family 
Listed Companies: A Case Study in Hong Kong’ (2007) 28(10) Co Law 309. 
365
 ibid. 
366
 For example, in Waddington Limited v Chan Chun Hoo Thomas and others [2009] 4 HKC 
381, a minority shareholder of a parent holding company was allowed to take multiple 
derivative action for its subsidiary companies under common law. 
367
 Hong Kong Companies Ordinance, section 732 Cap. 622 (formerly the Hong Kong 
Companies Ordinance, section 168BC Cap.32). 
368
 Gu Minkang, Understanding Chinese Company Law (2006) (HKU Press 2006) 8. 
369
 So Billy, ‘Law Without Heaven? Impact of Yan Fu's Translation of Evolution and Ethics by 
Thomas Huxley on the Chinese Legal Culture in the Early Twentieth Century’ (2010) 6(5) 
Tsinghua Law Journal 1 in Chinese 蘇基朗 有法無天？嚴復譯《天演論》對 20 世紀初中國法律
  
 
90 
 
despite the influences exerted by foreign legal norms, the influence of local 
legal culture, and particularly the influence of informal connection/relationship 
(guanxi) are increasingly evident in the behavior of lawyers and legal 
officials.370 The cultural differences affect the Chinese perception of rule of law 
in China.371 Unlike the Hong Kong company law which was transplanted from 
the English company law to facilitate business efficacy; the Chinese company 
law was modelled on the Western company laws but it was actually a creature 
of policies of the emperors or ruling parties to facilitate their governances.372  
 
Many scholars criticise that the main problem of Chinese company law is that 
rules as written are not always applied.373 Van Hoecke and Warrington argue 
that law is more than just a set of rules or concepts, it is also a social practice 
within a legal community and this social practice is determining the actual 
meaning of the rules and concepts, their weight, their implementation and their 
role in society.374 Watson contends that many people including lawyers and 
judges are usually unaware of the importance of the legal culture.375  
 
Tenev and Zhang contend that China is determined to protect minority 
shareholders and some of the corporate governance provisions are even 
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stricter than those in Hong Kong and other developed markets on paper.376 In 
practice, the Chinese corporate governance is under-developed,377 this is not 
due to the corporate law itself but the other structures in place. Young argues 
that Chinese legal system is reminiscent of the Confucian system rooted in the 
relation than rule-based governance.378 The local culture and features must 
be taken into account such as the perception of rule of law and competent and 
independent judiciary. In this study, I suggest that the reform in China involves 
both legislative and structural changes. 
 
Unlike those in the common law system, company law remedies for minority 
shareholders in China rely on the continental principles rather than the 
equitable principles.379 In China, in addition to the existing legal remedies 
such as the derivative action, the setting aside resolution and the winding up, 
Ma suggests considering the introduction and transplantation of equitable 
remedies into the company legislation including the unfair prejudicial conduct 
petition and the just and equitable winding up in strengthening corporate 
governance and minority protection.380 It is advised that China should adopt 
and transplant the common law equitable doctrine into the Chinese company 
law in view of the modern tendency for companies to have uncountable 
subsidiaries and associated undertakings.381  
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Companies in China also have highly concentrated ownership structures, 
which are different from those of Hong Kong and adopt the German model of 
corporate governance.382 The corporate ownership structures of most listed 
companies in China are still controlled by the state.383 It is contended that a 
highest ownership concentration leads to the least protection for 
shareholders.384 High occurrence of parent and subsidiary control is observed 
amongst the listed companies in China.385  The relationship between the 
parent and subsidiary companies in China should be better regulated to 
reduce further damage to the interests of minority shareholders. 386  The 
existing company law shall be examined and the issues covering the parent 
and subsidiary companies structure will be addressed. I will examine the 
various remedies to minority shareholders and their deficiencies and then 
compare them with the foreign company law to see whether it is viable to 
transplant the elements of foreign company law including the common law 
equitable doctrine and Western corporate governance codes into the Chinese 
civil law system in Chapter Four. 
 
In summary, different legal theories suggest that different factors may have a 
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more influence to the development of corporate governance. La Porta et al. 
find that the law matters in the development of corporate governance.387 
Bebchuk and Roe place the importance on history which links the past to the 
present. 388  Easterbrook argues that international differences in corporate 
governance are attributable more to differences in markets and economies 
than to differences in law.389 Watson argues that the local culture is a major 
barrier for the transplantation of foreign law.390 Roe emphasises that politics is 
the critical determinant; and that legal differences simply flow from the deeply 
rooted political values. 391  Hansmann and Kraakman contend that the 
outstanding issue for corporate governance is on the divergence of structural 
and institutional differences.392 Ma opines that a more fundamental issue of 
different historical, social-economic, political and legal structures and 
institutions has been largely neglected in the existing literature of comparative 
study of shareholders’ remedies.393 In this thesis, I contend that the Chinese 
company law is not enacted for efficiency reason and the issues for minority 
protection are the institutional and structural differences. I take a broader view 
that the factors affecting corporate governance include the historical, economic, 
cultural, legal and political structures and institutions. I will examine these 
structures for the corporate governance reform, namely, the legislative and 
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structural issues of the protection of minority shareholders in Chapter Six. 
 
2.7  Concluding Remarks  
This research is related to several unique characteristics in Hong Kong and 
China. Firstly, Hong Kong practices the common law legal system whereas 
China practices the civil law legal system. Secondly, Hong Kong and China 
share the same characteristic of high concentration of ownership. Finally, the 
different legal effects result from the transplantation of foreign company law into 
Hong Kong and China.  
 
This chapter offers an analysis of the fundamental aspects of corporate law 
and governance in Hong Kong and China. The Anglo-American model of 
corporate governance in Hong Kong was based on the British regime as part 
of the colonial policy; and the state intervention in corporate activities and the 
high concentrated ownership system in China are the policy of the CCP. In this 
thesis, I adopt the corporate law and governance theories to explain the 
transplantation effect of company law and the justification of imposing legal 
intervention in protecting minority shareholders in Hong Kong and China. 
These theories are able to explain Hong Kong company law. Surprisingly, 
some theories are also applicable to Chinese company law. The theoretical 
debate is a good foundation to assist us in our understanding of Chinese 
company law from a theoretical basis. The theoretical framework also 
articulates the legal basis for this thesis and provides a solid ground to explore 
the feasibility of legal transplantation into Hong Kong and China.  
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In Chapter Three, I will use the path dependence theory to explain the path of 
developing corporate governance structures and economic, social and legal 
institutions in Hong Kong and China and then identify their problems. The 
examination of historical path of these institutions will enable us to have better 
understanding of the rule and structure paths that these two places have gone 
through and provide the foundation for a subsequent legal analysis of corporate 
governance and minority protection in Hong Kong and China. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND THE STRUCTURAL PATHS 
 IN HONG KONG AND CHINA 
3.0 Introduction 
In Chapter Two, I reviewed the literature and identified a number of factors that 
contribute to the impediments of convergence of corporate governance. The 
legal origin theory suggests that the origin of law is a key element for 
protection of minority shareholders394 and the correlation between ownership 
concentration and protection of minority shareholders is negative.395 The path 
dependence theory contends that history has had an enduring influence on the 
current conditions and the dependence of outcomes on the path of previous 
outcomes; and the two sources for the present corporate law and governance 
are the initial rule-driven path and structure-driven path.396 It is necessary to 
identify the factors that impede convergence of corporate governance in Hong 
Kong and China. 
 
In this chapter, I use the cases of Hong Kong and China to argue that the path 
dependence theory is more important than the legal origin theory in explaining 
the corporate governance and protection of minority shareholders in Hong 
Kong and China. I discuss the paths of developing corporate law and 
governance in Hong Kong and China and present an argument that the past 
strongly influences the present in relation to the development of corporate law 
and its relationship with the economic, social, and political structures and 
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institutions in accordance with the path dependence theory. I argue that 
corporate governance reform and the legal transplantation into China without 
considering the historical path is bound to fail, the transplanted PRC Company 
Law is well-developed on paper but not in practice, its problems lie in the 
structures and not in the origin of law, and the reform involves both legislative 
and structural changes.  
  
The contention of this chapter is that the evolution of corporate law and 
governance in Hong Kong and China is dependent on and responsive to the 
local economic, social, and political paths. This chapter adopts the 
socio-economic and political approach to compare the basis of social and 
cultural perception of: rule of law; unique and distinctive features of local 
tradition, and practices of corruption; the effectiveness of market mechanisms 
for minority protection; the freedom of economic policy and the nature of share 
ownership; the accessibility to company law by the shareholders; the legal 
origin of the legal system; the political ideology of the government; and the 
independence of the judicial system between Hong Kong and China. 
 
This chapter is structured as follows: the first part examines the evolution of 
corporate law and governance in Hong Kong and China; and the second part 
examines the evolution of economic, social, and political institutions in Hong 
Kong and China. Finally, some concluding remarks are given. 
 
3.1 Paths of Developing Corporate Law and Governance 
The two case studies involve the oppression of minority shareholders in Hong 
Kong and China. In order to compare the Hong Kong common law and the 
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Chinese civil law systems in the case studies, it is important to examine them 
from the historical perspective. The Hong Kong and Chinese company laws 
developed under different backgrounds and driven by different forces. In my 
view, the historical analysis is useful for two reasons. Firstly, it provides a good 
understanding of the background and the reasons for the current status. 
Secondly, it articulates a basis for future reforms. David contends that the path 
dependence places importance on history that links the past to the present and 
the future so that institutions are described as the ‘carriers of history’.397 
 
Gower opines that company law cannot be properly understood without 
reference to its background.398 The present form of company law is a result of 
what has happened in the past.399 The historical analysis of company law in 
Hong Kong and China articulates a basis for the understanding of different 
legal effects of transplantation of foreign company law into two places,400 and 
the possibility of further transplantation for the purposes of future reform.401 
Pistor et al. consider that foreign law does not become well integrated into the 
countries and a direct transplantation is not always suitable for countries with 
less well developed legal structures as the countries adopting foreign law are 
always unprepared for the changes it brings.402 I argue that the development 
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of corporate law is a path-dependent process that requires looking at the 
history and linking it to the current condition in this chapter. 
 
I seek to identify the problems of minority shareholder protection in this chapter 
with the following questions. Does the high concentration of ownership lead to 
poor legal protection of minority shareholders in Hong Kong and China? Is the 
protection of minority shareholders better under the Hong Kong common law 
system than under the Chinese civil law system? If so, why? Is it due to 
different effects of legal transplantation, or does history matter in the 
development of corporate law and governance?  
 
3.1.1 Development of Corporate Law and Governance in Hong Kong  
Hong Kong was a British colony and its legal system and company law were 
modelled on the common law jurisdictions.403 Hong Kong company law and 
minority shareholder protection are based on the UK model 404  and its 
development has followed the development in England.405 Gu argues that the 
development of Hong Kong company law has a close connection with Hong 
Kong’s historical status as a British colony.406 It is necessary to discuss briefly 
the development of company law in the English common law jurisdictions and 
its legal transplantation into Hong Kong. This part presents an argument that 
the present company law of Hong Kong is strongly influenced by the initial 
path. 
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3.1.1.1 Direct Transplantation as a British Colony  
In the common law jurisdictions, company law originated from the UK. The 
origins of company law can be traced back to medieval times. It is worthwhile 
examining the historical development of company law in the UK and how it was 
transplanted into Hong Kong. The first company law began with the event of 
the South Sea Bubble at the instigation of the stock market in 1719. The British 
government attempted to intervene and suppress the speculative mood that 
caused panic and led to the crash of the stock market, and many investors 
were ruined. Lowry and Dignam describe that the Bubble Act, passed in 1720, 
was to require all joint stock companies to receive a Royal Charter and to 
prevent speculation on the stock market by imposing restrictive conditions in 
the grant of charters. 407  The earlier British government adopted the 
concession approach in allowing a company to obtain a grant of charter. 
 
In 1844, the Joint Stock Companies Act was passed by the British government 
to allow a company to be incorporated without Royal Charter or the special Act. 
However, these two pieces of legislation did not provide limited liability to the 
company’s members. The concept of limited liability was first adopted by the 
Limited Liability Act of 1855. The Act offered protection to the shareholders 
whereby the shareholders were only liable to the extent of the value of shares 
subscribed, but not to the debts of the company. In other words, shareholders 
were different from the company and were not liable for the debt of the 
company, they were only liable to the extent of the value of the shares and the 
concept of limited liability was then introduced into the English law.408 One 
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year later, the Joint Stock Companies Act 1856 was enacted and the 
frameworks for the modern-style company, incorporated by registration, and 
enjoying limited liability were established.409 The implication and applicability 
of the legal concept of limited liability was only examined some forty two years 
later in a landmark case by a court of law in the UK.410 
 
Thereafter there has been major consolidation of legislation at regular intervals, 
such as the English Companies Act in 1862, 1908, 1929, 1948 and 1985 and 
the most recent consolidation is the Companies Act 2006. The enactment of 
the first Hong Kong company legislation in 1865 by the colonial government 
was based on the English Companies Act 1862,411 and primarily to benefit 
British business interests and investments in the colony. 412  Today, the 
Companies Act 2006 remains the core legislation.413 The present British 
government adopts the contractarian approach in the English company 
legislation where a standard form of contract is provided in the Model Articles. 
Shareholders in general are not entitled to take part in management and only 
in limited circumstances may take shareholders’ action.414  
 
The principle of separate legal personality is firmly upheld and is the 
cornerstone of English company law and was established by the leading case 
of Salomon v Salomon Co Ltd in the House of Lords in 1897.415 The doctrine 
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was later approved and followed in a case where the controlling shareholder 
and the sole employee of a company was able to claim pension 
compensation,416  and in an insurance where that a shareholder had no 
insurable interest in the company’s assets. 417  These English cases and 
principles are still valid and applicable to Hong Kong. 
 
Today, as a member state of the European Union since 1972, the UK 
government must ensure that its company law is not significantly different from 
that of the rest of the Union. This is known as ‘harmonisation’ of company law 
within the European Union.418 Any amendment to the existing company law 
must not be inconsistent with the law of the European Union in general. The 
importance of path dependence in determining corporate governance can be 
seen in the European Union where many member-countries are moving 
towards a single system. The impact of path dependence might disappear 
when the power to make corporate law in each country is removed and the 
power vests in one single body, the stakeholders are restricted in their capacity 
to influence future structural change.419 
 
The English company law principles were gradually developed and became a 
well-defined doctrine and were then transplanted into the company law of other 
                                                                                                                                                        
purchase his own business, the other shareholders and directors were all relatives of the 
plaintiff. Later the company went into liquidation and the plaintiff wanted to enforce the 
debenture for recovering the loan to the company. His claim succeeded on the ground of 
separate legal personality that the company was separate and different from the shareholders. 
416
 Lee v Lee’s Air Farming Ltd [1961] AC 12. 
417
 Macaura v Northern Assurance Co Ltd [1925] AC 619. 
418
 Under the European Communities Act 1972, the United Kingdom must honour its 
obligations to implement EC directives and under Article 44(2) (g) of the Treaty of Rome 1957, 
member states shall ensure ‘harmonisation’ of company law, see Derek French, Stephen 
Mayson and Christopher Ryan, Mayson, French and Ryan on Company Law (OUP 2002) 28. 
419
 Bebchuk Lucian and Roe Mark, ‘A Theory of Path Dependence in Corporate Ownership 
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British colonies such as Australia and Hong Kong. The transplantation of 
English company law into Hong Kong began in 1843 as part of colonial policy. 
Hong Kong, as a British colony, received the common law based institutions 
that emphasise strong protection of individual legal rights, and this is path 
dependence in Hong Kong. 
 
Hong Kong became a British colony in 1843 as a result of the Opium Wars. It 
was a small fishing village and had no business enterprises or company 
legislation. As a British colony, the English market economy, the rule of law, 
and an independent judicial system were adopted by the colonial 
government.420 English laws, including company law, which were appropriate 
to the circumstances of Hong Kong, were directly applicable to Hong Kong.421 
In addition, the executive system was also transplanted to Hong Kong.422 The 
colonial government decided to enact the first Hong Kong Companies 
Ordinance in 1865 by direct transplantation from the English Companies Act 
1862. 423  Thereafter, the Hong Kong Companies Ordinance 1911 was 
modelled on the provisions of the English Companies Act 1908 and the Hong 
Kong Companies Ordinance 1932 was modelled on the provisions of the 
English Companies Act 1929 respectively. The English Companies Act had a 
                                                     
420
 Prior to be a British colony, Hong Kong followed Chinese legal system and only had lawyer 
as a legal profession. The legal profession in England includes two branches, namely, 
Barrister and Solicitor and were introduced to Hong Kong. The Supreme Court Ordinance 
1844 set up the structure of Hong Kong Courts. See Carver Anne, ‘The Background of Hong 
Kong Legal System’ in Hong Kong Business Law (Longman 2004) 13. 
421
 Krishnan Arjunan and Low CK, Lipton and Herzberg’s Understanding Company Law in 
Hong Kong (LBC Information Services Press 1996) 3 and under the Application of English Law 
Ordinance, Cap. 88 (now repealed). 
422
 Letters Patent and Royal Instructions provided the executive and governmental structures 
of colonial government. See Carver Anne, ‘The Background of Hong Kong Legal System’ in 
Hong Kong Business Law (Longman 2004) 13. 
423
 Tyler Ted, ‘Background to Hong Kong’s Companies Legislation and Review’ (Unpublished 
Paper, 1995) 20. The Hong Kong company legislation was known as the Companies 
Ordinance, Chapter 32, Laws of Hong Kong which was modelled on the English Companies 
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great impact on the Hong Kong Companies Ordinance. As a result of legal 
transplantation of the English company law into Hong Kong, both agency and 
contractarian theories are able to explain the situation in Hong Kong. The 
doctrine of separation of ownership and management is followed, and the 
Berle and Means type corporations exist in Hong Kong. The Hong Kong 
company legislation also provides a standard form of contract to shareholders 
in the Model Articles.424 
 
In 1962, the colonial government considered that the direct adoption of the 
English model of company legislation could no longer serve the demand from 
the Hong Kong market and it was necessary to have a local version of Hong 
Kong Companies Ordinance. The colonial government decided to set up its 
own Companies Law Revision Committee to make local company law.425 The 
Committee tabled two reports, Protection of Investors in 1971 and Company 
Law in 1973.426 It was the first time the local elements and conditions in Hong 
Kong were taken into account without direct adoption of the English 
Companies Act. Bates opines that the enactment of the local version of the 
Companies Ordinance in 1984 was as a great leap forward.427  
 
3.1.1.2 Selective Transplantation as a Special Administrative Region  
Since 1984, the Hong Kong Companies Ordinance had been comprehensively 
revised and localised, and ceased the practice of direct adoption of the English 
                                                     
424
 Following the new amendment of the Companies Ordinance effective in 3 March 2014, 
Table A Articles is replaced by the Model Articles to be prescribed by the Financial Secretary 
by notice published in the Gazette.  
425
 Hong Kong Government Gazette, 19 April, 1962, Notification No. 837. 
426
 Hong Kong Government Companies Law Revision Committee, Second Report (HK Co 
Law Govt Rev, 1973). 
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model of the Companies Act. Although the direct adoption approach was 
replaced by the selective adoption approach, English company legislation still 
has a great impact on Hong Kong company legislation. The common law 
model of company law in the Hong Kong special administrative region will 
continue to have same legal force under the Basic Law, a mini-constitution for 
Hong Kong.428 The adoption of the English company law model was the 
colonial policy and politics, and this is a rule-driven path in Hong Kong. I 
suggest that this can be explained by the path dependence theory. Applying 
the path dependence theory to the new regions such as Hong Kong separated 
them from other former colonial dependencies. Levi argues that once a country 
or region has started down a track, the costs of reversal are very high and 
there will be other choice points, but the entrenchments of certain institutional 
arrangements obstruct an easy reversal of the initial choice.429 I opine that the 
path dependence theory explains why China allows Hong Kong to adopt a 
system different from its own.  
 
Over the years, Hong Kong has become one of the major financial centres in 
the world.430 The Hong Kong Stock Exchange (HKSE) is one of the world’s 
largest stock markets and many foreign companies including Chinese 
companies are listed on the HKSE. There are 1,643 listed companies, 797 of 
which are from mainland China, 742 from Hong Kong and 104 from other 
                                                     
428
 Article 8 of the Basic Law. Basic Law is enacted by Chinese Legislature in accordance with 
the Joint Declaration signed by the British and the Chinese governments, which states that all 
the laws previously in force will continue to have the same legal effect after the handover 
429
 Margaret Levi, ‘A Model, A Method, and A Map: Rational Choice in Comparative and 
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countries.431 It maintains a highly developed capitalist market economy and is 
always regarded as the freest market in the world.432 The government of Hong 
Kong is committed to implement the laissez-faire policy and provide good 
financial and economical infrastructures to foreign and local investors. There is 
a strong demand for highly developed company laws and regulations and the 
government is committed to adopting the leading overseas corporate rules and 
standards in order to meet the local and international demands.433 
 
In view of the rapid development of the local market, the practice of direct 
adoption and selective adoption approaches changed after the handover of 
sovereignty of Hong Kong to China. The Financial Services and Treasury 
Bureau (FSTB) of the Hong Kong government conducted a comprehensive 
review of the Hong Kong Companies Ordinance in 2006. The first phase was 
launched in December 2009 and concluded in March 2010, with consultation 
conclusions issued in August 2010. The second phase of the public 
consultation on the Companies Bill was conducted by the FSTB with 
conclusions published in October 2010. The FSTB introduced the new 
Companies Bill into the Legislative Council in July 2012 and implemented the 
new Companies Ordinance in March 2014.434 The rewrite of the Companies 
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 As of 30 November 2013, there are 1,643 listed companies listed on the Hong Kong Stock 
Exchange. Source: <http://www.hkex.com.hk/eng/listing/listhk/our_markets.htm> accessed 23 
January 2014. 
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Ordinance is part of the government commitment to enhance Hong Kong’s 
competiveness as a major international financial and business centre. 
Sihombing and Tyler observe that the rewrite adopts many English legislative 
principles.435 I contend that Hong Kong is no longer a British colony but that 
English company law still has a strong influence on the development of Hong 
Kong company law and this is a rule-driven path of Hong Kong according to 
the path dependence theory. 
 
In addition to the influence of company legislation, it is an overwhelming 
characteristic of common law that besides legislation the case or judgment 
forms part of the law, which is different from that in civil law jurisdictions.436 
The codification of the legal principles in case law is the tendency in the 
                                                                                                                                                        
commenced in the Companies (Amendment) Ordinance 2010, parts of which came in force on 
10 December 2010 and the final stage of amendments is commenced in the first quarter of 
2014. The New Hong Kong Companies Ordinance (Chapter 622 of the Laws of Hong Kong) is 
fully implemented on 3rd March 2014. The provisions about insolvency and winding up in the 
Hong Kong Companies Ordinance (Chapter 32 of the Laws of Hong Kong) are retained but 
retitled as the ‘Companies (Winding Up and Miscellaneous Provisions) Ordinance (Cap. 32)’. 
The major changes include codifying director’s duties to exercise reasonable care, skill and 
diligence under sections 465 to 466. There is a new two tests: in performing duties, a director 
must bring to bear his or her own skills and experience (a subjective test), as well as those that 
any director in that position would be presumed to have (an objective test). While this 
represents a codification of the existing case law, it is now a statutory requirement. The duties 
apply to shadow directors in the same way they do to directors. The new amendment does not 
codify the common law fiduciary duties, and these will remain subject to common law. The new 
amendment also states that the person who can be liable is a ‘responsible officer’. This means 
that not just directors and the company secretary, but also shadow directors or a corporate 
officer of the company, are responsible and may be culpable and is a considerably broader 
reach under the new amendment. Sources: 
<http://www.dlapiper.com/hongkong/publications/detail.aspx?pub=8050> and 
<http://www.cr.gov.hk/en/publications/docs/042008_ch3-e.pdf> accessed 13 March 2014. 
435
 Sihombing Judith, ‘The New Companies Ordinance’ (Seminar Paper presented at the 
Hong Kong Academy of Law, Hong Kong SAR, 10 Jan 2014) and Tyler Ted, ‘Perspectives on 
The New Companies Ordinance, The Process and Some Outcomes’(Conference Paper 
presented at the Centre of Financial Regulation and Economic Development of the CUHK, 
Hong Kong SAR, 30 Jan 2013) both consider more influences for the rewrite Hong Kong 
Companies Ordinance from Australia and Singapore besides the UK, they consider that Hong 
Kong government not only benchmark Hong Kong against the UK but also against Australia 
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development of company law in common law jurisdictions.437 Nilubol argues 
that the differences between the common law and the civil law systems are 
blurring.438 Nonetheless, many important aspects of company law are still 
governed by case law, for instance, the principle of separate legal entity,439 the 
fiduciary duties of a director,440 and the shareholders’ right to bring legal 
action.441 The unique feature of precedent is that the judiciary is independent 
to decide the case and its judgment can evolve over time in response to 
changes in the political environment.442 Furthermore, it has better flexibility 
than legislation and can develop over time in response to a change of 
environment, for example, a multiple derivative action was not allowed under 
the companies’ legislation but was possible at common law.443 
 
The above discussion shows that due to the historical path, the transplantation 
of the common law model of company law from Britain to Hong Kong was 
based on colonial policy. I contend that the colonial policy was viable as Hong 
Kong was also transplanted with other structures such as its independent 
judiciary, free market economy, self-regulatory mechanisms, and laissez-faire 
policy. The English model is highly dependent on the existence of a free 
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 In Australia, directors’ duties were codified under section 180 of the Australian 
Corporations Act 2001. Similarly, the Company Law Review Steering Group of the Department 
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market mechanism with competitive constraints.444 I argue that the existing 
company law was shaped by the initial colonial path and this is the rule-driven 
path in Hong Kong. The Hong Kong special administrative region government 
has continued the colonial policy since the handover of sovereignty to China. 
Hong Kong is an illustration that direct legal transplantation is only applicable 
to a place with strong demand for importation of highly developed rules in the 
first place 445  and well-developed structures. 446  I further argue that the 
institutional transplantation theory 447  is an important explanation for the 
transplantation into Hong Kong, it involved both legislative and institutional 
transplantation, that is to say, it covers not only the company law, but also the 
other institutions448  including but not limited to the rule of law, the free 
economy, and the executive and judicial systems, in this thesis.  
 
3.1.1.3 Corporate Governance and Ownership Structure in Hong Kong 
Lau and Young contend that the corporate governance in Hong Kong is similar 
to that of other Anglo-American models; however, with less widely-dispersed 
ownership than their counterparts in the UK or the US, Hong Kong shares the 
Asian corporate governance characteristics of family-dominated ownership.449 
Jensen and Meckling opine that this kind of ownership structure is described 
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 Coffee John, ‘The Role of Law and the State in the Separation of Ownership and Control’ 
(2001) 111 Yale Law Journal 25. 
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as an insider system and gives rise to agency costs.450 Low suggests that the 
agency costs are a consequence of informational asymmetries between 
insiders (agents) and outsiders (principals).451 
 
Hong Kong adopts the doctrine of separation of ownership and control and 
creates agency conflicts that require a proper mechanism to govern the 
agency relationship between shareholders and management. The 
contractarian theory suggests freedom of contract through private contracting 
arrangement between individual shareholders,452 and favours the laissez-faire 
policy adopted in Hong Kong. Low and Mar consider that legal regulation for 
the protection of investors can outperform private contracting among 
shareholders themselves.453 Goo and Carver consider that Hong Kong is an 
Anglo-American model with Chinese characteristics, i.e. companies are 
family-dominated and closely-held.454 There is a strong element of controlling 
shareholders in many of Hong Kong’s listed companies. Goo and Carver 
observe that the Anglo-Hong Kong model is a hybrid of the two (insider and 
outsider) systems, and that its rule of law, accountability, disclosure and 
transparency are the pillars for the success of the Anglo-Hong Kong model 
which requires management (directors) to account to the principal 
(shareholders) on the results of their stewardship or agency.455 I contend that 
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 Jensen Michael and Meckling William, ‘Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behaviour, Agency 
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the concentrated ownership (by family) is a structure-driven path in Hong 
Kong. 
 
There are two features of listed companies in Hong Kong, they are 
predominantly family-owned, held by majority control, and they face further 
problems that their shares are often not easily convertible into cash.456 The 
phenomenon is due to the Chinese culture that emphasises 
connection/relationship (guanxi) and does not trust outsiders. Ownership is 
amongst family members. Cheung observes that the vast majority of 
companies, whether listed or not, are family-owned business dominated by 
controlling shareholders.457 Lawton also observes that ownership within family 
members and close relatives are unique characteristics in Hong Kong.458  
 
Coffee contends that the Anglo-American model of corporate governance is 
always associated with the rule of law system, an active and strong stock 
market, rigorous disclosure, a high level of transparency, arm’s length 
transactions and good shareholder protection. 459  I contend that the 
Anglo-American model may fit Hong Kong well but not fit China, as the issue of 
corporate governance must be solved in accordance with its own path 
according to the path dependence theory. 
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La Porta et al. advocate that the common law system provides more protection 
for investors.460 In the empirical study of La Porta et al., the shareholder rights 
score of Hong Kong is 5, the same score as the UK and the US.461 The origin 
of law has become the most important factor for good corporate 
governance.462 La Porta et al. further claim that a high concentration of 
ownership may lead to poor legal protection of investors.463 In terms of high 
concentration of ownership, it is criticised that the origin of law theory fails to 
explain the situation of Hong Kong. According to the research of Yu and Li on 
the Hong Kong stock market, concentrated ownership is common in Hong 
Kong where there is a legal system with high investor protection and high 
accounting standards, the result shows that listed companies were 
closely-held, and the public holding was only 10 to 25 percent.464 Lang, Low 
and So have a similar finding that some 94.7 percent of the companies 
surveyed (754 companies in total) were family-controlled companies; this is 
well in excess of the average of 48.85 percent for economies in East Asia. 
Family-controlled companies have the best economic performance and the 
presence of families in the ownership of companies does not adversely affect 
the economic performance of the companies. They observed that almost all 
companies (94.83 percent of the listed Hong Kong companies surveyed, or 
715 companies) adopted pyramid structures to exert corporate control, with 
the majority locating the listed entity at the first layer of the control pyramid.465 
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The above discussion shows that, notwithstanding that Hong Kong has a high 
concentration of ownership within family members, the corporate governance 
and the minority shareholders protection are highly regarded in Asia. The 
well-developed rules and structures make Hong Kong remain the world’s 
major financial centres 466  and stock markets. 467  The single-tier board 
corporate governance model of Hong Kong is based on the Anglo-American 
model. The model was transplanted from the English Companies Act 1862, 
and has been used during and after the colonial period. I opine that this is the 
historical path set at the colonial times and that the English model has served 
as a good foundation to develop the current Anglo-Hong Kong model. The 
legal origin fails to explain the high ownership concentration structure and 
good minority shareholders protection in Hong Kong.  
 
3.1.2 Development of Corporate Law and Governance in China 
After the foundation of the PRC in 1949 by the CCP, the first company law was 
enacted in 1993468 and the second company law was enacted in 2005,469 
hence the history of company law was relatively short compared to other 
countries. I argue that the path of developing company law in China has not 
been driven by the market but by the policies of the rulers in the following part. 
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466
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3.1.2.1 Prior to the Foundation of the People’s Republic of China 
In China, company laws were enacted in 1904, 1914, 1929, and 1946 prior to 
the foundation of the PRC in 1949. Tomasic and Fu opine that ‘[h]istorically, 
Chinese governments have not encouraged commerce, perhaps due to the 
long-standing policy of national isolation and what some have described as a 
Confucian disdain for the world of business. [T]he state provided minimal 
protection for private business, so that, by default, the family and the 
relationships of trust became a more secure basis for business activity than 
formal bodies of law, such as company law’.470 
 
Unlike the historical development of company law in Hong Kong that was 
mainly driven by the market, the development of company law in China was 
driven by the economic and political policies of the rulers. The development of 
company law in China started in the Qing Dynasty when the Qing government 
was defeated by the British government in the Opium Wars. Under political 
pressure from the foreign countries to reform the law, the Qing government 
directed the newly established Ministry of Commerce to draft the company 
law.471 The first Chinese company law was adopted in 1904 by the Qing 
government which was based on the English Companies Act472 and the 
Japanese Commercial Code.473 Wei opines that the original company law was 
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a hybrid of civil and common law models.474 The law provided the basic legal 
framework for company and protection for minority shareholders was not an 
essential element. The law was modelled on the English Companies Act and 
had all the fundamental elements of corporate practices such as directors’ 
duties and meetings, and shareholders’ rights and meetings. Under the law, 
there were four types of company: partnership; limited partnership; joint stock 
company with limited and unlimited shareholders; and company limited by 
shares. A company incorporated under the law had to be registered with the 
Ministry of Commerce in Beijing475 but only a few were registered.476 
 
After the collapse of the Qing Dynasty, the republican government enacted a 
new company ordinance in 1914 that was more detailed with 251 articles, and 
borrowed directly from and based on German company law. The ordinance 
included four types of company: unlimited company; joint company; joint-share 
company; and company limited by shares. The new law introduced the 
concept of legal person and detailed provisions as to the rights and obligations 
of the directors. This concept was developed in accordance with the unique 
circumstances of China.477 
 
The law operated well until the Nationalist Party (Kuomintang) took over the 
Qing government in 1927. The new government enacted the new Company 
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Law in 1929478 and amended it in 1946 to allow two more types of company, 
namely limited company and foreign company. The Nationalist Party realised 
that it was important to allow foreign companies to operate in China, especially 
in coastal areas such as Shanghai and Guangdong. Kirby argues that the main 
objective of the Company Law 1929 was to encourage more foreign 
businesses, with proper control by the state, and the present Company Law of 
Taiwan retains the essential features of the Company Law 1929.479  
 
The CCP defeated the Nationalist Party, which withdrew from mainland China 
to Taiwan, and the Company Law 1929 was annulled by the Communist 
government in 1949. For 44 years from 1949 to 1993, there was no law to 
govern companies; this was the initial rule-driven path in China. The CCP was 
first led by Mao Zedong in the establishment of the PRC. The CCP demolished 
the whole legal system established by the Nationalist government and 
replaced it with a more radical Communist system for ideological reasons. This 
virtually left a legal vacuum in China.480  
 
The constitutional document known as a ‘common programme’ was the only 
provisional document to fill the legal vacuum in the Chinese legal system. The 
Anti-Rightist Movement in 1957 rejected Western capitalist values and denied 
democracy and the rule of law, which later prompted the Culture Revolution. 
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The rule of the country was mainly guided by Maoism. Maoism was a cult of 
personality promoted by the Gang of Four during the Cultural Revolution from 
1966 to 1976. Since then, a ‘rule by man’ system had been adopted. During 
the post-Mao period, law was regarded as an instrument to carry out the policy 
of the CCP, and a rule by law system was adopted in China.481 All businesses 
were restricted to state-owned or collectively-owned, and gradually converted 
into public ownership, which was the major means of production and a central 
tenet of Marxist theory. The CCP adopted the socialist economy and the public 
ownership system, while the state maintained close control over the economy. 
I opine that there was no demand for comprehensive company law from the 
business sector under the rule by man and the rule by law systems. 
 
3.1.2.2 Open Door Policy and Transplantation of European Model  
Notwithstanding the takeover by the CCP, the term enterprise legal person was 
able to survive after the foundation of the PRC by the CCP in 1949.482 Zheng 
argues that the basic characteristic of a company developed in Chinese 
jurisprudence was the result of the open door policy initiated in 1978 under the 
reformist leadership of Deng Xiaoping.483 The Economic Contract Law was 
promulgated in 1981 as part of the reforms.484 The term enterprise was 
officially used, with no definition. However, in many articles of the Economic 
Contract Law the term ‘unit’ (dan wei) was used instead of enterprise or 
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company. ‘Company’ was not a familiar term at that time.485 The term ‘unit’ 
was a more acceptable term to the government and the term ‘enterprise’ was 
relatively new to the PRC. The legislative gap was later filled by the GPCL 
1986, which provides the definition of enterprise and non-enterprise legal 
persons.486  
 
As part of the economic reform, the stock markets in Shanghai and Shenzhen 
were re-opened in 1990 and 1991 respectively. In 1992, the State Commission 
of Economic Structure Reforms promulgated two important Opinions487 on the 
standardisation of companies limited by shares and limited liability companies 
that contained the principle of limited liability and the liability of the 
shareholders. These two Opinions formed the basis for drafting the relevant 
articles of the PRC Company Law 1993.488 The PRC Company Law 1993 was 
modelled on European models.489 The German two-tier board model was 
adopted. The primary purpose of the PRC Company Law 1993 was to 
transform the SOEs to corporations and to build up a socialist market economy. 
The collapse of the SOEs was the main catalyst for the enactment of the PRC 
Company Law; and this allowed the SOEs to corporatise into a corporation 
and saved the central government and local government from ill-managed and 
loss making state-enterprises. In the past, the state assumed full responsibility 
for the debts of the SOEs; the properties and assets of the state could not be 
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disposed of for repayments of the debts, and it was impossible to allow the 
SOEs to go bankrupt. Company law was used to facilitate the corporatisation 
policy by separating the legal liability of the SOEs from the state, and the state 
remains as a major shareholder and serves as an instrument to realise the 
CCP’s policy. I conclude that the enactment of the PRC Company Law 1993 
reflected the CCP’s ideology. The law was to promote the development of the 
socialist market economy. The ownership of state-owned assets in a company 
should vest in the state,490 and this is a rule-driven path in China.  
 
3.1.2.3 Accession to the WTO and Transplantation of Anglo-American 
Model 
China’s accession to the World Trade Organisation (WTO) in 2001 is part of 
the CCP’s policy and China is required to comply with various legislative 
requirements. The PRC Company Law 2005 was enacted to comply with the 
WTO requirements.491  Many common law principles and Anglo-American 
mechanisms are adopted including the one vote per share system, the 
director’s duties of loyalty and diligence, independent directors, derivative 
action, the rule of majority, and the protection of minority shareholders. Each 
shareholder is entitled to one vote for a limited liability company (LLC)492 and 
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a joint stock company (JSC), 493  and controlling shareholders are also 
defined.494 Regarding protection of minority shareholders, the legislative goal 
of the PRC Company Law is to protect the legitimate rights and interests of 
companies, shareholders and creditors, maintain socio-economic order, and 
promote the socialist market economy. 495  There are special roles for 
companies, which are SOEs, and the CCP maintains a tight control over 
companies. For companies other than the SOEs, each company is required to 
establish a CCP committee.496 
 
The law emphasises the socialist market economy and the state maintains a 
high degree of control. The term ‘protect the legitimate rights and interests of 
shareholders’ refers to shareholders in general, and also minority shareholders 
in particular. It is clear from the provisions that shareholders are empowered to 
make major decisions and select managerial personnel, are entitled to vote at 
the shareholders’ meetings in proportion to their share capital, and their 
legitimate rights and interests are protected.497 The protection of shareholders 
is one of the major legislative goals of the PRC Company Law.  
 
As a socialist country with a centrally planned economy, the law is regarded as 
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an instrument to carry out the policy of the CCP to promote the CCP’s ideology 
and the socialist market economy. This policy is known as ‘policy-driven law’ or 
‘rule by law’ under the PRC Constitution, and all the people, except the ruling 
party, must be bound by the law.498 The CCP emphasises the sanction and 
accountability of the management, which seems to suggest that the 
communitarian theory is applicable to the relationship between the 
management and the state as a major shareholder in the SOEs. The 
imposition of mandatory legal duties on the management is important to 
ensure accountability to the CCP. I opine that the CCP’s ideology and the state 
ownership have resulted in no demand for corporate governance reform, and 
the CCP’s ideology in enacting the company law is a rule-driven path in China. 
 
The present PRC Company Law was modelled on the European and 
Anglo-American models.499 Wang opines that it is difficult to identify a single 
significant origin country, and it is a hybrid model, notably from Germany and 
the US.500 Huang and Yeung contend that the selective adaptation is a model 
adopted by China by which the foreign laws are mediated by local norms.501 It 
has been said that borrowing laws from the West does not always work well in 
China. Chen argues that the law-in-a-book is not necessarily the same as 
law-in-action.502 Many scholars argue that the main problem with company 
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law in China is that the rules as written are not always applied.503 In addition, 
there are profound differences between the social and cultural elements. Shi 
observes that the Chinese social values and legal culture are very different 
from those of the foreign countries where the contemporary ideas of corporate 
law and governance are developed, for example, the development of the 
SOEs, the emergence of companies, and the enactment of company laws 
have taken a path that is distinct from other countries.504 
 
Hawes and Chiu argue that the adoption of foreign company laws is 
inappropriate for China because of some basic flaws in the assumptions of 
those advocating ‘Western-style’ company laws in China. The assumptions 
about the purposes and functions of enterprises are not shared by most of the 
CCP’s leaders. Even if Western style company laws were appropriate in China, 
they need to take into account that China is a very different local and political 
environment; and they contend that the jury is still out on the effectiveness of 
such reforms in their country of origin.505 
 
I argue that the CCP only enacted the PRC Company Law in 1993, 44 years 
after of the foundation of the PRC, and it has 23 years history. This is the 
rule-driven path, and the public ownership is the structure-driven path that was 
set in place by the CCP, whereas company law in Hong Kong is over 150 years 
old. This is the rule-driven path and private ownership is the structure-driven 
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path that was shaped in earlier times. Path dependence theorists claim that a 
country’s corporate law and ownership structures are contingent on its 
economic, political and cultural path set in place in earlier times and the 
corporate governance problem of a country should be solved in accordance 
with a given national context.506 Young, Li and Lau identify that there are 
unmistakably three considerations that distinguish China from the rest of the 
world, they are the political impetus, entrenched cultural orientations, and the 
SOEs’ political linkages.507  The colonial government’s policy has shaped 
company law in Hong Kong. The CCP’s policy and communist ideology have 
shaped company law in China. The path dependence theory explains how the 
historical paths have shaped company law in Hong Kong and China, and the 
political policy of the CCP is still the major consideration for the current 
development of company law in China. I contend that the role of the CCP can 
be reflected in the recent amendment of the PRC Company Law that the law is 
not enacted for business and efficiency purposes, but for promoting a socialist 
market economy and the CCP’s ideology.508 The CCP’s policy is a critical 
determinant for the evolution of company law in China according to the path 
dependence theory.509  
 
I further argue that the origin of law theory is wrong to conclude that the Hong 
Kong common law legal system is the crucial factor for better protection for 
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minority shareholders. The pre-existing local social values such as rule of law, 
laissez-faire policy, independence of the judiciary, high standard of rules are 
the path dependence in Hong Kong. It is contended that more comparative 
studies are needed for a better understanding of the impact of the 
transplantation of the foreign company law into China.510 Legal transplants 
and harmonisation projects are often unsuccessful due to differences in 
systems resulting from their different political, economic, and social 
institutions.511 
  
3.1.2.4 Corporate Governance and Ownership Structure in China  
The Chinese corporate governance structure was transplanted from the 
German model under the PRC Company Law 1993, and the existing corporate 
governance structure was modified by further transplantation from the 
Anglo-American model under the PRC Company Law 2005. It has adopted the 
German corporate governance structure of two-tier boards, i.e. boards of 
directors and supervisors and the Anglo-American model of independent 
directors.512 
  
In terms of Chinese corporate ownership structure, it is very different from that 
in other common law jurisdictions. Most listed companies in China are 
controlled or de facto controlled by the state,513 and nearly two-thirds of 
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companies’ issued shares were held by controlling shareholders with 
government backgrounds. This has had the effect of distorting share prices 
and creating conflicts of interests between the majority and minority 
shareholders.514 This is the structure-driven path set in earlier times. I argue 
that such control by the state is known as path dependence on the initial 
ownership structure. Lawton suggests these unique features are worth 
studying in terms of good corporate governance and the protection of minority 
shareholders.515 There is empirical evidence that the concentrated ownership 
system is always associated with a weak securities market, poor disclosure, a 
low level of transparency, and poor shareholders’ protection.516 I contend that 
the situation in China seems to support these findings. 
 
Tam considers that the Chinese corporate governance model is unique and 
has more in common with the German-Japanese model rather than the 
Anglo-American model.517 Unlike the German-Japanese model, the Chinese 
model fails to follow the role of the banking sector, which plays an important 
part in corporate governance in China. Li et al. observe that the banking sector 
does take an active part in corporate governance. It usually has close 
connection with the corporate sector and involves relatively relaxed lending 
requirements, particularly in the case of SOEs with government backgrounds. 
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The recovery rate of lending is relatively low.518 The result suggests that state 
ownership undermines good corporate governance. Wei argues that the 
loosening of the state’s control can improve the performance of listed SOEs 
and suggests that the next stage of corporate governance reform should be 
privatisation. 519  Clarke contends that the problems of Chinese corporate 
governance are not just legal, but political, social, and economic and are not 
necessarily best addressed by company law.520  
 
The Shanghai Stock Exchange identified eight crucial problems in the 
corporate governance of Chinese listed companies including, inter alia, the 
concentrated ownership by the state, the conflicting role of the state as both 
regulator and shareholder, and the inadequate legal protection for 
shareholders. 521  Allen, Qian and Qian conducted research on Chinese 
corporate governance by following the La Porta et al. methodology522 and 
gave a shareholder rights score of 3, where the highest score is 6.523 The 
                                                     
518
 Li Larry, Naughton Tony and Hovey Martin, ‘A Review of Corporate Governance in China’ 
(Working Paper 2008) < http://ssrn.com/abstract=1233070> accessed 23 July 2012.  
519
 In 1997, the 15
th
 National Congress of the CCP adopted the policy ‘Catching the big 
(SOEs), letting loose the small (SOEs) strategy. The commitments of the CCP to privatise the 
small SOEs to private and foreign investors was discussed. See Wei Cai, ‘Path Dependence 
and Concentration of Ownership and Control of Companies Listed in China’ (2009) 20(8) 
ICCLR 284. 
520
 Donald Clarke, ‘ Corporate Governance in China: An Overview’ (2003) 14 China Economic 
Review 505.  
521
 Shanghai Stock Exchange., China Corporate Governance Report 2003: Executive 
Summary <http://rru.worldbank.org/Discussions/OpenFile.aspx?id=1284> accessed 23 July 
2012. The eight problems are ‘ (1) Improper shareholding structure; (2) The role of government 
as both regulator and owner; (3) Inadequate legal protection for investors; (4) The dominance 
of insider control and the ‘key man’ model in corporate management; (5) Immaturities in 
external governance structure, such as the market for corporate control, the insignificant role 
of creditors and institutional investors; (6) The poor quality of information disclosure; (7) Lack 
of due diligence of directors and management in performing their fiduciary duties and 
supporting institutional arrangements and social norms (The Shanghai Stock Exchange stated, 
‘the current China has still not all around formed a social and cultural environment that 
cherishes uprightness, honesty and keeping one’s words’, p36); and (8) Lack of monitoring 
from the media and the public’. 
522
 La Porta Rafael and others, ‘Law and Finance’ (1998) 106(6) J Pol Econ 1113.  
523
 Franklin Allen, Qian Jun and Qian Meijun, ‘Law, Finance and Economic Growth in China’ 
(2005) 77 J Fin Econ 65. 
  
 
127 
 
score of China is an average of list of countries involved in the study of La 
Porta et al. and the score is below the English-origin average score of 4 and 
above the French-origin average score of 2.33.524 The result suggests that 
Chinese company law on paper is not that bad and the problems in China are 
related to other structural and institutional issues such as state ownership, a 
single ruling party, judicial enforcement, corruption, and rule by law.525 Allen, 
Qian and Qian’s research was based on the rights and remedies available 
under the company legislation. My argument in this thesis is that the legal 
origin methodology of using number in comparative company law is inaccurate 
and incomplete and cannot reflect real minority protection; minority protection 
in China is fine on paper but not in reality. Although the difference is 2 marks 
between Hong Kong and China, the legal protection of minority shareholders is 
much better in Hong Kong. 526  
 
The following table sets out the differences between the Anglo-American 
Model, Chinese Corporate Governance Model and Anglo-Hong Kong Model: 
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 Anglo-American Model 
Chinese Corporate 
Governance Model 
Anglo-Hong Kong Model 
1 Dispersed ownership Concentrated ownership with 
the state as the majority 
shareholder 
Concentrated ownership with 
family as the majority shareholder 
 
2 Investors usually free riders with 
little interest in the exercise of 
control except for some active 
institutional investors 
Control primarily by insider 
managers supported by their 
Party-ministerial associates 
Investors usually free riders with 
little interest in the exercise of 
control except for some active 
institutional investors 
 
3 Investment horizon of 
shareholders usually short term 
Investment horizon of 
individual shareholders usually 
short term and highly 
speculative 
Investment horizon of 
shareholders usually short term 
 
 
4 Shareholder as the primary 
stakeholder in setting company 
objective; 
primacy of the protection of 
minority shareholders’ rights 
Ineffective shareholder 
representation but company 
objectives subject to 
government interventions 
Majority Shareholder as the 
primary stakeholder in setting 
company objective; 
primacy of the protection of 
minority shareholders’ rights 
 
5 Reliance on securities market 
financing 
Reliance on bank credit from 
state owned banks 
Reliance on securities market 
financing 
 
6 Active market for corporate control, 
with highly liquid and transparent 
securities market 
Absence of active market for 
corporate control 
Active market for corporate control, 
with highly liquid and transparent 
securities market 
 
7 Arms length transactions Rampant insider and 
government directed 
transactions 
Arms length transactions 
 
 
8 Active market for senior 
managerial manpower 
Obstacles to development of 
active market 
Active market for senior 
managerial manpower 
 
9 Executive remuneration linked to 
corporate performance 
Executive remuneration not 
linked to corporate 
performance 
Executive remuneration less linked 
to corporate performance  
 
10 Board with majority of outside 
directors 
Insider-manager dominated 
board with appointments 
influenced by the authorities 
Insider dominated board with 
appointment of outside 
independent directors  
  
11 Active monitoring role by 
professional organizations and the 
mass media 
Weak or absence of monitoring 
role by banks, professional 
organizations and the mass 
media 
Active monitoring role by 
professional organizations and the 
mass media 
 
Source: Tam On Kit, Ethical Issues in the Evolution of Corporate Governance in China, Journal 
of Business Ethics modified by me with the addition of Anglo-Hong Kong Model.
527
 
 
In conclusion, I argue that the legal origin theory fails to explain the problems 
of corporate governance in China, which do not lie in the origin of law, path 
dependence theory identifies the problems of corporate governance and 
provide a suggestion to resolve the problems according to its own context, the 
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reform of corporate governance in China is not to transplant the common law 
system into China but to reform its structures in accordance with its paths, and 
some structural reforms and institutional transplantation are required.528  
 
3.2 The Structural Paths of Minority Shareholders Protection  
In the former part, I discussed the historical paths of developing corporate law 
and governance and provided useful insights into how and why they have 
changed and into their inter-relationship with the economic, cultural, legal, and 
political environments in Hong Kong and China. Company law, the rule of law, 
the market economy, and the administrative and common law systems were 
transplanted from Britain into Hong Kong, and the existing corporate 
governance and the economic, cultural, and political structures are the paths 
shaped by the colonial period. China started its reforms in the economic, 
political, and legal structures under the CCP’s policy since the late 1970s, and 
the existing company law and corporate governance of China have been 
shaped by these structures. This part evaluates how the economic, cultural, 
legal, and political structures shape the development of corporate governance 
and minority protection in Hong Kong and China. The intention of this part is to 
explore the roots of the persistence of divergence in corporate governance in 
China. This thesis opines that the structural and institutional differences are 
the bases for the persistence of divergence in corporate governance. I present 
my argument that the structural reform and institutional transplantation are as 
important as the legislation for corporate governance and minority 
protection.529 
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Ma advocates that a comparative study of company laws in two jurisdictions 
must take into account the historical continuum during which the laws have 
originated and developed and the context in which they now operate and shall 
include the political, socio-economic, and cultural backgrounds for each 
country.530 Bebchuk and Roe contend that economic, cultural, and political 
aspects shape the existing corporate law and governance of a country.531 
Milhaupt and Pistor explain that there are differences in systems resulting from 
their different political, economic, and social aspects for legal reform by 
transplantation.532 Roe argues that the presence of other different structures 
and institutions is critical to corporate governance.533 Pistor et al. contends 
that a direct transplantation of legal reform is not always suitable for countries 
with less developed structures.534 Scott argues that China should focus on the 
process of institutional transplantation and reform based on its own path.535 
 
The issue is what structures are suitable for the corporate governance and 
minority protection reform? In attempting to answer this question, I examine 
the economic, social and cultural, political, and legal structures in Hong Kong 
and China to identify the gaps between two systems, and to explain the 
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different legal effects of transplantation of foreign company law and minority 
protection. I argue that the existing structures are strongly influenced by the 
initial structures set by the colonial government in Hong Kong, the existing 
structures in China are shaped by the initial polices of the CCP, and the 
problems of corporate governance in China are not its legal origin but its 
economic, cultural, and political structures which must be solved in 
accordance with its peculiar context according to the path dependence and 
Hong Kong’s model can be used for Chinese reforms in the following part. 
 
3.2.1 Economic Structures in Hong Kong and China  
Owing to the different historical and political paths, Hong Kong and China 
adopt different economic structures, the former adopts the capitalist market 
economy, and the latter adopts the socialist market economy. I discuss the 
differences of economic structures between two places in the following parts.  
 
3.2.1.1 Hong Kong  
Hong Kong was a British colony prior to 1997, and economic policy was 
decided by the colonial government. Hong Kong has adopted the laissez-faire 
policy and a free market economy with less government intervention in the 
stock market. The special administrative region government continued the 
colonial policy after the handover. The continuation of the economic policy has 
enabled Hong Kong to become one of the major international financial centres, 
the global largest stock markets, the world’s freest economy, and its minority 
shareholders protection is highly regarded in the region. The following part 
presents my argument that the existing economic structure in Hong Kong is 
shaped by the initial path set by the colonial government. The evolution of the 
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economic structure in Hong Kong is a good reference for Chinese economic 
reform. 
 
3.2.1.1.1 Laissez-Faire Policy  
Hong Kong adopts a laissez-faire policy and the Anglo-American model of 
corporate governance. The model is closely dependent on the existence of a 
freedom of market mechanism that is able to align companies through 
competitive constraints.536 The laissez-faire policy can be traced back to the 
time when Hong Kong was under British rule. Ngo contends that the colonial 
government’s polices of economic laissez-faire and political non-intervention 
were widely regarded as the major factors contributing to its success.537 The 
positive non-interventionism set by the colonial government is the historical 
path for the development of corporate governance and ownership structures in 
Hong Kong.  
 
In 1997, the sovereignty of Hong Kong was returned from the UK to China. 
Under the Basic Law, Hong Kong practices the current capitalist economy 
system. Under the doctrine of ‘one country two systems’, Hong Kong has its 
own legal, economic and political structures, as distinct from China. The 
socialist and communist principles of China are not practiced in Hong Kong.538 
Hong Kong has its own taxation and fiscal policies,539 and the financial budget 
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of Hong Kong is separate from that of China.540  
 
The laissez-faire policy has strengthened Hong Kong economic growth in the 
trade, banking and financial sectors. Hong Kong government adopts the policy 
of freedom of trade, and Hong Kong is one of the major international financial 
centres in the world.541 Hong Kong has a stable economy, a rule of law system 
and anti-corruption measures. A high degree of freedom is given to business 
enterprises doing business in Hong Kong. The non-intervening policy of Hong 
Kong has resulted in it being one of the areas practising the lowest taxation 
rates in the region 542  and strong capital exchange reserves. 543  This 
non-intervening policy is extremely important to enable Hong Kong to maintain 
its international competitiveness in the world.544 
 
Hong Kong is now a special administrative region of China and a stepping 
stone for foreign investment enterprises to China. The laissez-faire policy has 
attracted much foreign investment and many foreign companies are listed on 
                                                     
540
 ibid Article 106. 
541
 Global Financial Centre Index 2014 
<http://www.qfc.com.qa/Files/Reports/Global%20Financial%20Centre%20Index%2014.pdf> 
assessed 17 March 2014. New York is number 1, London is number 2, Hong Kong is number 3, 
Singapore is number 4, Sydney is number 15, Shanghai is number 16 and Shenzhen is 
number 27. 
542
 KPMG, Global Tax Rate 
<http://www.kpmg.com/global/en/services/tax/tax-tools-and-resources/pages/individual-incom
e-tax-rates-table.aspx > accessed 12 May 2014. Hong Kong is one of the lowest taxation rate 
regions in the Asia. 
543
 International Monetary Fund, Data Template on International Reserves and Foreign 
Currency Liquidity <http://www.imf.org/external/np/sta/ir/IRProcessWeb/colist.aspx> accessed 
12 May 2014. Hong Kong is number 5 in the Asia and 9 in the world. 
544
 The Global Competitiveness Report 2014-2015 assesses the competitiveness landscape 
of 144 economies, providing insight into the drivers of their productivity and prosperity. The 
Report series remains the most comprehensive assessment of national competitiveness 
worldwide. <http://www.weforum.org/reports/global-competitiveness-report-2014-2015> 
accessed 3 September 2014. In terms of international competitiveness, Hong Kong is ranked 
7th and China is 28th in the world. 
  
 
134 
 
the HKSE,545 which is one of the major stock markets in the world.546 I 
contend that the protection of shareholders is one of the major tasks of Hong 
Kong government in order to maintain its international competitiveness. 
 
3.2.1.1.2 Free Market Economy  
A laissez-faire policy is commonly associated with the free market economy 
and the capitalism. The colonial government adopted the free market economy 
and the laissez-faire policy during its ruling. The government adopted the 
non-intervention policy and allowed the function of market on its own. Hong 
Kong is a market-oriented economy and is characterised by freedom of trade 
and foreign exchange with no tariffs and a low tax rate. Coffee argues that the 
development of corporate governance and stock market relies on the 
self-regulatory mechanisms and the free market economy.547 The market 
economy is an economy governed and supported by the rule of law.548 The 
cornerstone of the free economy rests on free trade and a free market open to 
all foreign investors. The Hong Kong government is committed to a free 
economy and maintains its free status. 
 
Hong Kong has had the freest economy in the world for consecutive 20 years. 
The Heritage Foundation found that the success of Hong Kong relies on, a 
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high degree of market openness as measured by the trade freedom, the 
effective regulatory environment, and the competitive tax regime. Hong Kong 
is ranked number one and followed by Singapore and Australia; China is 
ranked 137th out of 178 countries. They measure economic freedom based on 
10 quantitative and qualitative factors, grouped into rule of law, limited 
government, regulatory efficiency, and open markets.549  
 
The free economy comprises various elements. Some of the above factors are 
used in this chapter in evaluating the gaps between Hong Kong and China 
including the rule of law, property rights, freedom from corruption, the role of 
government, free fiscal policy, and the open market. In this thesis, I argue that 
these elements, and in particular the rule of law, are essential for the good 
corporate governance and minority protection. 
 
The free economy in Hong Kong has resulted in it being ranked fourth in the 
world in terms of world competitiveness. The economies are ranked from the 
most to the least competitive. The rankings measure how well countries 
manage their economic and human resources to increase their prosperity.550 I 
am of the view that the free economy is one of the fundamental elements for 
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the success of the Anglo-Hong Kong model. 
 
3.2.1.1.3 Private Ownership 
Private ownership is a legal term used to distinguish it from public ownership, 
which is ownership by a state or collective ownership by quasi-governmental 
bodies. Private ownership confers the individual owner’s exclusive and 
absolute legal rights over his intangible and tangible properties, and the rights 
can only be transferred with the owner’s consent. The government shall 
provide a clear law to protect these fundamental rights, and the courts are 
obligated to enforce these property rights. The private ownership right is a vital 
element in the capitalist market economy and essentially supported by a rule 
of law system. The private ownership right in Hong Kong is contrary to the 
communist public ownership of the CCP’s ideology in China.  
 
Over the years, Hong Kong became one of the major financial centres in the 
world. The HKSE is one of the largest stock markets in the world.551 There are 
many foreign (104) and Chinese companies (797) listed on the HKSE.552 The 
Hong Kong government only holds shares in a few public utility corporations 
on the stock market.553 The government emphasises its non-intervening policy 
and does not directly participate in the stock market. The HKSE is dominantly 
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by the individual private ownership and the private ownership right is protected 
by law. 
 
Evidence shows that ownership concentration in Hong Kong is within the 
private sector and amongst the family members. Most Hong Kong listed 
companies were predominantly family-owned. 554  Listed companies are 
closely-held, public holding is only 10 to 25 percent,555 and the presence of 
families in the ownership of companies does not adversely affect the economic 
performance of the companies.556 I argue that this is the structure-driven path 
for the minority protection in Hong Kong. 
 
A short conclusion of this part could be that the success of the Anglo-Hong 
Kong model depends on various elements; these include laissez-faire policy, 
free market economy and a private ownership system. The Hong Kong 
government maintains a highly developed capitalist economy, which is always 
regarded as the most free-market economy in the world. I observe that the 
Hong Kong government adopts a free economy and a contractarian approach 
with minimum government intervention. Hong Kong’s economic structure relies 
on the elements of accountability, disclosure, transparency, and rule of law,557 
and the current economic structure has been locked-in from the colonial period. 
Under the Basic Law, the existing financial and economical infrastructures 
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shall remain unchanged for at least 50 years.558 
 
3.2.1.2 China 
Unlike Hong Kong, China is a communist country with a socialist planned 
economy. The PRC was established in 1949 by the CCP and adopted a 
socialist ideology for controlling the economy. China has a long history of 
isolation from foreign economies and has adopted a strong state intervention 
policy, hence the economic activities are dominated by a few SOEs. 
 
3.2.1.2.1  State Intervening Policy 
The Chinese economic reform only began in the late 1970s. The state 
maintained strict control over the economy, and all commercial activities were 
basically dominated by SOEs. After the events of Anti-Rightist Movement and 
the Cultural Revolution initiated by the Gang of Four,559 the system became 
more administrative in nature but was still far from rule by law.560 
 
In 1976, the then CCP’s Chairman Mao Zedong died and Deng Xiaoping was 
appointed as the new Chairman of the CCP. A series of reforms were 
implemented which included the economic reforms policy to open the 
economy to foreign countries in 1978. This was quite a risky experimental 
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reform and was opposed by many senior members of the CCP. Deng 
advocated ‘two-hand policy’; one hand was to develop the economy, and the 
other hand was to strengthen the legal system. Deng described Chinese 
economic reform as a great experiment. The CCP was committed to 
revitalising China’s economy and found a marketing system compatible with 
China’s unique characteristics. The system must maintain the CCP’s ideology 
and the state’s centralised control.  
 
Many of the important sectors are still under the control of the state in the form 
of SOEs. Licht opines that the state intervention is ubiquitous and often 
motivated by goals that stray from shareholder wealth maximisation, or 
corporate governance more generally, to promote other national interests such 
as diversity.561 The state intervention policy is still the major foundation of the 
CCP’s ideology that serves as a tool to maintain the interests of the CCP, and 
the interests of shareholders are undermined in China. I contend that this is the 
path dependence for the minority protection in China. 
 
On accession to the WTO, a state must allow private businesses and the 
market force to play a larger role in its economy. This involves a major shift 
from its intervening policy. The present Premier, Li Keqiang, recently told the 
media562 that the government will ease administrative procedures to reduce its 
intervention in the market; business projects with sufficient market activity 
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which are in line with the structural adjustment need only be reported to the 
authorities, instead of requiring approval. The new policy will encourage fair 
competition, avoid unchecked construction, and reduce idle capacity. 
 
3.2.1.2.2  Socialist Market Economy  
The transitional reforms from a centrally planned economy to a socialist 
market-economy in China were significantly different from the experiences in 
the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe where privatisation was used to 
transform SOEs to private commercial enterprises in a short period of time, 
and this process was described as a ‘Big Bang’ approach.563 Comparatively 
speaking, the economic reform in the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe 
was revolutionary and the economic reform in China was evolutionary.564 
Deng adopted a different approach and called it ‘crossing the river by feeling 
for stones’. One can characterise the economic reform as incremental,565 
selectively adaptive, and more perceptive.566  
 
The economic reform in China served as the tool to facilitate the 
transformation of SOEs into corporations in order to diminish the financial risks 
and liability of the state in the SOEs. The reform saved the financial liabilities of 
the state in the event of the collapse of the SOEs, and affirmed the CCP’s 
commitment to socialism. This reform was different from the reform in most of 
the countries of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe; the state relinquished 
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the role of government control and ownership of the SOEs to private 
individuals. China did not want to repeat Russia’s ad hoc experience and rapid 
privatisation that transformed its economy to market capitalism overnight. 
China adopted a slower and steadier economic transformation, especially after 
the events of Tiananmen Square in 1989. 
 
Chinese officials and the CCP still resist the description of the transformation 
as a capitalist market economy and instead accept it as a socialist market 
economy, which utilises the foreign corporate form and shared ownership 
structure, albeit there is no sufficient legal framework for the minority 
shareholders protection after the transformation. 567  The Chinese socialist 
market economy is a transitional economy between the socialist and capitalist 
forms of economy. The Anglo-Hong Kong model suggests that the capitalist 
free economy is one of the major contributing factors to its success. It is 
necessary to reduce state intervention in the economy and allow the market to 
function on its own. I contend that China adopts the path dependent approach 
to solve its own problems by using a slower and steadier economic 
transformation. Due to the CCP’s ideology, this might be a difficult task for the 
PRC to transform its socialist market economy to a full market economy but a 
lesser degree of intervention is advisable. I suggest that a gradual approach 
shall be adopted in accordance with the Chinese unique context. 
 
Xie argues that only the rule of law and the market mechanism can ensure 
sustained economic prosperity in China. The instability of the socialist market 
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economy in China will continue unless the rule of law and the necessary 
checks and balances as well as market force are implemented in limiting the 
CCP’s power. The anti-corruption campaign is the only way to rein in 
government power in the absence of the rule of law and the free market 
economy. If the right economic structures are not put in place, the intervening 
power of the CCP will expand again when the economy is healed.568 I contend 
that the acceptance of the rule of market by the CCP in the economic reform is 
a good starting point for acceptance of the rule of law in China. 
 
3.2.1.2.3  Public Ownership  
Notwithstanding the economic reforms, the state remains the major 
shareholder of the SOEs and maintains a certain degree of control over 
companies. This process is known as corporatisation in China. The public 
ownership and the state intervention in the economy are still the foundation of 
the CCP in China. The socialist market economy is merely an economic model 
employed by the CCP. I argue that the public ownership is the structure-driven 
path for minority protection in China. 
 
The experimental market reform has led China to be the second largest 
economy in the world and China has achieved the fastest economic growth of 
the national economy.569 China has benefited from the economic reforms 
since the introduction of the Open Door Policy in 1978. The state remains a 
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major shareholder in most listed companies that are controlled or de facto 
controlled by the government,570 and nearly two-thirds of the listed companies’ 
issued shares are held by them.571 The other problem of state ownership is 
that the management is mainly appointed by the CCP by the nomenklatura 
system.572 The senior management is the CCP’s cadres accountable only to 
the Party and unaccountable either to the companies or the minority 
shareholders.573 I contend that this corporate ownership structure shapes the 
minority protection in China according to the path dependence theory. 
 
Further reform is required for sustained high economic growth and for the 
accession to the WTO. The PRC Company Law 1993 was enacted to facilitate 
the transformation of SOEs to corporations. The enactment of the PRC 
Company Law 2005 further strengthens the existing corporate governance 
mechanisms to facilitate the next stage of reform for privatisation. These 
reforms are essential to establish a modern corporate governance system and 
must be accompanied by a rule of law system. Milhaupt and Pistor contend 
that there is a positive relationship between the law’s development and 
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economic growth.574 Dam argues that the hand-in-hand relationship in the 
progress of economies and law is recognised by the CCP’s leaders and is 
necessary to continue to implement the economic and other structural 
reforms.575 I contend that the issue of rule of law is important for the economic 
development in China. 
 
Based on different economic structures, the protections of minority 
shareholders are varied. Hong Kong is a leading financial centre and must look 
after the interests of local and foreign investors in order to maintain 
competitiveness in the region. The minority protection is driven by the market, 
and the existing economic structure is a result of initial colonial government 
policy. In China, the CCP’s politics and policy are still the major consideration 
and barrier for corporate governance reform as minority protection is shaped 
by the policy-driven law. The Chinese political economy explains the corporate 
governance and minority protection development in China. I argue that the 
state intervention policy, the socialist market economy, and the public 
ownership system are the path dependence for minority protection in China. 
 
3.2.2 Social and Cultural Structures in Hong Kong and China  
Every legal system is built on some kind of cultural and philosophical 
foundation; Hong Kong and China are no exception.576 Hong Kong and China 
share many historical and cultural backgrounds, however, the sovereignty of 
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Hong Kong was ceded to the UK in 1843. Since then the British values and 
rules such as the rule of law and rule-based cultures were introduced to Hong 
Kong. Historically, Chinese culture was dominated by Confucianism, which 
emphasises rule by man and the relation-based tradition. The following part 
discusses the differences between the two places.  
 
3.2.2.1 Hong Kong  
The Hong Kong’s culture can be described as a foundation that began with the 
Chinese traditional culture and then British colonialism. The Chinese traditional 
culture in Hong Kong is greatly influenced by two schools of thought, namely, 
Confucianism (ru jia) and Legalism (fa jia). Confucianism emphasises harmony 
and resists using legal means.577 Legalism believes in strict adherence to 
law.578 The main aspects of Legalism emphasise strong government, clear, 
strict, and written laws, a system of rewards and punishments, and the majority 
of men act out of self-interest.579 The influence of these schools has been 
varied over different period of time.  
 
The positive aspects of Legalism are obedience to law and punishment for 
violation; its negative aspects are law is a tool to rule people with absolute 
authority and give severe punishment without justification.580 The positive 
aspects of Confucianism emphasises education, benevolent leadership, 
trustworthiness, diligence and hard work, setting aside one’s own interests, 
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and respecting other’s interests.581 The negative aspects of Confucianism 
emphasise the use of connection/relationship (guanxi) which is more important 
than formal rules and regulations.582 The Confucian principle is also adopted 
in business; it is not uncommon to give the tea money to bribe others in 
Chinese society. This kind of practice is generally accepted by the Chinese 
business community before and during the earlier colonial period in Hong 
Kong. 
 
The following table sets out some of the key differences between Chinese and 
Western legal traditions in the context of commercial and corporate laws: 
 
 Chinese legal traditions Western legal traditions 
Regulatory preferences  Moral and social norms Formal rules and agreement 
Property rights  Collective (family or clan) Individual 
Legal responsibility  Head of household or clan Agent or individual 
Dispute resolution 
mechanism 
Respected mediator to arbitrate Independent judiciary to offer a 
verdict 
Dispute outcomes  Compromises and repair 
relationship between parties 
Remedies to redress grievances 
of the plaintiffs 
 
Source: 
 
Lau Alex and Young Angus, ‘In Search of Chinese Jurisprudence: Does Chinese 
Legal Tradition have a Place in China’s Future?’
583
 
 
Hong Kong has inherited the rule-based tradition and the rule of law culture 
from British colonialism. The rule of law applying during this colonial era has 
been convincingly portrayed. Ghai contends that the rule of law became a 
powerful means to legitimise colonial rule, particularly as the ideology of a 
democratic and accountable government could not be pressed into service.584 
The rule-based tradition and the rule of law culture are the legacy left behind 
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by the British colonial government. 
 
3.2.2.1.1  Rule-based Tradition  
The relation-based tradition has been rooted in Chinese culture for a long time. 
It is common to do business by using the relationship in Chinese society. 
During the colonial period in Hong Kong, the British government introduced the 
Western concepts of rule-based tradition and rule of law. English laws were 
applicable to Hong Kong, which was absolutely new to Hong Kong’s people. 
The colonial government required all people in Hong Kong to comply and 
observe the laws, and violation of the laws was subject to criminal punishment 
including fine or imprisonment. The Hong Kong Chinese had no choice but to 
accept the English laws and values. The English traditions and values such as 
the rule-based tradition and the rule of law culture have been planted in the 
minds of the Hong Kong Chinese. Over the years, the Hong Kong Chinese 
have accepted the rule-based tradition introduced by the British colonial 
government. 
 
Nowadays, everyone in Hong Kong accepts a level playing field rule for all the 
people and follows the law and order of society. All people are equal 
regardless of their race, ethnicity, or background. People in the business 
sector are familiar with the rule-based tradition, and it has become part of the 
established norms in the society of Hong Kong. People in Hong Kong are able 
to exercise individual legal rights and redress their grievances in case of abuse 
by way of law. The rules-based tradition enables a fair and equitable 
functioning society and is an essential element for good corporate governance. 
Lau and Young argue that the corporate governance regime is interlinked with 
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the local value, culture, and tradition, and any corporate governance reform 
must deal with potential differences between the local and the foreign value 
systems.585 
 
Tradition is a social norm generally accepted by the public over a period of 
time and has been long-established in a given locale. Tradition can persist and 
evolve over a number of years. It may take many years to establish or change 
a tradition. The Hong Kong case shows that the British colonial government 
was able to change the relation-based tradition to the rule-based tradition and 
it took more than 150 years to introduce the foreign norms and values to Hong 
Kong. I suggest that Hong Kong’s cultural reform is a good foundation for the 
Chinese reform. 
 
3.2.2.1.2 Rule of Law Culture  
One of the most important incidents of using the British legal principles and the 
rule of law culture by the colonial government to rule Hong Kong was the 
introduction of the Prevention of Bribery Ordinance, and the establishment of 
the Independent Commission Against Corruption which was set up to prevent 
and stop the practice of corruption in 1970s. The practice of corruption and use 
of connection/relationship (guanxi) are very common in the Chinese society. 
The colonial government was able to use legal mechanism to stop the practice 
of corruption in Hong Kong. In addition, the colonial government has launched 
a series of school education and public campaigns for anti-corruption since the 
1970s. 
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It is particularly important for Hong Kong’s social attitude towards the rule of 
law to prevent corruption, and the Hong Kong people accepted the rule of law 
culture in business society.586 Hong Kong has been ranked 19th in the world in 
terms of the Rule of Law Index by the World Justice Project.587 The Project 
defines the rule of law system as elements of clean government, fair law, 
effective enforcement, and independent judiciary.588 
 
The result shows that the colonial government successfully cultivated the rule 
of law culture into Hong Kong local norms and values, and some of the above 
principles are used in this chapter in evaluating the gaps between Hong Kong 
and China. Today, Hong Kong still upholds the rule of law principle as it has a 
clean and responsible government and officials, a competence and an 
independence of judiciary, and individual legal rights are highly respected, and 
the citizens can challenge the government’s decisions by judicial review. All 
these elements are essential for the rule of law. It is suggested that good public 
governance practice of a country always result in a good corporate governance 
culture.589 I contend that the rule of law culture of Hong Kong has been 
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locked-in from its initial (colonial) path. 
 
3.2.2.1.3  Ethical Practices  
Over the years, the Hong Kong people have accepted clean and ethical 
cultures in business.590 Hong Kong is ranked 3rd in Asia (15th in the world) in 
terms of corruption-free places in the world. It is suggested that there is a 
negative correlation between democratic countries and corruption.591  
 
The combined effect of rule-based tradition and rule of law culture in Hong 
Kong is ethical practices within the corporate governance professions. The 
corporate governance professions in Hong Kong are modelled on the UK such 
as chartered secretaries, certified public accountants (CPA), and corporate 
lawyers. They are ethical, diligent, reliable, and trustworthy in general. Hong 
Kong has developed into a civic society that comprises the elements of 
freedom of speech, democratic rights, human rights, and civil liberty, and 
citizens have equal participation of social life in the society. Ethical corporate 
governance professions are important personnel to provide assistance and 
advice to minority shareholders. 
 
In addition to the traditional thought of Confucianism, the concept of rule of law 
is taught at school, and the regular public campaigns are launched in the 
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society. As such, Confucianism has lesser impact on the Hong Kong Chinese 
who have totally accepted Western cultures and values. The perception of 
Western doctrine of rule of law is very strong in the mind of Hong Kong 
Chinese. Hong Kong Chinese have mixed Western values and cultures into 
traditional Chinese values and cultures as compared to the mainland Chinese. 
I opine that under the British rule for over 150 years, the Hong Kong Chinese 
have totally accepted the mixture of Chinese and Western cultures and values, 
particularly, the perception of the rule of law.  
 
In concluding this part, this thesis finds that the ethical practices, the rule of law 
culture, and the rule-based tradition are one of the major pillars for the success 
of Hong Kong. The success of the Anglo-Hong Kong model is highly 
dependent on various structures and institutions, in particular, the rule of law 
culture.592  
 
3.2.2.2 China  
China had 2,500 years of feudalism with imperialist government, which was 
the longest history on record. Lau, Young and Li contend that the Confucian 
philosophy is deeply rooted in the Chinese culture; in the Confucian philosophy, 
the role of the state is central to create an orderly and civil society, and the 
head of the state is authoritarian and the benevolent leader.593 Thereafter, 
China, which comprises over one billion people, the highest in the world, has 
been under the rule of the CCP by different leaders since 1949. The leaders 
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have attempted to use ‘rule the country by law’ (yi fa zhi guo) as advocated by 
Legalism to govern the country.594 
 
Chad opines that Chinese legal reform started with borrowing the ancient 
substance-function distinction for a popular slogan that states that: ‘Chinese 
learning as the substance, Western learning as the function’. This was a 
formula for blending Chinese and Western culture.595 I opine that this formula 
explains the cultural gaps between two places and the failure of transplanting 
foreign law (function) for the Chinese legal reform while keeping the Chinese 
traditional culture (substance). 
 
3.2.2.2.1 Relation-based Tradition  
Young describes that the Chinese legal system is reminiscent of the Confucian 
system rooted in connection/relationship (guanxi) rather than the rule-based 
tradition and governance. 596  Law and Kwan contend that China is a 
patriarchal society as advocated by Confucianism.597 Confucianism principles 
emphasise relationship, compromise, and education and oppose the use of 
law or litigation; and the use of formal dispute resolution or litigation destroys 
harmony. Li contends that the Chinese do not want to use litigious means to 
resolve disputes and emphasises harmony.598 Brady contends that China had 
neither the capacity to regulate the social order closely, nor the intention. 
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Formal litigation was infrequent and strongly disapproved of under the 
Confucian principles of compromise and submission. The legal system was in 
any case outstanding for its brutality, corruption and explicit defence of social 
and class hierarchies.599 As discussed above, the Anglo-Hong Kong model 
relies heavily on the rule-based tradition and the rule of law culture. Lau and 
Young opine that the Chinese corporate governance system has been 
influenced by the Confucian doctrines that are moral centered precepts used 
to regulate the human behaviour and relationships.600 
 
The relation-based tradition is the established norms and cultures in China and 
the by-product of relation-based tradition is corruption. Wen argues that the 
various forms of connection/relationship (guanxi) have close connection with 
bribery-related behaviour in China.601 Influenced by the different historical and 
political backgrounds, Hong Kong has totally accepted the rule-based tradition 
and China is not ready to accept the rule-based tradition. The mere 
transplantation of advanced law into China without the acceptance of the 
Western cultures and values is the transplantation without soul.602 For any 
proposed reform, it ought to be able to deal with potential differences between 
the Chinese and foreign values.603 I am afraid that the relation-based tradition 
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has been deeply rooted in the Chinese local norms and values and is not easy 
to root out. I am doubtful that the Chinese relation-based tradition could be 
completely abandoned in favour of a rule‐ based system from Hong Kong. It 
might be difficult to find a solution that could lessen the conflict between the 
relation-based tradition and the rule-based tradition in a short period of time. 
 
China was under imperialism for over 2,500 years and has been ruled by the 
CCP for over 60 years since its inception of the PRC, and the country has 
accepted the relation-based tradition for so many years. Lau and Young 
suggest exploring hybrid solutions for the corporate governance reform to 
lessen the possibility of bottlenecks and incongruities emerging between local 
traditions and foreign values.604 I suggest that it may take a few decades to 
change the relation-based tradition based on the experience of Hong Kong. 
 
3.2.2.2.2  Rule by Man and Rule by Law Culture  
The rule by man (ren zhi) and rule by law (fa zhi) systems are unique 
characteristic of the Chinese legal system. The CCP took over China, and 
during the 1960s the CCP initiated the Cultural Revolution605 to reform society 
and introduced the class struggle, economic construction, and modernisation. 
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During the Cultural Revolution, there was neither law nor natural justice, and 
rule by man greatly outweighed rule of law. By the late 1960s, the Chinese 
legal system was thoroughly demolished, the courts and procuratorates were 
both eliminated, and the rule by man approach was absolute. The ideological 
dispute led to a withdrawal of the scientific and technical contracts by the 
Soviet Union and personal worship of Mao Zedong. Following the death of 
Mao, the CCP’s leaders denied the rule by man approach as advocated by 
Mao and adopted the rule by law system. The CCP governs the country 
according to law and upholds the uniformity and dignity of the socialist legal 
system in the PRC Constitution.606 
 
The rule by law system is advocated by the other school of legal philosophy in 
China, Legalism. The legacy left by Legalism is the concept of ‘rule by law’, 
which is the CCP’s version of ‘rule of law’ in Chinese legal context. 607 
Legalism advocates that although the ruler is above the law, all other people 
are equal before the law. The rule by law system is established in China and 
the CCP governs the country according to law. Chen contends that law 
increasingly becomes the administrative tool for determining and maintaining 
social order with the state at the centre and it is also enacted to facilitate the 
CCP’s policy.608 
 
Besides the use of Legalism, the CCP attempts to revive Confucianism in 
ruling the country for a number of purposes: ‘firstly, it could help to fill the 
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ideological vacuum left by the decline in Marxism-Leninism rhetoric legitimising 
the CCP’s mandate to rule. Secondly, it could assist tackling rampant 
corruption in China. The CCP also attempts to link modernisation with 
Confucian doctrines’. 609  The CCP’s leaders ‘affirm the linkage between 
Confucianism and modernity not only to explain their economic success but 
also to argue that the political and economic system that they have erected 
was in many ways superior to that of the West’.610  
 
In short, Confucianism represents ‘rule by man’ and Legalism represents ‘rule 
by law’. The ‘rule by man’ and the ‘rule by law’ have a great impact on the 
political leadership and the development of the legal system in modern China. 
The two schools of thought still play a major role in China. Some of the aspects 
of Legalism such as the rule by law have been merged with mainstream 
Confucianism and used by the CCP in ruling the country. In my view, these two 
schools are incompatible with the Anglo-Hong Kong model that relies on the 
rule of law, and these theories are used to explain the failure of legal reform in 
China later in this part. 
 
3.2.2.2.3 Corruption Practices  
The success of economic reform in China has achieved second largest 
economy in the world but also led to corruption problems. Corruption poses 
one of the most lethal threats to China’s future economic development and 
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also undermines the legitimacy of the CCP’s ruling. The prevalence of 
corruption in China is rooted in the Chinese relation-based tradition. To protect 
its own interests and encourage China in its transition toward a full market 
economy, it is necessary to tackle this problem and set up measures against 
corruption.611 
 
The ethics of government in the PRC have been corroded by rampant 
corruption, and state officials have been notorious for their abuse of power at 
every level in China. It is not uncommon for judges accept bribes to decide a 
case before them in favour to the parties who pay them as they are 
underpaid.612 The problem of corruption has become widespread from central 
to local governments in China. Recently, the CCP has taken steps and 
measures to tackle the problem of corruption. The Central Commission for 
Discipline Inspection and the Ministry of Supervision have conducted several 
investigations. The former member of the powerful Politburo Standing 
Committee Zhou Yongkang has been arrested and investigated for 
corruption.613 At local level, Bo Xilai, the former Chongqing CCP’s leader was 
convicted of the charge of accepting bribes.614 
                                                     
611
 Pei Minxin, Corruption Threatens China’s Future (Carnegie Endowment for International 
2007) abstract. 
<http://dspace.cigilibrary.org/jspui/handle/123456789/6294?mode=full&submit_simple=Show+
full+item+record> accessed 12 March 2014. 
612
 See Chinese case study in Chapter Five. 
613
 Zhai Keith, ‘Chinese Official Drops First Hint That Zhou Yongkang will be Probed for 
Corruption’ South China Morning Post (Hong Kong 2 March, 2014) 
<http://m.scmp.com/news/china/article/1438661/chinese-official-drops-first-hint-zhou-yongkan
g-will-be-probed-corruption> accessed 13 March, 2014. The CCP’s leaders had privately 
agreed to open a corruption investigation which marks the end of the party’s unwritten rule that 
members of the Politburo Standing Committee, including retirees, can be exempted from 
investigation for economic crimes. The Central Commission for Discipline Inspection and the 
Ministry of Supervision have announced the punishment for 31 top officials, including some at 
ministerial level and those who violates the party’s discipline and the state law will be 
investigated and punished, no matter who he is or how high ranking he is. 
614
 Sudworth John, ‘Chinese Court Rejects Bo Xilai Appeal and Upholds Life Sentence’ BBC 
News (25 October 2013) <http://m.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-24652525> accessed 13 
  
 
158 
 
 
Given that the CCP retains the authority to appoint senior management of 
SOEs, this results in appointment of incompetent CCP’s staff and lack of 
accountability to the company. The corruption and managerial problems of the 
SOEs in China are quite common and severe. It is suggested that adopting 
positive Confucian ethics as the governing principles in the Chinese corporate 
governance is a logical step; the positive principles of Confucianism such as 
setting aside own interests and respecting other interests can be used as 
benchmarks to improve corporate governance in China.615  
 
However, it is argued that the negative side of Confucianism resulted in 
corruption practices in the Chinese society. The philosophy of Confucianism 
has a great impact on the development of corporate governance in China. The 
corporate governance model is based on voluntary and non-legal basis.616 As 
a result of globalisation, the impact of Confucianism has gradually been 
weakening both in the society in general and particularly on the Chinese 
corporate governance system. 617  Young argues that Confucianism is 
incompatible with China’s modernisation objectives and achieving a rule of 
law.618 
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Hong Kong’s experience is a good demonstration to China that how the British 
colonial government planted the rule-based tradition and the rule of law culture 
in the mind of Hong Kong Chinese during the colonial period; it took more than 
150 years to cultivate this tradition and culture. I contend that the state must 
commit to support this cultural reform; such reform is necessary to ensure the 
mainland Chinese accept that everyone is equal and shall obey the rule 
regardless of majority or minority which is vital to the Chinese corporate 
governance reform; and it is a long-lasting project for the Chinese cultural 
reform. 
 
The above discussion reveals that owing to different social and cultural 
backgrounds, Hong Kong has accepted the rule-based tradition and the rule of 
law culture brought by the UK since the colonial period. For historical and 
political reasons, China is dominated by Confucianism (rule by man) and 
Legalism (rule by law). Hence, the rule of law is never prominent characteristic 
of the Chinese legal culture. I argue that these are the path dependence for 
corporate governance and minority protection in Hong Kong and China. 
 
3.2.3 Political and Legal Structures in Hong Kong and China 
Under the principle of one country two systems,619 Hong Kong and China 
practice different legal and political systems. Hong Kong practices the 
democratic governance and the common law system, and China practices the 
communist single-party politics and the civil law system. The following part 
explains their differences. 
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3.2.3.1 Hong Kong 
Hong Kong’s constitutional system and governmental structure were 
transplanted into Hong Kong by the Letters Patent, the Royal Instructions, and 
the Order-in-Council.620 The judiciary and executive organs of Hong Kong 
were modelled on the English basis. Before the handover on 1 July 1997, the 
Governor and Chief Judiciary were appointed by the British government and 
the Governor was the head of the colonial government. During the colonial 
period, there was no political party in Hong Kong though some pressure 
groups were allowed to participate in the social and administrative debates. 
The members of the Legislation Council were mainly appointed by the 
Governor with a few coming from the indirect election from the District Boards 
and the Urban Council. The political structure in Hong Kong was 
under-developed during the colonial period. After the handover, the special 
administrative government continues the colonial policies and structures that 
are different and separated from China. 
 
3.2.3.1.1  Democratic Governance 
It was until the handover of the sovereignty of Hong Kong to China in 1997, 
Hong Kong becomes a special administrative region of China. In accordance 
with the Chinese Constitution and Joint Declaration signed by the British and 
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Chinese governments.621 A special administrative region status was given to 
Hong Kong, which provided constitutional guarantees for implementing the 
policy of ‘one country, two systems’. Under this policy, Hong Kong system is 
completely different from China and enjoys a high degree of autonomy. The 
head of the special administrative region is the Chief Executive who is elected 
by the Hong Kong people. The Hong Kong special administrative region is ruled 
by Hong Kong people. The common law system and the doctrine of separation 
of powers are adopted in Hong Kong. The Hong Kong government is 
administratively independent from China. The Hong Kong people can challenge 
the administrative decision of the government by judicial review; this is a 
fundamental element of the rule of law. 
 
The Basic Law622 sets out a system of governance led by a Chief Executive and 
an Executive Council, with a two-tiered system of semi-representative 
government and an independent judiciary. The Executive Council decides the 
major policies of Hong Kong and all members are appointed by the Chief 
Executive from among the senior officials of the Hong Kong government, 
members of the Legislative Council, and other influential public personnel. 
Under the Basic Law, the Chief Executive will be directly elected by people in 
Hong Kong under the principles of universal suffrage in 2017.623 
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The Basic Law provides that the Hong Kong special administrative region 
enjoys a high degree of autonomy and executive, legislative, and independent 
judicial power, including that of final adjudication.624 The independence of 
judiciary could be seen in the discussion of the shareholders’ litigation cases in 
Chapter Four, judges are free to make their decisions without interference from 
the other branches. The Basic Law also provides that the Legislative Council 
shall be constituted by election625 and the Chief Executive shall be selected by 
election and be appointed by the PRC government.626 The ultimate aim is the 
election of all the members of the Legislative Council and the Chief Executive by 
universal suffrage. It is suggested that a democratic country or place has less 
corruption.627 I opine that the case of Hong Kong seems to support these 
findings. 
 
3.2.3.1.2  Common Law Legal System 
Common law was an invention of the English courts in medieval times. The 
basis of early English law was the unwritten customary law.628 The principles 
of common law are based on the customs of the people and evolved from the 
common law courts; it ensures that the law remains ‘common’ throughout the 
land. Common law originated from England and then was transplanted into 
other countries or colonies such as the US, Australia and New Zealand.629 It 
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was adopted by Hong Kong when it was a British colony, and maintained after 
the handover.630 These countries or places have adopted the common law 
system after their independence or otherwise cessation of British rule. The 
common law system has survived in many jurisdictions that have maintained 
the use of the system. These jurisdictions continue to make reference to the 
English laws and cases.631  
 
The Hong Kong colonial government introduced the courts system and English 
laws to Hong Kong and under the Supreme Court Ordinance 1844632 and the 
Application of English Law Ordinance 1966 633  respectively; the first 
Companies Ordinance was transplanted into Hong Kong in 1865 from the UK 
equivalent.634 Hong Kong applied the laws of England insofar as they were 
applicable to Hong Kong. Then, English lawyers including barristers and 
solicitors came to practise in Hong Kong. The Law Society of Hong Kong was 
established in 1907 and the Hong Kong Bar Association was established in 
1949. English company law and common law case system is the rule-driven 
path for the corporate governance and minority protection in Hong Kong. 
Under the Basic Law, the common law in Hong Kong shall remain unchanged 
for 50 years.635 
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The current common law system in Hong Kong is still very much influenced by 
developments in the UK and other common law jurisdictions. The Basic Law 
allows the Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal to invite judges from other 
common law jurisdictions to sit on its bench,636 and the citation of precedents 
from other common law jurisdictions.637 The Court of Final Appeal sits with five 
judges, one of whom must come from another common law jurisdiction.638 The 
judge from other common law jurisdiction brings their knowledge, wisdom, and 
international perspectives to Hong Kong. This arrangement is essential to 
maintain the international competitiveness of Hong Kong. 
 
The advanced nature of the case law enables and empowers the judges to 
retain extensive discretion and creativity in deciding shareholders’ litigation. 
Many important company law principles such as the fiduciary duties of 
director639 and shareholders’ rights640 are still governed by the case law. There 
are substantial amount of shareholders’ litigation cases in the common law 
jurisdictions. As discussed in Chapter Two, it is suggested that English common 
law legal origin has a close connection with better minority protection and the 
rule of law.641 This thesis argues that the issue with corporate governance is not 
the legal origin but the structures. 
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3.2.3.1.3  Independent Judiciary and Access to Justice 
Following the English tradition of separation of powers and a high degree of 
judicial independence, Hong Kong adopts the common law and the rule of law 
legal system. Judiciary is responsible for the administration of justice in Hong 
Kong and free to make decisions from any political and administrative 
influences. The final court of appeal was situated in the judicial committee of the 
Privy Council of the House of Lords in England prior to the return of sovereignty. 
The Court of Final Appeal was established on 1st July 1997 and is the highest 
court in Hong Kong; it is now situated in Hong Kong and not in Beijing.642 
 
Dobinson and Roebuck opine that the system in Hong Kong relies on the rule of 
law, it is perceived as the underlying basis for all the laws and the 
administration.643 The judiciary enjoys a high degree of independence and the 
doctrine of separation of powers is strictly adhered. The judicial system in Hong 
Kong is ranked number 2 in Asia in terms of independence and effectiveness.644 
As discussed in Chapter Four, Hong Kong judges adopt an innovative approach 
in determining shareholders’ litigation. Judges at District Court or above must 
undertake not to return to legal practice in return for lifetime tenure. Full-time 
appointment in the judiciary cannot affiliate to any political party and judges 
must observe the Judicial Conduct Guides.645 
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The legal profession in Hong Kong follows the English tradition. There is a split 
legal profession, which includes barristers and solicitors. It has been 
suggested that the two branches of profession should be fused but this is 
beyond the scope of this research.646 Lawyers practising in Hong Kong are 
subject to a stringent rule of professional conduct. The standard and 
competence of lawyers are not issues in Hong Kong. Complicated cases of 
shareholders’ disputes that usually involve the difficult points of law will be 
heard in the higher courts in Hong Kong. A barrister is usually retained to 
represent the shareholders in court. There are a number of good corporate 
counsels. The legal fees are calculated on a time basis and remain the same 
regardless of the outcome of the case. The issue of legal fees is always the 
major obstacle for shareholders litigation. Legal aid is generally not available to 
corporate law litigation. Although there was a suggestion to transplant the US’s 
contingency fees647 or the UK’s conditional fees648 into Hong Kong,649 it was 
rejected by the HKLRC.650 Hong Kong lawyers are not entitled to charge 
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contingency fees or conditional fees under the existing regulation.651 
 
The legal profession in Hong Kong has full autonomy.652 The full autonomy 
could be seen in a recent event when members of the Hong Kong Law Society 
passed a historic vote of no confidence in its president for his remarks backing 
Beijing’s recent white paper (which suggests that the judiciary is part of the 
administration and all the judges must be Chinese patriots) on Hong Kong 
constitutional development, and his other remarks saying that the CCP is a 
great Party in his capacity of the Hong Kong Law Society President.653 The 
vote shows that members care about the core values, the rule of law and the 
judicial independence in Hong Kong, and I am proud to be a member of the 
Hong Kong Law Society. 
 
The Hong Kong case shows that reliable governance and legal systems, good 
access of justice and the independent judiciary are shaped by the initial colonial 
policy and based on the rule of law principles. I argue that the costs of changing 
the initial colonial structures are high, which may obstruct a reversal of the initial 
choice and these are the path dependence in Hong Kong. I opine that these 
structures are the major issues for corporate governance and minority 
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protection in China. I propose to adopt the Hong Kong model for the Chinese 
reform and present my suggestions for the reform in Chapter Six. 
 
3.2.3.2 China 
China is a communist country where the CCP is the founding and permanent 
ruling party. China follows the communist ideology and the CCP is used to be 
the top governance structure in many SOEs. The ideology of the communist and 
socialism are reflected by two major characteristics: state ownership and the 
socialist market economy. These characteristics have a great impact on the 
development of corporate governance and minority protection in China.  
 
3.2.3.2.1 Communist Rule 
The CCP is founded mainly on ideology. The guiding ideology is 
Marxism-Leninism, Mao Zedong thought, and Deng Xiaoping theory.654 The 
CCP is the sole governing party of China. The governance of the CCP is vested 
in the Central Committee and the Politburo. One of the primary tasks of the 
Central Committee of the CCP is to elect the Politburo. The Politburo is the 
highest authority in the CCP and consists of a group of about twenty people who 
meet on regular basis to discuss the daily running of the country. Much of the 
real power in China is vested in this group of representatives from the CCP. This 
small group is responsible for the daily governance of China.  
 
The CCP’s politics plays a significant role in the Chinese legal reform. The 
CCP’s leader is also the President of the PRC and the Central Military 
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Commission. Senior members of the Chinese government must be members of 
the CCP. The leadership of the CCP is unquestionable under the PRC 
Constitution655 and exercises political, ideological, and functional leadership in 
China.656 The Constitution provides that ‘the PRC is a socialist state under the 
people’s democratic dictatorship led by the working class and based on the 
alliance of workers and peasants. The socialist system is the basic system of 
China’.657 This has been clear in the four cardinal principles mentioned in the 
Preamble to the Constitution. The leadership of the CCP is indisputable, the 
leading role of the CCP can be defined by the nature of the state, and the 
Constitution attempts to make a clear distinction of the functions between the 
state and the CCP and to regulate them by the Constitutional force.658  
 
Lubman observes that although a relative freedom has become possible in the 
growing private sector of the economy; the CCP’s version of the rule of law 
continues to control legal institutions and other social and political structures; 
and public discontent has grown, fed by the widening economic inequality, the 
widespread corruption, the official arbitrariness, the land stolen by local 
governments, the looseness of Party discipline, the rise of privileged elites of 
the CCP’s senior members’ second generation, and a persistent lack of 
protection for private individual rights.659 As such, I am of the view that some 
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structural reforms are essential to reduce the influence of the CCP. 
 
The different generations of the CCP’s leaders advocated structural reforms 
and the rule of law, which at least deserved some verbal support as an 
objective. The present CCP’s leader, Xi Jinping, has vowed to transform China 
into a rule of law state. 660  If the CCP carries on the current trend of 
comprehensive social-economic, cultural, legal, and political reforms, it is 
reasonable to be optimistic that the ‘rule of law state’ is achievable in China in 
the next few decades. Carothers argues that the most important path of 
developing countries towards the rule of law is the final stage as it strengthens 
both legislative and structural reforms aimed at providing an independent 
judiciary and separating the judiciary from the executive.661 This requires an 
implicit acceptance in the mind-set of political leaders who will ultimately be 
subordinated to the law.662 Peerenboom contends that it is a long march 
towards the rule of law and only time can tell when China will be able to 
establish it and become a rule of law state.663 
 
As far as corporate governance is concerned, the PRC Company Law requires 
that an organisation of the Communist Party of China shall be established in a 
company so as to carry out its activities, and the company shall provide the 
Party organisation with the conditions necessary to carry out its activities.664 
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The CCP emphasises the sanction and accountability of the management to 
the CCP. The criteria of management are based on political ideology and not 
on performance. The CCP’s committee retains the ultimate authority on 
corporate appointment over the members of the board of directors and the 
supervisory board. I contend that the participation of the CCP’s committee in 
corporate governance is inconsistent with the rationale of shareholder profit 
maximisation under the modern corporate governance principles. 
 
The CCP’s committee in corporate governance results in management 
ambiguity regarding accountability to the company or to the committee and 
abuse of power, corruption, and oppression of minority shareholders. I contend 
that the participation of the CCP’s committee in corporate governance is still 
the major issue for minority protection in China. 
 
3.2.3.2.2  Civil Law Legal System 
The development of the Chinese legal system is entwined with politics. China 
has a civil law legal system with Soviet and German influences. As a member of 
the civil law family, China does not have the doctrine of stare decisis and 
binding precedents; each case stands as its own. In practice, lower courts often 
follow the opinions and interpretations of the Supreme People’s Court (SPC).665 
Chinese laws are contained in a normative written instrument, hardly codified in 
a single piece of legislation and the legislation contains too many declaratory 
provisions, which are very vague and general. Detailed rules are usually 
enacted by the administrative organs in a practical manner. It is said that it take 
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a long time for China to codify its legislation in a specific manner which is 
comparable with common law legislation.666 Under the civil law traditions, the 
Chinese judiciary refuses to exercise discretionary power, applies vague 
principles, and relies heavily on explicit provisions. This will be illustrated in the 
case study in Chapters Four and Five; judges are unwilling to accept 
complicated corporate litigation. From a corporate governance perspective, it is 
contended that the common law legal system is better than the civil law legal 
system in terms of the protection of minority shareholders.667 
 
Chow observes that the characteristic of the Chinese civil law system is that it 
emphasises the administrative system in controlling the vertical authoritative 
ruling rather than the horizontal legal governance, and the law is viewed as 
being administered vertically as opposed to being used to resolve disputes 
horizontally.668 It adopts the system of rule by law (Legalism) rather than the 
rule of law.669 Peerenboom observes that courts lack of the independence as 
the CCP approves the appointment of senior judges in accordance with the 
nomenklatura system.670 Corresponding to the lack of independence of the 
judiciary is the absence of the doctrine of separation of powers. The CCP 
retains substantial administrative discretion with a very weak judicial control 
over the exercise of that discretion. The PRC Constitution provides that courts 
shall, in accordance with the law, exercise judicial power independently and are 
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not subject to the interference by administrative organs.671 However, this is only 
a symbolic reference and is contradicted by other Articles that courts at different 
levels are responsible to the organs of the state power that created them.672 
Inevitably, the courts apply the law in accordance with the state policy.  
 
The Chinese civil law system is the product of interaction between various 
factors including the political, social, economic, historical, and traditional factors. 
It is the process of evolution masterminded by the CCP that helps to build an 
institutional framework in order to support the economic growth.673 The unique 
aspect of the Chinese civil law system is that the country is governed by the 
law674 under the leadership of the CCP.675 In Chapter Four, I will identify that 
Chinese company law has adopted many common law principles, but it fails to 
have a similar function to their origins. The adoption of foreign law does not 
provide an adequate rule of law to the Chinese system. The perception of rule of 
law is never rooted in the Chinese legal system. This thesis argues that good 
minority protection does not rely on the legal origin but on various structures that 
relate to the rule of law principles. 
 
3.2.3.2.3 Limited Independent Judiciary and Access to Justice 
In China, litigation is not encouraged for commercial disputes. Peerenboom 
argues that the substantive law is used to serve the public interest and policy of 
the CCP. The law is not viewed by individuals as a tool to resolve civil and 
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commercial disputes and the use of law to settle private disputes is less 
common in China. 676  The CCP’s policy does not support the private 
enforcement of commercial disputes. The court is mainly to deal with the person 
who violates the state law and policy. In some cases, courts are reluctant to take 
cases involving political powerful parties.677 Anderson and Gao contend that 
the difficulties in enforcing the related company law is due to a lack of 
experienced corporate lawyers, a civil enforcement mechanism, judicial 
expertise in corporate litigation, and the prevalence of state intervention.678 The 
access to justice is very limited for individuals, and the legal aid system is 
under-developed. There is a lack of protection for individual legal rights. There is 
no doubt that traditionally the lack of protection of individual rights in Chinese 
society facilitates the ruling of the CCP in China. In order to preserve its 
influence, the CCP does not distinguish judicial from administrative activities; 
courts are particularly used to discharge all government functions including 
administration. Lau, Young and Li argue that the Confucian philosophy does not 
support extensive use of litigation. Instead, mediation is stressed and they 
remain the predominance forms of commercial dispute settlement rather than 
recourse to the courts.679 Even if the case has been brought to the court, the 
PRC Civil Procedural Law 2012 requires all courts to ‘stress mediation’,680 as 
the CCP intends to lighten the work load of the judiciary by promoting mediation 
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as an alternative to litigation.681 Lubman argues that structural weakness, 
ideology, rigidity, entrenched interests, localism, and corruption limit the 
functions and autonomy of the courts and undermine their legitimacy.682 
 
The legal profession in China does not have full autonomy. The Ministry of 
Justice has authority to govern practising lawyers. The autonomy and 
competence of lawyers in China are the major issues of access to justice. The 
lawyers in China are subject to the dual governance of the All China Lawyers 
Association and the Ministry of Justice. The legal profession in China does not 
have full autonomy although the Association has professional ethics and 
conduct to govern the members. 683  The Ministry of Justice is a judicial 
department of the government and responsible for all judicial functions 
including regulating the activities of lawyers in China. The Ministry of Justice 
may refuse a lawyer’s licence without giving any reason, and lawyers being 
arrested by public security (police) when representing clients is not uncommon 
in China. The fees and standards of lawyers in China are varied. The issues of 
autonomy and competence of corporate lawyers are one of the major 
obstacles to develop a genuine minority protection and a rule of law system in 
China. 
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Notwithstanding the economic reform that started in the 1970s, the legal reform 
in China is still under-developed.684 It has been argued that lawyers in the 
protection of their clients’ individual legal rights from being arrested have ended 
up putting themselves in jail. The two recent controversial cases are Chen 
Guangcheng and Xu Zhiyong. They represented clients against the local 
authorities for the protection of their individual legal rights and the local 
authorities used various reasons to arrest them, and eventually they were 
sentenced to imprisonment. 685  As a lawyer myself, I am sad to see my 
counterparts in China being arrested for protecting their clients’ individual legal 
rights. They insisted that the local authorities should obey the law and uphold 
the rule of law principles. They put the interests of their clients above their own, 
and their unselfishness earns my heartfelt respect. In China, individual legal 
rights are not well respected and the legal aid system is under-developed. 
Lawyers representing clients to sue powerful political defendants may be 
arrested. The access to justice and independence of judiciary are the major 
issues in developing a rule of law legal system in China.  
 
Based on the above discussion, I contend that minority shareholder protection 
in Hong Kong is better than that in China. Hong Kong has adopted democratic 
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governance, a reliable legal system, and an independent judiciary since the 
colonial period. China has adopted the domination of the CCP, a 
non-independent judiciary, and rule by law system since its foundation and 
these structures remain major barriers to the development of corporate 
governance and the protection of minority shareholders. I argue that the path 
dependence theory686 explains the initial colonial paths shaping the present 
structures in Hong Kong, the justifications in the transplantation of English 
company law into Hong Kong, the CCP’s ideology shaping the present 
structures in China, the failure of Chinese corporate governance reform by mere 
transplantation, and the importance of structural reform in China. 
 
The above evaluation shows that good corporate governance and minority 
shareholder protection in Hong Kong rely on both laws and structures. I suggest 
that the corporate governance and minority protection reform in China must 
include both legislative and structural changes based on Hong Kong’s 
experience. I summarise the empirical data in respect of the laws and structures 
for the corporate governance and minority protection in Hong Kong and China in 
the following table. 
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 Hong Kong China 
Shareholder’s right  score 5
687
 score 3
688
 
Free economy
689
 1st 137th 
Ownership structure
690
 Private Public 
Major stock market
691
 6th 7th and 16th 
Global financial centre
692
 3rd 16th and 27th 
Corruption-free place
693
 15th 80th 
Rule of law
694
 19th 76th 
Asian judicial system
695
 2nd 14th 
 
In order to identify the problems of minority shareholders protection in Hong 
Kong and China, there were four questions in the previous part (3.1). Based on 
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the above discussion, I identify that Hong Kong’s corporate governance model 
is a typical Anglo-American model except ownership is concentrated in family 
members as the majority shareholders, and concentrated ownership does not 
affect the success of the Anglo-Hong Kong model that relies on free economy, 
rule of law, and an independent judiciary. I also identify that the peculiar 
ownership concentration by the state in China is the product of communist 
ideology and socialist economy that emphasises rule by law, an intervening 
policy, and state ownership; and the ownership concentration is the 
structure-driven path set by the CCP in earlier times. On examination of the 
historical path, this thesis reveals that the British colonial government 
transplanted not only the English common law but also the other structures 
into Hong Kong under the then colonial policy. The existing structures were 
shaped by the initial paths set by the colonial government and its initial 
structures have been locked into the current structures according to path 
dependence. The case of Hong Kong shows that direct transplantation is not 
suitable to a place with less developed structures. The case of China reveals 
that Chinese corporate governance reform mainly relies on legal 
transplantation without any structural reform. The purpose of reform is to 
facilitate the CCP’s policy and the CCP still retains the ultimate authority on the 
corporate ownership and management. I opine that the Anglo-Hong Kong 
model and common law system are better than the Chinese corporate 
governance model and civil law system in terms of minority protection. The 
deficiencies are not only due to its civil law origin but also due to its unique 
path of economic, social, and political structures and must be solved with its 
peculiar context according to the path dependence.  
 
  
 
180 
 
In terms of structures, the Hong Kong’s experience is a good foundation for the 
Chinese reform. I summarise the different structures between Hong Kong and 
China and the ideal structures for the corporate governance reform in the 
following table. Chapter Six will discuss the solution to fill the gaps between two 
systems and to resolve the above problems. 
 
 Hong Kong China 
 
Ideal Structures for 
Corporate Governance 
Reform  
Economic 
Aspect 
Free Economy 
Laissez-faire policy 
Private ownership 
Planned Economy 
Intervening policy  
Public ownership 
Free Economy 
Laissez-faire policy 
Private ownership 
Social and 
Cultural 
Aspects 
Rule-based tradition 
Rule of law culture 
Ethical practices 
Relation-based tradition 
Rule by law culture 
Corruption practices 
Rule-based tradition 
Rule of law culture 
Ethical practices 
Political 
and Legal 
Aspects 
Democratic 
Common law system 
Independent judiciary 
Communist 
Civil law system 
No independent judiciary 
Democratic 
Common law system 
Independent judiciary 
 
The discussion of this part shows that the existing structures have been 
shaped by the initial structures. I argue that the path-dependent processes 
requires looking at history, rather than simply looking at current structures; 
path dependence explains the development in China because there is 
resistance to change from the established structures to a new or more 
efficiency one. Existing structures are based on what appeared optimal to the 
interest-holders (the CCP) at some point in the past, rather than on what might 
be preferred because of prevailing conditions. It also explains the development 
in Hong Kong that there are substantive economic, social and political costs in 
changing from the established (colonial) structures. The initial choices or 
events have led to the establishment and ‘lock in’ of particular institutions and 
structures in the current system.696 The legal origin could not explain the 
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 Puffert Douglas, EH Net <http://eh.net/encyclopedia/path-dependence/> accessed 30 
March 2014. 
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structural issues in Hong Kong and China. Instead, the path dependence 
theory explains how the path-dependent structures shape the present 
structures and some institutional reforms are required in China.  
 
In this chapter, I argue that China has borrowed many European and 
Anglo-American company law principles; they do not integrate well into the 
Chinese structures. Given these different legal origins, I am doubtful whether 
they can function effectively in a manner similar to their origins. I contend that 
the institutional transplantation theory explains the problems of legal 
transplantation and the path dependence theory explains the problems of 
corporate governance and minority protection in China which must be solved 
within its peculiar context. Compared with the Anglo-Hong Kong model, 
Chinese corporate governance reform should, apart from the legislative reform, 
have the state taken steps to reform the existing structures and institutions by 
separating the ownership from management, reducing the intervention on the 
economy, strengthening the independent judiciary, and providing legal remedy 
to the minority shareholders.697 All these issues are related to the structural 
reform according to the institutional transplantation theory.698  
 
3.3 Concluding Remarks 
The above discussion shows that the legal origin theory narrowly focuses on 
the legal origin is incomplete and unable to explain the situations in Hong Kong 
and China. The key for better protection of minority shareholders is not the 
                                                     
697
 Miles Lillian and He Miao, ‘Protecting the Rights and Interests of Minority Shareholders in 
Listed Companies in China: Challenges for the Future (2005) 16(7) ICCLR 290. 
698
 De Jong Martin, Lalenis Konstantinos and Mamadouh Virginie, ‘An Introduction of 
Institutional Transplantation’ in de Jong Martin and others (eds), The Theory and Practice of 
Institutional Transplantation. Experiences with Transfer of Policy Institutions (Kluwer Academic 
Publishers 2002) 2. 
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legal origin but the well-developed structures. The development of corporate 
governance in Hong Kong relies on both laws and structures. Hong Kong, as a 
former British colony for over 100 years, has well-developed structures such 
as its rule of law, laissez-faire policy, free economy, independent judiciary, and 
developed financial markets. These are the path dependence set in place at 
an earlier time by the colonial government and the key for good corporate 
governance. The Hong Kong legal transplant experience suggests that there 
must be a well established structures and a demand from the local market in 
the first place. The success of the Anglo-Hong Kong model is based on both 
legislative and institutional transplantation. 
 
The different rule-driven paths in Hong Kong and China explain the different 
effects of transplantation into Hong Kong and China. The evolution of company 
law in Hong Kong is largely by transplantation under the colonial policy, the 
evolution of company law in China and the legal transplantation into China 
have its own characteristics; the communist ideology of planned economy, the 
rule by law culture and the public ownership are its foundation. The Chinese 
corporate governance problem is not its civil law origin but its structures; and 
the path dependence theory explains how historical path shapes the existing 
structures in China and the adoption of foreign law without considering the 
historical path is the major barrier for a successful transplantation into China.  
 
In Chapter Four, I will examine the legislative paths of minority shareholders 
protection; discuss the effectiveness and weaknesses on the shareholders’ 
remedies and identify the problems in Hong Kong and China. Comparison and 
reference will be made to the other common law countries.  
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CHAPTER FOUR 
THE LEGISLATIVE PATHS OF MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS  
 PROTECTION IN HONG KONG AND CHINA 
4.0  Introduction 
In Chapter Three, I discussed the paths of developing corporate law and 
governance, and economic, social, and legal institutions, and identified the 
legislative and structural issues of minority protection in Hong Kong and China. 
I argued that the path dependence theory is better than the legal origin theory 
in explaining the protection of minority shareholders in Hong Kong and China, 
and that the existing protection of minority shareholders in Hong Kong is driven 
by the initial structures and shaped by colonial policy, including its free 
economy, laissez-faire policy, rule of law, and independent judiciary, which 
have been locked into the current system.699 Likewise, I argued that the weak 
protection of minority shareholders in China is not due to its legal origin but 
initial structures of communist public ownership, socialist economy, rule by law, 
and non-independent judiciary that have been shaped by the CCP’s policy set 
in earlier times according to the path dependence theory. 
 
In this chapter, I use the cases of Hong Kong and China to examine the 
legislative paths of minority shareholders protection and identify their 
deficiencies under the existing company law. The company laws of Hong Kong 
and China are modelled on foreign company laws, 700  I use the path 
                                                     
699
 Margolis Stephen and Liebowitz SJ, ‘Path Dependence, Lock-in and History’ (1995) 11 L 
Econ & Org 205. 
700
 Arjunan Krishnan and Low CK, Lipton and Herzberg’s Understanding Company Law in 
Hong Kong (LBC Information Services Press 1996) 3 and Gu Minkang , Understanding 
Chinese Company Law, (Hong Kong University Press, 2006) 8. 
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dependence theory to explain the minority protection and the success and the 
failure of legal transplantation into Hong Kong and China respectively.  
 
I have four questions to address in order to identify the problems: what are the 
sources of expropriation against the minority shareholders; what rights and 
interests of minority shareholders are protected by the company legislation; 
what are the role and attitude of the judiciary in shareholder litigation; and 
where does the problem of minority protection lie? The answer to the first 
question articulates a basis to design a proper mechanism against 
expropriation. The answers to the next two questions determine the protection 
of minority shareholders is sufficient or not. The answer to the final question 
diagnoses in which area the real problem of minority protection lies. In 
answering these questions, I present my argument that the present minority 
protection is influenced and shaped by the initial path in this chapter.  
 
An objective of comparative study on company law is to find out the gaps 
between two systems and the potential use of legal reform from one place to 
the other. To this end, reference is made to other common law jurisdictions 
such as the UK and Australia to see whether it is possible to transplant foreign 
legal norms into the Hong Kong and Chinese company laws that would 
enhance minority protection. The descriptive and functional approaches are 
used to compare the protection of minority shareholders in Hong Kong and 
China. The descriptive approach is based on the protection of the same name 
adopted in Hong Kong and China, whereas the functional approach is based 
on the protection of different names but performs the function of determining 
the same issues of shareholders’ disputes in Hong Kong and China.  
  
 
185 
 
 
This chapter divides into two parts. It first analyses the effectiveness and 
weakness of the shareholders’ remedies prevalent in Hong Kong and China 
including the historical paths and the backgrounds about the substantive and 
procedural laws, and then compares the shareholders’ remedies with other 
jurisdictions. Finally, some concluding remarks are offered. 
 
4.1 The Legislative Paths of Minority Shareholders Protection 
In this chapter, I examine the legal remedies in the company laws in Hong 
Kong and China. I argue that both Hong Kong and China adopt the foreign 
company laws and the shareholders’ remedies are very similar and the weak 
protection of minority shareholders in China is due to its structures shaped by 
the initial path according to path dependence. 
 
4.1.1 Hong Kong 
Hong Kong adopts the common law system and the shareholders’ remedies 
are based on the English model. The company legislation has been recently 
amended. I examine the shareholders’ remedies under the new company 
legislation where appropriate reference is made to other legal systems, and 
discuss the proposals for legislative reform modelled on other jurisdictions. 
 
4.1.1.1 Derivative Action  
In the common law jurisdictions, shareholders do not participate in the daily 
management of the company under the doctrine of separation of ownership 
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and management.701 Only in the exceptional circumstances can shareholders 
bring a derivative action against the directors for breaching their duties. 
Derivative action is rooted in the principles of equity and the exceptional rule is 
known as Foss v Harbottle.702 Shareholders can either sue in their own 
capacity to enforce their rights by direct action, or sue on behalf of the 
company to obtain redress for the wrong done to the company by a derivative 
action. The derivative action is an essential mechanism for protecting 
company interests against the misconduct of wrongdoers and for enforcing 
directors’ accountabilities. One school opines that the derivative action can 
improve the corporate governance of a company by way of litigation.703 The 
other school argues that there are other measures to encourage the managers 
to act in the best interests of the shareholders and there is no need for 
derivative action, which never produces real recovery for shareholders, the 
litigious model of corporate governance is not supportable.704 
 
A minority shareholder in bringing the derivative action on behalf of the 
company must observe two aspects,705 namely, the proper plaintiff aspect and 
                                                     
701
 Berle Adolph and Means Gardiner, the Modern Corporation and Private Property (1968 
revised, Harcourt, 1932) 244. 
702
 Foss v Harbottle (1843) 2 Hare 461. In Foss v Harbottle, two shareholders brought an 
action against the company’s five directors for misapplication and wasting the company’s fund 
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majority in general meeting to ratify the conduct, the action is bound to fail. However, there are 
two wrongdoings which are unratfiable, that is, special majority resolution and fraud on 
minority as identified by Jenkins LJ in Edwards v Halliwell [1950] 2 All ER 1064. 
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 Ramsay Ian, ‘Corporate Governance, Shareholder Litigation and the Prospects for a 
Statutory Derivative Action’ 15 UNSWLJ (1992) 156. 
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 Whincop Michael, ‘The Role of Shareholder in Corporate Governance; a Theoretical 
Approach’ (2001) 25 MelbULRev 432. 
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prima facie the company or association of persons itself. Second, where the alleged wrong is a 
transaction which might be made binding on the company or association and on all its 
members by a simple majority of the members, no individual member of the company is 
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the ratifiable aspect by a simple majority of shareholders.706 It has been 
argued that the fraud as a major ground for common law derivative action 
offers very limited protection to minority shareholders.707 Pettit argues that the 
difficulty to prove under common law was deliberate to prevent vexatious 
litigation.708 Hannigan suggests the reason for the difficulty is to limit the cases 
brought and to eliminate wasteful litigation.709 In Australia,710 there was a fifth 
exception to the rule; ‘where justice so requires’.711 However, the acceptance 
of this exception is questionable by other jurisdictions.712 It was rejected in the 
UK in Prudential Assurance713 and Estmanco.714 Lowry and Dignam opine 
that the justice doctrine is far too impractical as a test.715 Lo and Qu are 
doubtful that justice as a ground could be allowed in Hong Kong.716 
 
The rule in Foss v Harbottle is followed in Hong Kong. The fraud on minority as 
                                                                                                                                                        
allowed to maintain an action in respect of that matter for the simple reason that, if a mere 
majority of the members of the company or association is in favour of what has been done, 
then cadit quaestio. ‘ 
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 Parkinson JE, Corporate Power and Responsibility: Issues in the Theory of Company Law 
(Clarendon Press 2000) 246. 
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 edn, LexisNexis 2003) 459. 
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 Pettet Ben, Company Law (2nd edn Pearson Education Limited, London 2005) 213. 
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Now Showing Near You’ (2008) 7 JBL 631. 
713
 Prudential Assurance Co Ltd v Newman Industries (No.2) (1980) 2 All 841, [1982] 1 All ER 
354 [219]. 
714
 Estmanco (Kilner House) Ltd v Greater London Council [1982] 1 All ER 437. 
715
 Lowry John and Alan Dignam, Company Law (2nd edn, Butterworths Lexis Nexis 2003) 
183. 
716
 Lo Stefan and Qu Charles, Law of Companies in Hong Kong (Sweet and Maxwell 2013) 
397. 
  
 
188 
 
a major exception is classically an example created by common law. It allows 
the injured shareholders to bring a derivative action for the company, and the 
exception is too restrictive.717 A multiple derivative action was prohibited under 
the doctrine of reflective loss. Until recently, the Court of Final Appeal in Hong 
Kong allowed a multiple derivative action at common law, which is an 
innovative decision in common law jurisdictions.718 I consider that the relief 
restricted to the company only is too narrow and offers very limited protection 
to minority shareholders. It is recommended that statutory intervention on the 
derivative action is necessary.719  The Australian government initiated the 
reform in 1990,720 the UK government commenced the reform in 1996,721 and 
Hong Kong government started the reform in 1997.722 
 
4.1.1.1.1  Common Law Multiple Derivative Action  
The catalyst for the statutory intervention started with a leading family disputes 
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 See Prudential Assurance Co Ltd v Newman Industries Ltd (No.2) [1982] Ch 204; Menier v 
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case, Waddington Limited v Chan Chun Hoo Thomas and others from the 
Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal (Waddington)723 which is worthwhile for 
discussion in regard to deficiencies of the statutory regime. As a result of this 
case, the legislature amended the company legislation to allow statutory 
multiple derivative action.724 
 
Waddington shows that the form of a holding and subsidiary company is 
increasingly popular in the business community. The decision is innovative 
because it is first of its kind in the common law jurisdictions outside the US. 
Prior to Waddington, no multiple derivative action was allowed and only simple 
derivative action was possible under the common law and company legislation. 
In fact, ‘a multiple derivative action is in truth two derivative actions, one by the 
shareholders on behalf of the parent company against the subsidiary for its 
failure to sue the wrongdoers and the other by the parent company on behalf 
of the subsidiary against the wrongdoers’.725 
 
Waddington involved minority shareholder of Playmates Holdings Limited726 
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 Waddington Limited v Chan Chun Hoo Thomas and others [2009] 4 HKC 381 (FACV No. 
15 of 2007). 
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 The amendment of section 168BC of Hong Kong Companies Ordinance, Cap. 32 came 
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of Final Appeal in 2007 (FACV 15 of 2007). 
726
 Playmates Holdings Limited was a biggest and a famous toy manufacturer in Hong Kong 
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where Waddington was the plaintiff. Waddington was a typical family dispute 
between two brothers who were shareholders of a family-owned company. It 
was a multiple derivative action brought in 2003 before the operation of the 
statutory regime and thus the statutory derivative action could not be relied on. 
The main issue in this case was to determine whether Waddington could bring 
a derivative action on behalf of the subsidiaries Profit Point Limited and 
Autoestate Limited regarding alleged wrongdoing and damages suffered by 
them, and whether there was a relevant exception to the principle that 
precluded a shareholder from suing for losses that were reflective of his 
company’s losses. The alleged wrongdoing director, Chan Chun Hoo Thomas 
was the youngest brother of Chan Chun Wai Albert. Waddington illustrates the 
local features of closely-held and family-controlled companies in Hong Kong 
and indicates the importance of minority shareholder protection in terms of 
right to sue in Hong Kong.727 
 
4.1.1.1.2  Statutory Intervention and Amendment 
The Justices of the Court of Final Appeal unanimously held that ‘a multiple 
derivative action was maintainable at common law. On the well-established 
thinking as to why a single derivative action was maintainable, there was no 
reason why a multiple derivative action was not’.728 It was held that ‘having 
regarded to the injustice which would result if a derivative action was not 
                                                                                                                                                        
and Autoestate Limited. Waddington brought a derivative action on behalf of Profit Point and 
Autoestate Limited. The case of Waddington Ltd v Chan Chun Hoo has been cited one time in 
the common law court of Australia in the Oates v Consolidated Capital Services Pty Ltd and 
Others [2009] NSWCA 183. 
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available where the company was controlled by the alleged wrongdoers’.729 
The Court of Final Appeal opined in Waddington that ‘the co-existence of both 
statutory and common law regime was merely a source of confusion and 
complication’. 730  It was only possible in Hong Kong to bring a multiple 
derivative action by a minority shareholder of the holding company on behalf of 
a subsidiary company as a common law creature.731 The legislature has taken 
steps to amend the law creating a statutory mechanism for multiple derivative 
actions as suggested by the court and the academics.732 It was suggested that, 
in enacting the legislation, it should include a few peculiarly local variations.733 
It is contended that ‘the case of Waddington has shown tremendous effect on 
the protection of shareholder’s right and good corporate governance as it is the 
first reasoned decision on multiple derivative actions in a common law 
jurisdiction outside the United States and in England where it was not yet the 
statutory law’.734 A similar ruling to Waddington was followed and allowed in 
the UK in 2013.735 The statutory multiple derivative action was not considered 
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in Waddington, and a number of issues needed to be addressed regarding to 
the statutory regime including its various requirements.  
 
It was reported that ‘[p]reviously, a lower section of the High Court, the Court of 
First Instance had thrown out the claim, one ground being the principle that, 
where a company has suffered loss as a result of a wrong done to it, only the 
company itself can sue. Justice Rogers said a rethink of the principle was 
required because large companies nowadays conduct their affairs through a 
multiplicity of subsidiary companies which are virtually indistinguishable from 
the holding company’.736 The company legislation was deficient to deal with 
the multiplicity of corporate chain of subsidiary companies and to safeguard 
good corporate governance practices and the protection of the minority 
shareholders. As a result, the Hong Kong government introduced a statutory 
multiple derivative action in 2010. The new provisions extend the definition of 
company to include the subsidiary and holding companies.737  
The amendment brings Hong Kong in line with other leading common law 
jurisdictions such as the UK and Australia. The provisions of the Australian 
Corporations Act 2001 are more advanced and enable the minority 
shareholders of the holding company to take multiple derivative action on 
behalf of a subsidiary company. Applicants include any member (present or 
former, or person entitled to be registered as a member), any officer (present 
or former) of the company or of a related body corporate (holding or subsidiary 
                                                     
736
 Hilken Daniel, ‘Asia Africa Intelligence Wire’ The Standard (Hong Kong, 10 March 2005) 
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company).738 I suggest that the Australian model is a good reference for the 
reform of derivative action in Hong Kong. 
 
4.1.1.2 Statutory Derivative Action 
In the UK, the importance of the rule of Foss v Harbottle has been diminishing, 
and it is considered that ‘there may be reasons that courts decline to accept 
claims by shareholder due to refusal to be involved in disputes over business 
policy; disputes among shareholders should be settled by themselves; and 
fear of multiplicity of claims’. 739  It was proposed that the common law 
derivative action should be replaced with a statutory provision specifying the 
grounds in respect of which a derivative claim may be brought under the 
company legislation.740 The Company Law Review Steering Group broadly 
supported the need to provide a statutory basis for derivative claims and the 
need to make them available for other grounds such as negligence.741 In 2005, 
the legislature finally enacted a statutory derivative action for England after 
over 10 years of discussion.742 It covers claims for any actual or proposed act 
or omission involving negligence by the director including breach of duty to 
exercise reasonable care, skill and diligence even if there is no negligence on 
the part of the director under section 260 of the Companies Act 2006. It is a 
major departure from common law position that mainly fraud on minority is 
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entitled the shareholders to take derivative action.743 
 
In Australia, the statutory derivative action was introduced after a lengthy 
debate and gestation. In 1990, the Companies and Securities Law Review 
Committee recommended the introduction of statutory derivative action and 
was confirmed by the Companies and Securities Advisory Committee in 1993. 
The statutory derivative action was introduced by the Corporate Law Economic 
Reform Program Act 1999 and resulted in an enactment of section 236 of the 
Australian Corporations Act 2001. The statutory enactment was to respond to 
the widespread discontent with the rule of Foss v Harbottle and to maintain the 
investors’ confidence while moving from public enforcement of directors’ duties 
to private enforcement.744 
 
The introduction of statutory derivative action in Hong Kong is a result of some 
reviews, consultations and compromises, and there are various forces at 
play.745 The Hong Kong government formally proposed in a consultancy report 
in March 1997 to study the statutory derivative action and put an end of the 
nuisance which Foss v Harbottle represented.746 As a result, a statutory 
derivative action was first added to the Companies Ordinance in 2004.747  
 
The statutory derivative action is a major advancement to the protection of 
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minority shareholders. Skyes contends that codification of the law has 
balanced all stakeholders’ interests and is a great achievement in providing a 
concise, simple, and accessible guidance to directors and other users.748 The 
Hong Kong statutory provisions were enacted with a number of local features, 
including that most Hong Kong listed companies are family-owned, more 
vulnerable to family disputes and their shares were often rather illiquid 
because of the small public float.749 The Hong Kong companies are similar to 
those in other Asian countries, and shares are closely-held by family-owned 
shareholders as majority shareholders. 750  The recent amendment 751  has 
addressed to some of the criticisms;752 for example, the ratification by the 
company is not necessarily bar on a statutory derivative action.753  
 
There is empirical evidence to prove that the new statutory amendments have 
brought benefits to shareholders and greater clarity and certainty to an area of 
law which previously was well known for complexity in Australia754 and the 
Australian statutory regime is comparatively more flexible.755 I contend that the 
Australian model can be a useful reference for the Hong Kong reform of the 
statutory derivative action. 
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4.1.1.2.1  Misconduct  
The scope of the statutory regime is wider than that in common law regime 
which is only limited to a few grounds such as fraud. In the Hong Kong 
provisions, the term of misconduct (formerly known as misfeasance) is used 
and defined to cover ‘fraud, negligence, breach of duty or default in 
compliance with any enactment or rule of law’.756 The English provisions are 
similar to the Hong Kong provisions that ‘a statutory derivative action may be 
brought in respect of a cause of action arising from an actual or proposed act 
or omission involving negligence, default, breach of trust by directors of the 
company’.757 The Australian provisions are wider than the English and Hong 
Kong provisions, and ‘allows a member or officer (including former member or 
officer) to bring proceedings on behalf of a company, or intervene in any 
proceedings to which the company is a party for the purpose of taking 
responsibility on behalf of the company for those proceedings, and the 
company fails to take step in those proceedings’.758 The enactment expands 
the scope of the derivative action where fraud on minority is no longer the 
major ground for derivative action. 
 
However, it is argued that the scope in Hong Kong appears to be more 
cautious and conservative than that of other Commonwealth countries 
including the scope of applicant and application in Hong Kong are too 
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limited,759 the co-existence of both the statutory and common law regimes is 
confusing, 760  and there is bar on the action by way of shareholders’ 
ratification.761 Cheung suggests that ‘the legislature should adopt a robust 
approach by widening the scope […] which is not tied to the rigid language of 
misconduct along the lines of other legislation’ in order to serve the purpose of 
increasing shareholder protection. 762  The court should be given wider 
discretion to decide the scope of the statutory derivative action. The recent 
amendment has dealt with some of these issues and I discuss them in turn 
later in this chapter. 
 
Von Nessen et al. argue that the Australian statute is more liberal and detailed; 
the applicant only needs to show the inactive of the company to take action.763 
The court has a broad discretion under the Australian statute including 
appointing independent investigators to assure that the action is in the best 
interest of the company.764 I suggest that this model can be used as a 
reference for future legislative reform in Hong Kong. 
 
4.1.1.2.2  Locus Standi Requirements 
In the UK, the provision only confers standing on existing members to take 
statutory derivative action. The term member means ‘a member of a company 
including a person who is not a member but to whom shares in the company 
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have been transferred or transmitted by operation of law’.765 Only existing 
members have locus standi to apply. 
 
In Australia, the pool of applicants of a statutory derivative action may include 
a ‘member, former member, or person entitled to be registered as a member, of 
the company or of a related body corporate; or an officer or former officer of 
the company or of a related body corporate’.766 The Australian provision is 
wider than the provision in the UK and in Hong Kong. 
 
Hong Kong follows the English approach that the pool of potential applicants 
for the statutory derivative action only confers on ‘a member of the company or 
of an associated company of the company’767, which is more restrictive than 
the Australian legislation despite the recent amendment. The amendment 
does not follow the recommendation of the SCCLR in allowing former 
members to have locus standi to sue.768  
 
A flexible approach has been taken by the court in determining the locus standi 
requirements. In Re Luen Fat Paint Co Ltd, 769  the administrators of a 
deceased member’s estate under a limited grant had yet to obtain the full grant 
of letters of administration. At the mini-trial for leave, the court adjourned the 
hearing to enable an independent valuation to be conducted on the subject 
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property.770 By the time of the adjourned hearing, the applicants were able to 
register themselves as members of the company, by relying on the limited 
grant and on the order of adjournment; it overcame the issue of lack of 
standing. 
 
In respect of the respondent, the term ‘specified corporation’ used in the former 
provision771 was changed to the ‘company’ which is defined to include a Hong 
Kong company and a non-Hong Kong company in the recent amendment.772 
A non-Hong Kong company is defined as a company incorporated outside 
Hong Kong773 and establishes or has established a place of business in Hong 
Kong.774 A company includes a member of the company or of an associated 
company.775 This enables overseas companies and parent and subsidiary 
companies to be brought within the ambit of the statutory derivative action.776 
For technical reasons, the company must be made a respondent to the leave 
application to ensure that the company is bound by the judgment. Lee argues 
that the specified corporation used in the former provision was narrower than 
that which applied in other jurisdictions, where only simple derivative action 
was allowed.777 It is now possible in Hong Kong to bring a multiple derivative 
action by a shareholder of a company on behalf of a company on the statutory 
and common law basis.778 
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Cheung contends that the Hong Kong provisions are too narrow and cannot 
ensure the management’s incentive to discharge their duties properly for the 
ultimate advantage of the shareholders.779  
 
4.1.1.2.3  Statutory Leave Requirements and Demand Rule 
Approval of the court is required before a statutory derivative action can be 
commenced. The approval approach is developed from other common law 
legal systems and Hong Kong simply follows it.780  
 
Under section 261 of the English Companies Act 2006, the shareholder must 
show a prima facie case before permission is granted by the court to 
commence a statutory derivative action.781 There is a list of factors such as 
good faith, duty to promote the success of the company, the views of 
independent and disinterested shareholders, likelihood of authorisation or 
ratification by the company, and decision of the company to pursue or not to 
assist the court in exercising the discretion to grant leave to the applicants.782 
Cheung contends that the amendment emphasises on the new formulation of 
directors’ duty to promote the success of the company for the benefit of its 
members as a replacement of common law duty to act in good faith in the best 
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interest of the company that will form a basis for refusal of leave.783 A leave 
may be refused if the act can be authorised or ratified by the company.784 In 
England, there is no requirement to give notice to the company before applying 
for derivative action.785  
 
In Australia, the common law proper plaintiff rule is modified, which allows the 
court to grant leave and permit a member or officer to bring proceedings on 
behalf of a company, or to intervene in any proceedings to which the company 
is a party for the purpose of taking responsibility on behalf of the company for 
those proceedings, or for a particular step in those proceedings. 786  The 
application for leave may be granted if the company fails to take steps; the 
applicant is acting in good faith; it is in the best interests of the company; and 
there is a serious question at issue.787 The applicant must give 14-day written 
notice to the company of the intention to apply for leave and of the reasons for 
applying, or the court is satisfied that it is an appropriate case to grant leave 
without giving written notice. 
 
In line with other common law jurisdictions, Hong Kong provision also has the 
requirement for leave. There are several stages need to prove before leave 
can be granted. Hannigan opines that the leave application is a mini-trial and 
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can be used as a filtering process to single out unmeritorious applications.788 If 
the court is satisfied that there is a prima facie case, in the interest of a 
company, a serious question to be tried, the company has not itself brought the 
proceedings, or has not diligently continued or discontinued or defended those 
proceedings; and the member has served a 14-day written notice (with the 
intention and reasons to apply for leave) on the company and the company 
has failed to take any step.789 Skyes opines that the notice requirement would 
give the company a chance to correct the position without going through costly 
and lengthy litigation.790  
 
It is contended that Hong Kong court adopts a liberal approach in interpreting 
the statutory provisions in a number of cases. In Ferrari SpA v F & S Express 
Limited, it was held that it is sufficient at the stage of granting leave to prove 
that ‘an arguable case be shown to subsist’, a relatively low threshold to 
surmount as in the case of an application for an interlocutory injunction.791 
Cheung contends that the courts adopt a liberal and pragmatic approach to 
accept genuine cases and deter unmeritorious claims that are unable to fulfill 
the tests of best interest.792 The leave requirement in Hong Kong appears to 
be less restrictive than that of the UK, if it is in the interest of a company and 
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there is a serious question to be tried (no requirement of good faith but this is a 
factor when it comes to the question of costs),793 then leave will be granted. It 
follows only the second requirement of the UK and Australian models that 
double tests of good faith and best interest are required.794 The judges have 
adopted a liberal approach, where the threshold for a serious question to be 
tried and in the interest of company is not difficult to meet. In Li Chung Shing 
Tong (Holdings) Ltd,795 the Court took the view that where there is a serious 
issue to be tried, it is very likely that it would be in the prima facie interests of 
the company to bring the proposed legal action. Cheung suggests that the 
element of good faith can be added to the provision in line with other common 
law jurisdictions.796 I hold a contrary view that without the element of good 
faith, it is easier for the minority shareholders to prove their cases and the 
provision shall remain status quo. 
 
4.1.1.2.4  Shareholders’ Ratification 
At common law, if a wrong to a company is ratifiable, it constitutes an absolute 
bar to any shareholder’s legal action. For the statutory regime, the 
shareholders’ ratification is not an absolute bar but may be a relevant 
consideration for the leave application in some common law jurisdictions. 
 
If the wrong is ratifiable by the shareholders, it is not an absolute bar to prevent 
shareholders from taking derivative action though it is a relevant consideration 
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in deciding whether leave should be granted. 797  In the UK, only if the 
ratification is made by disinterested and independent shareholders will it 
constitute an absolute bar to any legal action taken by shareholders.798 In 
Australia, the court will consider how well-informed about the conduct the 
shareholders were; and were they acting for proper purposes.799 
 
In Hong Kong, shareholders’ ratification is no longer an absolute bar to 
bringing a derivative action. Section 734(3) of the new Companies 
Ordinance 800  sets out the ratification guideline in considering whether 
shareholders’ ratification should outweigh the interests of minority 
shareholders, and whether decisions made by majority shareholders are in 
good faith or not. Ratification is not a ground to refuse an application for 
leave. 801  The ratification guideline includes the extent of the members’ 
independence; how well-informed they are about the complained conduct; and 
whether or not they were acting for proper purposes having regard to the 
interests of the company. Cheung argues that the ratification guideline is 
unnecessary as it unduly restricts the flexible exercise of judicial discretion.802  
 
In the US,803 a special litigation committee is set up by a company and this 
committee serves as an independent organ and comprises independent 
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directors. The test of independence is laid down by a case of Re Oracle 
Corporation 804  where the Delaware Court of Chancery turned down an 
application of the litigation committee to dismiss a derivative claim made by 
shareholders of Oracle Corporation. Strine VC opined that independence is 
not based on whether the party is ‘dominated or controlled by the alleged 
wrongdoer’ and should be based on ‘whether the party is for any substantial 
reason, incapable of making a decision with only the best interest of the 
corporation in mind’. Cheung contends that the standard of independence was 
broadened to include additional factors such as personal and altruistic 
connections with the directors.805 The US special litigation committee was 
envisaged and rejected by the Australian Companies and Securities Law 
Review Committee in 1990.806 It was also disapproved by the English Law 
Commission in 1996807 and by the SCCLR in Hong Kong in 1997.808 
 
In the UK and Australia, the court as an independent organ has been conferred 
with extensive discretion to consider whether it is appropriate to refuse an 
application for leave if the wrong is ratified by the shareholders. It is not a bar, 
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but only serves as a factor for consideration. By the same analogy, I suggest 
that if the leave system is adopted then the US approach should not be 
introduced to Hong Kong. 
 
4.1.1.2.5  No Reflective Loss Principle 
It is well established that if the wrong done to a company, the proper plaintiff is 
the company. A minority shareholder is not entitled to take action in respect of 
the diminution of his shareholding in value as it is merely reflective of the loss 
suffered by the company.809 The basic rule is that it is only in exceptional 
circumstances that a reflective loss may be recovered by the shareholder. Lord 
Bingham laid down the rule in Johnson v Gore Wood & Co 810  that a 
shareholder must prove to have a separate duty in his favour by the wrongdoer 
and that the company no longer has a cause of action. Otherwise, it might 
enable double recovery by the company and the individual shareholder.811  
 
The issue of no reflective loss is a pre-requisite in a derivative action and is 
prohibited under the doctrine developed in Johnson v Gore Wood & Co.812 
The court laid down the rule that shareholders do not have a separate claim in 
damages for a wrong suffered by the company, which leads to a diminution in 
the value of shares.813 The principle of no reflective loss was adopted in 
Australia in David Ballard v Multiplex Limited.814 McDougall J held that the 
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principle of no reflective loss applied and rejected as a reflective claim the 
shareholder’s claim for loss of income and dividends arising because the 
company had lost earnings.  
 
In Hong Kong, the decision of Johnson v Gore Wood & Co was followed by the 
Hong Kong courts in Landune International Limited v Cheung Chung Leung.815 
The Court of Appeal upheld the decision of the lower court in applying the no 
reflective loss principle, and rejected the shareholder’s claim for reflective 
claim for loss suffered in its capacity as a shareholder in its subsidiary, or a 
creditor of its subsidiary. It would be good if the subsidiary enforced its full 
rights and would otherwise offend the rule of separate legal entity and 
reflective loss.  
 
By the same analogy, a multiple derivative action would be rejected as the 
claims advanced by the shareholders of the parent and subsidiary companies 
were merely reflective of the alleged losses of the subsidiary company which 
were precluded by the doctrine of reflective loss and the claims would be liable 
to be struck out.816 It is argued that the principle prevents shareholders from 
taking action for subject matter that is clearly wrong, leaving the shareholders 
unremedied.817 I contend that it is unfair for the minority shareholders as they 
are prohibited to take the multiple derivative action under the doctrine of 
reflective loss principle in view of multiplicity of companies involved in modern 
commercial practices. Waddington is first of its kind where a shareholder of a 
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holding company was permitted to take a derivative action on behalf of a 
wholly owned subsidiary company as long as there is no double recovery. 
 
4.1.1.2.6  Issues of Costs 
In general, legal aid is not available to shareholders’ disputes, and so the 
shareholders must use their own resources to finance the litigation including 
both unfair prejudice petition and derivative action. The high litigation cost is 
one of the major obstacles for shareholders to consider bringing legal action 
against the wrongdoer of the company, especially in some common law 
jurisdictions where the legal profession is split into two branches, namely, 
barristers and solicitors. The shareholders need to pay both sets of legal fees. 
 
At common law, it is always the discretion of the court to award costs to the 
party of the proceedings when dealing with the issues of costs. In the UK, 
there is no express provision as to costs.818 In Australia, the court may make 
any order it considers appropriate about costs.819 In a derivative action, the 
costs for an indemnity order, also known as a Wallersteiner order,820 can be 
made in the case of a shareholder’s derivative claim. 
 
In New Zealand, there is a statutory presumption of funding from the company 
in the derivative action. The court must order costs of proceedings be paid by 
the company, when the party is able to prove the case is made on good faith 
and in the interest of the company and leave is granted, unless it would be 
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‘unjust or inequitable for the company to bear those costs’.821 
 
In Hong Kong, the provision simply follows the common law discretionary 
approach in determining the question of costs. It confers wide discretion 
powers on the courts ‘to make any orders it thinks fit’. This innovative provision 
endows the court with an extensive power to ‘make any order it thinks fit about 
the costs’,822 including an indemnification order against the company823 and 
an order for costs to member if it is satisfied that the member is acting in good 
faith and has reasonable grounds.824 It also empowers the court to appoint an 
independent person to investigate the company’s affairs by professionals such 
as CPA or chartered surveyors in assisting the court with better and more 
accurate information, and order the relevant party to bear the cost and 
expense of such independent persons.825 Any settlement of a derivative claim 
out of court must be approved by the court in order to ensure a fair and 
equitable settlement under the supervision of the court.826 Cheung contends 
that the discretionary approach is uncertain in whether the shareholders will 
get any order for costs and the relief for derivative all flow to the company 
leaving the shareholders to a relatively small pro-rata benefit in share valuation; 
however, she agrees that the new provision will encourage more derivative 
claims under the statutory scheme to be settled without going to a full trial and 
minimise the risk of fostering a costly and lengthy derivative litigation.827 
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4.1.1.2.7  Co-existence of Common Law and Statutory Derivative Actions 
In the UK, under section 260(2) a ‘derivative claim may only be brought (a) 
under this Chapter, or (b) in pursuance of an order of the court in proceedings 
under section 994 (proceedings for protection of members against unfair 
prejudice)’. In essence, it abolishes the common law regime for derivative 
action. However, the common law double derivative actions survived 
enactment of the Companies Act in Universal Project Management Services 
Ltd v Fort Gilkicker Ltd & Others.828 Briggs J held that the enactment of the 
statutory regime was not intended to abolish a convenient procedural device 
for doing justice in cases of wrongdoer control and thus the common law 
double derivative actions were possible.  
 
In Australia, a statutory derivative action was introduced by the Corporate Law 
Economic Reform Programme and is now contained in section 236 of the 
Australian Corporations Act 2001. The common law right of bringing a 
derivative action was abolished to avoid uncertainty.829 The introduction of the 
statutory derivative action explains the existing common law derivative action 
is not enough for the protection of the minority shareholders.830  
 
In Hong Kong, the common law derivative action is retained and the recent 
amendment does not abolish the common law regime. The statutory provision 
                                                                                                                                                        
the new provisions. 
828
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‘does not affect any common law right of a member’.831 The court has the 
discretionary power to dismiss a derivative action brought by a member under 
common law after the court grants leave to a member of a company to bring 
proceedings on behalf of the company, or intervene in any proceedings to 
which the company is a party832 if the shareholders invoke both the common 
law and statutory derivative actions and the court is empowered to dismiss the 
application for a leave to commence a statutory derivative action.833 
 
Barma J argues that the co-existence of both the statutory and common law 
regimes is unusual in an international context and is a source of confusion and 
complication. It would appear to be appropriate for the statutory regime to 
replace the common law derivative action altogether.834 Cheung also supports 
this view that the co-existence of both statutory and common law derivative 
action compounds confusion and creates the risk of duplicity of 
proceedings.835 
 
Despite the criticisms from the judge and the academic, the recent amendment 
fails to address this issue and the co-existence of both statutory and common 
law regimes remains in the system. I suggest that the legislature should 
amend the provision by making reference to the Australian model and abolish 
the common law derivative action. 
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The effectiveness of the statutory derivative action in Hong Kong remains to be 
seen; it is argued that the derivative action is not a popular choice and the total 
number of cases under both common law and statutory regime has been few. 
With reference to the experiences of Singapore and Australia, there were only 
two cases reported since commencement of the statutory regime in 1993 until 
2001 in Singapore,836 and only 31 applications and leave granted in 19 cases 
from 2000 to 2005 in Australia.837 Von Nessen et al. contend that the statutory 
scheme continues to remain largely unutilised.838 Cheung contends that the 
effectiveness of the statutory scheme is uncertain and it is a matter of 
speculation as to the impact of the new statutory regime will have on the 
shareholder’s litigation.839 
 
In summary, the recent amendment has addressed some of the issues 
including the expansion of the scope of the application, and the introduction of 
statutory multiple derivative action. It has been argued that the scope of the 
applicant is still too limited and the co-existence of both statutory and common 
law derivative actions in the system is complicated. This thesis agrees that 
statutory regime has expanded the scope of the application and improved the 
minority shareholder’s right to take the derivative action. In terms of remedies, 
both common law and statutory derivative actions are taken for the company 
and not for the shareholder; a minority shareholder may need to consider the 
                                                     
836
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direct action or the unfair prejudicial claim for personal remedies. 
 
4.1.1.3 Direct Action  
In addition to common law derivative action, minority shareholders are entitled 
to bring direct personal action in their own names including the rights to 
enforce the company’s articles of association under the doctrine of statutory 
contract. The direct personal action is similar to the unfair prejudice claims, it is 
an action taken by an individual shareholder seeking a personal relief for 
himself. The SCCLR in Hong Kong identified that there are four main sources 
of the personal right including the articles of association, the provisions of 
statute law, personal contracts, and the common law.840 
 
The articles are the constitutional and contractual document involving the 
members and the company, and between each member. It is regarded as a 
statutory contract under company legislation.841 As such, it may be enforced 
by any member of the company, but there is some uncertainty as to the rights 
that may be enforced by means of statutory contract. The conservative view is 
that statutory contract may only be used in connection with what are 
sometimes termed ‘membership rights’, i.e. those rights if violated will affect 
the member in his capacity as a member. The liberal view is considered as a 
better view than the rights of the member including the right to have the 
company’s affairs managed in accordance with any provisions in the articles, 
irrespective of theoretical debates about the nature of membership rights. The 
                                                     
840
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liberal view may be contrary to the traditional approach stemming from the 
majority rule and proper plaintiff principles in Foss v Harbottle. For 
enforcement of articles of association,842 there are exceptions under the rule 
in Foss v Harbottle.843 An action may be brought by minority shareholders in 
respect of their personal rights. For the ground of ultra vires and illegality, the 
proper plaintiff in respect of wrongs done to the company shall be a company. 
In Waddington, Lord Millet said in his judgment that ‘[i]f a company has a 
cause of action, this represents a legal chose in action which represents part of 
its assets’.844  The proper cause of action for minority shareholders is a 
derivative action. The issues of personal or corporate rights are unclear. 
 
The personal right is very narrowly defined and some guidance and direction is 
warranted. Mayson, French, and Ryan point out that personal actions may be 
overlapped with the first three exceptions to the rule in Foss v Harbottle except 
fraud, which is related to company’s right.845 The principles are illustrated in 
Prudential Assurance Co Ltd V Newman Industries,846 where it was held that 
the personal action were the matters associated with the personal rights not 
the company’s rights. Hannigan argues that the issue of personal versus 
company’s rights has troubled the court on a number of occasions.847 This 
dilemma was faced by the House of Lords in Johnson v Gore Wood & Co,848 
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Hannigan argues that no unified approach can be deduced from the case 
law.849 She opines that the personal rights can be better served by unfair 
prejudice claims and their importance may gradually disappear.850 
 
The issues of personal rights of shareholders were discussed by the English 
Law Commission and the Company Law Review Steering Group. It considered 
the possibility of a non-exhaustive list of personal rights enforceable under the 
statutory contract rule enacted in company legislation. The Commission 
concluded that it was impossible and unnecessary to have a comprehensive 
list of all personal rights of shareholders on the grounds that ‘[f]irst, the list 
could not state every breach of the articles which could give rise to a personal 
action, and so cases would still arise which were not expressly mentioned. 
Secondly, breaches of the articles vary from the trivial to the grave. Where they 
are trivial, we did not want to encourage litigation, and considered that setting 
out examples in a statute might have just this effect’. 851  
 
In Australia, the issues of personal rights of shareholders has been considered 
by the Corporate Law Economic Reform Programme Act 1999 and resulted in 
an enactment of section 236(3) of the Australian Corporations Act 2001. It 
states that the right of a person (member) at general law to being, or intervene 
in, proceedings on behalf of company is abolished. The exceptions to Foss v 
Harbottle are now only significant in relation to enforcement of personal rights 
by members in their capacity as members, which could be conferred by the 
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Australian Corporations Act 2001 or the company’s constitution.852 Lipton and 
Herzberg argue that the exceptions to Foss v Harbottle were complex and 
placed substantial difficulties on minority shareholders, and that the statutory 
amendment largely replaces the outdated common law rules.853 
 
The SCCLR in Hong Kong identified that there is inconsistent case law in this 
area. In Bamford v Bamford,854 the court held that an improper allotment is an 
injury to a company and the conditions for a derivative action must be fulfilled. 
The decision was confirmed in MacDougall v Gardiner,855 where the court 
held that it is not a personal right and a member is not entitled to ensure that all 
articles of the company are adhered to. These decisions are contrary to other 
decisions such as Pender v Lushington,856 where the court held that rights 
under the constitution are personal rights in respect of which the shareholder 
can sue regardless of the rule in Foss v Harbottle.857 In Edwards v Halliwell,858 
the court made a similar distinction that it can be both corporate and personal 
rights for not observing the constitution; the SCCLR recommended that the law 
should be clarified.859 As a result, an amendment was made to the Companies 
Ordinance;860 it is no longer necessary to distinguish between personal and 
corporate rights in relation to the constitution.861  
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In Australia, steps have been taken to codify the personal rights of 
shareholders and abolish the common law personal rights of shareholder. 
Talbot observes that person and derivative actions can be brought by the 
shareholders for compliant of ultra vires, which is confusing.862 Judge argues 
that without clear guidance and direction it is indeed difficult to establish 
whether a personal right exists.863  
 
In concluding this part, this thesis takes the view that the duplicity of action 
gives rise to confusion and the precedents show that there is hardship in 
identifying the grounds for personal rights. I opine that it is unwise to leave the 
direct action without clear guidance and the addition of the non-exhaustive list 
of personal and corporate rights to the legislation is advisable. 
 
4.1.1.4 Remedies for Unfair Prejudice 
Apart from bringing a derivative action, a shareholder who is not content with 
the director or controlling shareholder may seek additional remedies through 
unfair prejudice claim. The oppression remedy was first introduced in England 
in 1948 and then transplanted into other common law countries such as 
Australia in 1961 and Hong Kong in 1978.864 It is necessary to prove that an 
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actual or proposed act or omission of the company is or would be prejudicial, 
or that the company’s affairs are being conducted in a manner which is unfairly 
prejudicial to the interests of some part of the shareholders. The remedies for 
oppressive or unfair conduct of company’s affairs are now contained in 
statutory provision in the UK, Australia, and Hong Kong.865 I contend that 
Hong Kong is no longer a British colony but its shareholders’ remedies are still 
strongly influenced by the English model. 
 
The statutory unfair prejudice provision is regularly and consistently the most 
attractive solution for an aggrieved shareholder in the small and 
quasi-partnership companies,866 it is difficult to see how this provision can be 
relevant in the context of public company.867 There is an interesting case in 
Hong Kong, which is worth discussion. A public listed company in Hong Kong 
was involved in the unfair prejudice petition. In Luck Continent Ltd v Cheng 
Chee Tock Theodora and Others, 868  the majority shareholder (47% 
shareholding) applied to court for the unfair prejudice remedies. The company 
was incorporated in Bermuda and listed on HKSE with the articles that special 
resolution was required to remove a director. The majority shareholder sought 
to amend the articles to comply with the listing rules (the rules only require an 
ordinary resolution to remove a director). The other shareholder (25% 
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shareholding) repeatedly blocked the resolution. As a result, the HKSE 
suspended the trading of shares of the company pending the necessary 
amendment. The Court of Appeal held that the equitable principles 869 
applicable to quasi-partnership companies should apply to the case. The court 
accepted the argument that it was unfair to allow the company to remain in 
breach of the listing rules where this might affect its continued listing which 
was contrary to the legitimate expectation of the other shareholders and was 
prejudicial to the shareholders’ interest. The relief of amending the articles was 
granted to the majority shareholder and the company was able to apply for 
re-listing on the stock exchange. 
 
In Chapter Five, the Hong Kong case study, the minority shareholder took out 
an application for both unfair prejudice conduct and winding up. The unfair 
prejudice petition can be used as an alternative to just and equitable winding 
up. Lo and Qu contend that there is overlap between two statutory 
remedies.870 In practice, it is almost inevitable that the petitioner joins the 
action for unfair prejudice petition and just and equitable winding up. 871 
Cheung describes these two remedies as ‘the twin statutory minority remedies 
of unfair prejudice and just and equitable winding up’.872 The test of fairness is 
akin to just and equitable winding up cases and on an objective basis.873 
Unlike the derivative action, the relief is personal to the shareholders and the 
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remedies are wide-ranging.874 The conduct complained of must be both unfair 
and prejudicial concerning mismanagement of a company.  
 
4.1.1.4.1  Mismanagement 
Mismanagement usually involves wider equitable considerations such as the 
fact that a member might have a legitimate expectation that he would continue 
in management: for example, failure to provide information; failure to declare 
dividends; dilution of shares or voting rights; and mismanagement of 
company’s internal affairs. The conduct of exclusion from management is 
amount to unfairly prejudicial to his interests as a member.875 
 
In the UK, under the section 994 of the English Companies Act 2006, a 
member of a company may apply to the court by petition for an order on the 
ground that the company’s affairs are being or have been conducted in a 
manner that is unfairly prejudicial to the interests of members generally or of 
some part of its members (including at least himself), or that an actual or 
proposed act or omission of the company (including an act or omission on its 
behalf) is or would be so prejudicial. Only an existing member may bring the 
unfair prejudicial petition.876 
 
In Australia, section 232 of the Australian Corporations Act 2001 states that a 
member must show that the conduct of the company’s affairs, an actual or 
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proposed act or omission by or on behalf of a company, or a resolution or 
proposed resolution by all, or by a class, of the shareholders is either: contrary 
to the interests of the shareholders as a whole, or oppressive to, unfairly 
prejudicial to, or unfairly discriminatory against, a shareholder or shareholders 
whether in that capacity or in any other capacity, in order for an application to 
be considered. 
 
In Hong Kong, a petition for unfair prejudice may be made by a member of a 
company: if (a) the company’s affairs are being or have been conducted in a 
manner unfairly prejudicial to the interests of the members generally or of one 
or more members (including the member); or (b) an actual or proposed act or 
omission of the company (including one done or made on behalf of the 
company) is or would be so prejudicial.877 Member includes existing and past 
member who may be a personal representative of deceased member, trustee, 
or person beneficially entitled by will.878 A company includes a non-Hong Kong 
company who has established a place of business in Hong Kong.879 
 
Hong Kong enacted its unfair prejudicial provisions based on the English 
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provisions.880 The Hong Kong provisions are more liberal than the English 
provisions and include existing and past member. Compared with the 
Australian provisions, the Hong Kong provisions are restrictive, the Australian 
provisions cover various capacities. The unfair prejudice remedy is for 
shareholders who content the affairs of the company are being conducted in 
an oppressive and unfair manner that is unfairly prejudicial to the shareholders’ 
interests.881 The main advantage is that the relief is to shareholder personally 
compared with that to the company under a derivative action. 
 
The unfair prejudice remedy is more relevant to a small private company than 
a listed company as it always involves the breakdown in relationships between 
shareholders. The contractarians oppose the use of law to intervene in 
disputes as the claim is based on contractual base. The use of private 
contracting system or well drafted articles of association can avoid resorting to 
legal mechanisms. If a reasonable offer is made to buy out the disgruntled 
shareholders, it is not necessary to provide the legal remedy. The imposition of 
law is unnecessary and will only incur additional costs and time, and will 
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reduce the efficiency of the business and corporate operations. Payne argues 
that too much protection may open the floodgates to litigation. 882  This 
approach of non-intervention was taken by English Law Commission that a 
statutory rebuttable presumption of unfair prejudicial conduct in favour of the 
applicant-shareholder was rejected. 883  The English approach has been 
followed by Hong Kong. The recent amendment does not have major change 
to the unfair prejudice provisions and the reasoning of O’Neill v Phillips is still 
prevailing in Hong Kong. 
 
In deciding what amounts to unfair prejudice, Hong Kong courts adopt the 
English objective approach and may apply principles akin to those applied in 
the just and equitable winding up cases.884 Hong Kong follows the English 
traditions and decisions. Under the doctrine of equity, the applicant must come 
with clean hands. However, there is no requirement that the petitioner must 
come to court with clean hands for an unfair prejudice petition. In a recent case 
in Hong Kong, the court allowed in an unfair prejudice petition that the 
petitioner did not have to come to court with clean hands. In Lehmanbrown 
Ltd, 885  both shareholders issued cross-petitions alleging unfair prejudice 
against the other. The Court of Appeal upheld the buyout order although each 
party had committed unfair prejudicial conduct against the other, and both 
parties were responsible for the relationship breaking down. It is necessary to 
find out the manner in conducting company affairs and interests, and 
unfairness to the shareholders under the statutory provisions. There are two 
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aspects under the unfair prejudice provision, that is, that the act complained of 
must affect the member and be unfairly prejudicial to the interests of some part 
of the members.886 
 
4.1.1.4.2  Member Qua Member 
The unfair prejudice provision confers a more general protection on minority 
shareholders. It gives the court discretion to grant relief against any course of 
conduct in the running of the affairs of a company that is unfairly prejudicial to 
the interests of some part of the membership including at least the petitioning 
member. 
 
There is a ‘qua member requirement’, that is to say, the member must be 
unfairly prejudiced in his capacity as a member of the company. In Elder v 
Elder & Watson Ltd,887 it was held that the petitioners could only complain of 
oppressive conduct against them as members and could not complain that 
they had been ousted from their offices as directors because if that was 
oppression, it was oppressive to them in their capacities as directors. Hoffman 
J reaffirmed the test for a ‘qua member’ requirement in the unfair prejudice 
provision in relation to another petition on the basis of exclusion from 
management of a quasi-partnership in Re a Company.888 However, he stated 
that the interests of the members were not necessarily limited to their strict 
legal rights as a member and must not be too narrowly construed. In some 
cases, a removal as a director is a prejudice suffered in the capacity as a 
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member. The ‘qua member requirement’ is followed in Hong Kong889 but is 
modified in Australia that the conduct complaint may affect a shareholder in 
another capacity.890 
 
Hannigan holds the view that the wide range of conduct covered and the 
flexibility of the relief provided shows that unfair prejudice proceedings under 
the unfair prejudice provision are consistently the most attractive solution for 
an aggrieved shareholder.891 In fact, the wide discretion provided by the 
statute reveals that the court has the power to play an important judicial role in 
the development of the unfair prejudice remedy. 
 
In Hong Kong, the unfair prejudicial conduct provision has been amended to 
entitle a member and a past member of company to make an application to the 
court for an order when the member is unfairly prejudiced. 892  The 
reformulation of the provision enables past members including personal 
representatives of deceased member, trustees, or persons beneficially entitled 
by will to have locus standi to correct the wrongdoing discovered after they 
sold the shares, which may have resulted in diminution of the value of their 
shares, where the shareholders were only able to discover it after selling the 
shares. For listed companies, the Securities and Future Commission (SFC) 
can bring an action for unfair prejudice petition.893 The Financial Secretary can 
                                                     
889
 Yun Jip Auto Services Limited v Yuen Sau Fai [1990] 1 HKC 21. 
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also present a petition for winding up because of unfair prejudice.894 The term 
‘company’895 includes companies incorporated in Hong Kong and overseas 
and therefore closes the gaps in the legal provision and reflects the 
complicated commercial reality in Hong Kong. I opine that the recent 
amendment has improved the minority shareholders’ right to take action. 
 
4.1.1.4.3  Interests of Members 
It is up to the court to decide whether the conduct is in truth unfairly prejudicial 
to the interests of the petitioner as a member of the company. It was suggested 
by Lord Granchester Q.C. in Re a Company896 is that the value of the 
member’s shares must be adversely affected by the conduct complained of. 
 
The notion of ‘unfairness’ in the unfair prejudice provision enables the court to 
have regard to wider equitable considerations such as the fact that a member 
might have a legitimate expectation that he would continue in management.897 
Dismissing him would be unfairly prejudicial to his interests as a member. Thus, 
exclusion from management in the Ebrahimi898 situation can fall within the 
unfair prejudice provision without detracting from the ‘qua-member’ principle. 
 
In Re Bovey Hotel Ventures Ltd,899 Slade J held that ‘a member must show 
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that the value of his holding in the company has been seriously diminished or 
jeopardised because of the conduct of those having control, which has been 
unfair to the members concerned’. The test of unfairness is an objective one 
and the interests of member must be harmful in commercial sense, not in a 
merely emotional sense.900 
 
Lord Hoffmann sought to limit the circumstances in which finding of unfair 
prejudice may be made in O’Neill v Phillips, 901  Phillips was the major 
shareholders and gave O’Neill 25% shares of the company, he promised 
O’Neill (an employee and later a managing director) that on meeting certain 
financial targets O’Neill was entitled to share 50% profit and to have more 
shares. Phillips refused O’Neill the share of the profit and refused to have more 
shares on meeting the targets. O’Neill sued Phillips for unfair prejudicial 
conduct or winding up on the basis that O’Neill had legitimate expectation for 
50% profits and further allotment of shares. Lord Hoffmann introduced the 
doctrine of good faith and imposed equitable constraints on legitimate 
expectation on the issue of fairness. The principle of good faith must be 
observed and includes the duty to keep a promise. The test of unfairness is 
satisfied if it would be inequitable to allow the majority shareholders to deny 
the promise. Lord Hoffmann firmly anchored the unfair prejudice remedy to the 
contractual and equitable principles.902 The approach of O’Neill v Phillips was 
followed in Fexuto Pty Ltd v Bosnjak Holdings Pty Ltd in Australia.903 The court 
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accepted the appellant’s claim that he had been excluded from management 
contrary to the principle of equity and consensus on the basis of an 
understanding inferred from the circumstantial evidence only. 
 
In Re London School of Electronics Ltd,904 which concerned the majority 
shareholders agreeing with the minority shareholders in running the business, 
the exclusion of another member from participation in management by 
dismissal of the member as a director of a quasi-partnership was accepted to 
qualify as unfairly prejudicial conduct falling within the unfair prejudice 
provision. 
 
Wide powers are conferred on the court if it is satisfied that a petition is well 
founded. It may make such order as it thinks fit for giving relief in respect of the 
matters complained of. This wide discretion to grant relief was confirmed in Re 
a Company.905 Hoffmann J granted a relief against a former shareholder who 
had conducted the company’s affairs in an unfairly prejudicial manner whilst he 
was a shareholder and an earlier valuation date may be appropriate in order to 
achieve fairness to the petitioner.  
 
Hong Kong courts adopt the reasoning in O’Neill v Phillips in determining the 
issues of unfair prejudicial conducts in a number of cases. The essential core 
of Lord Hoffmann’s ruling emphasising on contractual and equitable principles 
were followed in Hong Kong. In Wong Man Yin v Ricacorp Properties Ltd,906 
an unfair prejudice petition was presented for an order pursuant to section 
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168A (now section 724). The dispute between three shareholders was that the 
respondent-directors paid themselves excessive salary and the company 
concerned did not declare dividends despite large profits, which was unfairly 
prejudicial to the interest of the petitioner. When there was a dilution of the 
petitioner’s shareholding, a proposal was made to declare dividends. Clough 
NPJ, the judge of the Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal, expressly adopted the 
approach taken by Lord Hoffmann in O’Neill. In his judgment, the issues of 
unfairness were taken into account and a buyout order was made for the 
petitioner’s share by the two other major shareholders at pro-rata basis. 
Cheung contends that the valuation based on a pro-rata basis in a share 
purchase is to achieve a just and equitable result.907 
 
Deputy Judge Poon, in Re Kam Fai Electroplating Factory Ltd,908 delivered a 
different ruling on a similar fact of Re London School of Electronics Ltd that the 
petitioner was excluded from management in the family business. The learned 
judge considered the issues of unfairness under the principles of O’Neill and 
rejected an unfair prejudice petition presented by the petitioner for unfair 
prejudicial conduct against his interest as a shareholder. He ruled that the 
petitioner had failed to establish the existence of the contractual principle in 
addition to equitable principle. Cheung argues that there is no consistent in 
judicial reasoning and there is a need to bring greater certainty to the operation 
of unfair prejudice claims.909 
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Cheung contends that unfair prejudice is not well defined, which has created a 
considerable degree of uncertainty, and the petitioner might need to rely on 
multifarious allegations of unfair prejudicial conduct in order to increase the 
chance of success.910 This was illustrated in Clark v Cutland.911 The minority 
shareholder was forced to file two proceedings out of uncertainty and 
confusion, one for derivative claims and one for unfair prejudice in respect of 
misappropriation of large sums from the company by the majority shareholder. 
The court consolidated the two actions, granted relief to the minority 
shareholder, and exercised its discretion to decide what right had been 
infringed in the two proceedings. Goddard observes the difficulties of following 
Lord Hoffmann’s formulation in O’Neill v Phillips under the principle of legal 
certainty 912  as the terms ‘unfairness’ and ‘prejudice’ are not properly 
defined.913 In Anderson v Hogg,914 the Inner House of Scotland held that the 
judge in a lower court was wrong to dismiss a personal claim and considered it 
was a potential derivative claim. On appeal, the Inner House held that it was 
both a personal and a derivative claim. Attenborough comments that minority 
shareholders face potential difficulty in identifying a valid ground for their 
claim.915 Dine suggests that clear guidance as to what is interest and right 
should be given to avoid confusing, duplicated, and multifarious allegations in 
the claim. 916  Cheung argues that the English Law Commission’s 
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recommended statutory presumption of unfair prejudice conduct should be 
considered in Hong Kong in order to avoid the confusion.917 I suggest that the 
statutory presumption model can be envisaged for the reform of unfair 
prejudice remedies in Hong Kong. 
 
4.1.1.4.4  No Reflective Loss Principle 
The issue of no reflective loss principle is pre-requisite in a derivative action 
and was reviewed in Re Brightview Limited 918 in unfair prejudice claims in the 
UK. It is a notable precedent in reflective loss cases. The deputy Judge 
Jonathan Crow took the view that the reflective loss bar will not apply where 
the petitioner seeks relief under an unfair prejudice petition as long as there is 
no double recovery in such circumstances. Cheung argues that his ruling is not 
substantial and clear and may be contrary to the rule in Johnson v Gore Wood 
& Co.919 
 
In Australia, a shareholding does not prevent a compensation claim in respect 
of a proceedings against a company by a member and a member is not 
prevented from obtaining damages or other compensation from a company 
only because the member holds, or has held, shares in the company.920 In this 
regard, the Australian position is more liberal than the English position.  
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In Hong Kong, the position is much clearer than that in the UK but more 
restrictive than the Australian provision as under section 725(5), it expressly 
states that ‘a member, past or present, of a company is not entitled to recover, 
by way of damages under subsection 2(b) or (4), any loss that solely reflect the 
loss suffered by the company that only company is entitled to recover under 
the common law’. The reflective loss principle has no role to play in an unfair 
prejudice claim in Hong Kong where there is a clear statutory guidance.  
 
4.1.1.4.5  Issues of Costs 
Similar to a derivative claim, an unfair prejudice petition is not covered by legal 
aid and the application must be financed by the shareholders themselves. The 
costs indemnity order under the doctrine of Wallersteiner921 is not generally 
available to an unfair prejudice petition unless corporate wrongs are also 
litigated in the action of an unfair prejudice petition. This was dealt with in the 
case of Clark v Cutland922 where the Court of Appeal laid down the rule that if 
the relief is for the benefit of the company, an indemnity cost order shall be 
made and if the relief is for the benefit of the members, no indemnity cost order 
shall be made. 
 
Hong Kong follows the English and Australian models; there is no express 
provision in the legislation to empower the court to order costs. It is at the 
discretion of the court to award costs in an unfair prejudice petition and it is 
uncertain as to whether the shareholders can get costs from the company in 
an unfair prejudice petition. 
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It is argued that in view of the costs involved in the unfair prejudicial petition, 
further amendment should be made in favour of the minority shareholder for an 
order of buyout. 923  The statutory presumption is made in favour of the 
petitioner of owner-managed private companies in which the petitioner must 
hold 10% of voting rights, and the shares must be held solely in the petitioner’s 
own name, and the petitioner has been removed as a director or has been 
prevented from carrying on all or substantially all his or her functions as a 
director.924 
 
However, the recommendation was rejected by the Company Law Review 
Steering Group as the presumption is likely to encourage more shareholder 
litigation and is open to abuse as it is inequitable to assume that removal from 
management is unfair prejudicial conduct to minority shareholders. 925 
However, Boyle argues that the proposed statutory presumption would help to 
reduce the incidence of expensive and lengthy litigation in small and 
quasi-partnership companies. Cheung argues that the statutory presumptions 
would provide a realistic and flexible solution to the problems posed by lengthy 
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and costly shareholder litigation and provide more certain and predictable 
procedure in which more cases will be settled out of court or before going to a 
full trial.926  
 
4.1.1.4.6  Remedies and Reliefs 
The remedies are wide ranging including, but not limited to, restraint from 
doing or continuing an act complained of by the petitioner; to do an act which 
the petitioner has complained it has omitted or has proposed to omit to do; to 
order proceedings to be brought in the company’s name against any persons 
and on such terms as the court thinks fit; to appoint a receiver or manager of 
the company’s property or company’s business; to regulate the conduct of the 
company’s affairs in the future; to purchase of the shares of any members of 
the company by other members or by the company itself; or to order the 
company or any other person to pay any damages. This provision is modelled 
on the English provision.927 The relief of buyout order is frequently sought by 
the shareholders under the unfair prejudice provision, in both Hong Kong and 
the UK.928 
 
The Australian model is more liberal and wide ranging. The remedies cover an 
order for winding up a company; modifying or repealing company’s constitution; 
regulating the conduct of company’s affairs; purchase of shares by the other 
members or by the company; proceedings in the company’s name; appointing 
a receiver and a manager of the company’s property or business; restraining a 
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person from engaging in specified conduct or from doing a specified act; or 
requiring a person to do a specified act.929 
 
Cheung contends that the most common remedy for unfair prejudicial claim is 
an order for the purchase of the petitioner’s shares by the company or by other 
shareholders.930 However, as there is no statutory scheme for valuation of the 
shares, it can be on a pro-rata or a discount basis.931 
 
In terms of remedies, a conservative approach is adopted by the English 
courts, which do not allow an unfair prejudice petition to redress corporate 
wrong, although the court is empowered to make any order as it thinks fit 
including order civil proceedings to be brought on behalf of the company.932 
Hannigan argues that the unfair prejudice provision was intended to allow 
minority shareholders to bring a derivative claim; however, it is unlikely that a 
direct personal remedy would be granted. 933  In Prudential Assurance v 
Newman Industries, 934  the court laid down the general rule that it is 
inappropriate to allow an unfair prejudice petition to grant corporate relief that 
would in effect go around the rule in Foss v Harbottle. The court in the strict 
sense can order relief in favour of the company in an unfair prejudice petition 
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but in doing so would offend the rule in Foss v Harbottle. The issue between 
the unfair prejudice action and the derivative action was considered in Re 
Charnley Davies Limited.935 Millett J pointed out that ‘the distinction between 
‘misconduct’ and ‘unfairly prejudicial management’ does not lie in the particular 
acts or omissions of which complaint is made, but in the nature of the 
complaint and the remedy necessary to meet it’. 
 
The narrow approach taken by English courts has been followed by Hong 
Kong courts.936 In Tang Man Kou v Chime Corporation Limited,937 Lord Scott 
sitting in Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal attempted to make the distinction 
between misconduct and mismanagement based on the decision of Re 
Charnley Davies Limited; an unfair prejudice petition was presented by an 
administrator of the estate of the deceased shareholder-director for alleged 
misconduct of the company to advance a loan to another company owned by 
the respondent-director. The court held that if the nature of the complaint is 
misconduct, the appropriate remedy is for the benefit of the company and the 
proper claim should be a derivative claim instead of an unfair prejudice petition. 
The court was not prepared to allow a claim for misconduct and redressing 
corporate wrong in an unfair prejudice petition that in effect was to circumvent 
the rule in Foss v Harbottle. The distinction between misconduct and 
mismanagement is not very clear as no guideline was given by Lord Scott. It 
seems that the judiciary does not support Hannigan’s argument and there are 
very few cases reported endorsing her view. Amongst these cases, one case is 
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supporting Hannigan’s argument. In Gamlestaden Fastigheter AB v Baltic 
Partners Ltd,938 an unfair prejudice petition was used to redress corporate 
wrong, the court exercised its discretion and ordered the majority shareholders 
to pay damages to the company. Cheung argues that a more liberal approach 
should be adopted in an unfair prejudice petition that may include allegations 
of corporate wrongs, and the relief may restrict to personal rather than 
corporate remedies.939 
 
Compared with the UK and Hong Kong provisions,940 the Australian provision 
are considered to be more flexible as it allows shareholder to sue in his own 
capacity or any other capacity, and there is a wide range of remedies including 
winding up, altering the company’s constitution, regulating future conduct, and 
buying the shares. Berkahn argues that the scope for relief for unfair prejudice 
is thus now much more limited in the UK model compared to the Australian 
model.941 
 
Skyes emphasises that it is not right to assume statutory derivative action 
would prevail over an unfair prejudice petition as cases are consistently sought 
by minority shareholders.942 Choo argues that the effectiveness and popularity 
of statutory derivative action remains doubtful.943 Cabrelli suggests that an 
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unfair prejudice petition is the most attractive solution to minority shareholders 
as it achieves all that could be achieved by statutory derivative action.944 
Davies opines that an unfair prejudice petition in remedying wrongs is effective 
and its easier requirement is the reason for its popularity.945 I contend that the 
unfair prejudice petition is a more popular option than the statutory derivative 
action based on the minority protection experiences of other leading common 
law jurisdictions. 
 
A short conclusion of this part could be that the Hong Kong judiciary has 
followed the English traditions but adopted a more liberal and flexible approach 
in determining unfair prejudice claims, and the recent amendment has not 
brought significant change to the original provisions. This thesis finds that due 
to its effectiveness and popularity, there are some areas that could be 
reformed to improve its protection to minority shareholders. Cheung argues 
that the existing range of remedies is too limited and the issues of costs for 
unfair prejudicial petition.946 It is suggested that consideration should be given 
to allow redressing corporate wrongs and include a winding up option in the 
existing list of remedies947 in the Hong Kong model948 that can provide a 
better solution in the present duality or remedies.949  
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4.1.1.5 Just and Equitable Winding Up 
In addition to the derivative action and the unfair prejudice claim, a minority 
shareholder may petition the court for an order of winding up on just and 
equitable grounds, and it is a drastic step to apply for a winding up order. The 
just and equitable winding up remedy950 is based on an equitable rule. I 
contend that the Hong Kong Law Reform Commission (HKLRC) has failed to 
modernise the Hong Kong corporate insolvency law and the Australian model 
is a good reference for the Hong Kong reform. 
 
In the UK, under section 122(1)(g) of the English Insolvency Act 1986, the 
court is empowered to make a winding up order if the court is of the opinion 
that it is just and equitable that the company should be wound up. Hannigan 
argues that the just and equitable winding up jurisdiction relies on rule of equity, 
and has been all but superseded by the unfairly prejudicial jurisdiction.951 
 
In Australia, under section 461(1)(k) of the Australian Corporations Act 2001, a 
court may order the winding up of a company if the court is of the opinion that it 
is just and equitable to do so. Tomasic, Bottomley and McQueen contend that 
the just and equitable winding up provision follows the English rule of equity 
and equitable considerations lie at the basis of just and equitable ground,952 
as can be seen in Re Tivoli Freeholds Ltd.953 Lipton and Herzberg contend 
that the just and equitable winding up provision appears to overlap with the 
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remedies for unfair prejudice claim under section 232 and these provisions 
enable a court to wind up a company even if it is solvent and able to pay its 
debts.954 
 
In Hong Kong, section 177(1)(f) of the Hong Kong Companies (Winding Up 
and Miscellaneous Provisions) Ordinance provides that a company may be 
wound up by the court if the court is of opinion that it is just and equitable that 
the company should be wound up. The statutory provisions are based on the 
earlier English company legislation.955 Stott contends that Hong Kong follows 
the English principles in just and equitable winding up cases.956 However, Lo 
and Qu contend that lack of clean hands does not necessarily bar a winding up 
order.957 A company includes a foreign company, being a company neither 
incorporated nor registered in Hong Kong, which is known as an unregistered 
company. For an unregistered company, Hong Kong courts have jurisdictions 
to wind it up on just and equitable grounds958 as long as the requirements 
formulated in the English case of Re Real Estate Development Company959 
are met. The English ruling is followed in Hong Kong in Re Zhu Kuan Group 
Company Limited.960 The main requirement is whether a sufficient connection 
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with Hong Kong is established.961  
 
In practice, it is inevitable to join the just and equitable winding up and unfair 
prejudice claims together in a single petition as in the highly controversial 
family dispute case Re Yung Yee Holdings Limited and Others. 962  The 
shareholder (elder brother) alleged loss of trust and unfair prejudice and 
applied for the buy-out of his shares by the respondents (his youngest brother 
or the company), or alternatively to order the winding up of the company, 
incorporated in the British Virgin Islands, which owned a famous roasted 
goose restaurant in Hong Kong. The unfair prejudice claim was dismissed as 
the company had not established a place of business in Hong Kong, but the 
just and equitable winding up claim was allowed as the company had sufficient 
connection to Hong Kong. 
 
The statutory provisions963 do not define what is just and equitable, which is 
governed by common law. The leading case in this area is the House of Lords 
                                                     
961
 The test of sufficient connection is laid down in Re Solar Touch Limited [2004] HKLR 154 
that the existence of company’s assets in Hong Kong; a reasonable possibility that the order 
will benefit those applying for it; and one or more persons interested in the distribution of the 
company’s assets are persons whom the court has jurisdiction. 
962
 Re Yung Yee Holdings Limited and Others [2014] 2 HKLRD 313 (CA). The Court of Appeal 
and the Court of First Instance dismissed the petition as the court had no jurisdiction to order 
the company to be wound up or shares to be bought out, on the basis that the company had no 
‘sufficient connection’ to Hong Kong under section 327(3)(c) and ‘established a place of 
business’ in Hong Kong under section 168A (now section 722 of Cap.622). The Court of Final 
Appeal reversed the decisions of the courts below that the company had ‘sufficient connection’ 
to Hong Kong under section 327(3)(c) but upheld that the company did not establish a place of 
business for the purposes of section 168A.  
963
 English Companies Act 1948, section 222(f) and was replaced by English Insolvency Act 
1986, section 122(1)(g); Australian Corporations Act 2001, section 461(1); Hong Kong 
Companies Ordinance, section 177(1)(f) (Cap. 32). The New Hong Kong Companies 
Ordinance (Chapter 622 of the Laws of Hong Kong) is fully implemented on 3rd March 2014. 
The provisions about insolvency and winding up in the Hong Kong Companies Ordinance 
(Chapter 32 of the Laws of Hong Kong) are retained but retitled as the ‘Companies (Winding 
Up and Miscellaneous Provisions) Ordinance (Cap. 32)’. 
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decision in Ebrahimi v Westbourne Galleries Ltd.964 The decision in Ebrahimi 
was about the issue of just and equitable winding up. In that case, Lord 
Wilberforce set out two basic principles. First of all, the rule should not be 
divided into categories or headings. ‘Illustrations may be used, but general 
words should remain general and not be reduced to the sum of particular 
instances’. Secondly, the petitioner (if a shareholder) need not be confined to 
circumstances affecting him in his capacity as shareholder, but may rely on 
any circumstances of justice or equity that affect him in his relations with the 
company or with the other shareholders.965  
 
The fact that a company is a small one or private is not enough, and the 
applicant must come with clean hands.966 The superimposition of equitable 
considerations requires something more; for example, an association formed 
or continued on the basis of a personal relationship, involving mutual 
confidence; an agreement or understanding of the shareholders to participate 
in the conduct of the business; or restriction on the transfer of the members’ 
interest in the company.967 The above elements will be considered by the 
court in the application for just and equitable winding up petition.  
 
The principles of Ebrahimi are also applied to Hong Kong cases, for example 
in Re Lai Kan Co Ltd v Re Safe Steel Furniture Factory Ltd.968 The petitioner 
took out a joint petition for unfair prejudice claims and just and equitable 
winding up. The court applied the Ebrahimi principles and held that the 
                                                     
964
 Re Westbourne Galleries, Ebrahimi v Westbourne Galleries Ltd [1973] AC 360 HL.  
965
 ibid [374]-[375]. 
966
 ibid [375]. 
967
 ibid [379]. 
968
 Re Lai Kan Co Ltd and Re Safe Steel Furniture Factory Ltd [1988] 1 HKLR 257 (HC). 
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dismissal of the petitioner as a manager alone was not enough, and other 
elements such as loss of confidence and restriction on transfer his interests 
are required to satisfy the requirements of Ebrahimi, and refused to grant a 
winding up order but allowed the unfair prejudice claims.  
 
Stott identifies that an order for winding up is granted on the situations where 
the main object of the company has failed, or the company was formed to carry 
out a fraud or on illegal business, or the members have lost mutual trust, 
understanding, and confidence.969 The remedy of winding up is a more drastic 
remedy. The court is only prepared to wind up the company on just and 
equitable grounds that include deadlock and failure of substratum, exclusion 
from office, and justifiable loss of confidence. As winding up action is a drastic 
measure, the likely result of which is to close down the business of the 
company. Minority shareholders are last to get the surplus assets of the 
company after payment of all debts and expenses according to their 
shareholding in the winding up list, and therefore it is not a popular choice. It is 
considered that the winding up remedy is a drastic measure and is subject to 
tight judicial control. Lo and Qu contend that winding up order is of last resort 
and will be rejected if other alternative remedy would be adequate.970 
 
The current English insolvency law was made after consultation with the 
Insolvency Rules Committee established in 1976, 971  and the current 
                                                     
969
 Stott Vanessa, Hong Kong Company Law (13th edn Pearson 2011) 402. 
970
 Lo Stefan and Qu Charles, Law of Companies in Hong Kong (Sweet and Maxwell 2013) 
468.  
971
 The English Insolvency Act 1986 was made after a series of consultation with the 
Insolvency Rules Committee which comprised judges, accountants, barristers and solicitors 
specialising in insolvency work. See French Derek, Mayson Stephen and Ryan Christopher, 
Mayson, French and Ryan on Company Law (OUP 2002) 704.  
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Australian model is a result of the Australian Law Reform Commission, which 
conducted a wide-ranging general insolvency inquiry of its insolvency law in 
the 1980s.972 The English Law Commission proposed to increase the courts’ 
power to deal flexibly with shareholders’ remedies by adding winding up as a 
new remedial order for unfair prejudice petition. 973  The statutory leave 
procedure was proposed in the new remedial order and designed to prevent a 
predatory petitioner and for fear of vexatious shareholder litigation.974 The 
English Company Law Review Steering Group rejected this proposal on the 
ground that a winding up order would cause damage to the company’s 
business and reputation and would give rise to vexatious litigation.975 The 
SCCLR follows the English approach and does not include winding up as a 
remedy for unfair prejudice petition in the recent amendment. 976 
 
The HKLRC started its reform of insolvency law in 1990 and after 10 years of 
research and study, it did not make any recommendations for a change in 
2000.977 Ng argues that the winding-up provisions were referred to the Law 
Reform Commission in 1990, but there has been no significant progress in 
reform on corporate bankruptcy so far. Hong Kong has remained where it was 
20 years ago in respect of insolvency law reform, not to mention the much 
                                                     
972
 The Australian Law Reform Commission produced a General Insolvency Inquiry, Report 45 
in 1988 (also known as Harmer Report). The report identified the principles which it considered 
should guide the development of modern insolvency law. See Mason Rosalind, ‘Insolvency 
Law in Australia’ in Tomasic Roman (ed), Insolvency Law in East Asia (Ashgate Publishing Ltd 
2006) 466.  
973
 The Law Commission, Shareholder Remedies (Law Com No 246, 1997) paras 4.39-4.42. 
974
 ibid paras 4.39. 
975
 Department of Trade and Industry, Consultation Paper on Shareholder Remedies (DTI, 
1998) Paras 3.12 - 4.27. 
976
 The Standing Committee on Company Law Reform, Report on the Recommendations of a 
Consultancy Report of the Review Hong Kong Companies Ordinance (2000) 118.  
977
 ibid. The Committee rejected to give the court the option of making any other order it sees 
fit on the ground that there is no need for alternative remedies as the court has jurisdiction 
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needed reform on corporate rescue and the reform of insolvency law in Hong 
Kong was ‘a tortoise in coma’.978 The FSTB issued the Improvement of 
Corporate Insolvency Law Legislative Proposal in 2013 and finally revived its 
belated efforts to update the company winding up provision in company 
legislation.979  It is expected that the amended Bill will be available and 
enacted as legislation in 2016. Booth describes the reform of winding up law in 
Hong Kong and China as a race between two tortoises.980  
 
The above discussion of Hong Kong model reveals that the SCCLR has 
introduced the statutory derivative action and the statutory multiple derivative 
action, and has reformulated the scope of application and applicant for unfair 
prejudice claim to reflect commercial reality in Hong Kong. It has been argued 
that there are still some areas for improvement; the unfair prejudice claim and 
the just and equitable winding up provisions, should be the heart of the reform 
and the English Law Commission’s proposal could be considered as a model 
for Hong Kong’s future reform.981  
 
For comparative purpose, I summarise the shareholders’ remedies in the UK 
and Australia982 based on same description in the following table.983 
                                                     
978
 Ng Ludwig, ‘The Future of Law Reform in Hong Kong’ Hong Kong Lawyer, October 2011. 
<http://law.lexisnexis.com/webcenters/hk/At-Issue/The-future-of-law-reform-in-Hong-Kong> 
accessed 3 March 2014. See also Ludwig Ng, ‘Tortoises in Coma: Reform of Hong Kong’s 
Insolvency Law’ in Michael Tibury, Simon Young and Ludwig Ng (eds) Reforming Law Reform: 
Perspectives from Hong Kong and Beyond (HKU Press 2014) 135. 
979
 The 2013 Proposal is published by the Financial Services and Treasury Bureau of the 
Government of Hong Kong Special Administrative Region to consult the public on the key 
issues of the corporate insolvency law. 
<http://www.fstb.gov.hk/fsb/ppr/consult/doc/impcill_consult_e.pdf> accessed 3 March 2014. 
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 Booth Charles, ‘The Race of Two Tortoises: Insolvency Law Reform in Hong Kong and 
China’ (2006) 2 (2) ABA China Law Reporter 3. 
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 Cheung Rita, Company Law and Minority Shareholders’ Right, (Butterworths LexisNexis 
2010) 360. 
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The UK Direct and 
Derivative 
Actions under 
Common Law 
Derivative Action 
Section 260 
Unfair Prejudice 
Claims  
Section 994 
Winding-Up Order 
Section 122(1)(g)
984
 
Grounds Fraud (derivative 
action only), 
ultra vires, 
wrong resolution 
or infringement 
of personal 
rights. 
An actual or 
proposed act or 
omission involving 
negligence, default, 
breach of trust by 
directors of the 
company. 
The company’s affairs 
are being or have been 
conducted in a manner 
that is unfairly 
prejudicial to the 
interests of members 
generally or of some 
part of its members 
(including at least 
himself), or that an 
actual or proposed act 
or omission of the 
company (including an 
act or omission on its 
behalf) is or would be 
so prejudicial. 
Destruction of the 
basis of the 
association and the 
company is 
deadlocked. 
Lack of probity. 
Loss of substratum.
985
 
Requirements Prove the 
breach is 
harmful to 
personal 
interest. 
Prima facie case. 
Made in good faith. 
Duty to promote the 
success of the 
company. 
The views of 
independent and 
disinterested 
shareholders. 
Likelihood of 
authorisation or 
ratification by the 
company and 
decision of the 
company to pursue 
or not and so on to 
assist the court in 
exercising the 
discretion to grant 
leave to the 
applicants. Obtain 
permission from 
Court. 
The act complained of 
must affect the 
member and unfairly 
prejudicial to the 
interests of the 
members. Member 
includes existing 
member only. 
It is just and equitable 
to wind up the 
company. 
Remedies  Personal relief or 
damages to 
minority 
shareholder for 
direct action. 
Relief to 
company for 
derivative action.  
Relief to the 
company. 
Regulate the conduct. 
Require the company 
to restrain from the 
conduct.  
Require to do an act. 
Order proceedings in 
the company’s name.  
Appoint a receiver and 
a manager of the 
company’s property or 
business.  
Require the company 
not to make any, or 
any specified 
alterations in its 
articles without the 
leave of the court. 
Order of purchase by 
the other members or 
by the company.
986
 
Winding up Order. 
                                                                                                                                                        
model. 
983
 Unless otherwise stated, the section refers to in the table is either under the English 
Companies Act 2006 or the Australian Corporations Act 2001. 
984
 English Insolvency Act 1986, section 122(1)(g) 
985
 Hannigan Brenda, Company Law (1
st
 edn, LexisNexis 2003) 442. 
986
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Australia Direct Action 
under Common 
Law 
Derivative Action 
Section 236 
Unfair Prejudice 
Claims  
Section 232 
Winding-Up Order 
Section 461(1)(k) 
Grounds Infringement of 
personal rights 
under express or 
statutory contract, 
company law or 
legislation or 
company’s 
constitution. 
 
A member or officer 
(including former 
member or officer) 
may bring 
proceedings on 
behalf of a company, 
or intervene in any 
proceedings to 
which the company 
is a party for the 
purpose of taking 
responsibility on 
behalf of the 
company for those 
proceedings, and the 
company fails to 
take step in those 
proceedings. 
The conduct of the 
company's affairs, 
an actual or 
proposed act or 
omission by or on 
behalf of a company, 
or a resolution or 
proposed resolution 
by all, or by a class, 
of the shareholders 
is either: contrary to 
the interests of the 
shareholders as a 
whole; or 
oppressive to, 
unfairly prejudicial 
to, or unfairly 
discriminatory 
against, a 
shareholder or 
shareholders 
whether in that 
capacity or in any 
other capacity. 
The company 
fraudulent from 
inception. 
Denial of 
information.  
The company is 
deadlocked. 
Failure of 
substratum.
 
 
In the public 
interest.
987
 
Requirements Prove the breach 
is harmful to 
personal interest. 
Made in good faith. 
In the interest of the 
company.  
Serious question to 
be tried. 
Written notice of 
demand. 
Obtain permission 
from Court. 
The act complained 
of must affect the 
member and unfairly 
prejudicial to the 
interests of the 
members or any 
other capacity. 
It is just and 
equitable to wind up 
the company. 
Remedies  Personal relief or 
damages to 
minority 
shareholder. 
Relief to the 
company. 
Wind up a company. 
Company’s 
constitution is 
modified or 
repealed. 
Regulate the 
conduct. Order of 
purchase by the 
other members or by 
the company. 
Order proceedings in 
the company’s 
name.  
Appoint a receiver 
and a manager of 
the company’s 
property or business.  
Require a person 
from engaging in 
specified conduct or 
from doing a 
specified act.  
Require a person to 
do a specified act.
988
 
Winding up Order. 
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 Ford HAJ, Austin RP and Ramsay Ian, Ford’s Principles of Corporation Law (11th edn, 
Butterworths 2003) 600. 
988
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This part assesses of the efficacy of the protection of minority shareholders 
under the cases decided by courts and company legislation in Hong Kong. 
Overall, this thesis agrees that the protection of minority shareholders in Hong 
Kong is comparable to other leading common law jurisdictions and basically 
efficient in enhancing corporate governance, although there is still room for 
improvement. The efficient aspects have been locked in from the colonial 
period according to path dependence. The recent amendment has improved 
some of the issues for the protection of minority shareholders.  
 
4.1.2 China  
The legislative goal of the PRC Company Law 1993 was to corporatise SOEs, 
and the shareholder had no clear right to bring derivative action. Pistor and 
Xu989 contend that a shareholder of the JSC only had a right of personal action 
that was to ensure that the management would not breach their duties and 
cause loss to the company.990 Improvement was made in the PRC Company 
Law 2005; a shareholder now has the right to challenge the validity of 
shareholder resolutions and board decisions,991 the right to sue wrongdoers 
by derivative actions992 or by direct action by the shareholders,993 and the 
right to wind up the Company.994 Ma argues that the PRC Company Law 2005 
                                                     
989
 Pistor Katharina and Xu Chenggang, ‘Deterrence and Regulatory Failure in Emerging 
Financial Markets: Comparing China and Russia’ (WCFIA Conference, April 2003) and cited in 
Ma Fang, ‘The Deficiencies of Derivative Actions in China’ 2010 31(5) Co Law 150. 
990
 PRC Company Law 1993, Article 63 only stated that: ‘Directors, supervisors and the 
managers shall be liable for compensation, if they violate the law, administrative rules and 
regulations or the articles of association in performance of their duties and cause damage to 
the company’. 
991
 PRC Company Law 2005, Article 22. 
992
 ibid Article 152.  
993
 ibid Article 153. 
994
 ibid Article 183. 
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fails to include oppression remedy.995 It appears to me that the Hong Kong 
and Chinese company laws in terms of minority protection have some degree 
of convergence. In the following part, I present my argument based on the path 
dependence theory that Chinese company law is not enacted for efficiency 
reason and the issues for minority protection are its structures. 
 
Minority shareholders may take action to set aside any shareholders’ meeting 
or board meeting resolution that is contrary to law or otherwise infringes on 
shareholder’s legitimate rights.996 The PRC Company Law employs the term 
controlling shareholder, 997  which carries a similar meaning of majority 
shareholder in Hong Kong. It further provides that the controlling shareholder 
‘shall not abuse their rights as to cause losses to the company or other 
shareholders,’998 ‘infringe the company’s interests by taking advantage of its 
affiliated relationship and shall be responsible for any resulting damages 
caused to the company’999 and is subject to minority shareholders to ‘cancel 
the resolutions of shareholders’ meeting or board meeting resolutions’.1000 I 
contend that the remedies are very similar to that of the Hong Kong common 
law model. The term shareholder includes a de facto shareholder who has 
fulfilled his duty to pay capital or inherited his share but the company fails to 
issue him a share certificate and record his status.1001 
 
                                                     
995
 Ma Fang, ‘A Challenge for China: Is It Possible to Introduce Unfair Prejudice Remedies? 
Part 1’ (2009) 20(12) ICCLR 423. 
996
 PRC Company Law 2005, Article 22. 
997
 ibid Article 217(2). 
998
 ibid Article 20. 
999
 ibid Article 21. 
1000
 ibid Article 22. 
1001
 ‘Provisions of the Supreme People’s Court on Some Issues about the Application of the 
Company Law of the People’s Republic of China (III) 2011’ which was enacted on 27 January, 
2011, and came into force on 16 February, 2011, Article 24. 
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The term company referred to in the PRC Company Law means the LLC and 
the JSC1002 and does not cover overseas, holding, and subsidiary companies. 
In the Chinese case study in Chapter Five where holding and subsidiary 
companies are involved, the law does not cover this kind of situation. Chapter 
Six will discuss suggestions for reform. 
 
4.1.2.1 Derivative Action  
Compared with the common law jurisdictions, previous PRC Company law did 
not directly answer whether the shareholder’s action was direct or 
derivative.1003 The old version of Article 111 was repealed and replaced by 
Article 1521004 for derivative action, Article 153 for direct action,1005 and Article 
22 for challenging the resolutions of the shareholders’ meeting and board of 
directors.1006 The new PRC company law implicitly provides that directors owe 
a duty of loyalty and due diligence to the company and its shareholders.1007 
                                                     
1002
 PRC Company Law 2005, Article 2. 
1003
 PRC Company Law 1993, Article 111 states that ‘where a resolution of the shareholders’ 
meeting or of the board of directors violates the law, administrative regulations or infringes the 
lawful rights and the interests of the shareholders, the shareholders concerned shall be 
entitled to apply for an injunction in a people’s court to terminate the violation or infringement’. 
The provision only mentioned shareholders’ rights to restrain the infringement and did not 
clearly indicate whether it is a direct or an indirect action. 
1004
 PRC Company Law 2005, Article 152 states that ‘ where any director or senior executive 
of a company is under the circumstances of Article 150 of this Law, in case of a limited liability 
company, the shareholders, or in case of a joint stock company, the shareholders separately or 
jointly holding one percent or more of the company’s shares for 180 consecutive days may 
request in writing the supervisory board or the supervisor of the limited liability company 
having no supervisory board to bring a lawsuit before the people’s court; where any supervisor 
of the company is under the circumstances of Article 150 of this Law, the said shareholders 
may request in writing the board of directors or the executive director of the limited liability 
company having no board of directors to bring a lawsuit before the people’s court’. 
1005
 PRC Company Law 2005, Article 153 states that ‘where any director or senior executive of 
a company in violation of the provisions of the laws, administrative regulations and the articles 
of association of the company, cause damage to the interests of any shareholder of the 
company, such shareholder may bring a lawsuit before the people’s court’. 
1006
 PRC Company Law 2005, Article 22 states that a shareholder may bring a legal action to 
set aside ‘the contents in the resolutions of the shareholders meeting or the shareholders 
general meeting or the board of directors of a company, if in violation of the laws or 
administrative regulations, shall be null and void’. 
1007
 PRC Company Law 2005, Articles 148 and 149 stipulate that the directors, supervisors 
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The PRC Company Law prohibits directors, supervisors, and managers from 
embezzling funds or lending company funds to others and they shall not put 
themselves in a position where the interests of the company conflict with their 
personal interest.1008 These provisions are similar to the common law fiduciary 
duty. However, these provisions only describe the statutory duties without clear 
guidelines. These provisions are too skeletal with a lack of operating standards, 
and detailed rules are required.1009 The derivative action also applies to 
shareholders in the liquidation and deregistration situation where any 
members of the liquidation group violate law or regulation and thus cause 
losses to the company during the course of deregistration or liquidation by the 
provisions of the SPC.1010 
 
The PRC Company Law also provides that when shareholders’ lawful rights 
and interests are infringed by directors, they have the right to sue the directors 
for compensation.1011 It has been argued that there is no substantive rule for 
statutory shareholder remedies. Mo contends that it will take a long time for 
China to codify the legislation into a specific and detailed format, which is 
comparable to the legislation in a common law jurisdiction. 1012  Although 
                                                                                                                                                        
articles of association, truly perform their duties and protect the interests of the company and 
shall not be permitted to use their position and powers in the company to seek personal gains 
1008
 PRC Company Law 2005, Articles 149 and 150. It stipulates that a director shall not enter 
into any contracts or transactions with the company except if otherwise stipulated in the 
articles of association or approved by the board of shareholders or shall not violate the 
provisions of the laws, administrative regulations and the articles of association. 
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 Zhang Xianchu, ‘Practical Demands to Update the Company law’ (1998) 28 HKLJ 254; 
Anyuan Yuan, ‘Foreign Direct Investments in China-Practical Problems of Complying with 
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certain cases have recently been initiated by injured shareholders in China, the 
courts seem to be unwilling to hear a case regarding derivative actions due to 
lack of detailed procedures, competence of judges and corporate lawyers, 
security for action, cost of litigation, and entitlement to remedies applicable to 
derivative litigation.1013 Some of these issues are related to structures and rule 
of law principles; I will discuss the structural issues further in Chapter Six. 
 
4.1.2.1.1  Locus Standi Requirements  
In terms of locus standi, different requirements are laid down for the 
shareholding period and percentage for the LLC and the JSC. There are locus 
standi requirements that a shareholder of a JSC who has held at least 1% of 
the company’s shares for a minimum and continuous period of 180 days, is 
entitled to request that directors or supervisors take legal action against the 
unlawful acts of a director, supervisor, senior officer, or third party who violates 
laws, administrative regulations or articles of association, which has caused a 
loss to the company. If the company fails to take action, the shareholder, for 
the benefit of the company, is entitled to take the legal action, this is a 
derivative right not a direct right.1014 It means that the LLC’s shareholder can 
bring a derivative action without lower threshold requirements. Ma contends 
that the less restrictive approach in the legislation reflects the sympathy for 
shareholders and their difficulties in transferring their shares and leaving the 
LLC. It is much easier for shareholders of a LLC to access judicial remedies 
and to imitate derivative action, they need to take into consideration the issues 
                                                                                                                                                        
International, 1999) 95.    
1013
 Yang Jinzhu, ‘Comparative Corporate Governance: Reforming Chinese Corporate 
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of costs while the ultimate reliefs and benefit are to the company not to 
them.1015  
 
Huang argues that the ‘contemporaneous ownership rule’ is unclear as to 
whether the holding period must be strictly continuous without any interruption 
only at the time of initiating the action or throughout the action and the alleged 
wrong must fall within the 180-day period.1016 Clark and Howson argue that for 
the shareholding minimum threshold, even 1% may well be so high as to 
discourage otherwise meritorious actions by the minority shareholders in 
widely-held companies; this requirement threatens to defeat the first and only 
public JSC derivative action attempted after the introduction of PRC Company 
Law 2005.1017  
 
Practically speaking, the effectiveness of derivative or personal rights actions 
may be doubtful. With regard to the scope of plaintiffs, the SPC requires that 
only allows those shareholders who separately or jointly hold 1% or more of 
company’s shares for 180 consecutive days are allowed to initiate derivative 
actions.1018 Huang argues that the locus standi requirements for 180-day 
period shareholding will deter former bona fide shareholders to bring derivative 
action and some reforms are necessary.1019  
                                                     
1015
 Ma Fang, ‘A Challenge for China: Is It Possible to Introduce Unfair Prejudice Remedies? 
Part 1’ 2009 20(12) ICCLR 425. 
1016
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4.1.2.1.2  Demand Rule  
The demand rule provisions are transplanted from the common law 
jurisdictions.1020 However, it is argued that the procedural rule for demand in 
the provision is not clear as: the content of the demand is not specified; 
whether the minority shareholders may take over the corporate action if the 
board has decided to bring action but failed to pursue the action diligently; and 
the 30 day time limit is insufficient and unreasonable for the board to decide 
and investigate in complicated and difficult cases.1021 It should allow sufficient 
time for the management to make good of the complaint.1022  
 
Zhu argues that the demand rule is unclear as to whom the demand shall be 
served in the case of a company in liquidation.1023  Lu also argues that 
derivative action does not go against traditional fiduciaries, but against 
non-insider ‘others’1024 to whom the demand shall be served. He suggests that 
in such cases demand should be made first on the legal representative, then 
on the board of directors, and finally on the board of supervisors, in each case 
waiting thirty days for a response.1025 Howson suggests that further rules and 
                                                                                                                                                        
Recommendations for Reform’ 2007 4(2) Berkeley Business Law Journal 243. 
1020
 The demand rule provision was based on the United States Supreme Court decision in 
Hawes v Oakland (1882) 104 US 450 and then transplanted into other countries. See Deborah 
DeMott, ‘Shareholder Litigation in Australia and the United States: Common Problems, 
Uncommon Solutions’ (1987) 11 Sydney Law Review 262. Hong Kong has a same demand 
rule under Hong Kong Companies Ordinance, section 738(3) Cap. 622. 
1021
 Ma Fang, ‘The Deficiencies of Derivative Actions in China’ 2010 31(5) Co Law 153. 
1022
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Claims under the Companies Act 2006 (2010) 29(2) Civil Justice Quarterly 217. This argument 
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guidance shall be enacted to facilitate corporate law litigation.1026 
 
Regarding the demand rule requirements, the gap in the provision is partially 
filled by the SPC regulations that the shareholders are requested to provide 
evidence to prove one of the following: a) a request to institute legal 
proceedings was made to the company two months ago but the company 
failed to act accordingly; b) that there was a risk of the asset transferred, or the 
associated right/the time limit to bring proceedings was about to lapse; or c) 
that there were other urgent circumstances in the company disputes 
litigation.1027 
 
Huang conducted an empirical study from 2006 to 2010 based on 50 derivative 
actions. Huang observes that 26 cases (52%) of the shareholders did not give 
notice, 6 cases (12%) were dismissed and 20 cases (40%) were allowed to 
proceed. The courts allowed the applications on different grounds with no 
consistency. 1028  Clark and Howson argue that the lax requirement for 
exemption of the notice with no real standards or analysis at all.1029 Huang 
suggests that the courts have allowed some cases to waive the demand 
requirements under the statutory exception, and it is imperative to provide 
                                                                                                                                                        
‘Pathway to Minority Shareholder Protection: Derivative Actions in the People’s Republic of 
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detailed rules to ensure uniformity and consistency. He suggests that further 
rules for demand requirements should be provided to ensure uniformity and 
consistency.1030 I suggest that further guidance in respect of the procedural 
and substantive rules for the demand provision shall be given by the SPC and 
reference can be made to the Hong Kong model.1031  
 
4.1.2.1.3  Business Judgment Rule  
Another criticism is that shareholders can challenge any breach of duty by 
directors. There are two major duties under the PRC Company Law, that is, 
duty of loyalty and duty of diligence under Articles 148 and 149 respectively. 
The duty of loyalty is simply adopted from the former PRC Company Law 1993 
and the duty of diligence is new and has been introduced to the PRC Company 
Law 2005 but fails to provide a specific meaning and standard for the duty of 
director. Ma argues that the duty of loyalty and duty of diligence are similar to 
duty of fiduciary in the common law jurisdictions.1032 As such, the directors 
may be held liable for breach of duty in making wrong business decisions in 
good faith. There is no express provision in the PRC Company Law as to 
mismanagement as per the case of O’Neill v Phillips,1033 or the standard of 
duty as per the case of Re City Equitable Insurance Co Ltd.1034 It appears that 
the business judgment rule may be relevant to China, and its requirements and 
suitability are discussed in the following part. 
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The business judgment rule was codified in the Australian Corporations Act 
2001.1035 The rule had been studied and was rejected by the UK government 
in 20051036 and by Hong Kong government in 1997.1037 Professor Ermanno 
Pascutto suggested that there was no need for a statutory formulation of the 
business judgment rule in Hong Kong on the grounds that the business 
judgment rule already existed in the common law rule. If business decisions 
were made bona fide for the best interest of the company, the courts are 
reluctant to impose liability on directors. 
 
Huang shares the view of Professor Ermanno Pascutto that a business 
judgment rule is not suitable to China but on different grounds. He suggests 
that a business judgment rule is adopted in the Australian derivative action with 
leave requirements and the US model of a litigation committee is more 
appropriate to China.1038 In Australia, the court may refuse an application for 
leave to bring statutory derivative action if the directors who participated in 
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 Australian Corporations Act 2001, section 180(2). It is assumed that directors acted with 
required degree of care and diligence if, in exercising a business judgment, they meet the four 
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making the decision acted in good faith for a proper purpose and rationally 
believed that the decision was in the best interests of the company.1039 The 
wordings are expressed in identical terms with the third limb of the rebuttable 
presumption of the business judgment rule contained in section 180(2) of the 
Australian Corporations Act 2001. Huang opines that this is an application of 
the business judgment rule in the context of statutory derivative action in 
Australia.1040  
 
Since there is no leave requirement in China in bringing a derivative action, the 
business judgment rule and the Australian model of derivative action is not 
recommended for transplantation into China. In this regard, the US model is 
more relevant and feasible. In the US, a special litigation committee is 
established within the company composed of independent directors who have 
the authority to decide whether to proceed with the derivative action or not. 
The committee may refuse a derivative action if it is not in the interests of the 
company to pursue the derivative action. In most of the derivative actions in 
the US, the committees have recommended not pursuing, and the courts 
usually follow the recommendations from the committees.1041 The suitability of 
litigation committee will be discussed in Chapter Six. 
 
4.1.2.1.4  Legal Remedies to Minority Shareholders  
For listed companies, directors’ illegal acts are investigated by the China 
Securities and Regulatory Commission (CSRC). Directors may face 
                                                     
1039
 Australian Corporations Act 2001, section 237(3)(c). The wordings under section 237(3)(c) 
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administrative sanction or criminal prosecution if they make false disclosures, 
commit fraud, or manipulate the market in violation of the administrative 
regulations of CSRC. 1042  However, even with the help of the CSRC, 
disgruntled Chinese shareholders may not be granted proper personal 
remedies by the court for illegal conducts of the management. 
 
There was a high profile controversial case in 2006. Guangdong Kelon 
Electrical Holdings Co Ltd 2006, a Chinese company listed on Hong Kong and 
Shenzhen Stock Exchanges,1043 had a group of minority shareholders of 
Kelon who could only file a lawsuit until Kelon was penalised by the CSRC on 
administrative basis. The claim was against Kelon, its former director Gu 
Chujun and its auditors Deloitte CPA for overstating profits. Hu was a member 
of a group of 51 lawyers aiming to protect the interests of minority 
shareholders in the Kelon case. Hu pointed out that, for the moment, the 
regulator mainly uses administrative means to punish listed companies for 
their fraudulent behaviour and no legal remedies are available to 
shareholders.1044 
 
In order to attempt to deal with the irregularity of the procedural and 
jurisdictional issues, several regulations were passed in 2002 and 2003 by the 
SPC of the PRC to allow shareholder litigation on the condition that an 
                                                     
1042
 The administrative regulations include Guidelines for Articles of Association of Listed 
Companies 1997; General Requirements of Shareholders’ Meeting of Listed Companies 2000; 
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administrative sanction has been imposed by the CSRC first.1045 However, the 
situation has not improved as much as expected. From 1998 to 2003, there 
were 14 companies and more than 900 cases were involved in shareholder 
litigation and handled by nine courts.1046 Due to an inconsistency with the 
rules of the SPC, some shareholder litigation cases were struck out.1047 Even 
though some cases were successfully filed, no court has granted 
compensation to the injured shareholders as there was no competent judge to 
handle the case.1048 By contrast, some of the cases were forced to settle out 
of court. In some cases, judgment was behind the schedule in accordance with 
the PRC Civil Procedural Law. 1049  It seems that the law relating to the 
enforcement of shareholders’ protection is rather weak compared with that in 
Hong Kong. I contend that this phenomenon can be explained by the path 
dependence theory that the historical path of the CCP’s ideology and the 
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 The ‘Several Regulations Regarding the Adjudication of Civil Compensation of Securities 
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Confucianism does not advocate the individual legal rights and encourage a 
litigious means to settle private disputes.  
 
4.1.2.1.5  Issues of Costs  
Another criticism of shareholders’ litigation is litigation costs, including court 
fees and lawyers’ fees. In China, the parties are usually responsible for their 
own costs, the court does not award costs to wining party but losing party is 
responsible to the court filing fee.1050 Huang argues that lawyers’ fees pose 
another challenging issue for shareholder litigation, and there are two main 
ways to deal with high lawyer’s fees; an order of costs from the court or by 
special arrangement with lawyers on contingency or conditional fee basis.1051 
Huang suggests that the US model of contingency fee is more appropriate to 
China as leave of court is not required in China.1052 Clark and Howson argue 
that the lawyers’ fee should be borne directly by the losing party.1053 Choo 
argues that the issue of costs is largely responsible for the relative 
unpopularity of statutory derivative actions.1054 The issue of lawyers’ fees and 
access to justice are related to structural issues and will be discussed further in 
Chapter Six.  
 
                                                     
1050
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The court fees include the filing fees and other legal fees.1055 The court fees 
are substantive and calculated on the amount of claims and must be prepaid 
by the plaintiff as a security of costs when filing an action.1056 Zhang argues 
that there is no incentive for minority shareholders to bring a derivative suit.1057 
Clarke and Howson opine that there is no proper finance available to the 
minority shareholders such as contingency fees, loser-pays rule or indemnity 
order from the company in China, therefore, a derivative lawsuit cannot be 
financed or proceed.1058 There is a case concerning a listed JSC and high 
court filing fee. In Sanlian Shangshe Co Ltd 20091059 (a household appliances 
retailer now under the helm of Gome Electrical Appliances Holding Limited)1060 
a group of 78 minority shareholders who together held 1.56%, just meeting the 
locus standi requirements of 1% continuously for 180 days, attempted to sue 
derivatively the former controlling shareholder, Sanlian Group Co Limited 1061 
for violation of trademark law and misuse of the trademark ‘Sanlian’.1062 Geng 
argues that in Sanlian Shangshe, the initial court filing fee of RMB291,800 
(about US$47,000) was too high and the minority shareholder might have 
                                                     
1055
 PRC Civil Procedural Law 2012, Article 118 (formerly PRC Civil Procedural Law 2007, 
Article 107). The court filing fees are calculated in accordance with the Method of Paying 
Litigation Fees 2007 and the amount of filing doubles if the decision is appealed. The other 
legal fees are costs of travelling, accommodation, living allowances and subsidies paid to 
expert witnesses, accountants, translators Article 6 of the Method 2007. See Huang Hui, 
‘Statutory Derivative Action in China: Empirical Findings and Comparative Analysis’ (2012) 27 
Banking and Finance Law Review 641 and 651. 
1056
 The court filing fees are calculated in accordance with exact amount of claims in the action 
Article 13 of the Method 2007. The fees must be prepaid under Article 20 of the Method 2007. 
1057
 Zhang Zhong, ‘Making Shareholder Derivative Action Happen in China: How should 
Lawsuits be Funded?’ 38 (2008) HKLJ 523.  
1058
 Clarke Donald and Howson Nicholas, ‘Pathway to Minority Shareholder Protection: 
Derivative Actions in the People’s Republic of China,’ in Dan Puchniak et al. (eds), A Derivative 
Action in Asia: A Comparative and Functional Approach (Cambridge University Press 2012) 
258. 
1059
 A company listed on Shanghai Stock Exchange (SHSE: 600898). 
1060
 A company listed on Hong Kong Stock Exchange (SEHK: 0493). 
1061
Clarke Donald and Howson Nicholas, ‘Pathway to Minority Shareholder Protection: 
Derivative Actions in the People’s Republic of China,’ in Dan Puchniak et al. (eds), A Derivative 
Action in Asia: A Comparative and Functional Approach (Cambridge University Press 2012) 
275. 
1062
 ibid 258. 
  
 
263 
 
been unable to finance the claim.1063 The minority shareholder eventually lost 
the case in 2011 and the court filing fee was forfeited.1064  
 
Huang argues that the minority shareholders are more likely to pursue a 
derivative action in the absence of other remedies. He suggests that more 
litigation rights such as unfair prejudice claims should be given to minority 
shareholders.1065 Clark and Howson share Huang’s view and believe that 
without other oppression remedies, derivative action has a vital role and a 
promising future in China. However, the independence and competence of 
judiciary remains an issue for corporate governance.1066  
 
There is no express provision in the PRC Company Law to provide legal 
remedies and award costs to minority shareholders. In the absence of express 
provisions, a shareholder is reluctant to take direct or derivative action.  
 
4.1.2.1.6  Other Structural and Institutional Issues  
Confucianism and the CCP’s ideology do not support confrontation and 
litigation. Confucianism emphasises harmony and the Chinese do not want to 
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use litigious means to resolve the disputes.1067 There is a non-litigious culture 
in Chinese society and litigation is not a preferred means to settle the 
disputes.1068 Confucian philosophy is consistent with the CCP’s ideology and 
the effect of which is lack of protection of individual rights in the traditional 
Chinese legal system. These legal traditional and Confucian culture have 
facilitated the ruling of the CCP.  
 
Huang’s empirical findings are that all (50) actions were brought by the 
shareholders of the LLC which is contrary to the original intended role of 
derivative action in improving the corporate governance of listed state-owned 
companies. It is necessary to look at the policy implications of this result.1069 
Sanlian Shangshe Co Ltd 2009 is the only case involving a public company 
where the minority shareholders took out a derivative action against the 
controlling shareholder. 1070  Clark and Howson explain that the potential 
defendant managers or controlling shareholders of listed state-owned 
companies are usually powerful local government or Party figures who have 
significant political, administrative, and fiscal control over the local court 
system. The more political-economic actors are involved in the action, the 
more likely the action is subject to various kinds of obstacles and 
interference.1071 
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Howson contends that the courts tend not to accept public companies cases if 
the defendant has an economic, government or political background.1072 Clark 
and Howson opine that regional courts are reluctant to accept shareholders’ 
actions and tend to seek approval from the SPC.1073 Clark and Howson also 
observe that some courts have used technical readings of the law to avoid 
taking derivative actions;1074  however, they find the competence level of 
Chinese judicial officials has improved. 1075  More judicial autonomy and 
independence should be allowed to assure the protection of the shareholders’ 
rights. Given that there are not many cases on statutory derivative action in 
China, it remains to be seen the impacts on the minority shareholders. 
 
Besides, Clark and Howson contend that it remains the state regulatory 
institutions, and not the courts, which are likely to have independence from 
local political and economic interests, as well as technical expertise, to enforce 
accountability and expand legal rights of shareholders in China.1076 They 
further observe that the first multiple derivative action was dismissed by court 
in Shanghai Kouweier Co Ltd in 2008.1077 Tenev and Zhang contend that there 
is a high occurrence of parent and subsidiary control among listed companies 
in China. 1078  Clark and Howson contend that the existing rules for 
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shareholders’ litigation under the PRC Company Law 2005 and the PRC Civil 
Procedural Law 2012 remain unclear and insufficient in terms of minority 
protection1079 and further guideline as to time limit should be given.1080  
 
The conclusion could be drawn that, as regards the shareholder’s right to bring 
derivative action, there is a better picture now under the PRC Company Law 
2005 and hence a positive impact on promoting corporate governance, at least 
on paper. In my view, in addition to the legislative issues as discussed above, 
the problems of the structures are equally applicable to other shareholders’ 
actions and cannot be resolved by legislative reform. My argument for 
structural reform will be elaborated in Chapter Six. 
 
4.1.2.2 Direct Action  
The major improvement of the new PRC Company Law 2005 is to clarify the 
shareholder’s right to direct action. Under Article 153, a shareholder may bring 
a lawsuit before a people’s court if a director violates the provisions of the laws, 
administrative regulations, or the articles of association of the company, and 
causes damage to the interests of any shareholder of the company. Unlike the 
provision under Article 152, there is no prerequisite that a shareholder must 
hold a percentage of shares or a period of holding. A shareholder suffering 
damage as a result of an unlawful act may directly take legal action himself 
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before the court. It is a direct right of action and would approximate similar to a 
direct action by a shareholder under Hong Kong law. The direct action by a 
shareholder is either expressly provided by the company’s constitution, or by 
company law in Hong Kong. However, the Hong Kong model of personal right 
is not very clear and further guidance should be given.  
 
The conservative approach taken by the Chinese judiciary in derivative action 
is extended to direct action. Clark and Howson observe that the first 
shareholders’ action (direct action) was Zhangjiangang Fibre Co Ltd 1994 
under Article 111 of the PRC Company Law 1993. The case was subject to 
acceptance by the court and the court eventually sought the approval from the 
SPC in 1994. The case was dismissed because of a pre-existing arbitration 
agreement between the parties.1081 Gu opines that it is difficult to prove a 
direct action as it is too easy for it to be rejected by the court on various 
grounds.1082 Li argues that the problems of direct action include lack of 
detailed rules, lack of competent judges and corporate lawyers, defendants’ 
backgrounds, and high filing fees. Li points out that direct action of the PRC 
Company Law 1993 was not very satisfactory, the protection of minority 
shareholders was insufficient, and no single direct action case was made in 
favour of minority shareholders.1083 
 
The empirical-based study was conducted in China’s top 100 listed companies, 
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which included face-to-face interviews with 108 well-placed informants in nine 
cities across China between 2003 and 2004. The interviewees included senior 
officials from China’s top 100 listed companies, independent directors, 
accountants, and lawyers, as well as regulatory officials from the CSRC and 
two mainland Chinese stock exchanges in Shenzhen and Shanghai. The study 
confirms Lubman’s view that law reform in China continues to be closely 
controlled by the state, which is still enclosed by the bars of a cage.1084 
Tomasic and Andrews reveal that the state is a majority shareholder in many 
listed companies; any concession of power to minority shareholders would 
diminish state power; and the protection of minority shareholders was only a 
half-hearted project in Chinese corporate governance practice and there was a 
gap between the law in books and law in action.1085 
 
Huang predicts that the introduction of direct and derivative actions under the 
PRC Company Law may have a promising future because there are no other 
statutory unfair prejudicial and oppression remedies available in China. The 
direct and derivative actions of shareholders are expected to play a more 
important role and can be a useful and powerful means to improve the 
corporate governance in China.1086  
 
Cheng also conducted empirical research in 2010, which seems to support this 
view.1087 The analysis shows that the minority shareholders may sue the 
                                                     
1084
 Lubman Stanley, Bird in a Cage: Legal Reform in China after Mao (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press 1999) 297. 
1085
 Tomasic Roman and Neil Andrews, ‘Minority Shareholder Protection in China’s Top 100 
Listed Companies’ (2007) 9(1) Australian Journal of Asian Law 88. 
1086
 Huang Hui, ‘The Statutory Derivative Action in China: Critical Analysis and 
Recommendations for Reform’ (2007) 4(2) Berkeley Business Law Journal 233. 
1087
 The analysis of Cheng was made from 1999 to 2007 and collected from different web sites 
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company, the directors, and the controlling shareholders for damages. It 
concludes that minority shareholders can better protect their interests in 
companies under the new provisions.1088 
 
Out of these 26 cases, 11 cases were decided in accordance with the PRC 
Company Law 2005 and another 11 were decided on the basis of the PRC 
Company Law 1993. Four cases were closed because no relevant provisions 
and procedural rules in the PRC Company Law 1993 could guide judges in 
handling derivative actions and they were reopened for trial after the PRC 
Company Law 2005 became effective and some guidance was given under 
the new provisions. The result of the study seems to be very encouraging. The 
minority shareholders win their battles in 50 percent of direct actions and 60 
percent of derivative actions, and all these cases are decided in accordance 
with the PRC Company Law 2005, which indicates that direct or derivative 
actions are the more powerful weapons compared with other rights given to 
shareholders in the PRC Company Law 2005.1089 
 
The result is contrary to other findings of a detailed examination and 
comparison of corporate law cases brought by the minority shareholders 
against the company, the directors, and the controlling shareholders in 
Shanghai Higher People’s Court. Howson contends that China is still far from 
the complete rule of law; the judiciary has no autonomy and independence and 
                                                                                                                                                        
for 26 shareholders litigation cases including Chinalawinfo.com; Infobank; Isinolaw; 
LawinfoChina; Lawyee.net; Lexis.com and also relevant websites of local courts in China cited 
in Wei-qi Cheng, ‘Protection of Minority Shareholders after the New Company Law: Twenty Six 
Case Studies’ (2010) 52(4) The International Journal of Law and Management 289. 
1088
 Cheng Weiqi, ‘Protection of Minority Shareholders after the New Company Law: Twenty 
Six Case Studies’ (2010) 52(4) The International Journal of Law and Management 299. 
1089
 Cheng Weiqi, ‘Protection of Minority Shareholders after the New Company Law: Twenty 
Six Case Studies’ (2010) 52(4) The International Journal of Law and Management 283.  
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is lack of transparency and competence.1090  
 
The effectiveness of the shareholders’ litigation in China continues to be 
debated. One school opines that the introduction of shareholders’ litigation and 
a remedy for setting aside resolution and winding up action under the PRC 
Company Law 2005 are the most powerful mechanism to improve the 
protection of minority shareholders in China.1091 The other school advocates 
that unless the structural issues are resolved, minority shareholders in China 
are unlikely to have real and genuine legal protection.1092 In this thesis, I take 
the position of the latter and argue that some structural reforms are required 
for the protection of minority shareholders in China. 
 
In short, I remain doubtful about the effectiveness of direct action. The 
problems of no detailed enforcement rules, high costs of litigation, lack of 
competence corporate lawyers and judges, state ownership, and a rule by law 
system. These issues play a larger part in the decision of the shareholder on 
whether to commence an action. Similar to the problems of derivative action, 
these issues are related to the structures and the structural reform is 
necessary. In this regard, I suggest that China can make reference to the Hong 
                                                     
1090
 Howson Nicholas, ‘Judicial Independence and the Company Law in the Shanghai Courts,’ 
in Peerenboom Randall (ed), Judicial Independence in China: Lessons for Global Rule of Law 
Promotion (CUP 2009) 134.  
1091
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Twenty Six Case Studies’ (2010) 52(4) The International Journal of Law and Management 283 
and Huang Hui, ‘Statutory Derivative Action in China: Empirical Findings and Comparative 
Analysis’ (2012) 27 Banking and Finance Law Review 625.  
1092
 Including Howson Nicholas, ‘Judicial Independence and the Company Law in the 
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‘Pathway to Minority Shareholder Protection: Derivative Actions in the People’s Republic of 
China,’ in Dan Puchniak et al. (eds), A Derivative Action in Asia: A Comparative and Functional 
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Kong model.  
 
4.1.2.3 Remedies for Setting Aside Resolution  
Under the PRC Company Law, there is no equivalent provision and 
requirement as per the counterparts in common law jurisdictions that the act 
complained of must be unfairly prejudicial to the shareholders. However, the 
shareholders are entitled to bring legal action to set aside the contents in the 
resolutions of the shareholders meeting or the board of directors of a company. 
If it is in violation of the laws, administrative regulations, or articles of 
association, the court may declare it to be null and void under Article 22. The 
shareholders may within 60 days of the date of making the resolution, request 
the people’s court to cancel them and on the request the company, and the 
court may require the shareholders to provide the relevant security.1093 The 
SPC requires that the 60 days requirements must be strictly adhered to, and 
applications outside 60 days will not be entertained by the court.1094  
 
Ma argues that the scope of Article 22 is too limited and should be extended to 
cover more events such as the unfair prejudice conduct as found in the 
common law jurisdictions.1095 Lam argues that the unfair prejudice remedies 
should be introduced to China in the Chinese context by transforming and 
amending the existing provision.1096 I suggest that the Hong Kong common 
                                                     
1093
 PRC Company Law 2005, Article 22. 
1094
 Provisions of the Supreme People’s Court on Several Issues Concerning the Application 
of the ‘PRC Company Law’ (1) April 28, 2006, Article 3.  
1095
 Ma Fang, ‘A Challenge for China: Is It Possible to Introduce Unfair Prejudice Remedies? 
Part 1’ (2009) 20(12) ICCLR 423. 
1096
 Lam Daniel, ‘The Derivative Action: the Only Option for Minority Shareholders in PRC 
Companies?’ (2000) 12 Australian Journal of Corporate Law 124. Lam argues that Article 111 
of the PRC Company Law 1993 shall be amended and transformed to unfair prejudice claims. 
Article 111 was repealed and replaced by Article 22 for setting aside resolution, Article 152 for 
derivative action and Article 153 for direct action under the PRC Company Law 2005. 
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law model of unfair prejudice claim is a good reference for the Chinese reform.  
 
Since there is no equivalent provision in the PRC Company Law for 
mismanagement and unfair prejudice conduct, Article 22 has the function to 
challenge the decisions of the management or the controlling shareholders if 
they are in violation of the laws, administrative regulations or articles of 
association,1097 at the same time acting against the wills or interests of the 
minority shareholders. Ma argues that this provision is not sufficient to protect 
the interests of minority shareholders if the resolutions comply with laws, 
administrative regulations, and articles of association but infringe shareholders’ 
legitimate expectations that are based on informal understandings and 
agreements between the shareholders that might not be enforceable at 
law.1098 This is illustrated in the case of Li Jianjun v Shanghai Jiadongli 
Environmental Protection Technology Co Ltd 2012. The plaintiff Li, was a 
shareholder and the general manager of Shanghai Jiadongli. He was removed 
as a general manager, which was contrary to his understanding to manage the 
company. Li applied to revoke the resolution of removal. The district court ruled 
to revoke the resolution of the board of directors of Shanghai Jiadongli. 
However, the appellate court decided to reverse the decision of the lower court 
and to dismiss the claims of Li. The SPC clarified that as long as there is no 
violation of laws, administrative regulations, and articles of association, 
whether the facts based on which a resolution removes the general manager 
are justifiable or not and whether the grounds are well-founded or not shall not 
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 PRC Company Law 2005, Article 22. 
1098
 Ma Fang, ‘A Challenge for China: Is It Possible to Introduce Unfair Prejudice Remedies? 
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fall within the scope of Article 22.1099 
 
The informal understandings and agreements are not recognised in China but 
are recognised by the law of equity. I suggest that based on the successful 
experiences of the unfair prejudice remedies implemented in Hong Kong, 
China should consider these equitable remedies.  
 
4.1.2.3.1  Equitable Doctrine  
In China, the equitable doctrine of good faith as per O’Neill is not required 
under the setting aside provision. It is not necessary for the member to prove 
the act of unfair prejudicial conduct, only prove that the directors or senior 
executives of a company are in violation of the provisions of the laws, 
administrative regulations, and articles of association of the company. 
However, it is submitted that although the duty of good faith is not provided 
under this Article, the directors bear the duties of loyalty and due diligence 
towards the company under another provisions,1100 which is very similar to the 
doctrine of good faith in common law jurisdictions.  
 
In Hong Kong, the statutory provision1101 consists of ‘unfairly prejudicial to the 
interests of the shareholders,’ but the Chinese provision only requires ‘violation 
of the provisions of the laws, administrative regulations and articles of 
association of the company which may also against the wills or interests of the 
minority shareholders’. No definition of the term of ‘interests’ is given. I suggest 
                                                     
1099
China Law Update, (2013) Tsinghua University China Law Review 209 
<http://www.tsinghuachinalawreview.org/articles/PDF/TCLR_0502_ChinaLawUpdate.pdf> 
accessed 13 February 2014. 
1100
 PRC Company Law, Article 148. 
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that it shall include all legitimate interests of the shareholders including but not 
limited to financial interests. 1102  Obviously, without the need to prove 
unfairness in a court of law, the Chinese shareholders in theory are more able 
to take legal action against the wrongdoer than their counterparts in the 
common law jurisdictions. 
 
Similar to the Hong Kong unfair prejudice remedies, there are provisions in the 
PRC Company Law that provide that the shares of the minority shareholders 
can be purchased by the other shareholders.1103 The shareholders may also 
sue the directors for compensation; however, the remedy provided by the PRC 
Company Law is quite limited. If the directors are in breach of laws, 
administrative regulations, and articles of association as well as cause 
damage to the shareholders’ interests, the shareholders are entitled to bring 
legal actions against the directors for damages.1104  
 
In Hong Kong, the courts have extensive discretion to grant remedies and 
cover a wide range of acts of misconduct based on the equitable doctrine of 
good faith and fairness. It is necessary to examine whether transplantation 
from the Hong Kong unfair prejudice remedies to China is desirable.  
 
In China, the powers of the Chinese judges are different from those in the 
common law courts, where judges have extensive discretion and powers to 
consider what is unfair prejudice conduct and what remedy is appropriate. The 
                                                     
1102
 The shareholders’ right to the assets of the company under the PRC Company Law 2005, 
Article 4. 
1103
 PRC Company Law, Article 75 for the LLC and Article 143 for the JSC. 
1104
 The director shall be liable to compensation if causes loss to the company in performing 
his functions under the PRC Company Law, Article 150. 
  
 
275 
 
existing provision under Article 22 merely covers violation of laws, 
administrative regulations, and articles of association of the company, which is 
not enough to protect the interest of the minority shareholders. Under the civil 
law traditions, the judiciary does not enjoy discretionary power; and given the 
problem of corruption, competence, and quality of judiciary, it is inadvisable to 
follow the common law discretionary model. Instead, a comprehensive and 
detailed statutory list of unfairly prejudicial conduct should be provided under 
the provisions of the PRC Company Law. 1105  The English case of Re 
Westbourne Galleries, Ebrahimi v Westbourne Galleries Ltd1106 is a good 
reference that provides some guidance for consideration. It is suggested that 
some statutory guidance in the form of list of factors should be provided.1107  
 
If the equitable doctrine of unfair prejudice remedy is introduced to China, it will 
have a great impact on China according to the experiences in Hong Kong, 
England and Australia. In Hong Kong, unfair prejudice remedies have been 
used as true alternatives to derivative actions to obtain corporate remedies. It 
will be a powerful and valuable remedy to minority shareholders in China. 
Unlike the derivative action, the shareholders can benefit directly from the 
unfair prejudicial action. Ma argues that according to common law experiences, 
it is likely that an action for unfair prejudicial conduct will overshadow 
derivative action and winding up action in China.1108 I believe that this remedy 
will be a useful weapon for minority shareholders in a quasi-partnership 
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 For example, the full list of directors’ duties is provided under the PRC Company Law 
2005, Article 149 (1) to (8). 
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company in China. 
 
4.1.2.3.2  Fiduciary Duty on Controlling Shareholders 
Since majority rule has been adopted in Hong Kong1109 and China,1110 the 
controlling shareholders can pass a resolution to achieve their own wishes, 
which may be against the interest of the minority shareholders. Zhu contends 
that in order to prevent the abuse of power by the controlling shareholders and 
to act in good faith and equality, an obligation proportional to the special 
benefits obtained by controlling shareholders abusing their majority rights 
should be established. This obligation is known as controlling shareholders’ 
fiduciary duties in other jurisdictions. Zhu suggests that similar duties can be 
imposed in the provisions of the PRC Company Law.1111  
 
Fiduciary duty originates in the law of equity and trust from the common law 
jurisdictions. The relationship is based on absolute trust and integrity; and 
equitable obligations are imposed on fiduciaries.1112 Only a person in a special 
relationship with other shall have such a duty imposed on him. For example, 
an agent owes fiduciary duties to the principal. The principal entrusts the agent 
and empowers him a power to act for the principal and as such, the agent 
owes a fiduciary duties to the principal. 
 
By imposition of fiduciary duty on controlling shareholders,1113 the controlling 
                                                     
1109
 Hong Kong Companies Ordinance, section 588 Cap. 622 and the rule under Foss v 
Harbottle (1843) 2 Hare 461. 
1110
 PRC Company Law, Article 43 for a LLC and Article 104 for a JSC. 
1111
 Zhu Ciyun, ‘A Critical Analysis of the Majority Rule Principle and Controlling Shareholders 
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shareholders, in addition to protect their own interests, must also protect the 
interests of other shareholders in exercising their rights to vote. Zhu contends 
that the main purpose of imposing fiduciary duty on controlling shareholders is 
to ensure: fair play; principles of proper purpose; no abuse of powers by the 
controlling shareholders; principles of good faith and public interest; honesty in 
commercial business; and principles of equality to regulate the conflict of 
interests between controlling and minority shareholders.1114 
 
Zhu observes that both civil and common law jurisdictions have started to 
impose fiduciary duties on controlling shareholders such as Germany and the 
US.1115 In the US,1116 the first case of shareholders duties was reported in 
1919 in the case of Southern Pacific Co v Bogert.1117 In that case, the minority 
shareholders lost all their interests in a company reconstruction as part of an 
unfair scheme of reorganisation; the controlling shareholders are fiduciaries 
entrusted by minority and hence liable to the damages of the minority. The 
court held that controlling shareholders exercising the controlling voting rights 
are deemed trustees for the minority shareholders and owed duty to minority 
shareholders as directors and senior administrators of the company. 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
that ‘any shareholder whose capital contribution amount accounts for 50% or more of the total 
amount of the capital of a limited liability company or the shares held by whom accounts for 
50% of the total amount of the share capital of a joint stock limited company; and any 
shareholder, although whose capital contribution amount or shares held by whom is less than 
the said 50%, who can, through his voting rights on his capital contribution amount or shares 
held by him, have a major effect on the resolutions of the shareholders meeting or the 
shareholders general meeting’. 
1114
 Zhu Ciyun, ‘A Critical Analysis of the Majority Rule Principle and Controlling Shareholders 
Fiduciary Duties: A Chinese Perspective (2004) 16 Australian Journal of Corporate Law 257. 
1115
 ibid. 
1116
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1117
 Southern Pacific Co v Bogert (1919) 250 US 483. 
  
 
278 
 
In Germany, a director of controlling enterprises owes duty as fiduciary 
manager when the director dictates to the controlling enterprise the decision it 
takes.1118 This is supported by the rulings in German Supreme Court (BGH) 
that controlling shareholders owed to the company and to the other 
shareholders as well. Pistor and Xu observe that German Supreme Court 
recognised such a duty for the closed corporation in 1975, and extended the 
application to joint stock companies in 1988 and that the principles of fiduciary 
duty as the mandatory legal concept where shareholders may not opt out.1119  
 
In China, fiduciary duties are imposed on the controlling shareholders in a 
public listed company. The controlling shareholders owe a duty of good faith 
towards the listed company and other shareholders and shall be prevented 
from damaging the listed company or other shareholders’ legal rights and 
interests.1120 The fiduciary duties are to the public listed company and to other 
minority shareholders. However, these duties are not applicable to other 
companies other than a public listed company.  
 
The fiduciary duties of controlling shareholders include the duties not harm the 
interests of the company and other members and to help the company to 
achieve its goals positively. Zhu opines that the former is a negative duty that 
                                                     
1118
 German Corporate Law, section 309(1)(2).  
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 Pistor Katharina and Xu Chenggang, ‘Fiduciary Duty in Transitional Civil Law Jurisdictions 
Lessons from the Incomplete Law Theory’ (Working Paper 2002) 3 and 34 
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1120
 PRC Corporate Governance Code 2002, Article 19. It provides that ‘The controlling 
shareholders owe a duty of good faith toward the listed company and other shareholders. The 
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company or other shareholders’ legal rights and interests, through means such as assets 
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may be described as a duty of loyalty, whereas the latter is a positive duty that 
may be described as duty of care. The duty of loyalty includes a prohibition on 
conflicting of interests and secret profit while the duty of care includes the duty 
to act in good faith and with due diligence.1121 
 
The communist public ownership and socialist economy has resulted in 
concentrated ownership that is always associated with weak shareholder 
protection.1122 The state maintains tight control over companies as a major 
shareholder.1123 Clark and Howson observe that the agency conflicts are not 
vertical between management and shareholders but horizontal between 
minority and controlling shareholders in China.1124 Huang also has similar 
conclusions that the agency problem in China is the controlling shareholders 
abusing the rights of the minority shareholders.1125 His findings are that 30 out 
of 50 derivative actions concerned complaint of being abused by the 
controlling shareholders. The sources of expropriation are mainly from the 
controlling shareholder.1126  
 
Huang argues that, in view of the expropriation from the controlling 
shareholder, the existing provision requiring the controlling shareholders not to 
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 Zhu Ciyun, ‘A Critical Analysis of the Majority Rule Principle and Controlling Shareholders 
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abuse their majority power to the detriment of the company or other 
shareholders is insufficient.1127 He contends that ‘abuse’ in the provision is 
unclear and vague to be capable of being enforced in reality.1128 I suggest this 
provision should be amended to impose the fiduciary duties on the controlling 
shareholder. 
 
In summary, one of the main weaknesses of minority protection in China is 
related to its corporate ownership structure that has been shaped by the 
communist public ownership and the socialist economy. These issues are 
related to the structures and could not be solved by legislative reform. I will 
elaborate my argument for structural issues in Chapter Six.  
 
4.1.2.4 Winding up Action 
It is a prerequisite to prove just and equitable grounds to wind up a company in 
common law jurisdictions.1129 There is no equivalent provision as to winding 
up on just and equitable ground in the PRC Company Law. 
 
The winding up remedy plays an important role in protecting the interests of 
minority shareholders and acts as a last resort to resolve disputes in the 
company especially when there is a total breakdown in relationship and trust 
between shareholders. Under the PRC Company Law 1993, minority 
shareholders were not allowed this remedy. The shareholders in China are 
now entitled to dissolve a company and apply to the People’s Court for 
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 PRC Company Law 2005, Article 20. 
1128
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dissolution of the company if four requirements are satisfied: the shareholders 
have more than 10% of the shares or voting rights of the company; a 
company’s operation or management encounter serious difficulty; the 
shareholders’ interests would suffer heavy loss if the company continued to 
exist; and the dispute cannot be solved through other means or 
approaches.1130 This is a major improvement under the amendment to the 
PRC Company Law, which provides a very useful remedy to the minority 
shareholders and fills the gap in the minority shareholders’ disputes.1131  
 
However, it is somewhat drastic as a minority remedy for a member who 
complains suffering major loss. In the common law jurisdictions, this remedy 
will only be granted when there is a justifiable lack of confidence in the conduct 
and management of the company’s affairs based on some impropriety or 
oppression of the shareholders.1132 Ma argues that in the absence of any 
reference and guidance from the case law, the provision under Article 183 is 
insufficient and unclear. 1133  In Guangdong Xinhui Media Nylon Co Ltd 
2013,1134  a shareholder, Liang Weidong, applied to wind up the holding 
company (Guangdong Tianjian Industry (Group) Co Ltd) of Guangdong Xinhui 
Media Nylon Co Ltd because of management deadlock at the board. The 
disputes were among the three brothers Liang, who were the major 
shareholders and directors of the company. As a result of the disputes, the 
Shenzhen Stock Exchange suspended the trading of Guangdong Xinhui Media 
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 PRC Company Law, Article 183. 
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 Ma Fang, ‘A Challenge for China: Is It Possible to Introduce Unfair Prejudice Remedies? 
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Nylon Co Ltd. The court adjourned the case pending the administrative 
conciliation and mediation arranged by the local authorities. Eventually, the 
case was settled out of court as one of the brothers, Liang Weidong, was able 
to obtain a controlling shareholding.1135 The case shows that the Chinese 
courts are reluctant to grant a winding up order unless there is a clear and 
strong case. Instead, they will try to rely on administrative measures if other 
means to resolve the disputes are available.  
 
Even if there is a clear and strong case, the court may dismiss the action. In 
Lin Fangqing v Kailai Industrial Co Ltd of Changshu City and Dai Xiaoming 
2012, the plaintiff Lin Fangqing alleged that Kailai Industrial Co Ltd had serious 
difficulty in business operations and management and had entered a deadlock 
in 2006 that could not be settled, thus seriously damaging his rights and 
interests, and therefore he applied to wind up the company. The defendants 
Kailai and Dai Xiaoming contended that Kailai was in a good operating state 
and did not meet the conditions for company winding up, and that the conflicts 
between two shareholders Dai Xiaoming and Lin Fangqing (each held 50% 
shareholding) could be settled by other means. The court was cautious in 
using judicial means of mandatory winding up and emphasised administrative 
conciliation and mediation. The district court finally ruled that compulsory 
winding up of the company should not be used for this case and dismissed the 
application. On appeal, the appellate court held that since each shareholder 
held a 50% shareholding, no resolution could be passed and winding up was 
the only solution to the deadlock. The appellate court ruled that where the 
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 Finance People News, ‘Guangdong Xinhui Media Nylon’ 
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parties were unable to reach a consensus to maintain the company’s 
continuing existence1136 and the applicant held 10% or more of the shares of 
the company,1137 the court should allow such application.1138 
 
Ma1139 argues that the provision under Article 183 is abstract, vague, and 
inadequate, and that further guidance should be given to define the provision 
that operation and management of a company that is in serious difficulty and 
dispute cannot be solved through other means. 1140  Ma reveals that the 
judiciary adopts a more positive approach in dealing with winding up in some 
cases.1141 In 2008, the SPC has issued judicial opinions on the procedures 
and mechanisms of mandatory winding up actions of the company. It allows 
winding up action if a company’s operation or management has serious 
difficulty and the shareholders’ interests will suffer major loss if it continues to 
exist. The SPC has set out four situations: no shareholders’ meeting for 2 
years; no valid shareholders’ resolution for 2 years; long-lasting conflict 
between management; or material damages to the interests of 
shareholders.1142 
                                                     
1136
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The application is possible by shareholders who hold ten percent or more of 
shareholders’ voting rights, if there is deadlock in the business, and a meeting 
of shareholder and the board of directors fails to function properly and is 
unable to adopt the resolutions for dissolving the company. 
 
The next issue is to consider direct transplantation of just and equitable 
winding up is viable or not. It is considered that just and equitable winding up is 
derived from the doctrine of equity. The direct transplantation of the Hong 
Kong model of just and equitable winding up into the Chinese provisions is not 
desirable for the same reason as the discussion on remedies for setting aside 
a resolution. The judiciary has no experience to deal with equitable principles 
and limited discretion in deciding what is just and equitable as compared to 
their counterparts in the common law jurisdictions,1143 and a comprehensive 
and detailed statutory list of just and equitable events should be provided 
based on the civil law traditions.1144 
 
To conclude this part, the winding up remedy was not available under the 
                                                                                                                                                        
more, and the corporation has experienced serious difficulty in its operation and management; 
(iii) long-lasting conflicts have existed between and among directors and such conflicts could 
not be settled through the meeting of shareholders or the general meeting of shareholders, 
and the corporation has experienced serious difficulty in its operation and management; (iv) 
other serious difficulties have occurred in the operation and management, and the continuance 
of the corporation would cause material damages to the interests of shareholders’. It further 
provides that the People’s Court shall not accept the motion for dissolving a corporation which 
is based on the grounds that the right to information and the right to request profit distribution 
are encroached, or that the corporation suffers losses and its assets are not sufficient to 
discharge its total indebtedness, and that the corporation fails to proceed with the liquidation 
after its enterprise legal person business license is revoked. 
1143
 Ma Fang, ‘Winding-up Remedies in China and England: A Comparative Analysis’ (2013) 
34(8) Co Law 247. 
1144
 For example, exclusion from management, denial of dividends if company is profitable or 
alteration of articles of association beyond the mutual understanding of the shareholders 
mentioned in Ma Fang, ‘A Challenge for China: Is It Possible to Introduce Unfair Prejudice 
Remedies? Part 2’ (2010) 21(1) ICCLR 5. 
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previous PRC Company Law. It remains to be seen the effectiveness of this 
remedy in China in comparison with their counterparts in Hong Kong and 
England. I suggest that the remedy could be incorporated with the equitable 
doctrine such as just and equitable ground that may enhance the protection of 
minority shareholders in China. A minority shareholder may use this remedy as 
a last resort as the impact on the company is drastic. 
 
For comparative purposes, I summarise the shareholders’ remedies in Hong 
Kong and China based on the same description or on the similar function in the 
following table.1145 
  
                                                     
1145
 Unless otherwise stated, the provision is either under the Hong Kong Companies 
Ordinance 2014 or the PRC Company Law 2005. 
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Hong Kong Direct and 
Derivative 
Actions 
under 
Common Law 
Derivative Action  
Section 732 
Unfair Prejudice 
Claims  
Section 724 
Winding-Up Order  
Section 117(1)(f)
 1146
 
Grounds Fraud 
(derivative 
action only), 
ultra vires, 
wrong 
resolution or 
infringement of 
personal 
rights. 
Fraud, negligence, 
breach of duty, or 
default in 
compliance with any 
enactment or rule of 
law. 
Company has acted in 
a manner that is 
unfairly prejudicial to 
the member’s interest. 
The main object of the 
company failed.  
The company was 
formed to carry out a 
fraud or on illegal 
business.  
The relationship or 
confidence and trust 
between shareholders 
are broken. 
The company is 
deadlocked and is 
unable to function.
1147
 
Requirements Prove the 
breach is 
harmful to 
personal 
interest. 
Prima facie case. 
In the interest of the 
company.  
Serious question to 
be tried. 
Written notice of 
demand. 
Obtain permission 
from Court. 
The act complained of 
must affect the 
member and unfairly 
prejudicial to the 
interests of the 
members. Member 
includes existing and 
past member. 
It is just and equitable to 
wind up the company. 
Remedies  Personal relief 
or damages to 
minority 
shareholder 
for direct 
action. 
Relief to 
company for 
derivative 
action. 
Relief to the 
company. 
Regulate the conduct. 
Require the company 
to restrain from the 
conduct.  
Require to do an act. 
Order proceedings in 
the company’s name.  
Appoint a receiver and 
a manager of the 
company’s property or 
business.  
Order of purchase by 
the other members or 
by the company. 
Winding up Order. 
China Direct Action 
Article 153 
Derivative Action 
Article 152 
Setting Aside 
Resolution Article 22 
Winding-Up Order 
Article 183 
Grounds Director in 
violation of 
laws, 
administrative 
regulations or 
articles of 
association. 
Director in violation 
of laws, 
administrative 
regulations or 
articles of 
association. 
The (shareholders’ or 
directors’) resolution in 
violation of laws, 
administrative 
regulations or articles 
of association. 
Company’s operation or 
management occur 
serious difficulty, 
shareholders’ interests 
are suffering heaving 
and major loss if the 
company continues to 
exist or disputes cannot 
be solved through other 
means. 
Requirements Prove the 
breach causes 
damage to the 
interests of 
shareholder. 
180 days and 1% 
shareholding (only 
for a JSC). 
Written notice of 
demand.  
Prove the breach 
causes damages to 
the company. 
Prove the breach. 
Within 60 days of 
passing the resolution 
apply to Court. 
Provide guarantee. 
10% shareholding or 
voting rights. 
No shareholders’ 
meeting for 2 years. 
No valid shareholders’ 
resolution for 2 years. 
Long-lasting conflict 
between management. 
Cause material damages 
to the interests of 
shareholders. 
Remedies  Damages to 
the 
shareholder. 
Relief to the 
company. 
The resolution is null 
and void. 
Winding up Order. 
 
                                                     
1146
 Hong Kong Companies (Winding Up and Miscellaneous Provisions) Ordinance, section 
177(1)(f). 
1147
 Stott Vanessa, Hong Kong Company Law (13th edn Pearson 2011) 402. 
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The above discussion shows that Chinese company law is deficient as to the 
shareholder remedies, a competent judiciary, and effective enforcement rules, 
which relate to the structural issues. In terms of legislation, there is no unfair 
prejudice remedy, multiple derivative action, or just and equitable winding up. 
There are still many issues for initiating shareholders’ actions such as security 
for action, cost of litigation, and entitlement to remedies commonly found in 
common law jurisdictions. 1148  I suggest that these deficiencies could be 
remedied by using the experience from Hong Kong. The remedies to minority 
shareholders in Hong Kong rely on equitable principles that are relatively new 
to the Chinese civil law jurisdiction. The legitimate expectation and mutual trust 
in the unfair prejudice petition and just and equitable winding up involving both 
contractual and equitable principles can be introduced to China.  
 
In order to identify the legislative problems of minority shareholder protection in 
Hong Kong and China, I have four questions to answer in this chapter. The 
discussion of the above cases shows that the expropriation is mainly by 
majority family-owned shareholders. The path of developing minority 
protection in Hong Kong reveals that the decisions of English courts still have a 
great impact on the Hong Kong courts although Hong Kong ceased to be a 
British colony. Hong Kong courts have followed many equitable principles 
decided by the English courts. The advanced nature of case law enables and 
empowers the judges to retain extensive discretion in deciding shareholder 
litigation; it can evolve and develop over time without going through a 
legislative process. The above discussion shows that judges in Hong Kong 
enjoy high degree of independence, wide discretion, and adopt a liberal 
                                                     
1148
 Zhang Xianchu, ‘Practical Demands to Update the Company Law’ (1998) 28 HKLJ 251. 
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approach in shareholder litigation; and Hong Kong company legislation is 
substantively and procedurally efficient. The efficient structures have been 
locked-in from the colonial period. Following recent amendment, the remaining 
deficiencies of the legislation can be remedied by transplantation of relevant 
provisions from foreign company laws. I contend that the case law and the 
legislation are the rule-driven path in Hong Kong according to the path 
dependence.  
 
This chapter reveals that the expropriation in China is mainly by majority 
shareholders based on the above discussion. The PRC Company Law 2005 is 
a surprisingly well-developed law on paper, employs many common law 
principles, and appears to be converging towards common law model. The 
deficiencies of protection of minority shareholders in China are not only due to 
its legislation, but also its structures such as its non-litigious culture, an 
incompetent judiciary, a lack of enforcement mechanisms, high litigation costs, 
a socialist economy, and public ownership, which have been shaped by the 
initial path. The path of developing minority protection in China indicates that it 
links with the CCP’s ideology, which does not support private enforcement of 
company disputes, although a few cases have crept before the courts. There is 
no independent judiciary and judges are reluctant to accept cases when the 
parties have powerful political backgrounds, and this is a rule-driven path in 
China. The path dependence theory identifies the problem of minority 
protection lies in the economic, cultural, and political structures. The 
institutional transplantation theory provides a foundation for Chinese structural 
reform and the reform of economic, cultural, and political structures will be 
explored further in Chapter Six. 
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4.2 Concluding Remarks 
This chapter finds that the company laws of Hong Kong and China have 
achieved a high degree of convergence and the bases of divergence in 
corporate governance are their structural and institutional differences. The 
initial path of direct transplantation of English company law under the then 
colonial policy shaped the existing legal protection of minority shareholders in 
Hong Kong. The Hong Kong case shows that the key element for good 
corporate governance and minority protection is not only its company rules but 
also other well developed structures such as its case law system and 
independent and competent judiciary that were transplanted from the UK 
during the colonial period. The problems of corporate governance and minority 
protection in China relate to its structures such as its rule by law system, state 
ownership, non-litigious culture and incompetent judiciary which have been 
shaped by the CCP’s policies and thus some structural reforms are necessary. 
 
In Chapter Five, I will explain the particulars of two selected cases from my 
experience in the legal practice in the area of protection of minority shareholders, 
one from Hong Kong and one from China as part of the course requirements. 
The effectiveness and deficiencies of the protection of minority shareholders 
under the existing company law in Hong Kong and China will be examined. 
These two cases will identify the issues of the protection of minority 
shareholders.  
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CHAPTER FIVE 
CASE STUDIES OF SHAREHOLDERS’ DISPUTES 
 IN HONG KONG AND CHINA 
5.0 Introduction 
I have selected two cases from my previous legal practices in the area of 
minority shareholders protection from Hong Kong and China. These two cases, 
in my view, are most representable in this area. These two cases illustrate 
problems of the protection of minority shareholders in Hong Kong and China 
as identified by Chapters Three and Four.  
 
This research comprises two parts, this chapter is one part of my research 
being an introduction to two case studies drawn from my professional legal 
work in shareholders’ disputes in accordance with the requirements of the 
course. The cases set out the expropriation of minority shareholders by 
majority shareholders, the differences in corporate governance, the 
deficiencies of shareholders remedies under the existing company law. The 
other chapters are the second part of my research being a reflective 
commentary analysing the significance of the legal issues explored and 
critically assessing the implications. In these cases, I identify the legal issues 
of the protection of minority shareholders in Hong Kong and China.  
 
These two case studies are based on the shareholders’ disputes from my 
previous legal practice. Ethical concern is one of the major issues in this 
research. Every possible step has been taken to ensure the particulars of the 
persons and companies involved are not revealed. As such, the particulars of 
the cases are modified; and the modified particulars are only used for the 
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purpose of conducting this research. 
 
This chapter is divided into three parts. The first part discusses the cases of 
shareholders’ litigation in Hong Kong and the second part discusses the 
shareholders’ disputes in China. Both parts explain the backgrounds of parties, 
the corporate governance and ownership structures, the brief facts of the 
disputes, the legal issues and the outcome of shareholders’ disputes. Finally, 
the legal issues of the protection of minority shareholders are identified. 
 
5.1  Hong Kong Case Study of Shareholders’ Litigation  
As required by the program, I select a Hong Kong case from my previous legal 
practice for this thesis. The following parts explain the background of the 
disputes between the shareholders. 
 
5.1.1 Introduction to Hong Kong Case 
The present case study happened in late 1990s. It was about the disputes 
between shareholders in the management of parent and subsidiary companies. 
My client was a shareholder and director of a parent company which held two 
wholly owned subsidiary companies. The issues involved the oppression of 
minority shareholders and corporate governance structure in Hong Kong. 
 
5.1.2 Background of Our Client  
My client let say A was a typical local born Chinese. He was in his late thirties, 
born and educated in Hong Kong. He came from a middle class Chinese family 
in Hong Kong. His father was a businessman and his mother was a full time 
housewife. He went to Japan to study design and completed his 
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undergraduate education at a university there. He returned to Hong Kong in 
early 1990s and started his business in selling car accessories and parts from 
Japan. His business was very successful and accumulated wealth from the 
operation of his retailing selling of car accessories and parts.  
 
Initially, A started his business as a sole proprietor in Mongkok, one of the 
busiest areas in Hong Kong with the assistance of his youngest brother. On 
advice of his best friend B who was A’s secondary school classmate and a 
practising accountant in Hong Kong, A converted his business into a limited 
liability company. A and his youngest brother were the only directors and 
shareholders of the company. 
 
B had a cousin let say C who was also a secondary school classmate of A and 
B. C was selling car accessories and parts from Europe. C had a shop in Tsim 
Sha Tsui, another busiest area in Hong Kong and the business was doing very 
good. C completed his undergraduate in England and maintained good 
connection with his university classmates in England. One of his classmates 
was helping C as a merchandiser to supply car accessories and parts from 
Europe to C. C used a limited liability company to operate the business with 
the assistance of B.  
 
B was an accountant and auditor for A and C respectively. B was a very good 
friend of both A and C. The relationship between A and C was normal. In one of 
the social gathering function of the old boys association of the secondary 
school, A, B and C were present in the function and B suggested to form a joint 
venture with A and C. Several companies would be formed including holding 
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and subsidiaries companies and only subsidiaries companies would be used 
to operate business and were wholly owned by a holding company. A and C 
made use of their expertise in Japanese and European lines of car 
accessories and parts and B made use of his professional knowledge in the 
corporate restructuring and financial expertise to expand their businesses with 
a view to list the business in the HKSE. Hong Kong adopts a free market 
economy and the HKSE is one of the world’s major stock market. 
 
A initially had reservation about B’s idea. B explained that it was a common 
practice to use subsidiary and holding company in business community. B 
further explained that if any subsidiary company had problem, the creditors 
could not sue the holding and subsidiary company could be wound up without 
incurring any liability to the holding company. The holding company could be 
used for the future listing in the stock exchange. A finally agreed with this 
arrangement after the explanation of B. 
 
After the school function, they met on several occasions, finally agreed to form 
a holding company and two subsidiary companies to operate the business. A 
and C would transfer all their businesses to the new joint venture forming an 
amalgamation of mega car accessories and parts company in Hong Kong. 
 
5.1.3 Corporate Governance and Ownership Structures 
B set up a limited liability company let say ABC Limited as a holding company 
for the purposes of listing the holding company on the HKSE in the future and 
two subsidiary companies let say B Limited and C Limited. The ownership 
structure of ABC Limited was A (33%), B (34%) and C (33%). B Limited was 
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run by A for Japanese line of car accessories and parts and C Limited was run 
by C for European line of car accessories and parts.  
 
The share capital of B Limited and C Limited was wholly contributed by the 
holding company ABC Limited. There were two shareholders of B Limited: 
ABC Limited (99%) and C Limited (1%) and C Limited: ABC Limited (99%) and 
B Limited (1%). B Limited signed a declaration of trust to hold the share for 
ABC Limited and C Limited also signed a declaration of trust to hold the share 
for ABC Limited. The registered capital of ABC Limited, B Limited and C 
Limited was duly paid up. The scope of business was duly contained in the 
articles of association of each company. They had a shareholders’ agreement 
in Chinese which stated, inter alia, each shareholder had a right to participate 
in management of ABC Limited and a right to distribute dividends quarterly. 
 
In terms of corporate governance, Hong Kong has adopted the common law 
system, the English model of company law1149 and the Anglo-American model 
single tier board of directors. ABC Limited, B Limited and C Limited consisted 
of the organs of shareholders’ meeting and board of directors. A, B and C were 
appointed as directors of ABC Limited, B Limited and C Limited. B was an 
executive director of ABC Limited, A was an executive director of B Limited and 
C was an executive director of C Limited. There were no written agreement for 
the appointment of directorship for ABC Limited, B Limited and C Limited. 
 
The following diagram sets out the ownership structures of the parent and 
                                                     
1149
 The company’s articles of association is based on formerly the Table A and now the Model 
Articles under the company legislation. 
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subsidiary companies concerned: 
 
 
 
5.1.4 Brief Facts of the Disputes 
The ownership and management systems were operated smoothly for about 2 
years until B had an argument with A on a private matter and their relationship 
turned sour. A and B were very good friends. They knew a lady at a party. A 
and B also liked this lady and started to date her. It ended up that A was able to 
get a date with the lady and eventually she became his girl friend. B was very 
unhappy and started to keep his distance from A. Afterwards, B became very 
close to C and isolated A. B was absent in all the social functions when A was 
present. A and B later became very hostile to each other. 
 
In the business operation, B and C then dominated the Board and took over 
the management of B Limited. They excluded A from the management and 
refused to declare dividends. Instead, only B and C received salaries from 
ABC Limited, B Limited and C Limited. Despite objections from A, the other 
two shareholders B and C refused to honour the shareholder’s agreement. A 
A 
ABC Limited 
B C 
B Limited 
33% 34% 33% 
C Limited 
99% 
1% 
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retained the title of director but did not have any actual authority to run the 
business of A Limited. A had no salary and dividend from ABC Limited. 
 
In regard to personnel of B Limited, B and C terminated the staff worked for A 
for many years including his youngest brother and his personal assistant who 
worked for A for many years and had all the information and connection of A’s 
customers and suppliers in Japan and helped A to look after the clientele and 
financial matters of ABC Limited. The personal assistant and his youngest 
brother were the hands of A and the leaving of these two important staff 
members were a great loss of A and B Limited.  
 
With regard to the business operation of B Limited, B and C changed the style 
of products which were originally mainly from Japan by merchandisers of A. 
They decided that Korean products could be imported more as they were less 
expensive and their designs and patterns were similar to those of Japanese 
products. In fact, the Korean products were copying the design of the 
Japanese products and were lower in terms of quality. Despite the objection of 
A, they proceeded to purchase many Korean products. 
 
A was very unhappy about the management of B and C. A had discussed the 
matter with B that the existing arrangement made by B and C was in contrary 
to the original agreement between them. In the meeting between A, B and C, A 
told B that unless B and C declared dividend to him as agreed by them under 
the Chinese shareholders’ agreement and restored to the original arrangement, 
A was considering to take legal action against B and C. B and C also refused A 
to have access to the books and accounts of ABC Limited as well as B Limited 
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and C Limited. After a series of negotiations and conversations between A, B 
and C for about one month, and no solution was agreed between them. A 
decided that the disputes could only be resolved by legal means and came to 
us for legal advice. He produced the relevant documents to us including the 
shareholders’ agreement signed by A, B and C and the annual returns and 
latest audit accounts. 
 
5.1.5 Preliminary Legal Advice From a Firm of Solicitors 
We held the view that A had a prima facie case to enforce the shareholders’ 
agreement. We also needed to consider legal proceeding on contractual basis 
or on company law basis. We opined that A might take out an application for 
unfair prejudice petition,1150 just and equitable winding up1151 and derivative 
action. 1152 
 
We briefly explained the legal remedies that were available to A. There was a 
contractual claim against B and C to enforce the agreement between A, B and 
C for their refusal of declaring dividend. In regard to B and C domination of the 
Board of ABC Limited and the exclusion of management of A from B Limited, A 
might take out an application for an unfair prejudice petition against B and C. A 
might also consider to wind up the company on the just and equitable ground 
as there was a failure of substratum and exclusion from management. The 
other option available to A was a derivative action, if A could prove there was a 
                                                     
1150
 Hong Kong Companies Ordinance, section 168A Cap. 32 (now Hong Kong Companies 
Ordinance, section 724 Cap. 622). 
1151
 Hong Kong Companies Ordinance, section 177(1)(f) Cap. 32. 
1152
 Under the rule in Foss v Harbottle (1843) 67 ER 189. The statutory derivative action was 
under Hong Kong Companies Ordinance, section 168BC Cap. 32 only came into effect on 15 
July 2005. 
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fraud on him and the wrongdoers were in control. A might use the name of the 
company to sue B and C but the relief was for the company and not for A. 
 
A was initially keen on proceeding the matter further, we advised A that as 
company law was a complicated area of law and an expert should be 
consulted. We told A that there was a numbers of good corporate counsel. We 
suggested him to retain counsel as we needed one anyway when the disputes 
were brought to court, it was likely that the disputes would be heard in the 
companies division of High Court and counsel was required. 
 
A agreed with our advice and we contacted some leading corporate counsel 
and asked for the estimation of fees. Senior Counsel with extensive 
experience in corporate law quoted a very high hourly rate. We managed to 
find one who was able to match our client’s budget and had more than 10 
years experience in corporate law litigation. We finally retained the corporate 
counsel who was an expert in this area to advise A and he charged on an 
hourly basis. 
 
5.1.6 Retainer of Corporate Counsel 
We sent out our brief together with all relevant documents to the counsel and 
arranged a date for a meeting with our client A. At the meeting, a number of 
thoughts were given including a breach of the shareholders’ agreement, an 
unfair prejudice remedy, a derivative action and a just and equitable winding 
up under common law and the company legislation.  
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5.1.6.1 Breach of Shareholders’ Agreement 
Counsel advised that A might sue B and C for a breach of contract under the 
shareholders’ agreement as B and C refused to declare the dividend which 
was contrary to the express term of the agreement. Counsel considered that A 
had a very strong case and B and C should have no reasonable defence. As 
far as this part of issue was concerned, he advised that a summary judgment 
could be considered if B and C defended the claim.  
 
5.1.6.2 Inspection of the Books of Account 
In regard to access to the books of account of ABC Limited, B Limited and C 
Limited, they should be kept at the registered office of the company or at such 
other place as the directors thought fit, and should at all times be open to 
inspection by the directors. A as a director of ABC Limited, B Limited and C 
Limited, he was entitled to have access to the books of account. The refusal of 
access was a violation of the statutory provision.  
 
5.1.6.3 Unfair Prejudice Remedy 
In regard to exclusion of management, refusal of declaring the dividend and 
termination of the two staff members, these amounted to an unfair prejudicial 
conduct to A. A as a shareholder might complain that the affairs of the 
company were being or had been conducted in a manner unfairly prejudicial to 
the interests of the members generally or of some part of the members 
(including himself), and might make an application to the court by petition. 
Counsel explained that there were two aspects needed to be proved under this 
application that: (1) the act complained of must affect the member, and (2) 
there had been unfairly prejudicial to the interests of some part of the 
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shareholders and the unfair prejudice remedy was adhered to traditional 
contractual and equitable principles.1153 
 
5.1.6.4 Just and Equitable Winding Up 
Counsel explained that A might wind up a company by the court if he was able 
to prove that the company should be wound up on just and equitable 
grounds. 1154  Counsel advised that it was necessary to prove just and 
equitable in the application as the remedy of winding up was a more drastic 
remedy and the court was only prepared to wind up the company on just and 
equitable grounds which might include the deadlock and failure of substratum, 
exclusion from office, and justifiable loss of confidence. The exclusion of 
management, refusal of declaring the dividend and termination of the staff 
members worked for A might be the valid grounds. 
 
5.1.6.5 Derivative Action 
Counsel further advised that A as a shareholder might bring a derivative action 
on behalf of the company against B and C being wrongdoers who were in 
control of the company, and it was only under very exceptional circumstances, 
a shareholder might make use of this remedy. Counsel explained that the 
wrong complained of was unratifiable by the company in a shareholders’ 
meeting by ordinary resolution and that the company was subject to the 
wrongdoer in control and the common ground was a fraud which had been 
perpetrated on the minority shareholders.1155 The statutory derivative action 
                                                     
1153
 Hong Kong Companies Ordinance, section 168A Cap. 32 (now Hong Kong Companies 
Ordinance, section 724 Cap. 622). 
1154
 Hong Kong Companies Ordinance, section177(1) (f) Cap. 32. 
1155
 Under the rule in Foss v Harbottle (1843) 67 ER 189. 
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was not yet available in Hong Kong.1156  
 
5.1.6.6 Reliefs and Remedies 
Counsel advised that there were a number of issues involved and we needed 
to consider each of them in details, in particular, the reliefs and remedies 
available for each claim. 
 
5.1.6.6.1 Personal Reliefs  
Counsel explained that the court might make an order for damages or specific 
performance for breach of shareholders’ agreement. The remedy was 
personal to A including a declaration by the court that A would have the right to 
have the access to the company’s books of account.  
 
For the unfair prejudice remedy, Counsel explained that the relief was for A 
personally and remedies were wide ranging including an order for restraining 
the commission or the continuance of the unfair prejudice conduct; order that 
proceedings should be brought in the name of the company against any 
person and on any terms as the court might order; appoint a receiver or 
manager of the whole or a part of a company’s property or business and 
specify the powers and duties of the receiver or manager and fix his 
remuneration; and make such other order as it thinks fit, whether for regulating 
the conduct of the company’s affairs in future, or for the purchase of the shares 
of any members of the company and, in the case of a purchase by the 
company, whether for the reduction accordingly of the company’s capital, or 
                                                     
1156
 The statutory derivative action under Hong Kong Companies Ordinance, section 168BC 
Cap. 32 only came into effect on 15 July 2005. 
  
 
302 
 
otherwise; and the court may order payment of damages and interest on those 
damages as the court may think fit to any member(s) of the company whose 
interests have been unfairly prejudiced by the act or conduct. Winding up was 
not a remedy under an unfair prejudice petition in Hong Kong. In practice, it is 
possible to join the just and equitable winding up petition with the unfair 
prejudice petition by a cross petition. 
 
5.1.6.6.2  Reliefs for Company 
For the derivative action, the relief was for the company ABC Limited and not 
for A personally. The remedy was restricted to the company for redress of the 
corporate wrongs. It was necessary for A to consider whether he was willing to 
spend a large amount of money to redress the corporate wrong where all the 
benefits of the proceedings were to the company not A himself.   
 
The remedy of the just and equitable winding up to A was winding up ABC 
Limited, this was a very extreme measure. A as a shareholder of ABC Limited 
might obtain payment in respect of his shareholding from the official receiver in 
accordance with the priority list under the relevant statutory provisions. 
 
Counsel advised A that legal aid was not available to commercial disputes and 
he needed to consider the merits of each issue and such disputes might be 
time-consuming and costly. A had to use his own resources to finance the 
legal action and there was no guarantee that the costs would be awarded by 
the court. The award of costs was not as of right but discretionary. 
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5.1.6.7 Parent and Subsidiary Structures 
Counsel also considered that the relationship between ABC Limited with B 
Limited and C Limited. B Limited and C Limited were the wholly owned 
subsidiary of ABC Limited and A was only a director and a shareholder of ABC 
Limited, and only a director not a shareholder of B Limited and C Limited. As 
far as the shareholder’s remedies were concerned, they only applied to a 
single level at ABC Limited. He explained that under the existing common law 
and statutory provision,1157  the existing law covered only single level of 
company. Counsel was not for sure whether it applied to the multiple level at B 
Limited and C Limited where parent and subsidiary companies were involved. 
Counsel advised A not to proceed the claim in regard to his interests in B 
Limited and C Limited at the subsidiary level but should concentrate on ABC 
Limited at the holding level. Counsel explained that the reflective loss principle 
might bar the application sought relief under an unfair prejudice petition and a 
multiple derivative action as long as there was any possibility of double 
recovery in the circumstances. He made some preliminary research on these 
aspects and found no similar case in other common law jurisdictions and he 
was afraid that A had no right to seek shareholders’ remedies for B Limited 
and C Limited at subsidiary companies level. A was very disappointed to hear 
his advice.  
 
Having been explained the requirements of common law and the statutory 
                                                     
1157
 This case study was prior to the introduction of statutory derivative action under Hong 
Kong Companies Ordinance, section 168BC Cap. 32 only came into effect on 15 July 2005 
and also prior to the case of Waddington v Chan Chun Hoo Thomas and others [2009] 4 HKC 
381 which allows multiple derivative action under common law. The amendment of Hong Kong 
Companies Ordinance, section 168BC Cap. 32 came into force on 10 December 2010 (now 
Hong Kong Companies Ordinance, section 732 Cap. 622) which allows statutory multiple 
derivative action.  
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provisions, A was not sure whether to proceed on derivative action and just 
and equitable winding up as it involved parent and subsidiary companies, 
where ABC Limited was profitable and had accumulated profit and B and C 
wanted to continue the operation of the company.  
 
We considered that the proceedings of the contractual claim alone could not 
solve the corporate disputes between A, B and C. We subsequently took a 
very prudent and safe measure to inspect the company’s books of account and 
join an action for remedy against B and C’s unfair prejudicial conduct and to 
wind up B Limited, C Limited and ABC Limited. A was advised that the unfair 
prejudicial relief of the action was to him personally and unlike derivative action 
was to the company. Counsel also advised the cross petition based on just and 
equitable ground was a protective measure only. Counsel was not sure 
whether A was entitled to apply for winding up B Limited and C Limited. The 
issue of cross petition for winding up should give an additional pressure to B 
and C. 
 
A considered that it was necessary to teach B and C a lesson and show his 
determination to B and C that he was not hesitated to take the matter to court 
of law. He instructed us to proceed the matter further. We wrote a legal letter 
before bringing an action to B, C, B Limited, C Limited and ABC Limited to 
demand for the inspection of books of account, declaration of dividend, 
restoration of original management and the winding up of B Limited, C Limited 
and ABC Limited. We gave 14 days for them to comply with our client’s 
requests before we proceeded to commence legal action. The letter before 
action was served as a notice and warning to B and C. It gave an opportunity 
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to B and C for a settlement before commencing a legal action. The court might 
exercise discretion to award costs to A when it came to the issues of costs. 
 
5.1.7 Negotiation with a Firm of Solicitors for B and C 
A firm of solicitors represented B, C, B Limited, C Limited and ABC Limited and 
wrote to us. They requested for 14 days extension to study the case and take 
instructions from their clients B and C. At the same time, we wrote another 
letter on entirely without prejudice basis requesting to hold a meeting with B 
and C and their solicitors with a view to have a settlement out of court. 
 
The solicitors for B, C, B Limited, C Limited and ABC Limited replied that they 
did not consider there was any unfair prejudice conduct on their part nor any 
ground for winding up and refused to let our client A to have access of books of 
account and declare the dividend of ABC Limited. They would defend any legal 
action taken by A. Meanwhile, they also replied to us on without prejudice 
basis that B and C had no intention to discuss the matter out of court and 
refused our request to hold any without prejudice meeting with a view of the 
settlement. The firm of solicitors representing B and C had instructions to 
accept services on behalf of B, C, B Limited, C Limited and ABC Limited. 
 
On receipt of the letter from the solicitors for B, C, B Limited, C Limited and 
ABC Limited, we arranged a conference with A and took instructions from him. 
We explained that it was very unlikely that B and C were willing to settle the 
disputes with A without resorting the disputes to court of law. A confirmed his 
instructions to proceed the matter and instructed us to prepare the necessary 
documents for the intended court proceedings.  
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5.1.8 Commencement of a High Court Action 
A joint petition for the inspection of books of account and unfair prejudice was 
made by A to the Court of First Instance of the High Court of Hong Kong under 
sections 152FA and 168A1158 and for winding up under section 177(1)(f)1159 of 
the Companies Ordinance, Chapter 32 in late 2002. A was a petitioner, B was 
the first respondent C was the second respondent B Limited was the third 
respondent, C Limited was the fourth respondent and ABC Limited was the 
fifth respondent. A only needed to pay a nominal fee as filing fee to court and 
no more. As advised by Counsel, the cross petition for winding up was issued 
for protective measure and was withheld pending the result of the unfair 
prejudice application. Arrangement was made to put a winding up notice in the 
newspaper and government gazette for a Registrar’s certificate for winding up 
to be granted before a preliminary hearing before a Master in court. 
 
In the application, A asked for a declaration to have access to inspect all books 
of account and statutory records; an order of declaration of dividend; an order 
for the unfair prejudice remedy and/or winding up or any other order which 
might be made as the court thought fit; and costs of the litigation.  
 
A petition with returnable date and an affidavit of A verified the particulars of 
the application were served on the solicitors for B, C, B Limited, C Limited and 
ABC Limited. On receipt of our documents, the solicitors for B, C, B Limited, C 
Limited and ABC Limited filed an affidavit of B (who made the affidavit for 
                                                     
1158
  Hong Kong Companies Ordinance, sections 740 and 724 Cap. 622 from 3 March 2014. 
1159
  Hong Kong Companies Ordinance, Cap. 32 was retitled as the Hong Kong Companies 
(Winding Up and Miscellaneous Provisions) Ordinance on 3 March 2014. 
  
 
307 
 
himself and for C, B Limited, C Limited and ABC Limited) in opposing our 
application.  
 
In the preliminary hearing before a Master in court, an order was made to filing 
a further affidavit by the petitioner and then an affidavit to reply by the 
respondents. Thereafter, the parties were at liberty to file one further affidavit 
before another hearing. The case was adjourned to a date to be re-fixed before 
a Judge in court. 
 
We instructed counsel to prepare the affidavit set out all the particulars of the 
unfair prejudice conducts made by B and C against A and filed to court and 
served on the solicitors for the respondents. In turn, we received the an 
affidavit from the solicitors for B and C. B and C alleged A that he failed to 
observe the director’s duties and was liable to pay damages to the company. 
We then prepared an affidavit to reply denying their allegations. 
 
After the close of filing all the affidavits, we held another meeting with our 
counsel and analysed the merits of the case based on the existing documents 
filed to court. Counsel was of the view that A had a very strong case to obtain a 
declaration for A to have access to books of account of B Limited, C Limited 
and ABC Limited and the claim for a breach of directors’ duties were very 
weak. 
 
Counsel advised that it might take one to two years to proceed to a full trial of 
the present disputes in view of the allegations and issues involved and incur 
substantial amount of legal costs. He suggested that before proceeding to a 
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full trial, we could try to take out an application for an interim order for access 
to books of account of B Limited, C Limited and ABC Limited as this was one 
of the strongest points in the present application. The success of the interim 
application could attack the morale of B and C in this action and we only 
needed to spend a relatively small amount of money in terms of legal costs. A 
agreed to counsel’s suggestion and gave instructions to prepare the interim 
application. 
 
We prepared a summons and affidavit of A in support of his application and 
obtained a returnable date from the court. All documents were served on the 
solicitors for B, C, B Limited, C Limited and ABC Limited. We also prepared a 
brief to counsel to retain him to appear on the returnable date of the summons. 
The rate of counsel fee was calculated on time basis. The solicitors for B, C, B 
Limited, C Limited and ABC Limited served us an affidavit of B (who made the 
affidavit for himself and for C, B Limited, C Limited and ABC Limited) in 
opposing our application a few days before the hearings. 
 
At the hearings, A was represented by our counsel and B, C, B Limited, C 
Limited and ABC Limited were also represented by another counsel. Hearing 
was conducted in chambers and tried by a Judge. Our counsel opened the 
case and explained the reasons for our application that it was necessary to 
have the relevant information regarding the financial status of B Limited, C 
Limited and ABC Limited in order to determine whether it was justifiable to 
have dividend to be declared in accordance with the shareholders’ agreement. 
Counsel of B, C, B Limited, C Limited and ABC Limited opposed our 
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application and submitted that the final accounts were under preparation by 
CPA and would only be available later in that year. 
 
After the hearing of the arguments from the petitioner and from the 
respondents, Judge made a decision that it was clear from the statutory 
provision as well as the terms of the shareholders agreement that A as a 
director of B Limited, C Limited and ABC Limited and a shareholder of ABC 
Limited was entitled to have access to the books of account and denial of this 
right was unacceptable, and an order was granted in terms of our summons.. 
In addition, Judge ordered the costs with counsel certificate be to the petitioner. 
Costs were to be taxed if not agreed by the parties. 
 
In obtaining the interim order, A instructed us to conduct the case in a more 
aggressive manner and proceeded the case as soon as possible. In the 
meantime, the solicitors for B, C, B Limited, C Limited and ABC Limited 
requested us to reopened the without prejudice settlement. We advised A that 
it was in his interest to consider to have an amicable settlement out of court as 
it might involve large amount of costs if the matter went on to a full trial. 
 
5.1.9 Settlement out of Court with B and C 
In this action, we obtained the interlocutory order for a declaration to access to 
books of account before a full trial. After the hearing, we had several meetings 
with solicitors for B, C, B Limited, C Limited and ABC Limited on without 
prejudice basis and B and C also negotiated with A on their own. 
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Eventually we were able to reach a settlement out of court. As there was no 
statutory appraisal remedy in Hong Kong, we could not advise our client on 
this aspect. A agreed to sell his shares in ABC Limited to B and C at a price to 
be agreed. In the absence of agreement, an independent CPA was appointed 
by the Hong Kong Institute of CPA to conduct a valuation of the shares and the 
valuation was final and binding between A, B and C. The action was withdrawn 
with no order as to costs and the parties were responsible for their own costs. 
 
A instructed a firm of CPA to conduct a valuation of the shares and B and C 
also instructed another firm of CPA to conduct a valuation of the shares. There 
were differences in the opinions about the valuation of the shares. The 
differences were resolved at a meeting between two firms of CPA. A agreed to 
sell his shares in ABC Limited to B and C which in our view was at a 
reasonable price though not a very good price. 
 
We prepared a consent summons by way of Tomlin order to record the 
particulars of the settlement between A, B and C and was signed by the 
solicitors for B and C and us as the solicitors for A. The court granted an order 
in terms of our summons. The disputes were finally ended and resolved in late 
2004. As there was no order for costs in the action, A was required to pay his 
own costs from his pocket. The counsel fees involved was over 20 hours and 
we also prepared our bill of costs in accordance with a numbers of hours (over 
50 hours) involved in the action. 
 
5.1.10 Result of the Shareholders’ Litigation 
A was able to receive the settlement from B and C and sold all his shares in 
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ABC Limited to B and C. A reopened his business in Mongkok. He 
incorporated a new LLC to sell the Japanese car accessories and parts. A and 
his youngest brother were the only directors and shareholders of the company. 
 
A considered that the use of corporate form was good for the investors 
because the protection of limited liability and separate legal entity. 
Nonetheless, the protection of minority shareholders in Hong Kong was not 
enough and the use of parent and subsidiary companies was very complicated. 
The price for access to justice and resolving the disputes by legal action in 
Hong Kong is very high since Hong Kong retains two branches of legal 
profession and the proceedings in Hong Kong is complicated and lengthy. 
 
In summary, the potential impact of this case study on the oppression of 
minority shareholders by the management and majority shareholders and the 
remedies to minority shareholders is significant. Some of the issues, for 
example, the multiple derivative action, have been addressed by the recent 
legislative reform. It is worthwhile to have further analysis on the other issues 
based on the case study. In Chapter Six, I will discuss the reform proposals to 
address the issues of the minority shareholder protection in Hong Kong. 
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5.2 China Case Study of Shareholders’ Disputes  
According to the course requirements, a case of shareholders’ disputes in 
China is drawn from my previous professional legal work for the purpose of this 
thesis. The following parts set out the background of the disputes. 
 
5.2.1 Introduction to China Case 
The present case study happened in 2000s after about 20 years of economic 
reform in China. It was about the property investment by way of a company 
vehicle made by a Hong Kong resident in China. The other shareholders were 
Chinese residents. My client was a shareholder and director of a parent 
company which was a holding company of a subsidiary which in turn held a 
piece of land for a property development. The issues involved the remedies to 
minority shareholders and corporate governance structure in China. 
 
5.2.2 Background of Our Client 
My client let say John was a Chinese immigrant from mainland China and 
immigrated to Hong Kong in late 1980s. He was in his late thirties, born and 
educated in China. He received his undergraduate education at university in 
Hong Kong. He came from a traditional and wealthy Chinese family in 
Guangdong and received the best primary and secondary education in China. 
His father was a teacher and his mother was a nurse.  
 
He made his fortune in property market and accumulated his wealth from 
property investment in Hong Kong during early 1990s. He has been our firm’s 
conveyancing client for the last 10 years and so. He has a very good business 
sense in property investment and holds a number of properties in Hong Kong 
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and China. He is fluent in English and Chinese (both Cantonese and 
Mandarin). Since he grew up in China, he has very good connections in his 
home town in Guangdong. 
 
5.2.3 Background of the Land Investment Project 
During 1990s, the Chinese socialist economy was dominated by a few SOEs. 
As part of Chinese economic reforms, there was a massive redundancy of staff 
from the local government and SOEs. John had a former secondary school 
classmate in Guangdong and his classmate’s father was the cadre of the CCP 
and high official of a local people’s government. His father was forced to take 
early retirement in the reform. 
 
His classmate’s father let say Tom had a very good connection/relationship 
(guanxi) with the local government. He was able to buy land from the local 
government at a very good price. Many of the high officials of the local 
government were the former subordinates of Tom. Tom bought a few pieces of 
land in the sub-urban area which he knew the new railway station would be 
built in the nearby location. Tom bought the land at a very good price. All the 
approvals, documentation and taxes of the purchase of the land were duly 
complied with in accordance with Chinese laws and practices. 
 
Because Tom’s son was a former classmate of John, he was invited to invest 
in the parent company which held a piece of land by its wholly owned 
subsidiary company. The use of parent and subsidiary companies is very 
common in Western countries such as Hong Kong. It has been increasingly 
becoming more popular in China using this form of business structure for tax 
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and privacy reasons. 
 
John was told that in addition to him, another person was also invited to 
participate and invest in the land development project. However, John did not 
know the other investor well and the amount of consideration for the offer of 
the other investor. John only met with him on a few occasions with Tom. 
 
5.2.4 Corporate Governance and Ownership Structures 
Tom set up a subsidiary LLC let say S LLC for the purposes of holding the land. 
The capital was wholly contributed by another parent LLC let say P LLC. S 
LLC had two shareholders: P LLC (99%) and Tom (1%). The registered capital 
of both S LLC and P LLC were duly paid. P LLC had three shareholders: Tom 
(80%), his wife (10%), and his son (10%). The scope of business was duly 
contained in the articles of association of the company. No agreement for 
shareholders or directors was executed by them. 
 
In terms of corporate governance, China has adopted the civil law system and 
the two-tier board model i.e. the boards of directors and supervisors. Both 
LLCs consisted of the organs of shareholders’ meeting, board of directors and 
board of supervisors. The shareholders’ meeting was the highest organ of 
authority within both LLCs. The board of directors of both S LLC and P LLC 
consisted of Tom, his wife and his son; and the board of supervisors consisted 
of Tom’s ex-colleagues let say Jimmy and Sam; and the general manager was 
a good friend of Tom let say Ben. Tom’s son was appointed as an assistant 
general manager. Tom was appointed as the legal representative of both P 
LLC and S LLC and only the legal representative was authorised to act and 
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sign (with official stamp of LLC) contractual and legal documents for and on 
behalf of the LLC. Tom was also the CCP’s representative in both LLCs. 
 
As a result of the economic development of China, the price of land was 
increased substantially in 1990s. It was expected that after the Asian Olympia 
game held in Guangdong in 2010, the price of land was going up further. John 
was invited by Tom’s son to participate and invest in the project as Tom and his 
son were in need of cash to develop the land. John was offered to purchase 
10% shares of P LLC from Tom. John negotiated with Tom and wanted to 
directly invest in S LLC but was rejected by Tom on the ground that the transfer 
of shares of S LLC required an additional payment of tax and approval from 
the local authorities. Tom explained to John that as S LLC was wholly owned 
by P LLC, the investment in P LLC was in fact indirectly invested in S LLC. 
 
John realised this was a very good opportunity and finally accepted the offer 
and purchased the shares from Tom. Tom’s son also told John that another 
investor also accepted the invitation of investment and accepted the offer and 
invested in P LLC for 10% for an unknown amount. John did not know him and 
had no particulars of the other new shareholder.  John and the other new 
shareholder became the new shareholders in P LLC and they were appointed 
as directors of both P LLC and S LLC. The relevant share transfer and 
registration procedures were made in the local office of Administration of 
Commerce and Industry in Guangdong. After the transfer, P LLC had four 
shareholders: Tom (60%), his wife (10%), his son (10%), John (10%) and the 
other shareholder (10%). The post in board of directors, board of supervisors, 
and the position of general manager of S LLC and P LLC remain unchanged. 
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Tom assured John that he could later participate in the management and 
development of the land project. It was agreed that no dividend should be 
declared until the land development would generate profit.  
 
The following diagram sets out the ownership structures of the parent and 
subsidiary companies concerned: 
 
 
 
5.2.5 Background of the Disputes and Suspicious Transactions 
As John was appointed as a director, he joined the management team of the 
project. When John participated in the land development project, he found out 
many problems of the management. All the directors except him received 
salaries from P LLC and S LLC in the amount from RMB5,000 to RMB20,000. 
Later, he found out that the monthly salary of Tom was RMB20,000, his son 
RMB 10,000 and his wife RMB5,000. He was not happy with this arrangement. 
 
He also realised that many suppliers of the land development project were 
very good friends of Tom or his son. One of the suppliers let say Shih was 
supplying a batch of sub-standard building materials to the company at a price 
Tom 
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higher than the market price and in return paying secret commission to Tom. 
Shih told John that it was a common practice in this field. This kind of practice 
had been existed a number of years prior to John’s admission as a 
shareholder and appointment as a director. 
 
Later John investigated that besides Shih, there were many other suppliers 
who were supplying sub-standard materials to the project. The practices of 
under-table payments were known to members of the board of directors as 
well as board of supervisors. 
 
John discovered that Tom and his son set up a new LLC and received the 
sub-contract building work from S LLC at a very good price. In turn, they 
further sub sub-contracted the works to another builders at a lower price, as a 
result they obtained the advantage in the difference between two prices. John 
challenged this arrangement to Tom but Tom maintained that it was alright and 
no problem. Tom told John that it was not uncommon in this industry and told 
him not to bother.  
 
John also revealed that Tom used S LLC to guarantee his youngest brother in 
obtaining loan from the local bank for his business of window frame. Tom’s 
brother also supplied window frame to the land development project at a price 
higher than other suppliers. The guarantee was not brought to the board of 
directors nor shareholders’ meeting for approval. 
 
5.2.6 Private Negotiation with Management and Major Shareholders 
John attempted to obtain the book of accounts and contractual documents 
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from Tom in order to investigate the suspected transactions. He requested Tom 
and both LLCs to provide him with the relevant accounts and documents but 
was refused without giving any reason. 
 
John knew these facts and would like to call a directors’ meeting and 
shareholders’ meeting to discuss the problems he discovered. He demanded a 
formal board meeting with Tom and other directors. He called a shareholders’ 
meeting but no other shareholders except him turned up. At the request of 
John, an informal meeting was held with Tom and his son, Tom told him that 
there was no shareholders’ meeting ever called and held since P LLC was 
incorporated. All the shareholders just signed the documents and minutes in 
order to comply with the requirements of company law. He could simply tell him 
what the matters about the proposed shareholders’ meeting; he would 
represent the other shareholders and answer to him. Therefore, there was no 
need to call for shareholders’ meeting nor directors’ meeting. Consequently, 
the informal meeting did not produce any constructive result. 
 
John formally wrote a letter and brought the matter to the board of directors 
and put the matter on the agenda of the board meeting but no action was taken 
by the board to stop this kind of transactions. In the absence of any response 
from the board of directors, he also wrote another letter and brought this matter 
to the board of supervisors and again no action was taken by the supervisors. 
Instead, John received a letter of dismissal from the board of supervisors to 
dismiss his post of director in both P LLC and S LLC. 
 
At the material time, the property market in China was booming, the State 
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Council announced a series of policies for the purposes of controlling the price 
of property market and sale of land to the public by the local government would 
be strictly monitored. John anticipated the price of the land would go up in the 
next 12 months in view of the shortage of supply of land and his shares in P 
LLC should be higher to reflect the rise in property market.   
 
5.2.7 Resolving the Disputes 
John was not very happy about the management of the company and would 
like to stop the acts of Tom and Shih and other suppliers. He wanted to contact 
the other shareholder who also contributed 10% share capital to discuss the 
suspected transactions with him. Tom did not give him particular and 
information of this new shareholder, John could not locate him. John would like 
to contact other investor to take joint action but since he had no information of 
other shareholders, this could not be done. 
 
John as a traditional Chinese under the influence of the Confucianism (ru jia) 
and believed social harmony and compromise, he wanted to maintain a good 
relationship with Tom and his son. At the beginning, due to the traditional 
Chinese cultures and values, Chinese did not like to bother the court or 
government official during their lifetime under the Confucianism. He did not 
want to go to court in order to maintain good relationship with them and was 
willing to accept compromise to preserve harmony with the major shareholders. 
He wanted to resolve the matter amicably and privately with Tom. He did not 
want to resort to court and invited Tom’s son his ex-classmate to discuss this 
matter. Tom’s son promised to help him and persuaded his father to settle the 
matter with John. John spent a lot of time and made efforts to negotiate with 
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Tom and his son. There were numerous meetings and conferences amongst 
them in discussing the disputes with no resolution. The shareholders’ disputes 
over the development of the land could not be resolved after a lengthy debates 
and endless discussions for more than one year, it ended up that John was fed 
up with their delaying tactic and had no choice but had to consider resolving 
the disputes by way of litigation. Having discussed with Tom and his son for 
more than one year without any result, John decided to resolve the matter by 
legal means and wanted to know what rights and step he could take in order to 
protect his interest in the P LLC as a minority shareholder under the Chinese 
company law. 
 
5.2.8 Our Preliminary Views 
Since John has been our firm’s conveyancing client for a number of years, he 
came to us for another matter of his sale and purchase of property in Hong 
Kong and sought our initial advice. John told us all the particulars and 
backgrounds of the disputes. We advised Tom that the practices of paying 
secret commission was corruption and crime in Hong Kong and suggested him 
to report the matter to police department in China which is known as public 
security bureau and that the other issues might involve Chinese law which was 
not our area of practice and a Chinese lawyer should be retained.  
 
After the meeting with us, John followed our advice and went to Guangdong 
and reported the matter to the local public security bureau. John told us that at 
the local public security bureau when he mentioned the name of Tom, most of 
the officers at the local public security bureau knew him as he was a senior 
official in the local government and was very influential in the local government. 
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After listening of John’s report and complaint about Tom, the public security 
officer told John that it was a case of commercial disputes within a company 
and declined to accept the matter for criminal investigation. He advised John to 
consider civil proceedings and seek legal advice from a lawyer. 
 
He came back to Hong Kong and told us that the local public security bureau 
declined to investigate the matter and advised him to seek Chinese lawyers for 
advice. Since the case involved Chinese law, we needed to consult a Chinese 
law firm. A referral was given by a friend of John who was a businessman in 
China. We prepared all the documentation and particulars of facts to the 
Chinese lawyers for their advice. A meeting was set up in the office of the 
Chinese law firm in Guangdong. On instructions of John, I travelled with John 
from Hong Kong to Guangdong to meet with the Chinese lawyers. I stayed with 
John for a few days in China until we had all necessary information. 
 
5.2.9 Chinese Lawyers Retainer 
We had a meeting in a Chinese law firm in Guangdong. The firm was located 
in an urban area and the office was not very big. I was present in the meeting 
at the request and with the instructions from John. We were received by two 
gentlemen, one in his early fifties and the other in his late thirties. They were 
the Chinese lawyers for John. The elder gentleman introduced himself to us 
that he was the senior partner and the other was his assistant and claimed that 
his firm was one of the biggest law firms in the city. He also told us that he was 
working in the local people’s court prior to joining this firm as a practising 
lawyer, he had a very good connection with the judges of local people’s court. 
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At the meeting, John told the Chinese lawyers the particulars of the disputes 
and he preferred to have a non-litigation means to settle the disputes. I asked 
the Chinese lawyers whether the dismissal of John as a director was valid or 
not and what kinds of shareholder’s remedies were available in China. The 
senior partner advised us that he was very confident to accept our case and 
persuaded us to instruct him to pursue the claim. He did not answer my 
questions and discuss the details of the disputes and the merit of the case. 
 
The senior partner had a good friend, his former colleague working in the local 
people's court as a judge and could try to make use of his 
connection/relationship (guanxi) to make his former colleague to accept this 
case in his court. He contacted him by phone to see whether he could take up 
this case. The judge told him that he needed time to consider and would reply 
him later. Later on the same day, the senior partner called John and told him 
that the judge, his ex-colleague, declined to accept the case as he knew Tom 
was a high official of local people’s government and he was not very confident 
to take up a corporate litigation. The senior partner told us that he could make 
use of his connection and arrange another judge to accept this case and asked 
John to instruct him.  
 
When we asked for the estimation of legal fees, the reply was that there was 
no prescribed standard of fees and usually they charged client on a package 
basis. This was determined on a case by case basis and no uniform standard. 
The legal fees in China include filing fee to people’s court which is based on 
the amount of claims and lawyer’s fee. This was different from our system in 
Hong Kong that fee was usually charged on time basis and only minimal fee 
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was paid to court. If the party disagree the fee, the bill can be submitted to 
court for taxation. When we finished the conference with the Chinese lawyers 
and before we left, John settled the bill and mentioned that the fees for Hong 
Kong lawyers were very reasonable. 
 
John was unsure about whether the legal advice given by the Chinese lawyer 
was reliable. We were very uncertain about the connection of the senior 
partner might have with the judges of the local people’s court when we were on 
the way back to Hong Kong. I advised him to obtain second opinion from 
another Chinese lawyers and John agreed. I asked my fellow solicitors 
whether he could refer our client to another Chinese lawyers with good record. 
A firm of Chinese lawyers was referred, the firm had lawyers specialized in 
corporate law. I contacted them and gave them the facts and particulars of the 
disputes and asked for a fee quote. Their reply was very responsive and told 
us that fees were based on time, complexity of disputes and time involved. 
They quoted a fee which covered the work of perusal of documents and a 
conference for not more than ten hours at their firm in Guangdong. John and I 
considered the fee was reasonable. John agreed to retain the firm and fixed a 
date for an appointment of meeting. 
 
5.2.10 Second Opinion 
I travelled with John from Hong Kong to Guangdong to meet with the Chinese 
lawyers and we prepared to stay to meet with all relevant parties before we left. 
John told me that he also arranged some important persons to assist him to 
resolve the disputes during this trip. The firm was located in the newly 
established commercial area in Guangzhou city. The firm was decorated with 
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modern design which was very similar to the design of Hong Kong law firms. 
This time we were received by one gentleman and one lady Chinese lawyers. 
It seemed that they were very young in their mid-thirties.  
 
At the meeting, John told them that he preferred to have a non-litigation means 
of resolution and the previous advice given by another lawyers. They did not 
say anything and looked at each other just smiled. The lady lawyer told us that 
they knew this kind of practice but it was getting better today. In China, judges 
are civil servants and financed by the local people’s government. They also 
told us that it was possible in the old day that judges working in the local 
people’s courts had no formal legal education and were simply appointed by 
the state. The standards of judges were varied in different regions. John told 
them what was happened and I asked them whether the dismissal of John as a 
director was valid or not and what kind of shareholder’s remedies were 
available in China.  
 
5.2.11 Chinese Legal Issues Involved 
They advised us that the Chinese company law was relatively young as 
compared to other countries; the first Chinese company law was enacted in 
1993 and the present Chinese company law 2005 was modeled on Western 
countries. They told us that based on the particulars we provided, the directors 
of both P LLC and S LLC were in breach of their duties; since John was 
dismissed as a director, we could only consider the rights and remedies as a 
shareholder. They told us that although we had no oppression remedy and the 
just and equitable winding up; we had right to set aside the resolution of the 
company; we could take shareholder’s direct and derivative actions or wind up 
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the company in China. They told us that there were a number of actions we 
might consider. I asked them to explain to us further on these thoughts.  
 
5.2.11.1 Breach of Director’s Duties 
John was advised that Tom as a director of both P LLC and S LLC had 
breached the duty of loyalty to the company including but not limited to use 
company’s asset to guarantee to other; to accept commission in the 
transaction between others and the company; to take advantage of his position 
as a director of the company; and to misappropriate the company’s funds.1160 
As a shareholder, John might consider to take a legal action against the 
directors concerned for compensation if they cause loss to the company in the 
performance of their functions as directors. 
 
5.2.11.2 Dismissal as a Director 
In regard to dismissal of John as a director, the Chinese lawyer advised us that 
the supervisor had the statutory power to dismiss a director. When I asked him 
whether there was any requirement for dismissal and whether the dismissal 
was valid in our case. He was not very sure. 
 
5.2.11.3 Set aside Resolution 
John was also advised that he could try to set aside the transactions for secret 
profit. If the directors are in breach of laws, administrative regulations and 
articles of association and cause damage to the shareholders’ interests, the 
shareholders are entitled to bring a legal action against the directors for 
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damages.1161 John needed to prove that a resolution was passed by the 
shareholders’ meeting or board of directors so that a legal action could be 
taken to cancel the resolution by court. John did not have any access of the 
company’s documents and could not provide the appropriate resolution. 
 
5.2.11.4 Holding Shareholders’ Meeting 
The company must hold regular meeting and interim meeting as the case may 
be in accordance with the articles of association of the company.1162 It was 
only possible to have a written resolution if all the shareholders consent and 
agree to sing and affix their seals on the written resolution.1163 It appeared that 
Tom was in breach of this provision. 
 
5.2.11.5 Table Resolution at Meeting 
John was also advised that he had right to table resolution at the shareholders’ 
meeting if shareholders holding at least 10% of shares are permitted to put 
forward proposals to the board of directors, which are then obliged to notify the 
other shareholders and to include it in the meeting agenda.1164 It appeared 
that this measure was not very helpful as John had already attempted to call 
for a shareholders’ meeting but no other shareholder turned up. 
 
5.2.11.6 Inspection of Books of Accounts 
John could also inspect accounting books and request a check and review of 
the company’s account books and the resolutions of the board of directors, 
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 ibid Article 22. 
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 ibid Article 40. 
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 ibid Article 38. 
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and might take the case to the People’s Court if this request is turned down.1165 
This measures required to John take the matter to people’s court. 
 
5.2.11.7 Purchase of Shares 
John had the right to sell shares to the LLC. A shareholder in a LLC can require 
the company to purchase his shareholding at a reasonable price (1) if he votes 
against a resolution at a general meeting under any of the following matters: (2) 
the merger of the company or the transfer or division of the company’s major 
assets; or (3) the company’s decision not to distribute profits for five 
consecutive years despite having been profitable for those years; or (4) The 
renewal of the company’s term of operation upon its expiration, as stipulated in 
the articles of association (or other grounds for dissolution as stated in the 
articles of association have arisen) and the shareholders have resolved at a 
general meeting to extend the term of the company.1166 This was a sensible 
option but not practical because John did not appear to satisfy any of the 
grounds and Tom did not show any interest to purchase John’s shares. 
 
5.2.11.8 Winding Up 
John was advised that he could wind up P LLC if (1) any shareholder with 
more than 10% of the shares or voting rights of the company; (2) the 
company’s operation or management occurs serious difficulty; (3) the 
shareholders’ interests are suffering heavy and major loss if the company 
continues to exit; and (4) the disputes cannot be solved through other means 
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or approaches.1167 However, when we asked for the details and mechanism of 
this winding up action, the Chinese lawyer could not answer us.  
 
5.2.11.9 Derivative Action 
In addition, Tom could consider a derivative action. If the lawful interests of a 
company are infringed and cause loss to a company, a shareholder is entitled 
to request the directors or supervisors to take a legal action against the 
unlawful acts of a director, supervisor, senior officer or third party that have 
caused a loss to the company.1168 If they fail to take action, the shareholder, 
for the company, is entitled to take a legal action to people’s court. 
 
5.2.11.10 Direct Action 
John might consider using direct action if a director is in violation of the 
provisions of the laws, the administrative regulations and the articles of 
association of the company and cause damage to the interests of any 
shareholder of the company. 1169 The shareholder litigation is supposed to 
enhance the shareholder’s right to participate in the company’s affairs in order 
to improve the corporate governance of the company. 
 
5.2.11.11 Time limitation 
We were reminded by the Chinese lawyer that the time limitation to take legal 
action was relatively short in China, in general, it was two years from the date 
of cause of action.1170 Since John had occupied more than one year to 
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 ibid Article 183. 
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negotiate with the management and the major shareholder. We did not have 
much time to prepare our case if we minded to take the matter to the local 
people’s court. 
 
5.2.11.12 Parent and Subsidiary Structures 
When the meeting was about to finish, the lady lawyer from the same firm 
advised her colleague that the advice given to John regarding shareholder’s 
remedies were only applied to single level. She was not for sure it applied to 
double level where parent and subsidiary companies were involved. In the 
present disputes, S LLC was a subsidiary and John was only a shareholder of 
P LLC. She told us that she needed time to do further research on this point. 
The shareholders’ remedies might be inapplicable to John as a shareholder of 
P LLC. John was very disappointed to hear her reply. She advised John that 
he needed to consider even if it were applicable to his situation, it might involve 
a large amount of filing fees and legal costs. John had to use his own 
resources to finance the action. 
 
As a result of the advice from the two firms of Chinese lawyers and the lengthy 
negotiation with Tom, John decided not to pursue the claim and did not want to 
engage in the lengthy and costly litigation. He was not very confident on the 
Chinese legal system and the competence of the Chinese lawyers. He did not 
know how long and how much it might involve in the litigation. 
 
5.2.13 Settlement 
With the assistance of John’s former business partner in China and by his 
introduction, John was referred to meet with the local deputy secretary of the 
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CCP who was a good friend of his former business partner. He promised to 
help John to negotiate with Tom. 
 
Afterwards, John was able to arrange a meeting with Tom and his son during 
our stay in China. With all the parties’ consent, I was present in the meeting. I 
listened to both sides’ arguments and the local deputy secretary acted as a 
mediator to resolve their disputes. John told Tom that he wanted Tom to 
purchase his shares at the original price, otherwise he was not hesitating to 
take the matter to court. This would inevitably involve a large amount of sum in 
legal fees for both sides. The deputy local party secretary told Tom that unless 
he could settle the disputes with John, he would use his influence in the local 
government and give him a lot of trouble in the land development project. After 
a discussion for more than four hours, Tom offered to buy John’s shares at a 
very unreasonable price. Finally, they agreed that each of them appointing a 
professional CPA to value the amount for consideration. We were unable to 
reach an agreement on the amount of consideration when we left Guangdong. 
 
Later, John told us that he agreed with Tom the amount of consideration for 
the 10% shares but Tom needed to pay the amount by installments as he had 
no sufficient cash. John did not want to bother this case anymore and he was 
forced to sell his shares in the holding LLC to the other shareholders at a price 
lower than a reasonable value. 
 
5.2.14 Result of the Shareholders’ Disputes 
John finally received all the installments after two years. He told us that he 
would not invest in China in the future unless he could investigate the 
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investment project in advance and consult with the Chinese lawyers and CPA. 
This was a lesson he learnt at a high price. 
 
5.3 Legal Issues of Minority Shareholders Protection 
The case studies illustrated the problems identified by Chapters Three and 
Four. The problems include the deficiencies of shareholders remedies, 
increasing use of parent and subsidiary companies and the issues of access to 
justice and competent judiciary in Hong Kong and China. These issues include 
both legislative and structural aspects. I will investigate the issues of corporate 
governance and protection of minority shareholders arising from the two cases 
in Chapter Six. The issues include:  
 
1. The difference of the Hong Kong common law system and corporate 
governance and ownership structures and the Chinese civil law system and 
corporate governance and ownership structures; 
2. The oppression by management and majority shareholders under the 
doctrines of separate legal entity and majority rule, and the use of parent 
and subsidiary companies structures; 
3. The deficiencies of statutory provisions for protection of minority 
shareholders in the Hong Kong Company Ordinance 2014 and the Chinese 
Company Law 2005;  
4. The different effect of legal transplantation of foreign company law into 
Hong Kong and China; 
5. The difference of the economic structures in Hong Kong and China; 
6. The corruption and connection (guanxi) practices in Chinese society; and 
7. The competence of corporate lawyers, high legal costs and access to 
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justice; and the role and attitude of judiciary in shareholders’ litigation. 
 
The above issues as outlined are consistent with the problems identified in 
Chapters Three (3.1) and Four (4.0) and are material and warranted to have 
in-depth analysis. Reform Proposals will be made in the Chapter Six to 
address the above issues. It is hoped that the thesis will provide the 
suggestions in terms of promoting and developing the appreciation of the good 
corporate governance and the protection of the minority shareholders. 
 
5.4  Concluding Remarks 
This chapter summaries the two case studies from Hong Kong and China. This 
chapter is only one part and the other part of my research being a reflective 
commentary will analyse the significance of the legal issues explored and 
critically assess their implications, and a wider context of the profession work 
undertaken by me will also be included in the other chapters. This chapter 
identifies the legal issues of minority shareholders protection and the problems 
of corporate governance. 
 
In Chapter Six, I will discuss and evaluate the recommendations for legislative 
and structural reforms to resolve the legal issues of minority shareholders 
protection and the problems of corporate governance in Hong Kong and China. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
REFORM PROPOSALS FOR MINORITY SHAREHODLERS PROTECTION 
 IN HONG KONG AND CHINA 
6.0 Introduction  
In Chapter Three, I examined the paths of corporate law and governance and 
economic, social and legal institutions in Hong Kong and China and identified 
the legislative and structural issues of minority protection (3.1). In Chapter Four, 
I discussed the legislative paths of minority protection under the company 
legislation in Hong Kong and China and identified their deficiencies (4.0). In 
Chapter Five, I explained the two cases of shareholders’ disputes from Hong 
Kong and China and identified the legal issues of minority protection and the 
problems of corporate governance (5.3). It revealed that both Hong Kong and 
Chinese company legislation are foreign transplants; some of the Chinese 
corporate governance provisions are even stricter than those in Hong 
Kong,1171 and the problems of minority protection reform in China is the law 
only on the book and not necessarily in action.1172 I argued that the legal origin 
theory fails to identify the problem in China; legislative (legal origin) reform 
alone is insufficient to improve the minority protection and thus the reform of 
the structures shaped by the initial path is necessary in China according to the 
path dependence theory. In this chapter, I seek to offer suggestions to address 
the issues as identified by the above chapters from a corporate governance 
perspective. 
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 Tenev Stoyan and Zhang Chunlin, Corporate Governance and Enterprise Reform in China: 
Building the Institutions of Modern Markets (World Bank and International Financial 
Corporation 2002) 102. 
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This chapter is divided into three parts. The first part discusses and suggests 
the recommendations for legislative reform in Hong Kong and China. The 
second part analyses and proposes recommendations for the structural reform 
in China. Finally, some concluding remarks are provided. 
 
6.1 Recommendations for Legislative Reform in Hong Kong and China 
In Chapter Four presented an assessment of the efficacy of the protection of 
minority shareholders under the cases and the company legislation in Hong 
Kong, and proved that the minority protection in Hong Kong is substantively 
and procedurally efficient. The discussion of the cases decided by the Hong 
Kong courts showed that the judiciary enjoys a high degree of independence 
and adopts a liberal approach in a number of cases. Hong Kong judiciary 
made some innovative decisions by approving a multiple derivative action at 
common law,1173 allowing the unfair prejudice remedies usually available to 
the quasi-partnership companies and the minority shareholders also available 
to a public listed company and the majority shareholders,1174 and accepting 
the petitioner who did come with clean hands in an unfair prejudice petition in 
Hong Kong.1175 The innovative and efficient structures have been locked-in 
from the colonial period. It follows that no radical change is necessary and only 
improvement of the existing company legislation is sufficient. In contrast, the 
protection of minority shareholders under the Chinese company law seems to 
be under-developed, while Hong Kong has better protection for them.  
 
The main problem in China is not only its company law itself but also its other 
                                                     
1173
 Waddington Limited v Chan Chun Hoo Thomas and others [2009] 4 HKC 381. 
1174
 Luck Continent Ltd v Chen Chee Theodora [2012] HKEC 567 (CA). 
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structural and institutional issues such as its rule by law and state ownership 
that were set in place at the earlier times. Although technically direct 
transplantation is not difficult, some local features must be considered. I 
suggest that any change must take into consideration the path of China. The 
path dependence theory is used to identify the problems in China that lie in its 
economic, cultural, and political structures. The reform of the company 
legislation alone is insufficient to improve the protection of minority 
shareholders in China. Chen argues that the company law reform in China is a 
law-on-the-book not a law-in-action.1176 According to the path dependence, I 
suggest that the reform in China involves both rule and structural changes. 
 
6.1.1 Hong Kong 
The recent amendment of the Hong Kong Companies Ordinance1177 has 
addressed most of the issues discussed in Chapter Four, this is a commitment 
of the Hong Kong government to follow the international development of 
company law. Nonetheless, the Hong Kong case study reveals that Hong Kong 
company law is not perfect. On the one hand, it is argued that problems arising 
from co-extensive of common law and statutory derivative actions and the 
costs issue are unresolved, and the scope and applicant of the statutory 
derivative action are too limited. On the other hand, it is criticised that the 
reliefs and remedies for derivative action and unfair prejudicial petition are too 
narrow. As discussed in Chapter Two, the contractarian approach should be 
                                                     
1176
 Chen Jianfu, ‘The Transformation of Chinese Law: From Formal to Substantial’ (2007) 37 
Part 2 HKLJ 738. 
1177
 The New Hong Kong Companies Ordinance (Chapter 622 of the Laws of Hong Kong) is 
fully implemented on 3rd March 2014. The provisions about insolvency and winding up in the 
Hong Kong Companies Ordinance (Chapter 32 of the Laws of Hong Kong) are retained but 
retitled as the ‘Companies (Winding Up and Miscellaneous Provisions) Ordinance (Cap. 32).’ 
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adopted in Hong Kong and only necessary legislative reform should be made. 
Following the recent amendment, the position in Hong Kong’s reform is 
relatively straightforward. For the purposes of legislative reform, I use the UK 
and the Australian models to compare to the Hong Kong model as Hong Kong 
was a British colony, company law was transplanted from the UK, and many 
statutory provisions are based on English provisions. Australia was also a 
British colony sharing a similar historical path of Hong Kong.  
 
6.1.1.1. Statutory Derivative Action 
Concerning scope of applicant and application for the statutory derivative 
action in Hong Kong, only existing members are allowed, and misconduct is 
the major ground for statutory derivative action. It is criticised that the scope of 
applicant and application are too limited.1178  
 
The Australian statutory regime is more liberal. Hong Kong can follow the 
Australian model to expand pool of applicants to include members, former 
members, or people entitled to be registered as a member of the company or 
of a related body corporate, or an officer or former officer of the company.1179 
Likewise, the scope of application can be expanded, where the applicant does 
not need to prove any ground and only needs to show inaction by the 
company.1180 I suggest that Australian provisions should be transplanted into 
the Hong Kong provisions by including the former and the present members 
and directors of the company or of a related body corporate. 
                                                     
1178
 Cheung Rita, ‘The New Statutory Derivative Action in Hong Kong: A Critical Examination: 
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In terms of costs, as no legal aid is available in shareholder disputes, Hong 
Kong can follow the New Zealand statute1181 by enacting a provision for 
statutory presumption of funding from the company in a shareholders’ 
derivative action. It is up to the company to prove to the contrary that it would 
be unjust and inequitable for the company to bear the costs, which can 
encourage minority shareholders to pursue a genuine claim. I suggest that 
consideration could be made for the future legislative reform with reference to 
the New Zealand provision. 
 
The recent amendment abolished the absolute bar by ratification.1182 However, 
it fails to deal with the co-existence of statutory and common law regimes and 
is therefore confusing. I suggest Hong Kong should follow the Australian 
model1183 by abolishing the common law derivative action to avoid duplicity of 
proceedings. 
 
The relief of statutory derivative action is to company and not to shareholder 
personally. The issue of corporate wrong or unfair prejudicial conduct has 
troubled the courts in a number of cases. I suggest Hong Kong should follow 
the Australian model which allows a shareholder in his capacity as a 
shareholder or in any other capacity to apply,1184 and covers the conduct of 
the company’s affairs or an actual or proposed act or omission by or on behalf 
of the company.1185 The court is given extensive power to order wide ranging 
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remedies for the shareholders, which includes an order that a company be 
wound up.1186 This issue of corporate wrong or unfair prejudicial conduct is 
discussed in the following part.  
 
6.1.1.2 Remedies for Unfair Prejudice 
In short, the reformulation of the provision enables past members, personal 
representatives of deceased member, trustees, or people beneficially entitled 
by will to have locus standi, and this is a great advancement.1187 In respect of 
remedies, Hong Kong can follow the Australian model1188 by including the 
power to order winding up of a company. If the Australian model is adopted, 
the shareholder could simply issue one action and save the time and costs to 
issue two actions in the same subject matter in the Hong Kong case study 
discussed in Chapter Five. The statutory scheme for pro-rata valuation based 
on the US appraisal remedy should be transplanted into Hong Kong.1189  
 
The Australian model is more innovative: it allows the unfair prejudice petition 
to cover the personal or corporate remedies including winding up.1190 The 
Hong Kong model is similar to the English model, which does not have the 
winding up remedies. The English Law Commission suggested that the 
allegations of corporate wrongs and the winding up remedies should be 
included in the unfair prejudice provision, and leave is required to prevent a 
predatory petitioner seeking a winding up remedy for exerting improper 
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pressure on the company.1191 However, the Company Law Review Steering 
Group rejected this proposal on the ground that it might give rise to vexatious 
petitions and cause damage to the company’s business and reputation.1192 
Cheung argues that the rejection is unconvincing as any unmeritorious 
applications are likely to be struck by court at the mini-trial for leave; and the 
problem of vexatious petition appears to be overstated.1193 I suggest that 
Hong Kong should follow the English Law Commission’s recommendation 
notwithstanding its rejection,1194 and introduce the rebuttable presumptions in 
the case of expulsion in owner-managed private companies in the absence of 
clear guidance as to what is interest and right, and allow minority shareholders 
to redress corporate wrong. This would assist the minority shareholders in 
owner-managed private companies to avoid multifarious claims, to save the 
expensive litigation costs, and to settle the disputes out of court.  
 
In terms of reliefs, the pro-rata valuation without a discount for minority 
shareholders should be used in an unfair prejudice petition to discourage the 
oppression of minority shareholders.1195 The pro-rata valuation basis is a 
value based on an equivalent proportion of the total issued share capital 
without a discount for its being a minority shareholding. If valuation cannot be 
agreed, an expert can be used to assist the shares valuation. Hannigan1196 
suggests that this basis should be used in an unfair prejudice petition to 
                                                     
1191
 The Law Commission, Shareholder Remedies (Law Com No 246, 1997) paras 4.24-4.49. 
1192
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discourage the oppression of the majority shareholders in accordance with the 
reasoning in CVC/Opportunity Equity Partners Limited v Demarco Almeida.1197 
 
Cheung contends that the purpose of unfair prejudice remedy is to protect 
minority shareholders; the use of discount method is a kind of unfair 
enrichment to the majority shareholders who may reap a windfall from the 
appraisal process and constitutes another form of oppression of minority 
shareholders.1198 Cheung suggests that the US appraisal remedy should be 
transplanted into Hong Kong.1199  However, the SCCLR has followed the 
English Law Commission and does not include the exit and appraisal rights in 
the recent amendment.1200 I suggest that an express provision of exit and 
appraisal rights should be provided by the future legislative reform. 
 
6.1.1.3 Direct Action 
The issues of personal rights versus company’s rights have troubled the court 
for some time.1201 It has been pointed out that personal action may overlap 
with the first three exceptions to the rule in Foss v Harbottle that are related to 
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 CVC/Opportunity Equity Partners Limited v Demarco Almeida (2002) 2 BCLC 108 at 
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personal rights.1202 The dilemma should be resolved by a clear guidance with 
a unified approach.1203 If no reform of direct action is made, the question of 
whether it is a personal or corporate action is far from clear and shall continue 
to trouble the court. The recent amendment has failed to address the issue of 
direct action.  
 
I suggest that Hong Kong should follow Australia and abolish the common law 
person and direct actions, and codify these rights for avoidance of duplicity of 
action. The express provision with the addition of the non-exhaustive list of 
personal rights is advisable.  
 
6.1.1.4 Winding Up Action 
Hong Kong should be competitive with, and not lag behind, other common law 
jurisdictions that have corporate insolvency legislation such as the Insolvency 
Act 1986 in England. Compared with the other common law jurisdictions, the 
Hong Kong winding up provisions are out of step. I opine that the HKLRC 
should modernise the Hong Kong corporate insolvency law and the Australian 
model is a good reference for the Hong Kong reform. The belated Hong Kong 
corporate insolvency law will be available in 2016.                  
 
It is not uncommon for shareholders to issue a joint petition for unfair 
prejudicial conduct and just and equitable winding up as discussed in the Hong 
Kong case study in Chapter Five. In regard to future reform, I suggest that 
Hong Kong should follow the Australian model by allowing winding up as one 
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of the remedies to minority shareholders in the unfair prejudice claims to save 
the multiplicity and duplicity of claims of unfair prejudice conduct and just and 
equitable winding up by minority shareholders which are commonly found in 
Hong Kong.1204 I contend that the minority rights could be better served by the 
unfair prejudice claims if winding up becomes one of its remedies. 
 
6.1.2 China 
In this part, I attempt to determine which Hong Kong aspects could be used for 
Chinese company law reforms. For the purposes of the Chinese reform, the 
Hong Kong model is used to compare with the Chinese model as they share a 
very close geo-political proximity, traditional culture, and historical path. 
 
Hong Kong belongs to the common law family; company law consists of both 
legislation and case law. The advanced nature of the case law system is that it 
can evolve over time in response to a change of social, economic, and political 
environments, and has greater flexibility than the legislation. In contrast with 
Hong Kong, China belongs to the civil law family; company law is contained in 
the normative written instrument. Chinese company legislation contains too 
many declaratory provisions that are very abstract, vague, and general. 
Detailed company rules and regulations are required to be enacted in a 
practical and meticulous manner. 1205  As discussed in Chapter Two, the 
communitarian approach should be used in China, as the need to have 
mandatory protection to minority shareholders is greater. As far as the 
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legislative reform is concerned, I suggest that the reform of existing provisions 
for setting aside resolution, derivative action, direct action and winding up 
action,1206 the enactment of practical and procedural rules, the introduction of 
equitable rule and the reform of provisions of legal remedies and legal costs 
should be considered.  
 
6.1.2.1.  Derivative Action 
The PRC Company Law sets out a number of qualifications for taking out a 
derivative action. I suggest that China should follow the Hong Kong model, in 
which there is almost no qualification necessary for a member to initiate a 
derivative action; the only requirement is being a member of the company.  
 
The Hong Kong provision is more liberal; there is no restriction for a minimum 
percentage of shareholding or a minimum shareholding period and the judge 
has wide discretion to accept application in Hong Kong, while the scope for the 
applicant is relatively limited under the provision of the PRC Company Law. I 
suggest that the one percentage shareholding and 180 day locus standi 
requirements for shareholders of the JSC should either be deleted or 
reduced;1207 reference can be made to the Hong Kong model. 
 
As there is no leave requirement adopted in China in bringing a derivative 
action, I suggest that the US model of litigation committee be considered.1208 
The Chinese corporate governance model adopts the two-tier board, so for 
                                                     
1206
 PRC Company Law 2005, Articles 22, 152, 153 and 183. 
1207
 ibid Article 152 (1). 
1208
 Please see my previous discussion of the US litigation committee in Chapter 4 section 
4.1.1.2.4. 
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non-listed companies, the litigation committee can be established within the 
board of supervisors which is independent of the board of directors. This 
committee can decide whether or not it is in the interests of the company to 
pursue the derivative action. In regard to listed companies, independent 
directors are required and they can decide whether to pursue the derivative 
action or not. I suggest that additional functions and powers should be given to 
these independent directors1209 or the board of supervisors1210 under the PRC 
Company Law. 
 
The PRC Company Law only allows a member of a company to take derivative 
action. I opine that the scope of applicant is too limited and shall be expanded 
to members of an associated company. The Hong Kong model is again a good 
reference for the Chinese reform.1211 This issue of holding and subsidiary 
company is discussed in the following part.   
 
6.1.2.2.  Derivative and Direct Actions 
The definition of the company1212 under the PRC Company Law does not 
include holding, subsidiary and overseas companies. I suggest expanding the 
definition of the company to cover holding and subsidiary companies. In this 
regard, reference can be made to the Hong Kong Companies Ordinance.1213 
This could resolve the issues in the Chinese case study in Chapter Five where 
holding and subsidiary companies were used. I do not suggest covering 
                                                     
1209
 PRC Company Law 2005, Article 123.  
1210
 ibid Article 54. 
1211
 Hong Kong Companies Ordinance, section 732(1). 
1212
 ibid Article 2. 
1213
 Hong Kong Companies Ordinance, section 732. A company includes a member of the 
company or of associated company of a company. 
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companies incorporated overseas as China is not ready to cope with the 
extra-territorial aspects due to its legislative and structural issues as discussed 
in Chapters Three and Four. 
 
In both direct and derivative actions, there is no express provision in the PRC 
Company Law to provide legal remedies and award costs to minority 
shareholders. I suggest that consideration should be made in the future 
legislative amendment to allow legal remedies and costs to minority 
shareholders and reference can be made to the Hong Kong model, which 
gives the court an extensive power to make any order it thinks fit1214 and 
according to which a minority shareholder may be indemnified for costs by the 
company.1215  
 
Regarding time limitation, it is not prescribed by the existing provisions and we 
can only rely on the general principles in the GPCL. The limitation is two years 
from the date when the shareholder knows or should know that the rights have 
been infringed upon.1216 The two-year time limit to initiate a shareholders’ 
litigation is unreasonably short and the Hong Kong model is again a good 
reference for a Chinese reform.1217 Huang considers that it is unfair to the 
minority shareholders as often they do not immediately become aware of the 
harm done to the company and the management may allow the prescribed 
                                                     
1214
 Hong Kong Companies Ordinance, section 738 Cap. 622. 
1215
 Wallersteiner v Moir (No. 2) [ 1975] 1 QB 373, [1975] 1 All ER 909. 
1216
 General Principles of Civil Law 1986, Articles 135 and 137. 
1217
 The time limitation for shareholders’ action is 6 years in Hong Kong under section 4 of the 
Hong Kong Limitation Ordinance, Cap. 347. Under section 732 of the Hong Kong Companies 
Ordinance, Cap. 622 and included ‘a member of a related company of a specified corporation’ 
which enables multiple derivative actions and under the case Waddington Ltd v Playmates Ltd 
[2009] 4 HKC 381, the Hong Kong Court of Appeal allowed a shareholder of a holding 
company to bring an action on behalf of its wholly owned subsidiary.  
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time to lapse without taking any action. 1218  The time limit for minority 
shareholders to take action is considered to be too insufficient and practical for 
preparing a complicated shareholders’ litigation. In contrast, Hong Kong has a 
six-year time limit to take legal action.1219 
 
6.1.2.3  Remedies for Setting Aside Resolution 
The existing grounds to set aside the resolution of the management and the 
controlling shareholders are too limited and restricted. A detailed list of 
conditions can be added to the existing provisions for the setting aside 
resolution based on common law equitable principles.1220 These conditions 
would enable the minority shareholders to set aside a resolution or to apply for 
winding up.  
 
Ma suggests that some statutory guidance in the form of list of factors should 
be included: for example, exclusion from management, denial of dividends if 
the company is profitable or alteration of articles of association if they are 
beyond the mutual understanding of the shareholders.1221 Amendment should 
also be made to the existing provision of Article 22, which is limited to 
resolutions which have already been passed or taken, and which limits the 
remedy available to cancellation. Reference should be made to the Hong Kong 
model of unfair prejudicial conduct, which may include past, present or future 
conduct. In terms of remedies, the Hong Kong model is wide ranging including 
valuation right for buyout.  
                                                     
1218
 Huang Xiao, ‘Derivative Action in China’ (2010) 6 Cambridge Student Law Review 246. 
1219
 Hong Kong Limitation Ordinance, section 4 Cap. 347. 
1220
 PRC Company Law 2005, Article 22. 
1221
 Ma Fang, ‘A Challenge for China: Is It Possible to Introduce Unfair Prejudice Remedies? 
Part 2’ [2010] 21(1) ICCLR 5. 
  
 
347 
 
 
The English Law Commission has expressed concern that broad wording of 
unfair prejudice remedies may lead to lengthy and costly proceedings, which 
may in turn have a damaging effect on a company’s business.1222 To avoid this, 
consideration of the valuation right option and use of arbitration clauses should 
be inserted in the future amendments of PRC Company Law. Under the 
existing provisions, there are two Articles that deal with the buy-back option 
from objecting shareholders, but the circumstances under which it can be 
invoked are very limited.  
 
Under Article 75, there are only three situations governing the LLC: ‘where the 
company fails to distribute profits for continuous five years while the company 
has been profitable for continuous five years; where the company merges, 
divides or transfers its substantial assets; or the term of operation of the 
company expires or other events occur for dissolution as stipulated in the 
articles of association while the shareholders meeting adopts a resolution on 
revision of the articles of association to make the company continue to 
exist.’ 1223  For the JSC, Article 143 stipulates four situations: ‘where the 
company is to reduce its registered capital; where the company merges with 
other companies holding its shares; where the company offers its shares to its 
staff and workers as a reward; or where any shareholder of the company has 
                                                     
1222
 The Law Commission, Shareholder Remedies (Law Com No 246, 1997) para 11.1. The 
Law Commission made several recommendations to mitigate these problems, including the 
adoption of an exit article for smaller private companies paras 5.34 to 5.38 and 5.46 Appendix 
H and the inclusion of an arbitration provision in the model articles as recommended by the 
Law Commission, Shareholder Remedies: A Consultation Paper (Law Com Consultation 
Paper No.142, 1996) para 19.12. These proposals were not adopted in the English 
Companies Act 2006; nevertheless, but they could be of great benefit to the implementation of 
unfair prejudice remedies in China. See Ma Fang, ‘A Challenge for China: Is It Possible to 
Introduce Unfair Prejudice Remedies? Part 2’ [2010] 21(1) ICCLR 1. 
1223
 PRC Company Law, Article 75. 
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objection to the resolution on division or merger of the company adopted by 
the shareholders general meeting, so, requires the company to purchase his 
shares.’1224 These provisions do not cover the unfair prejudice conduct and 
thus amendment to the existing provision to cover the conduct is necessary.  
 
Before bringing disputes between shareholders over valuation to court, the 
matter can be referred to mediation or arbitration, which is less costly and is 
consistent with Confucianism. Cheung argues that the valuation right option, if 
properly structured and formulated, should play an important role in minority 
protection and in deterring managerial misconduct.1225 The valuation right 
option and use of arbitration clauses should be incorporated in future 
amendments to PRC Company Law. 
 
Oppression of minority shareholders in China is mainly from majority 
shareholders (see Chapters Four and Five). Given the dominant status of 
controlling shareholders in China, they can make use of their voting power to 
achieve their wishes at the expense of minority shareholders. Fiduciary duties 
are already imposed on controlling shareholders in respect of minority 
shareholders in the listed company,1226 and these fiduciary duties should be 
extended to cover private companies under PRC Company Law1227 in order to 
redress the problems of oppression of minority shareholders. The duties must 
be clearly spelled out in the law, and accompanied by legal remedies and an 
                                                     
1224
 ibid Article 143. 
1225
 Cheung Rita, ‘Statutory Appraisal Right: the American Experience and Hong Kong 
Prospects’ [2008] 19(10) ICCLR 331. The suggestion was made to Hong Kong but is also 
suitable to China. 
1226
 PRC Corporate Governance Code 2002, Article 19. 
1227
 PRC Company Law 2005, Article 20. 
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effective enforcement system, otherwise the interests of the minority 
shareholders will still be at the mercy of the controlling shareholders. 
 
6.1.2.4  Winding Up Action 
The existing provision for winding up has been criticised for being too abstract 
and vague. This thesis argues that the doctrine of equity can be transplanted 
into China. The Hong Kong model of remedy for unfair prejudice, and just and 
equitable winding up are each based on equitable rules. In civil law traditions 
where judges are very conservative and do not have significant discretion and 
power, a detailed list of conditions can be added to the existing provisions for 
winding up action based on common law equitable principles.1228 Based on 
the Hong Kong model, the conditions may include the main object of the 
company has failed, the company has been formed to carry out a fraud or on 
illegal business, and the members have lost mutual trust, understanding, and 
confidence.1229 The equitable remedies are discussed later in this part. 
 
6.1.2.5 Practical and Procedural Rules 
Although China has adopted rules of directors’ duties and shareholder 
protection, the judges do not enjoy the judicial independence and impartiality in 
the same ways as their counterparts do in common law jurisdictions. Anderson 
and Gao observe that the difficulties in enforcing corporate law are due to the 
lack of civil enforcement procedures and judicial expertise, and the prevalence 
of state intervention in the judicial process.1230 The courts tend not to accept 
                                                     
1228
 ibid Article 183. 
1229
 Stott Vanessa, Hong Kong Company Law (13th edn Pearson 2011) 402. 
1230
 Anderson Craig and Guo Bingna, ‘Corporate Governance under the New Company Law 
(Part 2): Shareholder Lawsuits and Enforcement’ (2006) (20) (3) China Law and Practice 17. 
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corporate law litigation. 1231  This is because there is neither a precise 
procedural rule on shareholder proceedings, nor a substantive rule for 
shareholder remedies. The PRC Company Law does not provide guidance for 
the courts in determining damages for business malfeasance, and the courts 
sometimes find it difficult to determine such damages. The courts are also 
reluctant to hear a case concerning derivative actions because of a lack of 
comprehensive procedures applicable to derivative litigation. Anderson 
observes that many company directors have been punished by either 
administrative sanction or criminal prosecution as a result of making false 
disclosures, misrepresentation, and market manoeuvring, and the disgruntled 
shareholders have been left without proper remedies for directors’ 
infringement of shareholders’ legal rights or interests.1232 
 
The effectiveness of Chinese corporate governance depends on good legal 
enforcement rules. Miles and He argue that corporate governance can be 
strengthened if there is a vigorous and enforceable legal procedures in China 
in which the shareholders, especially those of the minority, can bring legal 
actions in court when they suffer a grievance. The improvement of the PRC 
Company Law alone is not enough, and does not necessarily change the 
social and political dimensions of the Chinese litigation system.1233  
 
                                                     
1231
 Howson Nicholas, ‘Judicial Independence and the Company Law in the Shanghai Courts,’ 
in Peerenboom Randall (ed), Judicial Independence in China: Lessons for Global Rule of Law 
Promotion (Cambridge University Press 2009) 134. 
1232
 Anderson Helen, Director’s Personal Liability for Corporate Fault: A Comparative Analysis 
(Kluwer International 2008) 124. 
1233
 Miles Lillian and He Miao, ‘Protecting the Rights and Interests of Minority Shareholders in 
Listed Companies In China: Challenges for the Future’ (2005) 16(7) ICCLR 280. 
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In Hong Kong, minority shareholders can recourse to both common law and 
statute for a remedy, whereas the legal framework of protecting the interests of 
minority shareholders is not well-established in China. The PRC Company 
Law 1993 filed to provide a specific provision for minority shareholders to 
enforce their rights or seek a redress, they had to resort to the general 
provisions. Although the PRC Company Law 2005 has been amended to 
tackle these problems by empowering minority shareholders’ legal rights to 
initiate derivative or direct actions where appropriate, the procedures by which 
the actions can be commenced have not been clarified. In this regard, China 
may make reference to the Hong Kong common law practice. Hong Kong has 
the High Court Civil Procedure Practice, which is based on the English 
Supreme Court Practice. The High Court Civil Procedure Practice sets out the 
detailed procedures and practices.  
 
By comparison, there is a well-established enforcement system in Hong Kong. 
There is a clear statutory provision and huge number of cases for shareholders’ 
protection. I suggest that the enforcement rules should be clearly provided, 
otherwise the law is only on the books and the minority shareholders’ interests 
will still be at the mercy of the controlling shareholders. The mandatory legal 
framework is essential to protect the minority shareholders.  
 
6.1.2.6 Equitable Remedies 
In Hong Kong, remedies for minority shareholders are based on common law 
and equitable rules. Reference can be made from other common law 
jurisdictions; it has greater adaptability, flexibility, and superiority than civil law 
jurisdictions in terms of the protection of minority shareholders. Hong Kong 
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judges enjoy a high degree of discretion to decide the equitable rule. The 
common law system offers better and effective protection to minority 
shareholders in the changing variety and complexity of the commercial society. 
China should consider introducing and transplanting these remedies into the 
company legislation including unfair prejudicial conduct, just and equitable 
winding up, and multiple derivative action in strengthening its corporate 
governance and minority protection. 
 
Most of the common law remedies including unfair prejudice claims and just 
and equitable winding up for minority shareholders in Hong Kong rely on 
equitable principles. The doctrine of equity does not exist in Chinese law but 
the equivalent legal principles are not entirely new to Chinese law. 1234 I 
contend that the equivalent legal principles exist in the Chinese legislation. For 
example, the principles of loyalty and diligence,1235 the protection of the rights 
and interests of shareholders,1236 and fiduciary duty on controlling shareholder 
to other shareholders.1237 These provisions are in essence the equitable 
principles of good faith and fairness in a Chinese legal context. Ma suggests 
that the equitable principles established in O’Neill could be adopted, and unfair 
prejudice remedies could be introduced to China.1238 
 
Unlike the Hong Kong common law jurisdiction, Chinese judges follow the civil 
law traditions and are reluctant to apply vague principles such as doctrines of 
                                                     
1234
 Ma Fang, ‘A Challenge for China: Is It Possible to Introduce Unfair Prejudice Remedies? 
Part 2’ (2010) 21(1) ICCLR 4. 
1235
 PRC Company Law, Articles 148 and 149. 
1236
 ibid Article 1. 
1237
 of the PRC Corporate Governance Code 2002, Article 19. 
1238
 Ma Fang, ‘A Challenge for China: Is It Possible to Introduce Unfair Prejudice Remedies? 
Part 2’ (2010) 21(1) ICCLR 5. 
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equity and mutual trust and confidence. In fact, Chinese judges refuse to 
exercise discretion and rely heavily on explicit and abstract doctrines of 
honesty, credibility, good faith, and fairness that are expressly contained in the 
legislation.1239 This conservative approach of the Chinese judges can be seen 
in the shareholders’ litigation as discussed in Chapter Four. 
 
Based on the successful experience of Hong Kong, equitable rules can be 
introduced into China. As the Chinese judges only have limited discretion in 
deciding what is amount to equitable, the detailed list of equitable events 
should be provided under the legislation as discussed in the suggestion for 
remedies for setting aside resolution.1240 Huang argues that China should 
transplant the equitable doctrine into the PRC Company Law in the era of 
globalisation, and in view of the modern tendency for companies to have 
uncountable subsidiaries and associated undertakings.1241 I suggest that the 
unfair prejudice remedies and the just and equitable winding up should be 
introduced to China. 
 
6.1.2.7 High Litigation Costs 
The issue of litigation costs is of particular importance to the shareholders in 
pursing derivative action. Compared with the Hong Kong common law 
jurisdiction, where the court has the wide discretion to award costs to the 
discontented shareholders, the Chinese court does not award shareholders’ 
                                                     
1239
 The doctrine of honesty and credibility under the Article 4 of the General Principle of Civil 
Law 1986 and the principles of good faith and fairness under the Article 6 of the Contract Law 
1999. 
1240
 Please see Chapter 6 section 6.1.2.3. 
1241
 Huang Xiao, ‘Shareholder Revolt? The Statutory Derivative Action in China’ (2009) 5(49) 
Comparative Research in Law & Political Economy Research Paper 18 
<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1516448> accessed 15 March 2012. 
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legal costs. Generally, any recovery from such actions would go to the 
company (which is the plaintiff in a derivative action) rather than to the minority 
shareholders (who sue on behalf of the company). There is a little incentive for 
shareholders to take action against directors or management. In addition, large 
court filing fees could sometimes discourage shareholders from taking up such 
expensive shareholders’ action without compensation. 
 
In reality, court filing fees create a substantial financial obstruction for Chinese 
shareholders, particularly minority shareholders, who are seeking to bring 
derivative actions. Generally, the plaintiff must pay the upfront filing fee to the 
court in full before the commencement of any legal action.1242 Shareholders 
can only obtain indirect benefits from companies if they win the lawsuits; they 
will recover none of their legal costs if they do not succeed. Cheng argues that 
an imbalance between cost and benefit will obviously discourage, or even 
effectively prohibit, minority shareholders from initiating derivative actions in 
China to protect their rights and interests.1243 The State Council promulgated 
a new rule that has greatly reduced court filing fee.1244 By contrast, the filing 
fee in Hong Kong is minimal. The SPC is reviewing the issue of costs and 
issued a consultation paper proposing to award costs against the losing party 
                                                     
1242
 Although courts in China are allowed to reduce or waive filing fees, they depend heavily 
on the fees and many lawyers fear requests for waivers might result in bias against their clients. 
See Liebman Benjamin, ‘Class Action Litigation in China’ (1998)111 Harv L Rev 1534. 
1243
 Cheng Weiqi, ’Protection of Minority Shareholders After the New Company Law - Twenty 
Six Case Studies,’ (2010) 52(4)The International Journal of Law and Management 291. 
1244
 ‘Method of Paying Litigation Fees’ which became effective on April 1st 2007. The ‘Method’ 
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RMB 50. If a disputable amount is between RMB 10,000 to RMB 100,000, the litigation fee is 
2.5 percent. Comparing with the previous requirement of paying 4 percent litigation fee, 2.5 
percent is a great progress. See Cheng, Weiqi ‘Protection of Minority Shareholders After the 
New Company Law - Twenty Six Case Studies,’ (2010) 52(4)The International Journal of Law 
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in shareholder litigation.1245 
 
Reform of litigation costs structure in China is required. Reference can be 
made to Hong Kong, where only nominal filing fees shall be paid to the court. 
The reform of the costs structure will definitely enhance the protection of 
minority shareholders. I suggest that clear provisions as to cost shall be 
enacted in the PRC Company Law and Civil Procedural Law. 
 
This thesis reveals that the basic remedies to minority shareholders under the 
corporate legislation of Hong Kong and China have achieved a high degree of 
uniformity and the outstanding issue is on the divergence of structural and 
institutional differences in corporate governance. 1246  I opine that some 
structural reforms and institutional transplantation in China are necessary.  
 
6.2  Recommendations for Structural Reform in Hong Kong and China  
Hong Kong adopts the Western free economy and rule of law, the English 
common law legal system, and the Anglo-American corporate governance 
model. I consider that the structures in Hong Kong are better than those in 
China based on the discussions from Chapter Three. In the former part, I 
suggest that the reform in Hong Kong is relatively simple, it does not involve 
any structural change, and the legislative change shall ensure the Hong Kong 
company legislation is comparable to other leading overseas jurisdictions.  
 
                                                     
1245
 ‘Concerning Certain Issues of the Application of the PRC Company Law (No.4) 2009’ , 
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The situation in China is more complicated. China has adopted most of the 
Western mechanisms of corporate governance under the PRC Company Law; 
in theory, it should function the same, if not more effectively as in its original 
jurisdiction as discussed in Chapter Four. I find that the mere direct 
transplantation of the foreign corporate law is not enough to achieve good 
corporate governance. The weak protection of minority shareholders is not 
only due to the deficiencies of the company legislation itself, but also the 
structural issues that include but are not limited to the rule by law system. 
Compared with the Hong Kong system, the Chinese government still has a 
strong control over the economy and the companies. Roe argues that the legal 
evolution may not always be towards laws that are more efficient, and why 
there are differences in laws between countries rather than convergence to the 
most efficient laws, and the issue of corporate governance must be solved in 
accordance with their path dependence. 1247  Thus, due to the path 
dependence, any reform must take into account the historical paths as 
transplanted law from foreign countries may not suit the prevailing structures in 
China. Reform in China shall involve both legislative and structural changes 
that aim to build a rule of law system.1248 This part discusses the feasibility of 
structural reforms and institutional transplantation in China, I suggest that the 
Hong Kong structures are used to compare with the Chinese structures with a 
view to transform China into a rule of law status according to the institutional 
transplantation theory.1249  
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 Roe Mark, ‘A Political Theory of American Corporate Finance’ (1991) 91 Colum L Rev 10; 
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Based on the comparative analysis of Hong Kong and China in Chapter Three, 
the next logical step is to suggest the improvement of the structures in China. 
According to the path dependence theory, I suggest that an evolutionary 
approach for the structural changes shall be adopted in accordance with the 
Chinese context, as China has been isolated from the world for a long time. My 
findings and recommendations are based on the Hong Kong experience, and 
applicable to resolve the issues as discussed in the two cases in Chapter Five 
and the problems identified in Chapters Three and Four. The proposal is based 
on the structures and institutions of the Chinese system: the economic aspect, 
social and cultural aspects, and political and legal aspects. The proposal is 
divided into three parts, each of which discusses one of these aspects. 
 
6.2.1  Economic Aspect  
In China, there is considered to be too much state intervention. The conclusion 
of the comparative analysis in Chapter Three is that Hong Kong makes good 
use of market mechanisms with virtually no government intervention. The state 
should reduce the role in SOEs and excessive use of administrative measures 
in the market. The CCP’s politics plays too large a role in the Chinese economy. 
Further economic reform is necessary in China. 
 
6.2.1.1 Reform of Public Ownership 
Public ownership exists around the world; it is commonly recognised that a 
government should maintain some control over the society, especially in 
certain important sectors such as natural resource, public security and utility 
and infrastructure sectors. The problem of public ownership relates closely to 
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the vested interests of various stakeholders that need to be resolved 
economically and politically by reducing the control of the state. I contend that 
the path dependence theory is able to explain the persistence of change in 
China. It comes from the CCP as the main stakeholder under the existing 
structures, which enjoys vested interests (internal rent seeking) and may 
impede any change to other more efficient structures. 
 
Hong Kong and China share the similar concentrated ownership structures. 
The protection of minority shareholders is not weak in Hong Kong as it has a 
highly developed company law and other established structures including its 
free economy, rule of law culture, limited and accountable government, reliable 
legal system, and independent judiciary. The ownership structures are very 
different from that of China. The Hong Kong government does not directly 
participate in the corporate affairs as a shareholder. In Hong Kong, the 
ownership structures are that shares are closely-held by family, often referred 
as the quasi-partnership companies.1250 
 
In China, shares are held by the state in most PRC listed companies, and 
shareholders separately or jointly holding more than 1% normally mean they 
are the second to tenth largest shareholder of a company.1251 In more than 
60% of listed companies, the managers are not accountable to the company 
and the shareholders, but to the CCP, and usually ignore the interests of 
minority shareholders and good corporate governance. 1252  It is easy for 
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majority shareholders to exploit minority shareholders. There is evidence that 
the judiciary does not take cases if the defendant has a politically powerful 
background.1253 Minority shareholders are always the victims of oppression by 
the management and by the majority shareholders. Comparatively speaking, 
Hong Kong has a good market mechanism, which provides better protection 
for the minority shareholders than that in China. 
 
For listed companies, privatisation can improve the efficiency of resource 
allocation and firm performance, but there are failed cases in Russia and the 
Czech Republic.1254 Selacuse argues that successful privatisation depends on 
the effective corporate governance system, and there are plenty of cases 
where asset stripping and self-dealing has become a common practice due to 
the weak corporate governance system in the case of Russia and the Czech 
Republic.1255 The view of legal origin theory that the weak protection for the 
minority shareholders is provided in companies that have the highest 
ownership concentration is justified in China. 1256  The transfer of the 
state-owned shares to the private and foreign sectors is an important task of 
reform. The process is extremely time-consuming and costly. The privatisation 
includes the state reducing its role in the management of many stated-owned 
listed companies by transferring its shares to the public sector. Huang 
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observes that several attempts have been made to implement a nation-wide 
reform program for all listed companies in an effort to reduce the state-owned 
shares, this reform has yet to be completed, and it remains to be seen how it 
would affect the Chinese stock market.1257  
 
Besides privatisation, there are several ways to reduce the role of the CCP in 
the SOEs. Tenev and Zhang suggest that the state can transform shares of the 
SOEs into non-voting shares or restrained-voting shares. 1258  This will 
enhance the voting mechanism to protect the minority shareholders. In this 
regard, I suggest that China can learn from Singapore’s experience. The 
Singapore government set up a holding company ‘Temasek’ in 1974 for all 
SOEs, including Singapore Airlines and SingTel. The Singapore government 
does not participate in the management and hires professional teams to run 
the enterprises. Temasek is primarily focused on increasing the value of the 
investment of its shareholder, the Ministry of Finance.1259 The separation of 
management and ownership is considered a step forward; the professional 
management teams of the SOEs are more responsive to financial and 
economic returns rather than the CCP’s ideology and bureaucratic 
interference.1260 Wen argues that the separation of government functions from 
                                                     
1257
 Huang Hui, ‘Statutory Derivative Action in China: Empirical Findings and Comparative 
Analysis’ (2012) 27 Banking and Finance Law Review 625. The CSRC promulgated the 
Measures for Reforming the Ownership Structures of Listed Companies on 4 September 2005. 
1258
 Tenev Stoyan and Zhang Chunlin, Corporate Governance and Enterprise Reform in China: 
Building the Institutions of Modern Markets (World Bank and International Financial 
Corporation 2002) 144. 
1259
 Temasek Holdings company is an investment company owned by the Singapore 
government and incorporated in 1974, Temasek has its own broad of directors which is 
separated from the government. Temasek owns a net investment portfolio of S$215 billion 
(US$173 billion) as at 31 March 2013, mainly in Singapore. < http://www.temasek.com.sg/> 
accessed 18 January 2014. 
1260
 Dam Kenneth, ‘China as Test Case: Is the Rule of Law Essential for Economic Growth?’ 
(John M Olin Program in Law and Economic Working Paper No. 275 2006) 29. 
  
 
361 
 
management could also prevent the sources of official corruption and bribery 
in China.1261 
 
The reform of the ownership structure should, at least in theory, make internal 
monitoring and market for corporate control more effective. 1262  Public 
ownership should be reduced to a non-dominant position in non-important 
sectors, and should be replaced by private ownership. The market can play a 
more active role. The mixed (diversified) ownership from the private and public 
sectors will definitely enhance the operation of the market. I suggest that the 
CCP should reduce its role in the market by separating its ownership from the 
management, and privatisation of the SOEs is another viable option. I contend 
that the CCP should learn how to accept the rule of market economy that all 
players including minority shareholders are equal in the market, and more 
importantly, the rule of law that all entities including the CCP are equal at law. 
 
6.2.1.2 Transformation from Socialist Economy to Market Economy 
China is a communist country and has a socialist market economy. This is a 
mixture of planned economy and market economy and can be described as a 
hybrid of two models or a market economy with Chinese characteristics. This 
model is unique and is reflected in the legislative goals of the PRC Company 
Law to maintain socio-economic order and to promote the socialist market 
economy.1263 The state maintains a certain degree of control over the economy, 
and public ownership is still the foundation in China. I contend that the two 
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foundations of the CCP, namely, the socialist market economy and the public 
ownership, are major barriers to minority shareholder protection; and the 
intervention of the state is too much. It is necessary to reduce the role of the 
state and allow the market to function on its own. 
 
China remains a developing country and its market reforms are incomplete. It 
is unlikely that the CCP will relinquish its control over the economy, but rather 
emphasis on authoritarian political philosophy is expected. Any concession to 
minority shareholders will diminish the power of the state. It is contended that 
the state as the majority shareholder can maintain control over a corporation 
from a non-regulatory position, and retain a visible hand in the economy.1264  
 
The Chinese socialist market economy is the world’s second largest economy 
by Gross Domestic Product, and is increasingly playing an important and 
influential role in the global economy. This economic ascendancy has brought 
many challenges to China and some policy adjustments are required.1265 
Chinese economic reform has been characterised by decentralisation of 
economic power from the centre to the provinces and to localities. The local 
authorities have more autonomy to determine the economic issue over the 
region. The decentralisation is a good sign of moving towards a market 
economy. I contend that the CCP shall maintain a coordinating role and reduce 
its control over the economy. 
 
                                                     
1264
 Osgathorpe John, ‘A Critical Survey of The People’s Republic of China’s New Company 
Law’ (1996) 6 Indiana International and Comparative Law Review, 493. 
1265
 The World Bank research shows that China is the world’s second largest economy by 
GDP in 2012. <http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/china/overview> accessed 15 January 
2014. 
  
 
363 
 
The success of the free economy in Hong Kong relies on the freedom of 
market, the protection of individual legal rights, and the rule of law. This makes 
Hong Kong one of the major financial centres in the world.1266 In my view, the 
elements of laissez-faire policy, free economy, and rule of law are of utmost 
importance in the success of Hong Kong. China can make use of the Hong 
Kong’s experience to transform its socialist market economy to a full market 
economy. Lubman contends that China needs a more developed system to 
match its market economy reforms, because such an economy should be 
governed by law, in which law provides rules like those in an athletics 
contest.1267 In recent years, the state has changed its role from absolute 
control to indirect control in China. The CSRC has implemented the reform 
policy of ownership structures of listed SOEs since 2005, and most SOEs have 
been privatised or are in the process of privatisation.1268 It is hoped that the 
reform of SOEs can assist China to transform into a full market economy that 
must be supported by a rule of law system.1269 Peerenboom opines that the 
CCP will use an incremental approach in a series of local experiments and 
China’s long march to transform its economy to a full market economy.1270 It is 
believed that the free competition amongst private businesses without 
government intervention in a free market economy is the best determinant. I 
suggest that the state should allow management to have more autonomy in 
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making corporate decisions, and the allocation of production is made through 
markets and not in a plan of production.  
 
Hong Kong and China are both members of the WTO.1271 This thesis takes 
the view that with accession to the WTO, China is obliged to open its economy 
to the other members and reduce its role and control to comply with the WTO 
protocols. In order to resolve the conflicting role of the state as a major 
shareholder and as a regulator, the state must relinquish its power and allow 
the function of the economy on its own and supported by the rule of law system. 
Hong Kong took over 150 years to fully accept the Western economic 
mechanisms; I contend that China has long history of isolation from the world 
economy, and the process of reforming the economic aspects for minority 
protection should be evolutionary rather than revolutionary.  
 
6.2.2 Social and Cultural Aspects 
In most Western countries or democratic societies, the concept of rule of law 
has been planted in the hearts of most people. They have separation of 
powers, independence of judiciary, and believe that the judicial system is the 
best protection of their legal rights and interests. With higher education level 
and prevailing individualism, most the Hong Kong people are aware of their 
legal rights and able to access to justice. The perception of rule of law in Hong 
Kong is widely-held as part of the established cultures. Claessens and Fang 
suggest that a culture of good public governance always results in a good 
corporate governance culture as the corporate governance practices of a 
country are governed by the quality and integrity of a government and its 
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regulatory institutions.1272 Wen opines that it is necessary to recognise the 
cultural gaps between different places before implementing legal reform in 
China.1273 
 
Hong Kong is a Chinese society with over 92% Chinese population.1274 Hong 
Kong Chinese places greater emphasis on the morals and ethical values, and 
disgruntled minority shareholders are fully aware of their legal rights to sue.1275 
Hong Kong has adopted the Western system of education and accepted the 
Western values of independence and autonomy. Hong Kong Chinese have 
fully recognised the Western concept of rule of law. It is contended that merely 
adopting foreign law without the acceptance of the foreign values and cultures 
cannot improve the corporate governance and protection of minority 
shareholders.1276 I contend that the rule of law culture is important for Chinese 
corporate governance reform. 
 
Von Nessen et al. explain that there is a non-litigious culture in Chinese 
society. 1277  In theory, the Chinese minority shareholders can invoke the 
derivative or direct actions.1278 However, in reality, due to cultural and social 
differences, the Chinese tend to settle disputes through compromise and 
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harmony oriented focus (yi he we guii).1279 Traditionally, the Chinese society 
emphasises social harmony. Thus, the Chinese would prefer non-judicial 
means of dispute resolution such as conciliation, mediation, and out of court 
settlement to court proceedings to pursue individuals’ private monetary or 
proprietary interests.1280 It is suggested that the cultures can be cultivated by 
education.1281 I suggest that this should be started from the primary school 
level, and public education should also be launched on regular basis. Chinese 
people are taught with the concept of individual rights and equality at law. It 
may take a few decades to change the established norms and cultures. 
 
6.2.2.1 Educating the Positive Aspects of Confucianism and Legalism  
The Chinese society is dominated by two schools of thought, namely 
Confucianism and Legalism. The principle under the doctrine of Confucianism 
is a belief of social harmony and compromise. 1282  Traditional Chinese 
conception of ‘rule by man’ has been largely influenced by Confucianism, 
which emphasises the educational function of etiquette (li) in governing the 
state. Confucianists1283 believe that people are educable and, by education 
through etiquette (li), an ideal social order can be created on the basis of virtue 
(de). Confucianism strongly opposes the use of law.1284 However, the Chinese 
people have been greatly influenced by Confucianism. The use of law or legal 
action is not a favoured means under the school of Confucianism. 
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On the contrary, its opposite – Legalism – advocates the use of severe 
punishment and legal enforcement. Legalism 1285  emphasises centralised 
authority, confrontation, and punishment. The ruling of the country is backed 
by law with severe punishment. The CCP is concerned that economic reforms 
would potentially result in a loss of financial and fiscal powers, and rapid 
changes in social values and culture will also pose serious threats to the 
political and public control over the country. The principles of Legalism are 
consistent with the ideology of the CCP. The CCP attempts to revive Legalism 
in ruling the country by law and to make the people, not the CCP, act according 
to law, but the CCP remains above the law.1286 The common aspect of 
Confucianism and Legalism is the concession of the ultimate authority to the 
emperor or ruler, who remains above the etiquette (li) or law (fa). This aspect is 
contrary to the rule of law principle and not suitable for Chinese corporate 
governance reform. I contend that these two schools have had a significant 
impact on the legal culture in China, and some form of education must be 
undertaken to root out their negative aspects. 
 
Lubman argues that the Chinese legal cultures are not meeting the Western 
standard of rule of law.1287 Peerenboom contends that the Western notion of 
‘rule of law’ is embracing the concept of supremacy of law, equality of all before 
the law, separation of powers, judicial independence, checks and balances, a 
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parliamentary system, and protection of individual rights.1288 In my opinion, 
these elements are essential for China to establish a rule of law status as well 
as for good corporate governance and protection of minority shareholders. Lau 
and Young suggest reinforcing the ethical ideals of Confucian doctrines.1289 
Young suggests that widespread education over a few generations and 
comprehensive judicial reform are needed in China; people will have better 
access to justice and the general public will have confidence in the judicial 
system and be aware of their individual legal rights.1290 Based on Hong Kong’s 
experience, I suggest that education programme be arranged both at the 
school and society levels, teaching the ethical aspects of Confucianism – 
trustworthiness, diligence, setting aside own interests, and respecting other 
interests – and the obedient principles of Legalism should be enforced in order 
to cultivate the rule of law culture in the mind of people in China. 
 
6.2.2.2 Establishing the Rule of Law Culture 
The rule of law is a universal value, not belonging to the West or the East, but 
its importance and fundamentals remain the same. It is an essential foundation 
for economic growth in developing countries.1291 Dicey defined the notion of 
rule of law, as ‘…the absolute supremacy of predominance of regular law as 
opposed to the influence of arbitrary power, and [which] exclude[s] the 
existence of arbitrariness of prerogative or even wide discretionary authority 
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on the part of government’. 1292  The rule of law is undermined by the 
leadership of the CCP and the law is always regarded as an administrative tool 
to rule the country.1293 The rule of law does not mean running the state by law, 
it means the CCP must also obey the law and all the people including the CCP 
are equal at law. It was the CCP’s custom that members of the Politburo 
including retirees are not subject to criminal prosecution. This custom has 
been changed recently and some members brought to court on corruption 
charges.1294 
 
In China, the goals of enacting the company law are not those that the 
Western countries.1295 Pascoe contends that the most important aspect of 
corporate governance reform is the issue of the rule of law and not merely the 
overhaul of the legislative provisions. 1296  Andreadakis argues that no 
corporate governance reform will be successful unless ethics becomes an 
integral part of the business strategy, and the ethical culture becomes the 
established norm in society.1297 He contends that the failure of Chinese legal 
reform is the best illustration of mere transplanting of advanced foreign law 
while keeping the foundations of the Chinese legal traditions.1298 Lau and 
Young suggest that a hybrid solution that incorporates both local culture and 
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foreign rule of law principle may be suitable for China.1299 In my view, this can 
be done by a combination of a strict legal enforcement for disobedience 
(Legalism principles), and a series of public campaigns and education 
(Confucian principles) for establishing the rule of law (foreign principles) based 
on the Hong Kong’s experience in the 1970s. 
 
Lubman describes the Chinese legal system as the one ruled by law instead of 
the rule of law.1300 Young suggests that the transplantation of foreign law alone 
is not sufficient unless the Chinese culture and beliefs can be fused with the 
foreign values and traditions.1301 The adoption of foreign laws must take into 
account the prevailing Chinese rule by law cultures.1302 Andreadakis argues 
that legal transplantation is definitely a good starting point, but it is too 
simplistic to say that the problem of corporate governance will be solved just 
by the law.1303 Frances contends that the transplantation of foreign law into 
China has not necessarily been accompanied by a corresponding adoption of 
underlying legal cultures and principles from the West. 1304  Kahn-Freund 
opines that the question is that in many cases it is no longer how deeply the 
transplanted law is embedded, or how deep are its roots in the soil of the 
country, but who planted the roots and who cultivates the garden.1305 It also 
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takes time to establish ethical and rule of law culture and it needs to be 
nurtured on a continuing basis.1306 So suggests that a legal transplantation 
without root is bound to fail.1307 In my view, the root is the notion of rule of law 
in the Chinese legal culture, and the project of establishing the rule of law 
culture in China must be made on a continuing and enduring basis.  
 
This thesis holds that changing culture is not an easy task. I suggest that 
China can learn from the Hong Kong’s experience, where the rule of law 
culture is taught at school from the primary school level and is regarded as a 
part of the established cultures. China should take steps to cultivate the rule of 
law concept from the school and public levels to ensure the local culture and 
beliefs are fused with Hong Kong’s values. To achieve a genuine rule of law 
status, the state must commit to establishing a rule-based tradition and root 
out corruption. I opine that it takes time to educate and cultivate the culture. 
China has steadily moved from the rule by law to the rule of law, it is 
reasonable to keep optimistic that the rule of law is achievable in China as it 
can converge towards some form of ‘rule of law’ in the future.1308 
 
6.2.3 Political and Legal Aspects 
There is no doubt that the Chinese political and legal structures need to be 
further improved to provide a legal framework for minority protection. The key 
element of corporate governance and protection of minority shareholders is to 
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respect individual legal rights and the rule of law. In this regard, China should 
be open-minded and consider the experience of Hong Kong. In evaluating the 
political and legal structures in Hong Kong, I have identified the differences 
between the two places in Chapter Three; it is necessary for China to adjust 
and modify Hong Kong’s experience to fit its own unique environments.  
 
6.2.3.1 Reducing the Role of the Chinese Communist Party  
The official division of the role of the CCP and law is not very clear. In the Mao 
era, the CCP’s policy substituted for law. The CCP’s policy enjoyed the same 
status as law. In the post-Mao era, the CCP’s policy is to be transformed into 
law and regulations by entities authorised to make law in accordance with the 
stipulated law making procedures. Lubman opines that the supremacy of the 
CCP’s authority and the role of CCP are still two of the major obstacles for the 
development the rule of law legal system in China.1309 This has been the 
CCP’s ideology since the foundation of the PRC in 1949 and has been duly 
reflected in the PRC Company Law 1993 that ‘the ownership of state-owned 
assets in a company shall vest in the state’,1310 and in the PRC Company Law 
2005 that ‘the organisation of the CCP shall be established in a company so as 
to carry out their activities of the communist party’.1311 I contend that these 
provisions are good evidence to show that the company legislation is a 
policy-driven law and a rule-driven path for corporate governance in China. 
 
With no democratic parliamentary system in China, the CCP’s ideology in 
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reform is the supremacy of policy over law. The crucial consideration of the 
CCP is power, and how it is to be allocated in a single party socialist state. The 
key to the future realisation of the rule of law is not ideology but power. Hong 
Kong has a democratic governance system. In theory, the people have the 
ability to throw the government out of office and elect a new one. The election 
system serves as the final check and balance on government power. In the 
absence of multi-party democracy, the authorities and powers remain in the 
CCP. The strengthening and realisation of the ‘rule of law’ could lead to the 
demise of the CCP or a drastic reduction in its power.1312 The CCP’s leaders 
may be reluctant to relinquish its power voluntarily and to support ‘rule of law’ 
reform, as the institutions could become so powerful that they could provide a 
basis for challenging the CCP. The rule by law (Legalism) in traditional China 
had no protection of individual rights, but with expansion of the CCP’s power, 
the CCP has clearly benefited from the traditional system that absence of 
protection of individual rights. The CCP’s ideology must be changed to respect 
individual legal rights and equality at law.  
 
Tanner contends that in recent years, the CCP’s involvement in daily 
governance has been gradually reduced, and that the CCP’s influence on the 
administrative and the judiciary has also been diminished and become indirect. 
In some aspects, the CCP’s influence on the administrative rule-making has 
been broken down, and local governments are more concerned with the 
regional interests of local people.1313 Nowadays, the CCP rarely takes part in 
determining the outcomes of specific cases. The judiciary, therefore, now has 
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more autonomy in deciding cases based on merit. This is an effort by the CCP 
to establish a new set of rules and overcome their historic lack of respect for 
the judiciary and the legislature.1314 The mere fact that a ruling party is 
effective at having its policies become law is not inconsistent with the rule of 
law.1315 Peerenboom suggests that there must be some degree of separation 
between law and politics and the imposition of limits on the CCP and the state, 
and that the Party is required to comply with the law in theory compatible with 
the rule of law, albeit not a Western liberal democratic version.1316 
 
In my view, the state should define the official division between the CCP and 
diminish its role in the economy and the society in order to achieve a rule of 
law status. The central issue is the tension between the dominant role of the 
CCP and the supremacy of law. I suggest that the CCP should limit its role in 
corporate appointment and decision making in terms of corporate governance, 
corporate power should be returned to the relevant stakeholders under the 
company law and not under the CCP’s direction, and the role of the party’s 
committee in the company should be restricted to the ideological affairs. 
 
6.2.3.2 Improving Access to Justice  
In Hong Kong, justice is accessible and affordable, and access to justice is 
regarded as one of the major pillars of the rule of law. The provision of legal 
services is one of the major factors of access to justice. This includes the 
standards and fees for legal services. Clearly, there is an imminent need for 
better provision of accessible and affordable legal services in China.  
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In China, the parties are usually responsible for their own costs, and the court 
does not award costs to the wining party. There is no incentive for the 
shareholder to take action. Huang argues that legal fees involved in the 
shareholder litigation are too high, which poses another obstacle for 
shareholder litigation. 1317  The UK or the US system of conditional or 
contingency fees should be considered.1318 Huang opines that the US system 
is more appropriate to China as there is no leave requirement in the derivative 
action, and the lawyers will assess the merit of the shareholders’ case on a no 
win no fee basis.1319 Since this arrangement is based on no win no fee 
structure; it appears to be more effective in discouraging the discontented 
shareholders from taking derivative action without sufficient merits. I suggest 
that the US model can be introduced to China to promote the idea of better 
accessible and affordable legal services, given its potential to greatly increase 
access to justice. 
 
The discussions in Chapters Four and Five explained that the shareholder 
remedies have not been properly established in China, notwithstanding that 
China has adopted many foreign corporate law and governance principles. As 
a matter of fact, the legal services and access to justice remain major issues in 
China. Although the number of the Chinese lawyers has grown significantly in 
recent years, and company lawyers have become more popular, their number 
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is still inadequate. Most lawyers who practice in company law are doing 
business in provincial capitals. At the regional level, there is a lack of 
experienced corporate lawyers to deal with shareholder litigation against 
corporations or to bring a derivative action against directors. China must 
commit to provide more vocational training in corporate law and litigation to 
lawyers. 
 
I suggest that China should improve the public awareness of the benefits of 
good corporate governance, the importance of the investors’ protection 
including those of the minority shareholders, and improvement in both the 
quantity and quality of the company lawyers engaged in shareholder litigation 
and other corporate governance-related professions such as CPA and 
company secretaries. The issue of access to justice is regarded as one of the 
fundamental elements for a rule of law system and improving the access to 
justice in China is a step forward towards a rule of law status. 
 
6.2.3.3 Independence and Competence of Judiciary 
Hong Kong has independence of judiciary. Judges have high esteem in society. 
Hong Kong enjoys a very high reputation in the quality of its judiciary, and 
many cases decided by Hong Kong courts are used and cited by other 
common law jurisdictions. The competence and ethics of judges in Hong Kong 
are unquestionable. Appointment to the bench is regarded as an honorary 
position. Judges are usually experienced and successful lawyers. The judges 
in Hong Kong are highly regarded in Asia. By contrast, the competence of the 
judiciary in China is always the issue for minority protection. Clark and Howson 
observe that due to lack of technical competence, the judges deny the 
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shareholders’ litigation in some cases. 1320  Huang suggests that Chinese 
judges, particularly in lower level courts, need to gain more technical 
expertise.1321 Peerenboom argues that judges in China lack formal legal 
training and have been appointed based on political criteria.1322 
 
The role of judges is important in shareholder litigation cases. Their attitude 
and performance in handling cases are vital in the protection of minority 
shareholders. It has been argued that there is no independence of judiciary in 
China, and courts are one of a number of party-state institutions serving as a 
safety valve for a widening range of popular complaints.1323 The judiciary is 
regarded as merely another administrative organ of the state. People’s courts 
are financed by and part of the local government. It is suggested that the 
judiciary tends not to accept shareholders’ litigation cases due to the parties’ 
political backgrounds 1324  and lack of experience and confidence in this 
area.1325 It is notorious that the use of connection/relationship (guanxi) and 
corruption practices are very common in the legal profession and the judiciary 
in China. In order to improve the quality of judiciary, all judges in China must 
pass the national uniform judicial examination and are required to comply with 
the Code of Conduct promulgated by the Ministry of Justice in 2005. The 
                                                     
1320
 Clarke Donald and Nicholas Howson, ‘Pathway to Minority Shareholder Protection: 
Derivative Actions in the People’s Republic of China in Dan Puchniak et al (eds), A Derivative 
Action in Asia: A Comparative and Functional Approach (Cambridge University Press 2012) 
282. 
1321
 Huang Hui, ‘Statutory Derivative Action in China: Empirical Findings and Comparative 
Analysis’ (2012) 27 Banking and Finance Law Review 631 and 644. 
1322
 Peerenboom Randall, China’s Long March Toward Rule of Law (CUP 2002) 14. 
1323
 Liebman Benjamin, ‘China’s Courts: Restricted Reform’ (2007) The China Quarterly 620. 
1324
 Clarke Donald, ‘Corporate Governance in China: An Overview’ (2003) 4 China Economic 
Review 503. 
1325
 Howson Nicholas, ‘Judicial Independence and the Company Law in the Shanghai Courts,’ 
in Peerenboom Randall (ed), Judicial Independence in China: Lessons for Global Rule of Law 
Promotion (Cambridge University Press 2009)134 and Naomi Li, Civil Litigation against 
Chinese Listed Firms: Much Ado about Nothing? (Working Paper Asia Program No.13 The 
Royal Institute of Royal Affairs, London 2004) 4.  
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Judicial Reform plan is to root out corruption and relation-based (guanxi) 
practices.1326 Failure to comply with the Code will lead to disciplinary action. A 
responsible system has been introduced to all levels of courts for wrongfully 
decided cases and is quantified by complaints and appeal rates. These factors 
will be taken into consideration in evaluation of the performance of a judge in 
promotion at the end of each year. In order to prevent the use of 
connection/relationship (guanxi) and corruption practices, judges at higher 
courts are required to rotate from time to time.1327 It is believed that, with the 
improvement of the quality of judiciary, the confidence and status of the 
judiciary should rise.1328  
 
I suggest that more training should be given to improve the technical expertise 
of judges in handling corporate litigation. The benefits and remuneration of 
judges should be improved substantially to attract good law graduates to join 
the judiciary, and to prevent corruption. The long-term solution is to have an 
independent judiciary, which is the pillar of a rule of law system. On accession 
to the WTO, in order to break the barriers to judicial independence, the rule of 
law requirements of the WTO on independent judiciary, and adjudication 
system to review the trade related matters in accordance with the WTO 
                                                     
1326
 The PRC Judges’ Law effective on July 1, 1995 and amended in June 31 2001 and the 
‘Code of Conduct for Judges (for Trial Implementation)’ were promulgated by the Ministry of 
Justice in 2005. It has 93 provisions <http://chinaperspectives.revues.org/document274.html> 
accessed 23 August 2012. The 5-year Judicial Reform plan is to root out corruption and 
relation-based guanxi practices. 
1327
 As part of the Confucius and traditional Chinese practices, guanxi is defined as a 
particular kind of interpersonal relationship or connection that serves as a form of social 
currency. See Lau, Young and Li, ‘Rethink Corporate Governance and Law in China: The 
Theories, Rules and Practices’ (2007) 2 Australian Compliance and Regulatory Journal 63. 
1328
 He Xin, ‘Rule of Law in China: Chinese Law and Business – the Enforcement of 
Commercial Judgments in China’ (2008) (3) The Foundation for Law, Justice and Society 2 
<http://www.fljs.org/sites/www.fljs.org/files/publications/Xin%2520He%25231%2523.pdf> 
accessed 23 August 2012.  
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Protocol,1329 the CCP must relinquish its power over the judiciary.1330 I opine 
that this change will enable China move towards a rule of law status. 
 
6.2.3.4 From Administrative Sanction to Legal Protection 
China adopts the self-regulatory model of corporate governance. The Codes of 
Corporate Governance have no legal force. The violation of the Codes only 
lead to administrative sanction and no legal remedy is provided to 
shareholders. In this regard, the US mandatory Sarbanes-Oxley model is 
suggested.1331  
 
Some improvement was made in 2003. The SPC issued new rules and made 
good the previous position,1332 and enabled local courts to accept cases taken 
out by the shareholder.1333 Yang argues that the scope of the regulations was 
too narrow by far in response to all kinds of securities fraud, such as insider 
                                                     
1329
 The WTO Protocol of Accession 2 (D)(1). 
1330
 Potter Pitman, The Chinese Legal System: Globalization and Local Legal Culture 
(Routledge 2001) 15. 
1331
 Lau Alex, and Young Angus, In Search of Chinese Jurisprudence: Does Chinese Tradition 
have a Place in China’s Future? (2009) 20(5) ICCLR 155-164. Please also see Chapter 2 
section 2.5.1. the discussion of the US Sarbanes-Oxley Act. 
1332
 The Notice of ‘Several Regulations Regarding the Adjudication of Civil Compensation of 
Securities Cases on the Ground of Misrepresentation’ enacted by on 15 January, 2002, which 
permitted shareholder litigation on the condition of an administrative sanction had imposed on 
the company who were involved in false statement by the Chinese Securities Regulatory 
Commission or one of its designated agencies (Art.2 of the Several Regulations). The Several 
Regulations <www.legaldaily.com.cn/gb/content/2002-01/16/content_30562.htm> accessed 
15 January 2014. The regulations lay down that only cases relating misrepresentation issues 
such as false record of major transactions, misleading statements; material omission and 
acting in an inappropriate manner in information disclosure could be sued through shareholder 
legal action. 
1333
 The ‘Several Rules on Adjudicating Civil Lawsuits against Listed Companies on the 
Ground of False Statements 2003’ was to replace an earlier set of regulations ‘Several 
Regulations Regarding the Adjudication of Civil Compensation of Securities Cases on the 
Ground of Misrepresentation 2002’ which were practically unenforceable due to a lack of 
clarity as to when investors were entitled to compensation, how compensation was to be 
calculated, the difficulty in establishing a causal link between shareholder loss and the false 
statements and the reluctance of the court to hear class actions brought by shareholders. The 
rules stipulate that issuing false statements includes: falsely recording major events, making 
misleading statements, omitting to disclose certain information, or disclosing information in an 
inappropriate manner. Minority shareholders may now sue for damages from the directors 
issuing false statements. 
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dealing, market manipulation, and other practices prejudicial to minority 
shareholders in China.1334 Peerenboom argues that the SPC creates rules 
contradicting the national legislation with no enforcement mechanism.1335  
 
China’s leaders have been struggling for decades to enact a private property 
law to cover individual private property rights. This would be seen as an 
important step away from communist collective ownership and towards a free 
market economy.1336 The belated private property law was enacted in 2007 to 
identify the ownership of property, protect the property rights of owners with 
express provision of legal remedies, and safeguard the economic order of the 
socialist market economy. 1337  The PRC Property Law was enacted in 
accordance with the PRC Constitution.1338 The CCP has ruled China for over 
60 years; the CCP’s leaders are fully aware that China needs to link up with 
the world and cannot remain isolated from it. As discussed in the Hong Kong 
model, respecting individual private ownership rights is one of the most 
important aspects of the rule of law. In achieving a genuine rule of law status, 
individual legal rights could be better protected.  
 
In my view, individual legal rights are micro-protection and the public and 
human rights are macro-protection; these two have close connection. The 
                                                     
1334
 Yang Jinzhu, ‘Comparative Corporate Governance: Reforming Chinese Corporate 
Governance’ (2005) 16 ICCLR 17. 
1335
 Peerenboom Randall, China’s Long March Toward Rule of Law (CUP 2002) 317. 
1336
 Griffiths Daniel, ‘China Passes New Law on Property’ BBC News (China 16 March 2007). 
Mr. Wen Jiabao stressed a need for greater equality China’s parliament has wrapped up its 
annual session, passing a landmark law to increase private property rights. 
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/6456959.stm >accessed 13 March 2014. 
1337
 PRC Property Law 2007, Article 1. 
1338
 PRC Constitution 1982, Article 13 provides that: ‘The lawful private property of citizens 
shall be inviolable. The country shall protect in accordance with law citizens’ private property 
rights and inheritance rights. The country may, as necessitated by public interest, expropriate 
or requisition citizen’s private property and pay compensation therefor’. 
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latter remains a sensitive issue in China, and the reform of the former is a good 
starting point for the latter. An individual legal right, in a wider sense, includes 
the minority shareholder’s right, which could be improved if the judiciary is 
given more autonomy and the legal protection mechanism is established as 
discussed above.  
 
I opine that further reform of enforcement mechanism for shareholders’ 
remedies is necessary. Dam argues that judicial enforcement is as important 
as substantive law, and that poor enforcement is more likely to be a hindrance 
to economic growth in the development of a country.1339 I remain optimistic 
that the CCP will gradually allow more legal protection to individuals and 
permit the state to achieve a rule of law status. 
 
This chapter presents the reform proposals for the issues and problems of the 
minority protection in Hong Kong and China as discussed in Chapters Three 
(3.1), Four (4.0) and Five (5.3). It concludes that the direct transplantation of 
foreign company law could not resolve the problem of minority protection, and 
some structural reforms are required to achieve a rule of law status in order to 
improve the protection of minority shareholders in China. These include 
reforming public ownership and the socialist market economy, cultivating the 
rule of law culture and ethical practices, diminishing the role of the CCP, 
strengthening the independence of the judiciary, improving access to justice, 
and implementing enforcement mechanisms. The path dependence theory is 
used to identify that the problems in China lie in economic, cultural, and 
                                                     
1339
 Dam Kenneth, ‘China as Test Case: Is the Rule of Law Essential for Economic Growth?’ 
(John M Olin Program in Law and Economic Working Paper No. 275 2006) 20. 
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political structures, which in a broader sense relate to the rule of law issues. 
The solutions must take into account the paths of China, and be solved in 
accordance with its peculiar context. In view of the distinctive local feature that 
China has been isolated from outside influences for a considerable time, an 
evolutionary approach for reform is more appropriate.1340 Further structural 
reforms and institutional transplantation are required according to the 
institutional transplantation theory.1341 The findings of this thesis are also 
relevant to other developing countries which want to have corporate 
governance reform, but whose structures are less developed. This thesis 
suggests that the corporate governance reform must include both legislative 
and structural changes. 
 
6.3 Concluding Remarks 
The legacy left by the British colonial government for Hong Kong is its rule of 
law system, laissez-faire policy, independent judiciary and market economy. 
These structures are the path dependence for the corporate governance and 
minority protection and have been locked in from the colonial period. The 
success of Hong Kong is not only because of its common law origin but also its 
good infrastructures which have been shaped by its initial path, in particular, its 
rule of law system. The reform of the minority shareholders protection in Hong 
Kong requires legislative reform only.  
 
The main difference between Hong Kong and China is the perception of the 
                                                     
1340
 Dam Kenneth, ‘China as Test Case: Is the Rule of Law Essential for Economic Growth?’ 
(John M Olin Program in Law and Economic Working Paper No. 275 2006) 41. 
1341
 De Jong Martin, Stoter Suzan, ‘Institutional Transplantation and the Rule of Law: How this 
Interdisciplinary Method Can Enhance the Legitimacy of International Organisations’ (2009) 
2(3) Erasmus Law Review 311. 
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rule of law. In China, the function of company law is to carry out the CCP’s 
policy and there is no sufficient legal framework to protect the minority 
shareholders. The failure of Chinese corporate governance reform is not due 
to its civil law origin but its structures shaped by the CCP according to the path 
dependence theory. The reform of minority shareholders protection in China 
should include both legislative and structural changes in order to establish a 
rule of law status. The legal origin theory fails to identify the structural issues in 
China. The path dependence theory explains that the Chinese corporate 
governance problem lies in its economic, cultural and political structures. The 
institutional transplantation theory provides a foundation for Chinese structural 
reforms based on Hong Kong’s experience. Chinese corporate governance 
and rule of law reform is a long march. Napoleon’s aphorism, "China is a 
sleeping lion. Let China sleep; for when she wakes, she will shake the 
world."1342  
 
In Chapter Seven, it will summarise the research and conclude the findings for 
all chapters. I will discuss the limitations of the research, the reflective 
commentary and the contribution to the literature on corporate governance and 
the answers to the research questions. Finally, some recommendations for 
future research will be offered. 
  
                                                     
1342
 Croll Elisabeth, China’s New Consumers: Social Development and Domestic Demand 
(London: Routledge 2006) 9. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
CONCLUSION 
7.0 Introduction 
The importance of good corporate governance and protection of minority 
shareholders are investigated not only on a theoretical context, but they can 
also be seen on the results of real case studies. The issues of this study have 
been based on two cases from my previous legal practice as identified in 
Chapter Five as part of the requirements for this thesis. This study has 
identified the following research questions: Whether the Hong Kong common 
law system provides better protection for minority shareholders than that in the 
Chinese civil law system? Whether a high concentration of ownership leads to 
poor protection of minority shareholders in Hong Kong and China? Whether 
the existing legal remedies to minority shareholders in Hong Kong and China 
are adequate? What are the effects of legal transplantation from other 
jurisdictions into Hong Kong and China? and What are the problems of 
corporate governance reforms in Hong Kong and China?  
 
To answer the above questions, I have carried out five major tasks in this 
thesis. Firstly, I began with an examination of the theoretical framework of 
corporate law and governance and the justification to protect minority 
shareholders in Hong Kong and China. It is important that the theoretical 
framework articulates the basis for my comparative study of corporate 
governance. Secondly, I discussed the paths of developing corporate law and 
governance and the economic, cultural and legal institutions in Hong Kong and 
China, and the different transplanting effects of foreign company law into Hong 
Kong and China and their problems. Thirdly, I examined the legislative paths of 
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minority protection and identified the deficiencies of the company laws in Hong 
Kong and China. Fourthly, I selected two cases about the oppression of 
shareholders from my previous legal practice to identify the legal issues. 
Finally, I evaluated and analysed the proposals for reform of the existing 
legislation and institutions in Hong Kong and China. A reflective commentary 
has been made in this thesis as part of the requirements for this program. 
 
This chapter is structured as follows: First, it gives the introduction. Then, it 
explains the background of the research, the summary of chapter findings, and 
the answers to the research questions. Next, it describes the reflective 
commentary and the contribution to the literature on corporate governance, the 
limitations of the research, and the recommendations for future research. 
Finally, some concluding remarks are offered. 
 
7.1 Background of the Research 
In this thesis, I have studied the protection of minority shareholders in Hong 
Kong and China. Hong Kong is a former British colony, now a special 
administrative region of China and a place where East meets West. Although 
Hong Kong and China have two separate systems, they do not go completely 
separate ways; their relationship has become even closer after the return of 
sovereignty in 1997.1343 The Hong Kong system is used to compare with the 
Chinese system for two reasons. Firstly, Hong Kong and China have similar 
historical and traditional backgrounds. Secondly, the Hong Kong common law 
system has over a hundred years’ earnest practices and accumulated 
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 Flora Huang and Yeung Horace, ‘Regulating Cooperation between Securities 
Commissions: a Reflection from Hong Kong’ (2013) 1(1) Chin J Comp Law 112. 
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experience of Chinese characteristics of doing business with similar cultural 
features. The comparative study of Hong Kong and China enables me to make 
a reflective commentary and contribution to both theoretical and practical 
perspectives. This study reveals that the success of the Anglo-Hong Kong 
model relies on its well-developed structures which have been shaped by its 
initial structures according to the path dependence theory. This thesis 
suggests that the Hong Kong structures can be used as a model for the 
Chinese structural reform according to the institutional transplantation theory. 
 
7.2 Summary of Chapter Findings 
Chapter One was an introductory chapter and gave the outline of this thesis. I 
described the background, the research issues, questions and objectives of 
this thesis, it also explained the research methodology. I identified the path of 
corporate governance under the path dependence theory and adopted this 
methodology for this thesis. 
 
In Chapter Two, I reviewed the corporate law and governance theories and 
applied them to Hong Kong and China. I explored the institutional and legal 
transplantation theories and then identified the gap between the theories and 
realities in Hong Kong and China. The issue as to how much of legal 
intervention depends on the path where the places have gone through. I 
argued that less intervention should be imposed in Hong Kong according to 
the contractarains, and more legal protection should be imposed in China 
according to the communitarians; the path dependence theory is used to 
identify how history shapes the existing corporate law and governance in Hong 
Kong and China, and the issues of corporate governance must be solved in 
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accordance with their own paths.  
 
In Chapter Three, I examined the paths of corporate law and governance and 
economic, social and legal institutions in Hong Kong and China. The Hong 
Kong Company Law has over 150 years history and been shaped by the 
English model, and the PRC Company Law only has 23 years history and 
been shaped by the CCP’s policy; these are their rule-driven paths. Hong 
Kong is influenced predominantly by the family ownership and China is 
influenced predominantly by the state ownership and these are their 
structure-driven paths. The Anglo-Hong Kong model shows that good minority 
shareholders protection relies on both legislation and structures. I used the 
path dependence theory to identify the paths of the socialist economy, rule by 
law system and public ownership in shaping the existing corporate governance 
and ownership concentration in China, and the institutional transplantation 
theory to solve the problems of minority shareholders protection.  
 
In Chapter Four, I examined the shareholders’ remedies in Hong Kong and 
China. I revealed that the company laws of Hong Kong and China have 
achieved a high degree of uniformity, and the outstanding issue is on the 
divergence of structural and institutional differences. This chapter identified the 
deficiencies of shareholders’ remedies in Hong Kong and China. The 
deficiencies of company legislation in Hong Kong can be remedied by 
legislative amendment with reference to other leading common law 
jurisdictions. I suggested that the reform of the protection of minority 
shareholders in China requires both legislative and structural changes. 
 
  
 
388 
 
Chapter Five explained the two cases from Hong Kong and China. The cases 
identified the expropriation by the majority shareholders, the differences in 
corporate governance, and the deficiencies of remedies to minority 
shareholders under the company laws. I identified that the judiciary of Hong 
Kong has a high degree of independence, a wide discretion in deciding 
corporate litigation, and the access to justice is not an issue in Hong Kong; and 
it is difficult to find the competent lawyer, and the courts are reluctant to accept 
shareholders’ litigation in China as shown in the case studies. These cases 
illustrated the problems identified by Chapters Three and Four. 
 
In Chapter Six, I discussed the issues identified by Chapters Three, Four and 
Five respectively and then evaluated the legislative and structural reforms of 
minority shareholders protection in Hong Kong and China. Some suggestions 
are given to amend the existing provisions of Hong Kong and Chinese 
company legislation. Hong Kong is relatively simple and only an improvement 
in some statutory provisions is required. In China, both legislative and 
structural reforms are required. The structural reform proposals are divided 
into economic, social and legal aspects and based on the institutional 
transplantation theory. I contended that the success of the Anglo-Hong Kong 
model is dependent upon both laws and structures, and the Hong Kong model 
is a good foundation for the Chinese reform.  
 
Chapter Seven is a concluding chapter which summaries my research. It 
provides a summary of each chapter and the answers to the research 
questions. It also describes the reflective commentary and contribution, the 
limitations of the thesis, and the recommendations for the future research. It 
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concludes the study with some remarks.  
 
7.3 Research Questions and Answers  
This thesis attempts to answer two main and three subsidiary questions as 
identified in Chapter One. The two main questions are based on the legal 
origin theory:  
1. Is the protection of minority shareholders better in the Hong Kong common 
law system than that in the Chinese civil law system?  
2. Does the high concentration of ownership lead to poor legal protection of 
minority shareholders in Hong Kong and China? 
 
In Chapter Three, I concluded that the Hong Kong common law system is 
better than the Chinese civil law system in terms of the protection to minority 
shareholders, the deficiencies are not due to the legal origin but due to the 
Chinese unique historical path of economic, cultural and political structures. I 
also concluded that the Anglo-Hong Kong model (ownership concentration by 
the family) offers good minority protection and is better than the Chinese 
corporate governance model. I argued that ownership concentration by the 
state is the product of communist ideology, socialist economy and state 
ownership; this is the structure-driven path set in place at an earlier time by the 
CCP and these are the major barrier for good corporate governance and 
protection of minority shareholders in China according to the path dependence 
theory. The legal origin theory is only partially supported and the gap can be 
filled by the other subsidiary questions. 
 
The other subsidiary questions include: Are the problems of corporate 
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governance and protection of minority shareholders due to:  
1. the different legal effect of transplantation of foreign company law into 
Hong Kong and China?  
2. the deficiencies of statutory provisions for the protection of minority 
shareholders including the issues of the structure of parent and subsidiary 
companies in the existing Hong Kong Companies Ordinance and PRC 
Company Law? 
3. the different economic, cultural and political structures and institutions? 
 
In Chapter Three, the case of Hong Kong shows that direct transplantation is 
only suitable for a place with local demand and well-developed structures and 
institutions. Although China has borrowed many common law and 
Anglo-American corporate governance principles, they have not been 
integrated well into the Chinese unique structures and institutions. The path 
dependence theory 1344  and institutional transplantation theory1345  are the 
important explanations for the deficiencies of direct transplantation to improve 
corporate governance in China, which also explains why the problem of 
corporate governance must be solved in the Chinese context. 
 
I examined the legislative issues of minority shareholders protection in Hong 
Kong and China in Chapters Four and Five. There are trends towards the use 
of parent and subsidiary companies in Hong Kong 1346  and China. 1347 
                                                     
1344
 Roe Mark, ‘A Political Theory of American Corporate Finance’ (1991) 91 Colum L Rev 10; 
and Roe Mark, ‘Political and Legal Restraints on Ownership and Control of Public Companies’ 
(1991) 27 Journal of Financial Economics 7. 
1345
 Morton Peter, An Institutional Theory in Law Keeping Law in its Place (OUP 1998) 11. 
1346
 Lang Larry, Low CK and So Raymond, ‘Economic Analysis Co-Relating the Performance 
of Listed Companies with their Shareholders’ Profile’ Consultancy Report Phase II of the 
Corporate Governance Review by the Standing Committee on Company Law Reform (2003) 
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Following the recent amendment, I contended that the Hong Kong company 
legislation allows the multiple derivative action in parent and subsidiary 
companies and is substantively and procedurally efficient. I argued that the 
existing corporate law and governance structures are shaped by the initial path 
set by the colonial government; and that the flexible and innovative company 
cases and the company legislation have been locked in from the colonial 
government according to the path dependence theory. I identified that the PRC 
Company Law is surprisingly well-developed law on paper but not in practice, 
and that the issues of protection of minority shareholders in China are not only 
due to its company legislation but also its structures and institutions.  
 
I evaluated and analysed the structural and institutional issues and concluded 
that the success of the legal transplantation of foreign company law into Hong 
Kong and the Anglo-Hong Kong model are dependent upon its structures and 
institutions which comprise free economy, non-intervening policy, rule-based 
tradition, rule of law culture, ethical practices, independent judiciary and 
reliable legal system as discussed in Chapter Three. I presented the evidence 
that the economic, cultural and political structures and institutions in Hong 
Kong are the major reasons of its success, and the problems of corporate 
governance in China lie in its structures and institutions. I contended that the 
above structures and institutions are the paths set by the colonial government 
in Hong Kong, and Hong Kong’s structures and institutions are the good model 
for the Chinese reform according to the institutional transplantation theory. 
                                                                                                                                                        
2.  
1347
 Tenev Stoyan and Zhang Chunlin, Corporate Governance and Enterprise Reform in 
China: Building the Institutions of Modern Markets (World Bank and International Financial 
Corporation 2002)144.  
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7.4 Reflective Commentary 
It is the requirements of the course, a reflective commentary is made to this 
research. The present study comments, not surprisingly, that in terms of 
legislation, on the basic aspects of company law in China sharing many 
similarities with those of Hong Kong; and that in terms of structures, there are 
some differences in the economic, cultural and political institutions between 
Hong Kong and China. Notwithstanding the similarities and the differences, the 
Hong Kong aspects can be used as a reference to the Chinese corporate 
governance reform. The comparative study of Hong Kong and China 
comments that the issue of corporate governance must be solved according to 
their paths and the success of legal transplantation depends on their structures. 
I have made a critical assessment of the implications of the two cases and a 
reflective commentary in the following six areas. 
 
7.4.1 Historical and Theoretical Commentary  
This thesis adopts the historical analysis methodology of the path dependence 
theory to evaluate the paths of corporate governance and the protection of 
minority shareholders in Hong Kong and China. Evidence suggests that Hong 
Kong has better protection in both rules and structures which have been 
locked in from the colonial era. In terms of rules, the shareholder rights score 
of Hong Kong is 5, 1348  whereas China is only 3 based on the same 
methodology.1349 In terms of structures, Hong Kong is, the world’s freest 
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 La Porta Rafael and others, ‘Law and Finance’ (1998) 106(6) J Pol Econ Table 2 1130.  
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 Franklin Allen, Qian Jun and Qian Meijun, ‘Law, Finance and Economic Growth in China’ 
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economy for 20 consecutive years,1350 the world’s major stock markets,1351 
the global financial centre,1352 influenced predominantly by private (family) 
ownership in the stock market,1353 the corruption-free place in the region,1354 
and highly regarded in its rule of law1355 and judicial system.1356 This thesis 
finds that the existing corporate law and governance structures are shaped by 
the historical paths and history certainly matters. My study comments that the 
legal origin theory narrowly focuses on the origin of law and fails to explain the 
concentrated ownership and good minority protection in Hong Kong. It 
contends that the problem of corporate governance in China is not its origin of 
law;1357 the path dependence theory is able to explain the economic, social 
                                                     
1350
 The research on freedom of economy made by the Wall Street Journal and Heritage 
Foundation, Hong Kong is ranked 1st and the PRC is ranked 137th
 
out of 178 countries. 
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 World Federation of Exchanges Report 2012 
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625. 
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and political structures are the paths shaping the existing corporate 
governance and minority protection in Hong Kong and China; and the issue of 
corporate governance and minority protection in China must be solved in 
accordance with its peculiar path.1358 The case of Hong Kong confirms that 
the concentrated ownership is not necessarily bad, and the best corporate 
governance model could be achieved by the combination of concentrated 
ownership structure and strong minority shareholders’ protection. 1359  The 
result suggests that the legal origin theory using numerical method in the 
comparative study of company law is incomplete, the number cannot reflect 
the real situation of minority protection, and the protection on paper does not 
mean the protection in reality.  
 
7.4.2 Economic Commentary   
This thesis comments that there is a positive correlation between the economic 
growth and company law development in Hong Kong and China. The free 
economy and laissez-faire policy in Hong Kong cultivate the local demand for 
company law reform. The Open Door Policy triggered the PRC Company Law 
1993, and the PRC Company Law 2005 was a product of China’s accession to 
the WTO in 2001. It can be seen in the PRC Company Law 1993 that the law 
was used to corporatise the SOEs.1360 The PRC Company Law 2005 is used 
to maintain socio-economic order and to promote the socialist market 
economy.1361 As a result of the economic reform, the Chinese economy is the 
                                                     
1358
 Bebchuk Lucian and Roe Mark, ‘A Theory of Path Dependence in Corporate Ownership 
and Governance’ (1999) 52 Stanford Law Review 129. 
1359
 Shleifer Andrei and Vishny Andrei, ‘A Survey of Corporate Governance’ (1997) 52 (2) J Fin 
737. 
1360
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should vest in the state. 
1361
 PRC Company Law 2005, Article 1. 
  
 
395 
 
world’s second largest economy. 1362  Notwithstanding the success of the 
economic reform, the legal reform in China is still regarded as a bird cage.1363 
Tomasic and Fu argue that ‘the Chinese legal reform actually occurred after the 
economic reforms gained momentum.’1364 Lubman contends that ‘the market 
economy is an economy governed by the rule of law.’1365 Peerenboom opines 
that ‘China's long march towards the rule of law is likely to proceed on the 
same basis as has the transition to a market economy.’1366  This thesis 
comments that each system solves the problems in the peculiar context of its 
own path dependent institutions, and the rule of law supports the sustainability 
of economic growth. 
 
7.4.3 Cultural Commentary  
The importance of local culture and tradition should not be undermined, and 
the success of the Anglo-Hong Kong model relies on the rule of law. The 
corporate governance reform in China goes beyond the mere adoption of 
foreign legal form. The prevailing Chinese legal culture, namely the rule by 
man (Confucianism) and the rule by law (Legalism), does not fit into the foreign 
legal norms. It is suggested that the existing rule by man and rule by law must 
be replaced by the genuine rule of law culture;1367 any reform of the existing 
                                                     
1362
 The World Bank research shows that China is the world’s second largest economy by 
GDP in 2012. <http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/china/overview> accessed 15 January 
2014. 
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 Lubman Stanley, Bird in a Cage: Legal Reform in China after Mao (Stanford University 
Press 1999); and Tomasic Roman and Jian Fu, ‘Legal Regulation and Corporate Governance 
in China's Top 100 Listed Companies’ (2006) 27 Company Lawyer 278. 
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 Lubman Stanley, ‘Introduction: The Future of Chinese Law’ Special Issue China’s Legal 
Reform (1995) 141 The China Quarterly 12. 
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 Peerenboom Randall, China's Long March Toward Rule of Law (CUP 2002) 559. 
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corporate law and governance must be consistent with local cultural 
values.1368 The success of corporate governance reform depends on the 
ethical practices and the rule-based tradition of the society.1369 This may 
require a change in the Chinese cultural and ethical beliefs.1370 It takes time to 
embrace the Western ideology and inspire the Chinese society with the 
concept of rule of law.1371 This thesis comments that the local culture and 
tradition persists and evolves for a number of years; it may take many years to 
cultivate the Western rule of law culture in China.  
 
7.4.4 Political Commentary  
My other commentary is that the government’s policies and politics play an 
important role in the corporate governance reform. The government’s politics 
has significant impact on shaping the minority protection in Hong Kong and 
China.1372  The laissez-faire policy has been adopted by the Hong Kong 
government since the colonial period with minimum government intervention 
and self-regulatory mechanism, which are the principal catalysts for good 
corporate governance and protection of minority shareholders; and the colonial 
structure is the path dependence in Hong Kong. The two key characteristics of 
the CCP’s politics and polices are the socialist economy and the public 
ownership, which are the major factors for poor protection of minority 
shareholders and ownership concentration, and this is the structure-driven 
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path dependence in China. This thesis comments that the role of government 
plays an important part in shaping the corporate governance, and the rule by 
law ideology of the CCP makes no local demand for the Chinese corporate 
governance reform. 
 
7.4.5 Comparative Law Commentary  
A comparative study of corporate law and governance of Hong Kong and 
China has shown that both models are not perfect, they have their own pros 
and cons. The choice of model is not dependent upon the legal origin but the 
path that was set in place at an earlier time and the path includes the economic, 
cultural, and legal institutions. Hong Kong is a market economy and a rule of 
law society, and China is a socialist market economy and a rule by law society. 
The Hong Kong common law system allows judge to have a certain degree of 
creativity in making judicial decisions and to refer to previous cases and 
precedents under the doctrine of stare decisis which does not exist in China. 
This thesis comments that the historical structures determine the existing 
model of corporate governance and the argument is supported by the cases of 
Hong Kong and China. The Anglo-American model is closely dependent on the 
existence of a high degree of judicial independence, the rule of law culture and 
the effectiveness of market mechanism. Hence, the Anglo-American model 
may well fit Hong Kong but may not fit China. Path dependence theory is 
justified that the issue of corporate governance must be solved in accordance 
with its own path.1373  
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7.2.6 Legal Transplantation Commentary   
The case of Hong Kong confirms that direct legal transplantation is only 
suitable for a place with developed structures. The sovereignty of Hong Kong 
was returned to China from Britain in 1997, and the current legal system 
remains unchanged for 50 years under the Basic Law. In contrast, China is a 
developing country and adopts the socialist economy and the public ownership 
in accordance with the CCP’s policy. China has opened its economy since 
1978 for over 30 years. Although some of the transplanted provisions are 
stricter than those in Hong Kong,1374 it is criticised that perfection in legislation 
does not mean flawlessness in practice1375 and there are still many gaps 
between rhetoric and reality.1376 Given the different legal origins of Chinese 
company law, it is questionable how effectively it functions in the similar 
manner of their origins. My study shows that even if common law system is 
transplanted into China, it would not improve the corporate governance. This 
thesis comments that China has no demand for legal reform and is not ready 
to implement the foreign company law. Legal transplantation of law from one 
country to another does not guarantee success, but it is a good starting point 
as it can provide a general framework and basic rule. It is too simplistic to 
achieve the purpose of corporate governance reform just by legislation. The 
most critical stage is to strengthen the structural and institutional reforms in 
order to build an independent judiciary and a rule of law system.1377 
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In summary, this thesis comments that China may need time to gradually 
adjust its laws and structures in accordance with its path based on the path 
dependence.1378 Under the principle of one country two systems, China can 
learn from its special administrative region, Hong Kong, as they have close 
connections in terms of geo-political proximity. China needs to modify the 
Anglo-Hong Kong model to suit its unique characteristics.  
 
7.5  Contribution to the Existing Literature 
In addition to the reflective commentary, this thesis seeks to make a theoretical 
contribution to academic knowledge in the understanding of law and theory in 
the corporate governance and protection of minority shareholders in Hong 
Kong and China, as well as practical solution to the problems of corporate 
governance and protection of minority shareholders in China. There are two 
main contributions of this thesis. 
 
7.5.1  Theoretical Contribution  
First of all, it makes a contribution from a theoretical perspective. The legal 
origins literature suggests that the concentrated ownership leads to the poor 
protection of minority shareholders and the common law legal system provides 
a better protection for minority shareholders than that in the civil law legal 
system. This thesis applies and tests this theory in Hong Kong and China. The 
findings make a theoretical contribution to the literature on comparative 
corporate governance in Asia.  
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7.5.2  Practical Contribution 
Next, this thesis makes a contribution from a practical perspective. Existing 
literature has no systematic suggestions to solve the problems of legal 
transplantation and corporate governance in China in a pragmatic manner. 
This comparative research identifies the problems of direct legal 
transplantation into China, the issues of corporate governance and minority 
protection in China and provides the suggestions for reform based on Hong 
Kong’s experience. The suggestions make a practical contribution to the 
corporate governance reforms in China.  
 
7.5.3  Contribution to the Existing Literature 
Chapter Two reviewed the existing literature on corporate governance and 
revealed the different theories advocating different factors for the development 
of corporate governance. This thesis identifies the factors affecting the 
development of corporate governance in Hong Kong and China. There are a 
few pieces of literature under the Hong Kong Companies Ordinance 2014. 
This thesis contributes to the existing body of literature on corporate 
governance under the new Companies Ordinance. This thesis also makes the 
theoretical and practical contributions to the existing literature which can be 
further divided into five areas. The following part explains each of these 
contributions. 
 
7.5.3.1  Legal Origin Theory Literature 
Firstly, the legal origins literature is mainly based on European civil law 
countries and Britain and its colonial common law countries including the US 
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and Australia and there are no socialist or transition economies in those 
studies. The number of the legal origins literature in Asian countries is limited. 
The findings in this thesis contribute to and are significant in the law matters 
debate in the existing literature. The legal origin theory emphasises on the 
legal system which is a key for corporate governance. In this thesis, only the 
Hong Kong common law and market economy systems and the Chinese civil 
law and socialist economy systems are used as a basis for comparative 
analysis to test the legal origin theory in Asia. This thesis finds the importance 
of structures in shaping corporate governance and rejects the legal origin 
theory as it fails to explain the corporate governance in Hong Kong and China. 
This thesis contributes to the existing body of literature on the legal origin 
theory in Asia. 
 
7.5.3.2  Path Dependence Theory Literature 
Secondly, this thesis adopts the historical methodology of path dependence 
theory to investigate the issues in China, and suggests the solution to China as 
the legal origin fails to explain the concentrated ownership and good minority 
protection in Hong Kong and fails to identify the structural issues in China 
which is not its origin of law. This thesis attempts to fill the gap left by the legal 
origin theory by using the path dependence theory methodology to address the 
problems in Hong Kong and China, and argues that the historical structures 
determine the existing corporate governance. By comparing the historical path 
of economic, cultural and political structures of China with those of Hong Kong 
according to the path dependence theory, it reveals that the protection of 
minority shareholders in Hong Kong is better because of its well-developed 
structures and not because of its common law origin. This thesis suggests that 
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the structural issues in China must be solved in the Chinese context as China 
has been isolated from the world for a long time and under the influence of 
Confucianism for over 2,000 years according to the path dependence theory. 
This thesis contributes to the literature on the path dependence theory in Asia. 
 
7.5.3.3  Legal and Institutional Transplantation Theories Literature 
Thirdly, this thesis reveals that both Hong Kong and Chinese company laws 
are foreign transplants and their institutions are distinctive; Hong Kong 
company law is modelled on English common law and the case of Hong Kong 
confirms that legal transplantation is only suitable for a place with local 
demand for reform and well-developed structures and institutions. This 
research indicates that legal transplantation is not an easy task and the 
success of transplantation into Hong Kong relies on its well-developed 
structures and institutions and strong local demand for reform. This thesis 
reveals that although the European and Anglo-American company laws have 
been transplanted into the Chinese company law, they cannot function in the 
same way as they do in the jurisdictions from which they come. This can be 
explained by the differences between the social, economic and political 
institutions in which European and Anglo-American companies are located. 
The Chinese corporate governance reform is not only about the law or the 
legal system but also other institutions. This thesis contributes to the existing 
literature on legal transplantation into China, and contends that the legal 
transplantation is only a good starting point for the corporate governance 
reform and protection of minority shareholders but its core issues remain in the 
structural reforms and institutional transplantation.  
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7.5.3.4  Convergence of Company Law Literature 
Fourthly, this thesis examines the legislative issues of minority shareholders 
protection in Hong Kong and China, and reveals that they have similar 
shareholders’ remedies under the company legislation, namely, the direct 
action, the derivative action, the action to challenge a company's 
affairs/resolutions and the winding up. This thesis finds that the convergence 
of company law has occurred in Hong Kong and China. Some of the Chinese 
provisions are even stricter than those in Hong Kong. It also reveals that the 
protection of minority shareholders in Hong Kong is adequate and better than 
that in China; the problems of minority protection in China are that law in China 
is well-developed on paper but poor in execution. Existing literature on 
comparative study of shareholders’ remedies has failed to take into account 
the different economic, cultural and political structures of the countries. This 
thesis examines the relationship between corporate governance and economic, 
cultural and political structures; focuses on both legislative and structural 
reforms; and finds that the Chinese corporate governance issue is on the 
divergence of structural and institutional differences. It suggests that the 
well-developed structures and institutions matter in the development of 
corporate governance in China. This finding contributes to the existing 
convergence of company law literature. 
 
7.5.3.5  Literature on Corporate Governance in Developing Countries 
Lastly, this thesis identifies the structural and institutional issues in Hong Kong 
and China. It contends that the success of the Anglo-Hong Kong model relies 
on both laws and structures. Although China, like other developing countries, 
adopts many foreign legal principles which aim to improve its corporate 
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governance and the protection of minority shareholders, its economic, cultural 
and political structures are still under-developed. This thesis contends that 
mere transplanting of foreign company law without reforming the other 
structures cannot improve the protection of minority shareholders, and the 
failure of Chinese corporate governance reform is the best illustration. The 
comparative analysis shows that the problems of corporate governance in 
China lie in its structures and institutions which relate to the rule of law issue. 
The findings of this thesis are also relevant to other emerging economies and 
developing countries in understanding the importance of the structural and 
institutional issues and the limitations on the use of foreign law to improve 
corporate governance and the protection of minority shareholders. The 
findings contribute to the existing literature on the corporate governance 
reform in developing countries. 
 
7.6 Limitations of the Research 
According to the requirements of the course, I have to make a reflective 
commentary based on the cases. It is difficult to select a public company case 
from my previous legal practices. The two cases I selected in Chapter Five 
were the shareholders’ disputes in private companies. The scope of my 
research was mainly based on the private companies but some of the findings 
are equally applicable to the public listed companies.  
 
In Hong Kong, there are two major pieces of legislation regulating company, 
namely, the Companies Ordinance and the Securities and Futures Ordinance. 
In China, the PRC Company Law and the PRC Securities Law are the major 
legislation. In this thesis, I mainly dealt with the issues under the Hong Kong 
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Companies Ordinance and the PRC Company Law, which provide a legal 
foundation for the establishment and governance of companies, the definition 
of a company and the remedies to minority shareholders.  
 
In regard to public listed companies, there are other rules and regulations 
which may be relevant to the protection of minority shareholders issued by the 
SFC and the HKSE in Hong Kong, and the CSRC and the Shanghai and 
Shenzhen Stock Exchanges in China. I did not deal with these rules and 
regulations in detail as they are applicable exclusively to the public listed 
companies and outside the scope of my research as identified by the cases in 
Chapter Five.  
 
Despite of the above limitations, this thesis makes some contributions to the 
existing literature that the corporate governance and minority protection reform 
in Hong Kong and China requires both legislative and structural changes. The 
case of Hong Kong suggests that good corporate governance and minority 
protection rely on both an advanced company law and well-developed 
structures, and the case of China suggests that structural and institutional 
reforms are vital and essential in its corporate governance reform. 
 
7.7 Recommendations for Future Research 
In my research, it reveals that the corporate group relationship between parent 
and subsidiary companies structure should open up a new question that can 
be addressed in the future research. The discussion of the case studies of 
Hong Kong and China in Chapter Five and the cases of oppression of minority 
shareholders in Chapter Four show that the use of parent and subsidiary 
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companies becomes more common in modern business dealings. It is 
observed that the high occurrence of parent and subsidiary control amongst 
the listed companies in Hong Kong and China. 
 
There are several corporate law scholars in the study of corporate group 
relationship between the parent and subsidiary companies structure.1379 It is 
recommended that this area is worthwhile to do further research and work that 
is indicated by the present study and the scope of my present research can be 
extended. 
 
The number of empirical studies of this area remains small and it is worthwhile 
to conduct future research on a corporate group and shareholder control 
perspective on corporate governance in Hong Kong and China; there are two 
major aspects which should be looked into, namely a discovery aspect of the 
group structure and a recommendation aspect for future regulatory reform.1380 
There is a close relationship between the existence of pyramiding structures 
and the inadequacies of minority protection.1381 The corporate group between 
parent and subsidiary companies relationship should be better regulated to 
reduce the further damage to the interests of minority shareholders in Hong 
                                                     
1379
 Hadden Tom, ‘Inside Corporate Groups’ (1984) 12 International Journal of the Sociology 
of Law 271;  Ramsay Ian and Stapledon Geof, ‘Corporate Groups in Australia’ (Research 
Report, Centre for Corporate Law and Securities Regulation, University of Melbourne 1998); 
Tomasic Roman and Bottomley Stephen (1993), Directing the Top 500: Corporate Governance 
and Accountability in Australian Companies, Allen & Unwin, St Leonards, NSW cited in Fu 
Jenny, ‘Corporate Governance in China: A Research Agenda for a Corporate Group and 
Shareholder Control Perspective’ (2006) 1 Journal of Business Systems, Governance and 
Ethics 9. 
1380
 Fu Jenny, ‘Corporate Governance in China: A Research Agenda for a Corporate Group 
and Shareholder Control Perspective’ (2006) 1 Journal of Business Systems, Governance and 
Ethics 9.  
1381
 Cheung Rita, 'Corporate Governance in Hong Kong: On Certain Issues of Minority 
Shareholders' Rights and Protection in Listed Companies' (2008) 19(6) ICCLR 184.  
  
 
407 
 
Kong and China. 
 
Corporate governance and the protection of minority shareholders are life-long 
subjects in the legal research of company law since it is always not easy to 
strike the equilibrium between the majority rule and minority protection. Further 
research is necessary to identify the inadequacies and deficiencies of 
shareholders' litigation and enforcement mechanisms on the implementation of 
the Hong Kong Companies Ordinance 2014 and the PRC Company Law 2005. 
It is worthwhile to look into the effectiveness of the legislation and to see its 
implication in practice. 
 
7.8 Concluding Remarks 
In conclusion, the legal origin theory fails to explain the concentrated 
ownership in Hong Kong. The minority protection under the Anglo-Hong Kong 
model has been operated for many years and modelled on the common law 
jurisdictions. The existing laws and structures are the path dependence set by 
the colonial government. Path dependence theory is an important explanation 
for the development of corporate governance in Hong Kong. The core value of 
the Hong Kong model is the rule of law which is the cornerstone for the 
protection of minority shareholders. Hong Kong took more than 150 years to 
accept the rule of law and China may take a century to cultivate it. The legal 
origin theory fails to explain the structural issues in China. Path dependence 
theory is used to identify the issues of corporate governance and the 
protection of minority shareholders in China, which lie in its structural and rule 
of law issues. China should adopt the path dependence approach to corporate 
governance reform in accordance with its unique path.  
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My research is finished here, however, the corporate governance and minority 
protection reforms and most importantly the legal reform in China do not. It is a 
long march towards a rule of law legal system in China. The protection of 
minority shareholders in a broader sense involves not only the legislative 
issues but also the structural and institutional issues which relate to the issues 
of rule of law, and deserves more theoretical debates and researches. Finally, 
it is hoped that this research contributes to a better understanding of corporate 
governance and the protection of minority shareholders in Hong Kong and 
China, and will stimulate further and more research on this interesting topic. 
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